Commentaries, Diplomacy, G 20, Global Economy, India, India-Russia, international affairs, Narendra Modi, USA and Canada

India leads: Two to Tango with in 2023

It is a busy season on Raisina Hill as India assumes stewardship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and takes charge of the Group of Twenty (G20) in December. Leading these two plurilateral groups will be complex and challenging. The groupings have divergent goals, purposes, and memberships even as they grapple with Covid-19’s disruptive impact on the global economy and conflicts during and after the pandemic. India will need to ensure that the concerns of developing countries are not relegated to the margins by the European conflict.

At the heart of the endeavour lies the challenge of dialogue and conversations with all, even as a subset of like-minded countries invest in frameworks that respond to decadal objectives. “Talk to all and work more with some” will have to be India’s mantra for 2023 as it has a rare opportunity to make two distinct agendas align with its own.

At SCO, China’s dominant position is inescapable, and it overwhelms the preferences and perspectives of others. Here, India and Russia may share a common imperative to balance China and make SCO focus on a broader policy and development agenda. As Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi pointed out during the SCO summit last month, this is not the time for war. Moving away from conflict to attend to the frailties of the economy may be beneficial for SCO and less contentious too. Many in the group are uncomfortable with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and would rather see this group focus on the development and human challenges the region is saddled with. India will have to reset the playing board skillfully. If China is playing “go”, and Russia is playing “roulette”, New Delhi will need to play smart chess.

Many in the group are uncomfortable with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and would rather see this group focus on the development and human challenges the region is saddled with.

However, the nature of SCO and its purpose will ensure that politics takes centre-stage. In Samarkand, the Indian PM showed the way. Niceties need to be dropped, and hard questions must be posed, including on sovereignty, the expansionist tendencies of some countries, including China, and terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

Simultaneously, India must inject its growth imperative around technology, sustainability and green transitions into discussions and state its concerns over cyber security, online malfeasance, and white elephant infrastructure projects, among others. At SCO, India would do well to initiate debates on these issues, irrespective of the outcomes, and create space for discussions that may not have Beijing’s blessings.

Diplomacy sometimes misconstrues the role of the host country to imply benign or agnostic participation. India, however, must maintain its determination to have an assertive foreign policy that seeks to shape and steer conversations towards the outcomes it desires.

All of this cannot be starkly divergent from India’s G20 agenda. There needs to be a bridge linking what we aim to achieve through SCO and G20, although the methods and formulations used in each forum may differ. G20 requires a different type and style of hosting. India can leverage its experience to communicate with all actors involved and curate conversations that cater to diverse constituencies. “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas and Sabka Prayas” (inclusive development for all, everyone’s trust and efforts) is an all-encompassing Indian approach that fits G20.

India can leverage its experience to communicate with all actors involved and curate conversations that cater to diverse constituencies.

Here, India will need to ensure that the clouds of war that loom over Europe do not pour down on its presidency. India must make it clear to its western partners that it will view any attempt to reduce the impact of its G20 presidency seriously. At the same time, New Delhi must make clear to Moscow that steps towards de-escalation are essential from its end.

External factors will inevitably distract the grouping from anything that is discussed within it. The agenda that is engaged with and outcomes delivered at G20 may be bold (unlikely) or sub-optimal (more probable). However, thanks to G20’s structure, global action will always be evolutionary. India’s efforts must draw from Indonesia and deliver to Brazil and then South Africa.

PM Modi’s reiteration of the importance of “democracy, diplomacy, and dialogue” at the SCO Summit is a message that the G20 leaders should also remember as they prepare to engage at the upcoming G20 Summit in Indonesia and beyond. G20’s ability to navigate through economic and social crises should not become hostage to regional or bilateral politics.

India must make a clear and robust case to address larger goals in the spirit of cooperation. It must focus precisely on what it wants to achieve from each working group at G20 and aim to create a legacy and a futureoriented architecture, which will lend continuity to what it incubates.

