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2nd Interview’s link is here
Original link is here
This column is about US Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent visit to India and the new peace initiative for Afghanistan. Kerry visited India to participate in the fourth round of the India-US strategic dialogue. The dialogue was held soon after the opening of US-Taliban peace talks in Doha. The Indians were not too happy at this development, as they found themselves sidelined. The US Secretary of State had to do some explaining to them and seek to dispel their apprehensions. There would be no compromises, he said, with the “red lines” meaning certain conditions, which the Taliban must adhere to, viz Taliban’s break with al-Qaeda, renouncing violence and accepting Afghanistan’s constitution. Kerry was not quite right as after an earlier exchange, it was agreed by the State Department that these would not be “preconditions” but “outcomes”.
During his stay in India, Kerry called upon New Delhi to play a vital role in the next Afghan elections and help “improve its electoral system and create a credible and independent framework for resolving disputes.”
Mention may he made of a video message to the Indians sent on the eve of the Secretary’s visit, in which he assured of US backing of Indian’s inclusion as a “permanent member of a reformed and expanded Security Council.” “The US,” he declared, “welcomes India as a rising power,” adding that, “a strong India is in American’s national interest.”
More from the message: “The friendship between our two nations is one of the defining partnerships of the 21stcentury. Today, the US and India collaborate closely in almost every field of human endeavour. Together, we are tackling shared challenges and making the most of new opportunities. From higher education to clean energy, from counter-terrorism to space science, we are seizing new opportunities to work together, and in doing so, we are increasing the prosperity and security of both of our peoples. The US and India share a strong and enduring commitment to Afghanistan’s peace and prosperity. And we also welcome India’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.”
Despite the various agreements and partnerships inclusive of nuclear status and supplies, space, health, clean energy, defence, counter-terrorism, etc, New Delhi has not been too keen to acknowledge the favours done to it by Washington.
Just read how an Indian columnist, Indrani Bagchi, assesses Kerry’s visit to India in Economic Times/Times of India: What did one make of John Kerry’s whirlwind run-through of the India-US strategic dialogue? ‘Well, we didn’t expect much, so we were not disappointed’ runs the dominant response in this city.
On paper, the bilateral relationship is almost universal in its reach. Innovation, space, health, clean energy, defence, counter-terrorism. The US too has moved from the extensive vision of the Bush years to becoming a transactional power under Obama.
Possibly, the only worthwhile conversation at this point is the dialogue on defence technology that NSA Shivshankar Menon is holding with Ash Carter. Menon has to steer the defence-strategic relationship from a buyer-seller one to one that is more equitable……In their haste to turn off the lights in Afghanistan, the US will find another way to talk to the Taliban to bring them on board in Kabul, with a “ruinous deal” with Pakistan. Look closer home. India should push an investment treaty with the US, using it to straighten out its internal investment strategies and launch the next round of economic reforms. Strategically, let’s look at the Indo-Pacific as the theatre for the next big deal. Notwithstanding China’s categorisation of the Xi-Obama meeting at a ‘New Type of Great Power Relationship’, India and the US have the greatest strategic alignments there. Let’s not get spooked by G-2 either – the bald truth is ‘rebalancing’ is a China-hedge strategy.
As for Afghanistan, the Indian view has been, thus, well-expressed by Samir Saran and Abhijit Mittra in Economic Times/Times of India: “While John Kerry lauded India’s role in his June 23 speech in New Delhi, events of the last 90 days tell a very different story; one in which the US disregards the concerns of both India and the Afghan government and continues to woo the Pakistani military establishment. The US actions have allowed the Taliban to formally open an office in Qatar for direct negotiations, which the Taliban see as the first step towards a new emirate.
“The victory of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, in collusion with fundamentalists, allows radicals in that country certain influence over the civilian government and the military’s shadow over foreign policy looms larger and stronger as the US consolidates General Kayani’s pivotal role, established by a hurried and reckless K-3 meeting (Kerry, Kayani, Karzai).
“India’s Afghanistan policy has historically always been long-term and more than capable of absorbing reverses in the short to medium term. It cannot be coy in providing soft and hard military support to its friends, and it must not be seen as an unreliable and indecisive partner. India has in the past succeeded in maintaining Afghanistan as a viable partner for over 60 of 67 years of bilateral history.
“After 1997, India continued to support the Northern Alliance in the hope of better times. That time came in 2001, when, following the US invasion, a government whose core elements had been supported by India, were installed in power. India in 2014 is not the economic cripple it was in 1991; a $290 billion reserve buys more loyalty and battle resilience than 15-day currency reserves.
“Over the last 12 years, India has worked exceptionally hard to win over significant pockets of support among the Pashtuns. Unlike the 1990s when India’s support base was the ethnic minorities, support for India is now deeper and wider. Afghanistan post-2014 must not by default become a neutralised backyard of Rawalpindi and its proxies.”
So, while framing an Afghanistan policy, Pakistan has to keep the following factors in view:
1. After the return of the combat forces in 2014, the US will continue to keep a certain number of well equipped troops in Afghanistan. And the Taliban will continue creating difficult conditions for them.
2. The post-American exit scenario looks murky and uncertain. Pakistan must devise well thought out policies in regard to different emerging situation.
3. The initiative to forge an understanding with the Northern Alliance must continue with a view to securing positive results.
