China, Indo-pacific, Raisina Dialogue, Research

Walking the walk of values-based diplomacy

Co-Authored with Amrita Narlikar

The talk of values is not new to German foreign policy-makers. But the Russian invasion on Ukraine seems to have finally led Germany to walk the walk. The last week has been both frenzied and path-breaking in German politics.

On 22 February, Germany’s Chancellor, Olaf Scholz—a Social Democrat from Hamburg—called for a halt to Nord Stream 2, in response to Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s, provocations in Eastern Ukraine. This was dramatic at several levels: Germany’s energy dependence on Russia had tended to make some politicians—including Scholz’s predecessor, Angela Merkel (a Christian Democrat)—wary of pulling the plug on the pipeline project. Scholz deserves even more credit for having made this break with Germany’s Russia policy in the context of party politics: The Social Democrats had come under critique in the past for being too soft on Russia (Russlandversteher).

Germany’s difficult past had led it to ban the export of weapons to conflict-zones; in keeping with this practice, the country had blocked Estonia from sending arms to Ukraine last month.

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine on 24 February, Olaf Scholz has taken three further remarkable steps. First, after some hesitation, he has agreed to the inclusion of a ban on SWIFT transactions with Russia. This is a strong and costly signal to send to Russia as it will also have financial implications for Germany. Second, Germany’s difficult past had led it to ban the export of weapons to conflict-zones; in keeping with this practice, the country had blocked Estonia from sending arms to Ukraine last month. Olaf Scholz engineered an unprecedented shift. In a stirring speech at a special session of the German Parliament on 27 February, Scholz stated that Germany, by supporting Ukraine, will stand on the side of Europe, democracy, and the “the right side of history”. Amongst the concrete measures he outlined, sending military supplies to Ukraine was key: “Russian invasion marks a turning point. It is our duty to support Ukraine to the best of our ability in defending against Putin’s invading army”. Germany will now be supplying anti-tank weapons and Stinger missiles to Ukraine. And third, just as significant is Germany’s announcement to increase its NATO defence spending, thereby signaling the emergence of Germany as a security actor.

In a country where deliberative democracy is exalted (sometimes to a point where it amounts to being a strategy to doing nothing or muddling through), and the burden of history is high, the swift turn towards taking greater responsibility through action cannot be underestimated. Scholz’s leadership has been critical to this development, though he is undoubtedly helped by his coalition partners in the Green Party, who have come to power on a platform of principles and values. Germany’s proactive role is invigorating for us to observe, and is perhaps also serving as a catalyst for the European Union: Witness the unprecedented decision by the EU to purchase weapons for Ukraine.

One could still take issue with the timing of all this: It would have indeed been better to signal such resolve to Putin before his attack on Ukraine, thereby, deterring war in the first place. But at a time when Germany seems to be finally walking the walk of values, it is time to not look behind, but fare forward.

Germany’s proactive role is invigorating for us to observe, and is perhaps also serving as a catalyst for the European Union: Witness the unprecedented decision by the EU to purchase weapons for Ukraine. 

It is clear that Scholz has understood the importance of hard power, in a way that his predecessors had not. As a dedicated European, he also knows that the Putin’s aggression towards Ukraine is a threat to European security as a whole. The question remains though, will he be able to extend his gaze to the global stage, and exercise much-needed leadership there? Putin is not the only authoritarian with grand designs in his neighbourhood; President Xi has been displaying similar adventurism towards Taiwan. The Ukraine crisis has brought these two players even closer, thus far. Will Scholz be the Chancellor to break out of the European platitudes of “partner, competitor, and rival” and finally call out China, just the way he has with Russia? As Mayor of Hamburg, Scholz was able to successfully attract Chinese investment to his city. As the Chancellor of Germany, he now has the onerous task of building a governance architecture that will secure the continent—and like-minded, democratic partners—from Chinese expansionism.

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Books / Papers, BRICS, China, COVID-19, Research

Stocktaking and Recommendations for Consolidation: Joint Academic Paper by ORF and RIS

As the BRICS passes through a crucial milestone of its existence, celebrating 15 years of its formation, this report examines the initiatives launched since inception and makes recommendations for consolidating and streamlining the agenda.

The BRICS remains a prominent grouping in the global governance architecture due to the individual influence of each member-state and the collective size of their economies. The confidence in BRICS from within and the perceptions outside the grouping are shaped by its successes in institution-building and resource mobilisation. The highlight of BRICS’s success is its strong focus on issues of financial stability and global governance reforms, particularly in areas related to macroeconomic stability. These are supplemented by attention to sustainable development issues backed by finance and technology.