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Commentaries, foreign policy, Great Power Dynamics, India, India-Russia, international affairs, Strategic Studies, USA and Canada

Modern Geopolitics: A Race Through Chaos to Stability

Originally published in The Valdai Club. Co-authored with Aarshi Tirkey.

The third decade of the twenty-first century has compelled the world to face its most intractable challenge yet—offering a coherent, collective and equitable response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This has tested the faith of the most ardent internationalists, and is part of a deeper churn in the global order that was underway even before the first COVID-19 case was reported in Wuhan in 2019.

US hegemony has all but come to an end and the rise of a multipolar world has effected a redistribution of power at the global stage. American leadership, that would have been essential to catalysing collective action against the pandemic, bordered on wanting to island itself from the rest of the world much before former US President Trump launched the “America First” campaign. The utopian vision of interdependence and global cooperation had already taken a beating in Europe when Brexit demolished the ideological and institutional underpinnings of the European Union. And China, the other great power, was engaged in its project ‘Pax Sinica’, determined to make globalisation beneficial for its Communist party.

Global institutions had weakened, and the benefits of investing political will into their mechanisms had greatly receded. The coronavirus further exacerbated this: While nations scrambled to respond to this fast-spreading disease, their immediate reaction was to look inwards, go at it alone or with trusted partners, and engage with the international community only for self-serving purposes. At the end of the day, all were ‘Darwinian’ and privileged their own survival without consideration and care for others. This is typified by the perverse ‘Vaccine Access’ world map.

Global institutions had weakened, and the benefits of investing political will into their mechanisms had greatly receded. The coronavirus further exacerbated this: While nations scrambled to respond to this fast-spreading disease, their immediate reaction was to look inwards, go at it alone or with trusted partners, and engage with the international community only for self-serving purposes. At the end of the day, all were ‘Darwinian’ and privileged their own survival without consideration and care for others. This is typified by the perverse ‘Vaccine Access’ world map.

As such, the postwar liberal international order—underwritten by the West under US leadership—had been facing an existential crisis since the turn of the century, with wars in South and West Asia and the Financial Crisis all challenging the old arrangements and aiding the rise of `China as a new revisionist power. And then the Virus from Wuhan exploded on the world stage, accelerating the processes that were already influencing modern geopolitics, a few of which are discussed here.

The 3 R’s of Modern Geopolitics

The first is readjustment, as countries are grappling with the impact of the rise of new regional and global actors. The American century has waned, and the rise of the Asian century—home to the growing economies in the world—is well on its way. The biggest challenge to the global balance of power comes from China, which is set to be the first major economy to rebound after the pandemic With the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s close integration with global supply chains, and its advancements in civilian and military technologies—Beijing’s rise appears to be an inevitable reality, howsoever much its international behaviour instills distrust among many, particularly the US and some of its allies.

A contest is, therefore, inevitable. In President Biden’s interim National Security Strategy Guidance, the rise of both China and Russia is treated as a challenge to a stable and open international system. President Xi Jinping—for his part—recently declared that Beijing will never allow any foreign forces to bully, oppress or enslave China and the focus of the party would be “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Will the two global powers head for a confrontation or choose to opt for a peaceful coexistence with limited and contained disagreements? The outcome of the US-China rivalry remains to be seen, and countries caught at the intersection of this evolving dynamic must take into account how they readjust their approach to this new age of geopolitics. Russia too will be asked some tough questions and will have to make some difficult choices. Can a positive Biden-Putin engagement play a stabilising role in the 21st Century? Or is a China-Russia nexus inevitable?