4. India has invested billions of rupees in Afghanistan. Both Kabul and Washington want it to play a significant role in the post-2014 Afghanistan. Karzai has already sealed a strategic partnership with India and Afghan army personnel are being trained by Indian military experts. India’s interests just cannot be ignored. These, to some extent, may have to be accommodated with Islamabad safeguarding its own interests.
5. It is time that a settlement with the Pakistani Taliban is negotiated jointly by the civil government and the military.
6. A competent retired diplomat should be immediately appointed as a special envoy for Afghanistan. He may pilot Pakistan’s case and look after its interests in the US-Afghanistan-Taliban negotiations.
The writer is an ex-federal secretary and ambassador, and a political and international relations analyst
Original link is here
SAMIR SARAN & Abhijit Iyer Mittra Jun 27, 2013, 12.00AM IST
While John Kerry lauded India’s role in his June 23 speech in Delhi, events of the last 90 days tell a very different story; one in which the US disregards the concerns of both India and the Afghan government and continues to woo the Pakistani military establishment in search of its elusive salvation.
The US actions have allowed the Taliban to formally open an office in Qatar for direct negotiations, which the Taliban sees as the first step towards a new emirate. The victory of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, in collusion with fundamentalists, allows radicals in that country certain influence over the civilian government and the military’s shadow over foreign policy looms larger and stronger as the US consolidates General Parvez Kayani’s pivotal role, established by a hurried and reckless K-3 meeting (Kerry, Kayani, Karzai).
Consequently, India has nowhere to hide. Three eventualities have to be prepared for in Afghanistan, possibly unfolding concurrently. The first is a Karzai government under severe pressure from a heavily armed Taliban backed by the new mandate available to the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan. The second is a Taliban takeover of Kabul. The third is some form of dismemberment of the country again. Each of these eventualities leads to India having to shoulder a greater share of the blowback, than the western countries that seek to drive the current agenda.
India’s exclusion is symptomatic of the short-termism that has plagued western policy that has sought to create a closed information loop to filter out inconvenient truths. The problem is, as history repeatedly shows, an unstable Afghanistan destabilises the region. Importantly, as 9/11 showed, it also has the potential to threaten western power centres. Yet it would seem nothing has been learnt and India would need to very quickly write its own script again.
India’s Afghanistan policy has historically always been cold, calculating, uncompromising, long-term and more than capable of absorbing significant reverses in the short to medium term. Its response today must also support those who it does business with in Afghanistan. It cannot be coy in providing soft and hard military support to its friends and it must not be seen as an unreliable and indecisive partner.
India has in the past succeeded in maintaining Afghanistan as a viable partner for over 60 of 67 years of bilateral history. Wading through the precarious years starting 1989 and through the economic crisis of 1991, India still managed to support one dispensation or another that held inimical forces at bay till 1997. After 1997, India continued to support the Northern Alliance in the hope of better times. That time came in 2001, when, following the US invasion, a government whose core elements had been supported by India, were installed in power.
Pakistan, in spite of its advantageous geography, had succeeded in pacifying Afghanistan for just four to six years at best. Anybody with a cursory knowledge of the region will know that it takes a lot more than common borders to manage bilateral relations.
Going into a winning war is easy but wading into uncertain waters to safeguard vital interests is the true test of realpolitik. That is why India’s Afghan gambit must be gutsy and counterintuitive. Given the high stakes and high probability of failure, too much talk is counterproductive and blueprints for the post-2014 chaos that will be Afghanistan are urgently needed.
India in 2014 is not the economic cripple it was in 1991; a $290-billion reserve buys more loyalty and battle resilience than 15-day currency reserves. Over the last 12 years India has worked exceptionally hard to win over significant pockets of support among the Pashtuns. Unlike the 1990s when India’s support base was the ethnic minorities, support for India is now deeper and wider.
Taliban 2.0, therefore, will find a house divided, facing the enemy without and also within. India has four consulates in addition to the embassy in Kabul. These are the prime nodes of aid dispersal, which is counted as the most effective of any country’s efforts there.
The nearly $2 billion dispersed so far have gone to infrastructure, agriculture and education, especially self-sustaining schemes at the village and micro levels in Pashtun areas. It is precisely these schemes that connect India directly to the Pashtun’s day-to-day life and make India a friend in their view. It will be Pakistan’s inability to deliver — systemically and financially — on this score that will make Pakistan the outsider.
Afghanistan post-2014 must not by default become a neutra-lised backyard of Rawalpindi and its proxies. Any interference must necessarily require significant injections of Pakistani treasure and blood. India could lay for Pakistan the same trap that the US laid for the Soviets in Afghanistan.
If Pakistan marches in directly or by proxy it gets bogged down and alienates any residual western sympathy. If Pakistan does not, it loses the prize. Win or lose by default Pakistan loses and win or lose by default India is likely to succeed.
The writers are vice-president and programme coordinator, respectively, at the Observer Research Foundation.
Original link is here..
India
By Samir Saran, Senior Fellow and Vice President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF);
Vivan Sharan, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
India is a study in contrasts. In the post liberalisation era, since 1991, the country has witnessed a rapid GDP growth, secular expansion of its services sector, and a commensurate increase in per capita consumption. As a result, in 2012, the country overtook Japan’s GDP (in purchasing power parity terms), to become the third largest economy in the world. However, at the same time, a recent survey across 100 districts in the country revealed that 42 per cent of India’s children under the age of 5 are underweight and a shocking 59 per cent are stunted in their physical development98. Extrapolating these results to reflect the overall state of socio-economic development, the picture at once becomes stark. This paper will delve into some macro trends
through which it aims to unbundle facets of the country’s distorted growth narrative.