The BRICS agenda has witnessed a steady expansion of its scope ever since its inception. During the initial years, the agenda was focused on responding to the trans-Atlantic financial crisis with a special focus on multilateralism, particularly the need to reform the international monetary and financial architecture. Subsequently, the BRICS established the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, two flagship financial initiatives that remain the biggest success stories of the plurilateral to date. Notably, with the outbreak of Covid19 in 2020, there has been a special focus on responding to the pandemic and coordinating recovery.

Given the expanding scope, there is a need for consolidation and streamlining of the BRICS agenda. This will help address structural deficiencies and facilitate the smooth coordination for building consensus on key issues. To realise these goals, a thorough review of the BRICS cooperation mechanisms is necessary. This joint academic study presents an assessment of the various tracks under the BRICS framework, such that the grouping can better pursue the collective agenda of economic cooperation and sustainable development.

The year 2021 has been significant, with the Indian presidency underscoring ‘BRICS@15: Intra-BRICS Cooperation for Continuity, Consolidation and Consensus’ as the theme. The aspect of ‘consolidation’ received special attention. The Indian presidency also helped in concretising several action areas that had remained dormant. A case in point is the Agriculture Research Platform proposed by India at the 2015 Ufa Summit with a memorandum of understanding signed during the Indian presidency in 2016. This was launched in the virtual format in 2021, again during India’s presidency.

India’s presidency of BRICS in 2021 has set a definite example for streamlining of the BRICS agenda. As the agenda consolidates, future presidencies will find room for emerging themes that require urgent attention. Consolidation does not always only mean weeding out weaker sprouts, but to have comprehensive approaches towards setting common goals so that even relatively weaker initiatives can be scaled with resources. A preliminary assessment of the initiatives launched by BRICS is presented in this report.

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Columns/Op-Eds, Politics / Globalisation, Writing

Banking on each other: India, Russia and the new era of global politics

This article was first published in The Economic Times Magazine

The narrative of a widening strategic gap between New Delhi and Moscow has been prevalent for some time now. Even within the strategic communities of Russia and India, there is an ongoing assessment of the importance of this bilateral engagement. Ahead of the upcoming India-Russia summit, this article delves into what is working for the relationship between the two nations, and what needs to be worked on.

It would be fair to say that the essential glue keeping the two together is strategic legacy. It is supplemented by a contemporary strand of political convergence in a world where both South Block and the Kremlin are actors, but also being acted upon.

One of India’s primary objectives in the coming decades is to prevent China’s hegemony in Asia. A multipolar world and a multipolar Asia are in its interest. Russia will strongly endorse this, and, for differing reasons, seek it. In its calculus, it would position the US as the principal protagonist to thwart. The Russians would not want to curtail China if that ends up enabling US influence. Therefore, there is a big picture convergence on a multipolar world order, even as India and Russia differ on relative roles of the poles shaping this order.

As of 2020, Russian weapons systems and equipment accounted for about 60 per cent of the inventory of the Indian armed forces.

This could change dramatically if Russia were to reach the conclusion that it is happy to sit in the court of the Emperor in Beijing as a junior partner. India sees this as unlikely. It hopes for a more independent Russian worldview that would not hesitate to differ with others, including China, in defence of its own interests. New Delhi is, therefore, continuing to invest substantially in this relationship, and in a number of areas.

The first and biggest is defence. As of 2020, Russian weapons systems and equipment accounted for about 60 per cent of the inventory of the Indian armed forces. While India is determinedly diversifying sourcing of military hardware, Russia remains a strong legacy player. Much of this is driven by spares and component upgrades. However, there have also been significant new ventures. These include the S-400 missile contract (on track for first deliveries this year); manufacture and co-production of four Project 1135.6 Frigates; manufacture of the world’s most advanced assault rifle – the AK-203 – under the ‘Make in India’ initiative; and additional deliveries of T-90s, Sukhoi-30 MKI, MiG-29, MANGO ammunition and VSHORAD systems. Russia is more involved with the ‘Make in India’ initiative in defence equipment than any other country.

Simultaneously, exercises have also increased in numbers and sophistication. As he demitted office as Indian Ambassador in Russia, DB Venkatesh Varma pointed out that the two nations were exploring different formats – including mobilisation of forces and their transportation across long distances, impact of drone technology on modern warfare, and impact of cyber on future of conflict. The landscape for doctrinal coordination and understanding is ever expanding.

India aims to increase import of oil from Russia, currently 1 per cent of all imports, to 4 or 5 per cent in the next five years.

The second area of convergence is energy. This includes not only hydrocarbons (oil and gas), but also nuclear. While India does import gas from Russia, a rapid increase is on the cards. If successful, the Vostok negotiations will bring India into one of the world’s biggest energy projects. India aims to increase import of oil from Russia, currently 1 per cent of all imports, to 4 or 5 per cent in the next five years. Another avenue is petrochemicals, where a Russian investment in the Paradip cracker plant and an Indian investment in Arctic LNG-2 are being explored.