The outcome of the US-China rivalry remains to be seen, and countries caught at the intersection of this evolving dynamic must take into account how they readjust their approach to this new age of geopolitics. Russia too will be asked some tough questions and will have to make some difficult choices

Second, the hard-won consensus on the frameworks underpinning multilateralism and globalisation is undergoing a dramatic restructuring. The 2008 global financial crisis, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, have exposed the fragility of global economic interdependence. The growth of hyper-nationalism and populist politics assess globalisation and multilateralism as arrangements that impinge on the sovereign choices of a state. As such, there is potential for the creation of a ‘gated globalisation’—a globalisation that is less free and less open than before. Economic policies are no longer solely dictated by economic principles; they are now guided by strategic considerations, political trust, climate, health and technological threats. Countries, such as the UK, US and India have introduced trade restrictions, investment screening mechanisms, sanctions and monetary policies to reflect these new considerations. China had already perfected their own model of perverse global integration.

The disillusionment with multilateralism can be directly attributed to institutional inertia, lack of reforms and capture by vested interests, which continue to hamper decision making before these organisations. Countries are, therefore, leaning towards smaller groupings to forge fluid, issue-specific partnerships, which can expedite cooperation between like-minded countries. While this can be one way to overcome the malaise of multilaterals, they may hamper the development of broader and cohesive international strategies for ‘global bads’—from COVID-19 to climate change—which require the participation and commitment of all. The pandemic is not over till all are vaccinated and secured and the threat of climate change is not going to recede by unilateral actions of any single state. The ongoing restructuring calls for the need for new arrangements that can redress the inefficiencies of multilateralism and globalisation, without diminishing their larger benefits. Can a ‘consortium of plurilaterals groupings’ agree to a common minimum framework to address the challenges that confront us all even as they engage within their own clubs to maximise their economy and security?

In the midst of this churn, geopolitics has been reoriented to accommodate new actors, and emerging factors and considerations. Modern geopolitics is increasingly influenced by geoeconomics and geo-technology. Important works, such as War by Other Means, talk of the systemic use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical objectives—a form of statecraft that was present during the Marshall plan, and is present today as well through China’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and more generally the BRI.

Modern geopolitics is increasingly influenced by geoeconomics and geo-technology. Important works, such as War by Other Means, talk of the systemic use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical objectives—a form of statecraft that was present during the Marshall plan, and is present today as well through China’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and more generally the BRI

If the medium is the message, then technology is the future of our politics. The advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has resulted in the development of technologies that can be both a boon and a bane for humankind. While America was at the forefront of technological leadership in the recent past, this is being challenged by China as it invests heavily in emerging and dual-use technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, and biotechnology. First movers may not only take the mantle of technological leadership, but will also become the providers for other countries, creating asymmetric dependencies. ‘GeoTech’ opens a new realm of interstate competition, where concerns of national security and strategic autonomy implicate technology choices and arrangements. In an increasingly digital world, the capture of data—and not territory—and the compromise of critical information infrastructure—and not state borders—are the new security challenges for nations. As an individual’s attention, eyeballs and personal data become the coveted political prize, will the next domain of conflict be the human form and how we will protect it?

New Actors, New Geographies

While the above factors remain at the heart of this churn, new actors and geographies are influencing the conduct of geopolitics. Though the coronavirus hearkened the return of the ‘nation-state’, communities across borders represent a robust challenge to this primary unit of Westphalian sovereignty. The concentration of economic resources and power in global technology companies, from Twitter to Tencent, has driven home the fact that states are no longer the primary actors in the world. Hate, tribalism and irrational ideologies have returned with new vigour, riding on the reach and amplification of digital technologies. Technology giants are now the arbiters of economic and political choices and are challenging the writ of the older political systems.

The emergence of new geographies, such as the Indo-Pacific, Eurasia and the Arctic—in which all regional and global powers have stakes—demand the genesis of new norms, institutions and partnerships. In a universally parochial world, there is limited appetite or leadership to shape and create these. In sum, the pandemic confirmed the decline of the US as a superpower and sharpened questions on Beijing’s moral and political capability to step into the void. Even with its attendant equity and efficiency losses, the importance of‘multi-polarity’—first ideated by Primakov through the Russia, India and China trilateral mechanism—received a resolute confirmation. It has urged that we appreciate this shifting nature of global and domestic affairs to be able to adapt to an increasingly complex world, that is no longer tethered to a conventional understanding of geopolitics.