In March 2012, the Planning Commission of the Government of India set the poverty line at INR
28.65 (approximately USD 0.52) for urban areas and INR 22.42 (approximately USD 0.4) for rural areas in terms of per capita expenditure. Using rounded approximations of INR 28 and INR
22 (USD 0.5 and USD 0.4) for urban and rural areas respectively, National Sample Survey data from household surveys conducted in 2009-10 reveal that 22.98 per cent of India’s urban population and 36.58 per cent of its rural population spend less than the approximated poverty line (Table 1). Meanwhile, India’s ‘emerging’ identity, which derives from its significant middle class, is also exposed for what it is. Only about 4 per cent of India’s population earns more than INR 100 a day (approximately USD 1.8 a day in nominal terms). The rural urban divide is also particularly prominent and can be observed throughout this paper.
Table 1. Per Capita Expenditure and Population, 2009-10
|
|
All India |
Urban |
Rural |
|
Expenditure |
% of Population |
% of Population |
% of Population |
|
< Rs. 28 per day |
48.92 |
22.98 |
36.58 |
|
Between Rs. 28 to 100 per day |
47.09 |
65.54 |
62.21 |
|
More than Rs. 100 per day |
3.99 |
11.49 |
1.21 |
|
Total |
100 |
100 |
100 |
Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs
The world is still grappling with the ripples caused by the Global Financial Crisis. While the crisis found its origins in the West, it perhaps has greater absolute implications for the emerging and developing world. India has witnessed a slowdown in growth to around 5 per cent in 2012-
13. The fundamental assumption about GDP growth, echoed by Indian policymakers has been that faster GDP growth is a prerequisite to reducing poverty and concomitantly, enhancing development99. Such views are reflections of a wider international consensus that “there is every reason to believe that economic growth reduces poverty”100. In this case, the converse argument also holds, and every percentage point slowdown in India’s GDP growth impacts the sustenance prospects of millions of rural and urban poor.
There is of course a large volume of academic literature which questions such simplistic correlations. For instance the India Chronic Poverty Report (2011), states that “the issue arising
98 The HUNGaMa Survey Report, Naandi Foundation, 2011
99 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/india-needs-high-gdp-growth-to-reduce- poverty-at-faster-pace/article4153965.ece
100 Roemer, Michael and Gugerty, Mary K., “Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?”, Harvard Institute for
International Development, March 1997
74
in some developing economies with large populations is not that there is poverty in spite of moderate to high economic growth, but that this poverty is often created by the very nature of economic growth itself’’101. While this view is open to debate, it is sufficiently clear that there has been a consistent rise in inequity between the rich and the poor in India. This is evidenced from the fact that those at the bottom 10 per cent of per capita wealth account for merely 3.6 per cent of total consumption, while the top 10 per cent account for 31.1 per cent102. Additionally, Pal and Ghosh (2007) have observed that “comparable estimates of the 50th (1993-1994) and
55th (1999-2000) rounds of National Sample Survey data reveal that inequality increased both in
rural and urban India”103.
Perhaps the starting point for any meaningful analysis or explanation of India’s unequal society must be an overview of aggregated expenditure profiles for different social groups. From table 2, it is evident that the traditionally disadvantaged groups (scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, and other backward classes), on average fare worse than those that fall within the category of “others” in terms of per capita expenditure. On an all India level, less than 2 per cent of the disadvantaged groups spend more than the nominal equivalent of USD 2 a day. A majority (at an all India level) are below the approximated urban poverty line expenditure assumed here. It is
safe therefore, to infer strong causality between income classes and social groups104.
Table 2. Per Capita Expenditure and Social Group, 2009-10
|
Social Groups |
< Rs. 28 per day |
Between Rs. 28 to 100 per day |
Greater than Rs. 100 per day |
Total |
|
Scheduled Tribes |
67.35 |
31.32 |
1.33 |
100 |
|
Scheduled Castes |
61.1 |
37.69 |
1.22 |
100 |
|
Other Backward Classes |
50.86 |
46.65 |
2.5 |
100 |
|
Others |
32.06 |
59.07 |
8.87 |
100 |
|
Total |
48.91 |
47.1 |
3.99 |
100 |
Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs
When the multidimensional nature of poverty is taken into account, it is not surprising that self fulfilling spirals can trap millions within a variety of systemic constraints. Table 3 helps to illustrate that while nearly all of those spending more than INR 100 per (approximately USD
1.8) day have access to electricity for domestic consumption, over 35 per cent of those who spend less than INR 28 (USD 0.5) in rural areas, still have no access to electricity.
Table 3. % Population with Electricity for Domestic Use and per Capita Expenditure, 2008-09
|
Expenditure |
All India |
Urban |
Rural |
|
< Rs. 28 per day |
64.61 |
90.25 |
86.66 |
|
between Rs. 28 to 100 per day |
92.32 |
98.66 |
97.83 |
|
greater than Rs. 100 per day |
99.05 |
99.98 |
99.98 |
|
Total |
73.21 |
96.14 |
96.14 |
Source: NSS, 2008-09 @ ORF India Data Labs
101 India Chronic Poverty Report, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 2011
102 Mehta et. al., “India Chronic Poverty Report”, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 20011
103 Pal, Parthapratim and Ghosh, Jayati, “Inequality in India: A Survey of Recent Trends”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, United Nation, 2007
104 Expenditure can be used as a substitute for income, using the established economic relationship that savings =
income – expenditure; and assuming negligible savings at the bottom of the pyramid.
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Peeling through the multiple dimensions of social inequity and concomitant to the above described ‘sociology of the poor’ are issues around access to services and resources. Saran and Sharan (2012) point out that between 30 to 40 per cent of those belonging to the various disadvantaged groups still use kerosene for lighting in rural areas105. This is a particularly illustrative statistic on two counts. Firstly, typical kerosene lamps deliver between 1 to 6 lumens
per square metre of useful light compared with typical Western standards of 300 lux for basic tasks such as reading. There is no convergence of living standards for those at the bottom of the pyramid. The second is that those with least access are disadvantaged on multiple fronts.
Access to modern forms of energy is necessary for development. Access to resources such as water is necessary for basics sustenance which underpins development. Wide divergences in the access to drinking water across different income profiles are indicative of a serious structural deficit. This deficit has no doubt helped to perpetuate inter-generational infirmities. Table 3 shows that those with per capita expenditures greater than INR 100 (USD 1.8) a day are around two and a half times as likely to have access to drinking water within their premises as those in the bottom quartile assumed here (expenditure less than INR 28 (approximately USD 0.5) per day). Those at the bottom are much more likely to walk significant distances to access water than those at the top. There are multiple implications of such divergences in access, including on household productivity.
Table 4. % Population and Distance from Drinking Water Sources Mapped to per Capita
Expenditure, 2008-09
|
Expenditure |
Within Dwelling |
Outside Dwelling but within the Premises |
Outside Premises |
||
|
Total |
0.2 to 0.5 km |
0.5 to 1.0 km |
|||
|
< Rs. 28 per day |
15.74 |
22.68 |
50.47 |
9.18 |
1.43 |
|
Between Rs. 28 to 100 per day |
36.24 |
32.12 |
26.31 |
3.86 |
0.9 |
|
More than Rs. 100 per day |
76.57 |
18.91 |
3.34 |
0.69 |
0.26 |
Source: NSS, 2008-09 @ ORF India Data Labs
Household productivity is also closely linked to the levels of education attainment. Within a rights-based framework for development, the role of education is increasingly emphasised. Tilak (2005), notes that “poverty is seen as deprivation of opportunities that enhance human capabilities to lead a tolerable life” and importantly that “education is one such important opportunity, deprivation of which in itself represents poverty”106. While it is up for debate
whether primary, middle and secondary education actually offers productivity gains that are commensurate with the contextual imperatives for human capital formation given the scale and nature of poverty; and whether higher education or vocational education should be prioritised; the statistics in table 5 illustrate that there is a clear causality between income and education levels. Indeed, many studies have argued that this causality runs both ways.
105 Saran, Samir, and Sharan, Vivan, “Identity and Energy Access in India: Setting Contexts for Rio+20”, Energy
Security Insight, TERI, Volume 7 (1), January 2012
106 Tilak, Jandhyala B.G., “Post-Elementary Education, Poverty and Development in India”, Working Paper Series
No. 6, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh
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Table 5. Education Levels Mapped to % Population sorted by Per Capita Expenditure, 2009 – 10
|
Education Levels |
All India |
|||
|
Expenditure |
||||
|
< Rs. 28 per day |
between Rs. 28 to 100 per day |
more than Rs. 100 per day |
Total |
|
|
illiterate |
42.93 |
25.65 |
9.25 |
33.45 |
|
upto primary |
34.89 |
29.43 |
15.22 |
31.54 |
|
middle |
12.46 |
15.87 |
10.48 |
13.99 |
|
secondary |
5.96 |
12.7 |
14.26 |
9.47 |
|
higher secondary |
2.7 |
8.6 |
15.53 |
5.99 |
|
diploma & certificate course |
0.1 |
0.91 |
2.95 |
0.6 |
|
graduate & above |
0.96 |
6.83 |
32.32 |
4.98 |
|
Total |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs
India is rated as having a moderate inequality relative to several other developing countries, with a Gini coefficient of 36.8 in 2004-05107. While the coefficient has likely worsened since then, India is leagues ahead of several other G20 countries, including the United States and China. However, the Gini coefficient cannot capture the nuanced trends of inequity, and the causal relationships that perpetuate it.
Development is a long term, complex process. It is clear from the socio-economic realities which have been outlined in this paper, that India’s development trajectory is steep, and the challenges, stark. Concomitantly, the public policies which have also been highlighted here, have been formulated by policymakers to bridge inequities between various socio-economic identities and promote inclusive growth. They aim to provide better access to services, employment and information; and are certainly enablers of transformation when implemented right. Even so, they are necessary but not sufficient. A number of systemic initiatives are required to create the momentum and maintain the development gains required for a broad based transition to higher levels of prosperity and equity, particularly for those at the bottom of the pyramid. In this context, we suggest there are two fundamental questions that Indian policymakers must pose to themselves, to tailor effective and efficient interventions that can ensure that development in fact leads to growth:
1. What is the threshold level of inequality for political and social stability?
2. How can policy interventions resolve the strategic, but not necessarily binary choice between generating employment and increasing productivity?