While the ability to project power globally resides with the US, the world is steadily moving towards political, economic, technological and normative multipolarity. The evolving contours of modern geopolitics is still in a state of flux, and there is wisdom in accepting the notion that the end result is perhaps indeterminable. The age of disruption is here, countries that thrive on disorder may do well in the short term, while nations who invest in stability may well define the future of globalisation and, indeed, the new world order.

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Eurasian Sudies, Great Power Dynamics, India-Russia, Indian Froeign Policy, international affairs, Quad, RIC, Russia, SCO

The US approach to the Russian federation will not determine the interaction of New Delhi and Moscow

India has been one of just few countries that’s managed to buy Russian weapons and avoid US sanctions. Nevertheless, anti-Russian sanctions sometimes serve as discouraging factor in Russian economic ties with other countries including China. Will India succeed in balancing between US and Russia, or the threat of sanctions will leave its mark on Russia- India cooperation?

Samir Saran: The sanctions on Russia are unilateral sanctions outside the UN system. While I do not speak for the government, India is unlikely to allow such sanctions to hurt its core relationships and objectives. Russia is India’s most important partner and US approach to Russia will not determine India’s engagement with Moscow. Our defence partnership and business relationships are vital and India will strive hard to ensure that these grow and strengthen. The US understands India’s views and concerns. The past year has seen the defence partnership with Russia grow stronger and I am confident that this will be the case in the future as well.

IzvAbout two years ago India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. So far, has the country felt any bonuses from participating in this organisation? Did membership in this club change anything for India?

SS: In my view these are early days for India at this club. India is currently settling in and is still finding its way about. The SCO if reimagined and designed can potentially have an important role to play in the Asian Century. It can be a group with Russia – India – China (RIC) at its core, from which contours of a political union in Asia can emerge. This will require major efforts and India will need to partner with Russia to make this happen. While the current impact of this membership is minimal, the potential of SCO to contribute to the future growth and stability of the region and continent (if developed appropriately) is immense.

IzvIn one of the interviews you suggested that the two crucial powers defining the future Asian Order are China and India. Though, to be sustainable the Asian order would need more players, including Russia. What role can Russia play in the region and in Asia? And from an Indian perspective where does Russia belong, East to the West?

SS: India sees Russia as a Eurasian power that straddles Europe and Asia. India also appreciates Russia’s role in the Asian continent and its leadership of the Asian century. An Asian order will be incomplete and impossible without a central role of and for Russia. Without doubt Moscow understands geopolitics and strategy better than most in the world and it is the single most decisive actor in that sense. Russia has to reconcile with its Asian identity and embrace the continent more robustly. There are signs that this is happening.

IzvIndia, just like Russia has been a supporter of a multipolar world. In the this context, is the US push for the quadrilateral alliance comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US an attempt to disrupt this multipolar order? Beyond the general talk about the need for the largest democracies to unite, does the Quad have any substance?

SS: The Quad is an outcome of a multipolar world, where many countries are creating multiple coalitions that serve specific purpose and interests. The Quad is not incompatible with any other plurilateral or multilateral arrangement nor with the idea of dispersed power centres collaborating on specific issues. Quad is in its infancy and will require more political investments from the four capitals if it is to be a significant institution.

Izv: This week India will be preoccupied with the Parliamentary elections with outcome being far from predetermined. Can we say that Russia is an weather friend and partner for India regardless of which party will be in power? Or there are some nuances?

SS: Yes – A strong Russian relationship is a multi-party consensus. And irrespective of which party assumes power in India, the bilateral will continue to receive highest consideration.

Interview originally appeared in Izvestia

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