Two decades have passed since India embarked on a new growth trajectory underpinned by a neoclassical economic framework. Liberalisation led reform has delivered unequally. With over
1.2 billion people and an extremely heterogeneous socio-economic profile, any attempts to recalibrate policy prescriptions must be fully cognizant of diverse realities and trends that have become firmly embedded. Whether GDP growth has exacerbated inequities, or served as the template for improving living standards is not the most urgent question in the contemporary context. Rather, policymakers and political leaders must focus their energies on understanding the causal influences that have a bearing on socio-economic trends; and accordingly designing a progressive and contextual framework for development and growth. We suggest that such a framework must include and be complemented by the following crucial elements:
107 World Bank Indicators
77
Nearly 12 million people enter the Indian workforce ever year. A majority lack the skills to gain meaningful employment, and face an abject lack of access to decent work. As a result those at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid are largely employed in the informal sector, without any form of job security or social security. The availability of productive and remunerative employment is central to enabling equitable growth. The Indian economy must employ a larger proportionate share of its workforce. In turn, minimum wages and domestic labour standards must be enforced universally; and the skills gap must be addressed through strategic emphasis on subsidised and targeted vocational education.
The Indian economy relies asymmetrically on growth of the tertiary sector, particularly capital and skilled labour intensive sectors such as information technology which have not been able to bridge the systemic employment gap. Employment creation is a policy imperative for enabling equitable outcomes; and the revitalisation and reemphasis on the growth of the secondary sector is a necessary prerequisite for achieving broad based socio economic transformation. The industrialisation process requires a number of enablers, including improved infrastructure and service delivery; and the creation of a workforce with skill sets commensurate with a strategic vision for industrial growth.
The competitive advantage of the Indian economy in the export sector remains largely untapped. With an export to GDP ratio of 16.5 per cent (in 2012), the Indian export economy has a vast potential. In this regard, high productivity, labour intensive sectors in particular demand a sustained policy focus. Greater integration with regional supply chains and increased leverage of regional trade agreements can provide the necessary momentum for secular growth of such sectors. Monetary policy, fiscal management and financial market depth must complement such growth.
Policy Emphasis must be placed on facilitating access to markets with strong internal drivers demand. This will help the Indian economy to hedge against global demand volatility perpetuated by disruptive business cycles. The Southwards shift of Indian exports is a positive sign in this context. According to the Indian Exim bank, the share of Asia, Africa and LAC regions has increased sharply from 47% in 2001-02 to 62.7% in 2011-12; and the share of Asia has risen from 40% to 52% during this period.
The equitable growth of the Indian economy will to a large extent be determined by the degree and nature of private sector participation. The virtual stagnation in the investment/GDP ratio (of which the private sector is a larger contributor than the public sector), which has grown by a mere 5 per cent since 2005-06 to 37.6 per cent in 2011-12, is indicative of inherent challenges. Greater participation of the Indian private sector can be driven by a better environment for doing business. Policy frameworks must address issues around corporate governance and labour reforms without compromising market competitiveness.
Long term capital formation through increased participation in the financial markets must be prioritised. This will entail a broad based emphasis on imperatives such as financial literacy, financial inclusion, and investor protection. The nominal proportionate retail participation in the domestic capital markets is a cause of concern. Household savings must be productively and efficiently deployed in order to finance the widening current account deficit. Simultaneously, short term speculative participation must be offset by genuine market opportunities for growth. Commensurate emphasis must be placed on channelling global savings into long term asset creation in the Indian economy, with a supportive policy framework. Increased government emphasis on development of micro, small and medium enterprises as well as industrial clusters must be sustained despite political cycles. Policy disruptions can quickly reverse gains achieved over time, and political risk poses the greatest challenge to unleashing the entrepreneurial potential in the country. A coherent, inclusive and long term political vision must complement policy formulation. Robust legal frameworks must be employed to secure long term growth largely devoid of political risk uncertainties.
78
References:
The HUNGaMa Survey Report (2011) Naandi Foundation.
URL: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/india-needs-high- gdp-growth-to-reduce-poverty-at-faster-pace/article4153965.ece
Roemer, M., Gugerty, M. K. (1997), Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?, Harvard Institute for International Development, March.
India Chronic Poverty Report (2011), Indian Institute of Public Administration.
Mehta et. al. (2011), India Chronic Poverty Report, Indian Institute of Public Administration.
Pal, P., Ghosh, J. (2007), Inequality in India: A Survey of Recent Trends, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, United Nation.
Saran, S., .Sharan, V. (2012) Identity and Energy Access in India: Setting Contexts for Rio+20, Energy Security Insight, TERI, Volume 7 (1), January 2012.
Tilak, Jandhyala B.G. (2005), Post-Elementary Education, Poverty and Development in India, Working Paper Series No. 6, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh

Global Times | Samir Saran and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra
Published on May 20, 2013 22:18
Original Link is here
In a significant act of political signaling and foresight, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang chose India as his first ever overseas destination after taking charge of the premiership.
He arrived in New Delhi on Sunday evening and held meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first. He also met Singh’s cabinet colleagues and flew to Mumbai and met with Indian industrial leaders.
This visit is important in more ways than one. At the purely bilateral level, an excruciating border episode was just recently brought to a close.
On a global level, the two countries are dealing with a once-in-a-century churning in the architecture of global governance, while at the same time trying to shake of the lethargy that both economies have fallen prey to.
For the first time in many centuries, this continent has the wherewithal to define itself on its own terms. Capitals in Asia will lead the process of shaping the Asian project.
China and India must be partners in this effort, and to get there they need to deal with the hard questions, as the time for sweet talk is now over.
We need to start having brutally frank conversations on our legacy problems and on the more recent challenges.
The parroting of old staid positions and whispering of diplomatic sweet nothings will yield little and allow others to intervene and impose.
It is time for the two countries to grow up and resolve the disputed border. And even as this resolution is discovered, progress on the bilateral relationship must be insulated from this process.
For this to happen, political leadership in both countries will have to demonstrate courage to make their respective security establishments toe the line.
Economic integration is not and will never be the answer to this political poser alone. It can provide the motivation for seeking a resolution, but it is not the answer by itself.
In fact, it can now be argued that the political discord and public perception in both countries are limiting greater economic integration.
Trade shows signs of plateauing, with Chinese firms struggling for access to all projects in India, be they shipyards, roads or telecommunications, despite some early and spectacular inroads.
The two countries now need to realize that they are confronted with the political moment that has been deferred and delayed but cannot be denied. Strong and purposeful measures must be crafted.
There must be a bold statement on the border issue that no matter what the differences, incidents like that in Ladakh recently will not happen again.
While the border management pact recently offered by China may not be the answer, an equitable arrangement that prevents any troop movements remotely close to each other’s claimed territory must be worked upon.
This conversation cannot be delayed. And the process of arriving at this accord needs to be a lot more transparent. Opaque political discussions lead nowhere, and public opinion must be built and sought.
China’s engagement with India must transform from one that is largely seen as transactional, such as the selling and buying of goods and commodities, and more recently functioning as a lender, to one of being a long-term investor and stakeholder in the Indian economy.
Chinese money, businesses and investments must bet on India and be located in this country.
This cannot happen however until businesses and people in China begin to perceive India as a friendly destination, an outcome equally determined by Indian attitudes to China.
India for its part must seriously consider identifying special industrial zones that Chinese firms can develop as centers of large manufacturing and R&D.
There must be a complete, honest and meaningful revamp of the current visa regime. The level of visits is abysmal, and security considerations cannot determine the level of engagement between the two countries destined to be the largest trading partners in a decade or so.
Finally, the two must bilaterally develop a substantial conversation on the cutting edge of global governance issues, including issues of the global commons like climate change, water, health and medicine, and Asian security architecture, as well as issues of space and proliferation, of rules and mechanisms of economic governance, and on new arenas of maritime and ocean governance.
This dialogue must help discover common ground that the two countries can articulate and put forth for the consideration of the global community.
Such articulation will be the first step toward an Asian century. Ultimately a political Asia will be born when New Delhi and Beijing can assume parentage of this Asian geography that until now has only seen many guardians.
Samir Saran is a vice president and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra a program coordinator at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

Original Link is here
Faced with the limitations of economic relations without political integration, Asian states have begun to reevaluate their prior relations and coalition structures to meet the demands imposed by U.S. rebalancing within Asia. Nowhere is truer than in the nuclear arena, where China, India, and the United States face questions over their ability to redefine their partnerships and the global nuclear order. Samir Saran, vice president and senior researcher at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, spoke in the twentieth session of the “China-South Asia Dialogues” seminar series for senior experts. This was followed by presentations by three Tsinghua University master’s degree students: Mao Keji from China, John McGowan from the United States, and Ece Duygulu from Turkey. The students’ presentations were part of the “China and South Asia’s Future” seminar series for rising scholars. Carnegie’s Lora Saalman moderated.
Rebalancing Within Asia
Saran noted that while the United States is often seen as rebalancing “to” Asia, much of this reorientation has actually occurred “within” Asia. Even as Washington seeks to redefine the role that it will play, regional powers have begun to delineate their own identity, he asserted. In doing so, economic integration has begun to “reach its limits” in the face of unresolved political tensions and obstacles. Without addressing political integration and rebalancing among regional players, Saran suggested that an integration project designed and implemented by Asians themselves would be difficult to achieve.
•U.S. Regional Role:
Saran asserted that one of the driving motives behind U.S. rebalancing within Asia has been China’s reluctance to enter into a G2 construct, under which Washington and Beijing would serve as the primary players. Rather than resulting in comity or competition in a bipolar order, Beijing and Washington are both jockeying for their own national interests, said Saran. However, he added, the United States maintains a strong isolationist streak that could result in significant drawdowns in how it engages the region and guarantees its security. In the face of this uncertainty, Saran maintained that regional players would be best served by coordinated political integration fashioned by capitals in the region.
•India’s and China’s Regional Roles:
The futures of China and India are inextricably linked, Saran said. Chinese refusal to sign onto the bilateral U.S.-China agenda, coupled with the fact that Washington has already made its unsuccessful play for a G2 construct, means that Beijing is in the driver’s seat. As a result, he maintained that the U.S. pivot to Asia will ironically be “made in China.” In looking further afield for energy stores and cooperation, Beijing and New Delhi will also be faced with the need to guarantee passage throughout the Indo-Pacific, Saran added. Beyond the bilateral, he noted that engagement at multilateral forums has proven to be most viable for China and India, since it obviates confronting mutual tensions. Enhancing Cooperation
•India’s Role in Security:
Saran noted that preoccupation with traditional security misses the economic fallout and necessity of integrating political, economic, and military solutions, particularly when faced with new territorial disputes, piracy, drug running, and other asymmetrical threats. To this end, Saran asserted that India has a role to play. However, when it comes to territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, he remained reluctant to predict a role for New Delhi. When asked about ties between New Delhi and Tokyo by one of the Chinese participants, Saran responded that Japan and India have similar interests, which become all the more evident in the context of China’s regional rise.
•Identity Crisis:
One of the Chinese participants spoke of allegations of China’s aggressiveness when it comes to its neighbors and suggested that this was tied to internal shifts in how China defines itself. He questioned whether India is undergoing a similar case of self-reevaluation. Saran responded that part of Beijing’s crisis of perception comes from the fact that despite its growth and creation of regional dependencies through donations and economic benevolence to its surrounding countries, it has not changed its behavior towards these countries. Similarly, given New Delhi’s growth, it seeks accommodation on its desire to be a “global manager.” Unlike China, however, he noted that India has global aspirations, but continues to be bogged down by domestic issues. A Chinese expert added that he felt China and India have more in common with each other than with the United States, advocating increased interaction and exchange to build strategic mutual trust.
•Mutual Respect:
A Chinese participant queried what measures would increase China’s respect for and willingness to cooperate with India. Saran responded that people-to-people contact, expanded media interaction, and investments leading to greater integration between Beijing and Delhi on all levels are key. Mao, McGowan, and Duygulu offered their takes on how this dynamic has played out in the nuclear sphere, with India’s pursuit of a nuclear capability to solidify its status and respect from countries such as China. A Chinese expert noted that when it comes to multilaterally binding arms control treaties, India still has a role to play, particularly with the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Saran responded that trust must be mutual; as such, India’s signing of treaties like the CTBT will be dependent upon the actions of China and its decision whether or not to ratify them.
•Demographic Pressures:
Much like “China’s Dream,” Saran cited “India’s Promise,” asserting that Beijing is waking up to New Delhi’s potential over the next ten to fifteen years. However, he cautioned that while demographic windfalls may shore up India’s production capacity in the short term, they are likely to pressure New Delhi to meet the employment demands of a young and disenfranchised population. As these numbers soar, Saran further predicted that the long-term implications of caring for the elderly would threaten the sustainability of India’s economic growth. Despite such pressures and the recent decline in Sino-Indian trade, Saran maintained that the two countries share common aspirations and challenges. More than simply reacting to U.S. rebalancing within Asia, Beijing and New Delhi should conduct their own regional recalibration, Saran concluded.
The original article can be found here
On February 11, the Supreme Court issued notice to the government, seeking its response on making intelligence agencies accountable to Parliament. This question is pertinent and in some ways captures the sentiments expressed by many and best vocalised by two leaders in recent times. Vice-President Hamid Ansari had said in his 2010 speech on this subject “….responsibility to the legislature, and eventually to the electorate, is an essential element of democratic governance to which we are committed by the Constitution.” Thereafter, the Private Members Bill introduced by Manish Tiwari (now Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting), The Intelligence Services (Powers & Regulation) Bill 2011, sought to empower intelligence agencies through a legally mandated charter that included well-thought-out elements of supervision and oversight.
Mr. Tiwari’s effort was supported by a research initiative at the Observer Research Foundation over a period of about two years. Views of and feedback from over 150 experts, politicians, social scientists, mediapersons and security professionals were solicited. The resulting analysis questioned obsolete notions of national security liberally deployed by the security community to protect turfs, prevent change and indeed to defend the indefensible. In this context, four core issues stood out and need early resolution even as the court is appraised of this matter.
Regulatory framework
In modern democracies, intelligence agencies are legally created by and operate under a charter drawn up by the legislature. India’s agencies however bear a chilling resemblance to Haiti’s Tonton Macoute, a voodoo police named after a phantom bogeyman having no charter, rules or limits. In effect it is an extra-constitutional body, prey to individuals and politics and, like such institutions, is totally unaccountable. Setting a charter improves efficiency, focussing resources and minds on what needs to be done. It directs operations on the basis of policy, not individual whim. For example if folklore has it right, if RAW had a charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated ground assets and priceless reach.
Intelligence ombudsman
Intelligence agencies such as Mossad, CIA and MI6 have reformed their structures to include operation and financial audits which have improved their efficiency. These agencies, prior to reforms, had a history of personal and political abuse. Institutions are based on trust, but there is no incompatibility between trust and verification. The taxpayer needs to know from a competent authority that his rupee is not being misused on ballerinas, champagne and settling personal scores. The state has a responsibility to verify and audit. The reports that these agencies are used to spy on political opponents, blackmail them and purchase parliamentary votes are too regular and too consistent to be ignored. “Watergate” was the most visible example of such abuse. Closer home, leaked telephone conversations (recorded dubiously) and allegations of keeping a tab on political opponents tell us that “Trust me” is simply not an argument — unless the government can prove that these agencies are staffed by people with a special mitochondrial DNA that makes them free of incompetence, inefficiency and corruption. As all details obviously cannot be divulged, an independent intelligence ombudsman with the highest level of security clearance is the optimal answer.
Collective responsibility
A National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee will address the issue of control. Democracy is about deferring to the wisdom of the many. In our system, the Prime Minister is primus inter pares; all governmental decisions are passed by cabinet committees. The Prime Minister therefore, must not have permanent and exclusive control over such agencies. Far from making the process of intelligence collection tedious, collective control leads to better absorption of intelligence and enables the system to efficiently analyse the same. Interdisciplinary inputs would allow holistic analysis insulating the Prime Minister from tainted or bad intelligence. Inconsistencies may be better detected resulting in moderation and course-correction. Optimally, such a collective must include parliamentary opposition to ensure national consensus and continuity. A recent example of abuse is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was because powerful individuals hijacked the intelligence apparatuses of the United States and the United Kingdom that intelligence was allowed to be concocted to build a bogus case for war.
Protecting the protectors
There is a case for a National Intelligence Tribunal that protects the public at large but also those serving within such institutions. Extra-constitutional institutions are usually rife with turf wars: a person trapped within such a phantom has no way to protect himself against individual caprices with no system of grievance redressal. Becoming a breeding ground for cronyism and negating merit has an enormous negative impact on professionalism and morale. After all in such a dangerous line of work, personal enmity can translate into a death sentence. A special tribunal will protect both the interests of intelligence employees as well as shield the general public from their excesses.
Deploying the “National security” argument against reform is a fig leaf for defending cronyism, incompetence, inefficiency, and corruption. A proper regulatory mechanism can only strengthen national security, not weaken it. It is time to bring in facts and lessons from global best practices to this debate as it unfolds in the highest court of the land.
(Samir Saran is vice-president and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is programme coordinator at the Observer Research Foundation.)
New Delhi, 11th of May 2012
Please find here the link to the original article as well as the PDF-file: Article – Time To Get Over It.
Time to get over it
by Samir Saran and John C. Hulsman
But the Brics do share common interests. First, all Brics countries stress there must be a stable external environment that must not be jeopardised by partisan interventions in Iran or other parts of the Middle East and Africa. Second, an accountable and stable global financial regime must evolve – with a far greater say for the rising economic powers – the promises for which remain unfulfilled since 2008-09.
Third, there must be a far greater global emphasis on development and poverty reduction efforts in Asia, Africa and Latin America – linked to the new hurdles of `green protectionism’ that Brics must stand up against. No developing power is likely to commit economic suicide to make over-privileged western `greens’ happy. As a global agenda (and despite not possessing common values), that is a lot to agree upon.
It is time to wake up to the world we actually live in and move towards the more workable paradigm of `shared interests and shared prosperity`. These are terms that flow from the vocabulary of the realist camp, acknowledging that beneath every facade, nations and societies share at least the one common value of self-preservation based on self-interest. A man in the gutter and a man in a mansion will share this, even if nothing else.
This approach offers a far greater global potential for powers, old and new, to collaborate and cooperate than the parochial values-based approach that is viewed by most outside of the EU as a not so subtle attempt to propagate wes-tern interests in an ethical cloak.
But this fetish with values is not the only intellectual challenge that efficient global governance is confronted with today. The concept of sovereignty – and the very different individual experiences of nation-states that compel them to define this critical notion differently – is another potential stumbling block.
The Brics and other emerging power centres view this transition period of their relative rise as the time to consolidate their sense of nationhood and reclaim sovereignty from a western-dominated world. Again Europe is the outlier, as sovereignty actually matters. If the Brics are to be made stakeholders in the new global governance architecture, this conceptual difference must be recognised.
The third reality of our times is that large economies in the Indo-Pacific (India, China and some others) with low-income populations and prevalent poverty will now be the fulcrum for governing the most important regions of the world. Their success is essential for global growth to be safeguarded, else, we will live in a far more hostile world. The West will need to carve out partnerships within the region to secure sea-lanes, trade, property rights and ensure stability. This dependence on these large emerging economies will change the ethos of governance.
Growth and not human rights will dictate the agenda. Industrialisation will trump environmentalism and poverty alleviation will define sustain-able development. Only when western efforts are truly made to accommodate the views, interests and needs of the rest on these issues will we see a more efficient multipolar framework emerge.
So how to make sense of this new world? The primary rule of the road must be the unbreakable link between burden-sharing and power-sharing. This basic principle must become nothing less than the new mantra of the multipolar age.
Of course, this fundamental global change takes place on a continuum; it will take years for the transition from a western-dominated world to a world with many powers (with the Brics leading the economic way) tobe completed. But as the global financial crisis made clear, change is already occurring more rapidly than anyone imagined. Along the way, a fading West and a `not-yet-up-to-it’rest could well drop the ball over vital global governance issues, resulting in what American political scientist Ian Bremmer (somewhat apocalyptically) has referred to as a G-0 world, where nothing much gets done.
It is time for Europe to get over it. Nations will not have common values, because nations themselves are a collection of diverse experiences. However, there is no need to throw in the towel, for nations can have a vision for shared prosperity with different approaches to get there. To make all this work, there must be some common macro rules and these must be negotiated on the realist terms of common interests and not through the fruitless semantics of ethics and morality.
Saran is vice-president, Observer Research Foundation, and Hulsman is president of a strategic consultancy firm.
An extraordinary meeting with His Holiness The Dalai Lama in New Delhi organised by an unnamed friend and accompanied by my dear friend Wendy. In the 30 minutes or so that we were able to spend with him, I was able to ask him about China and the growth of religion in that country and its implications. His Holiness was very lucid in his views on China and the possible changes, the Tibetan youth and incidents of violence and his great love and admiration for India and its people shone through. His views remain with me alone, yet i left the room with some thought that i will capture in another article soon…
My own thoughts post this meeting:
1) How will the Tibetan population exist in India post the Dalai Lama and how would the dynamics alter?
2) Will the youth get restless on both sides of the border and which country would bear the brunt – India or China?
3) Even a more democratic China may not mean reintegration for the Tibetans in India?
4) How does it feel to be a nation without real estate?
5) How does he still smile while recounting his story?
Perhaps these are old posers….perhaps they still need to be understood…perhaps they never will be….