With India announcing its net zero target date, the need to transition to greener energy sources has become imperative. A new Gas Task Force will bring in Russia as a major partner, including in the field of hydrogen.

The third area of mutual interest is high-technology. A proposal to establish a Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation is being explored. It would encompass hi-tech areas like quantum, nanotechnology, cyber, AI, robotics, space and bio-technology. Pharmaceuticals, digital finance, chemicals and ceramics are all potential economic drivers of the relationship. Each of these is at the core of the fourth industrial revolution.

The fourth area of significance is food security. India leasing land in the Russian Far East, and cultivating it with Indian labour, offers a tantalising prospect. Russia is going through a demographic crisis and has notable human resources deficits. China has leased thousands of hectares of land in the Russian Far East. This is cultivated by Chinese farmers, whose produce is partially sold in the Russian domestic market and partially exported to China.

A proposal to establish a Joint Commission on Science and Technology Cooperation is being explored. It would encompass hi-tech areas like quantum, nanotechnology, cyber, AI, robotics, space and bio-technology.

A similar strategy can be followed by India. The government could negotiate an enabling arrangement with Russia but leave it to the private sector to execute. The Chennai-Vladivostok maritime connectivity corridor enhances scope for such cooperation.

This strategy would be a genuine win-win. India would contribute to its food security by reducing load on its resources (land, water, electricity) and providing opportunities to its excess farm labour. For Russia, dependency on China would come down, giving Moscow the strategic leverage that it needs and wants.

And here is where India needs to answer a strategic question. Is it willing to invest in the Russia story just as we celebrate Russia’s engagement with “Make in India”? India must write itself into the development text of the Far East and other parts of Russia through investments and expertise. There could be no stronger foundation for the relationship.

There is also an urgent need to overcome some recent angularities. The first is Afghanistan. At least till 15 August 2021, India and Russia had a serious disagreement, with Moscow unabashedly flirting with the Taliban. While both countries want stability in Afghanistan and curbs on export of terrorism and drugs, the perception in New Delhi is Moscow’s negotiators with the Taliban ended up become negotiators for the Taliban. That is a credibility problem for Russia to ponder.

India must write itself into the development text of the Far East and other parts of Russia through investments and expertise.

The second divergence is on the Indo-Pacific. It boils down to lack of trust. Russia does not trust India vis-à-vis the US, and India hears Russia reading from China’s script. This is a challenge to be addressed. Either country is the other’s flexibility mechanism, an arrangement that has stood the test of time. Russia’s ‘Greater Eurasia’ project and the Indo-Pacific are complementary and describe the same emergence: Of a new political moment and of a political geography that will seek a new alignment of interests and actors. Even as India and Russia carve new relationships, their sturdy partnership is a bank guarantee for both.

President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India is only his second trip abroad since the beginning of the pandemic. The first was to Geneva earlier this summer, for a summit with President Joe Biden. Coming to New Delhi to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi is hugely symbolic and strategic. It indicates that the President knows India allows him a more equal partnership with China, even as Russia offers India room for its own endeavours.

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Research, Writing

Modern Geopolitics: A Race Through Chaos to Stability

Originally published in The Valdai Club. Co-authored with Aarshi Tirkey.

The third decade of the twenty-first century has compelled the world to face its most intractable challenge yet—offering a coherent, collective and equitable response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This has tested the faith of the most ardent internationalists, and is part of a deeper churn in the global order that was underway even before the first COVID-19 case was reported in Wuhan in 2019.

US hegemony has all but come to an end and the rise of a multipolar world has effected a redistribution of power at the global stage. American leadership, that would have been essential to catalysing collective action against the pandemic, bordered on wanting to island itself from the rest of the world much before former US President Trump launched the “America First” campaign. The utopian vision of interdependence and global cooperation had already taken a beating in Europe when Brexit demolished the ideological and institutional underpinnings of the European Union. And China, the other great power, was engaged in its project ‘Pax Sinica’, determined to make globalisation beneficial for its Communist party.

Global institutions had weakened, and the benefits of investing political will into their mechanisms had greatly receded. The coronavirus further exacerbated this: While nations scrambled to respond to this fast-spreading disease, their immediate reaction was to look inwards, go at it alone or with trusted partners, and engage with the international community only for self-serving purposes. At the end of the day, all were ‘Darwinian’ and privileged their own survival without consideration and care for others. This is typified by the perverse ‘Vaccine Access’ world map.

Global institutions had weakened, and the benefits of investing political will into their mechanisms had greatly receded. The coronavirus further exacerbated this: While nations scrambled to respond to this fast-spreading disease, their immediate reaction was to look inwards, go at it alone or with trusted partners, and engage with the international community only for self-serving purposes. At the end of the day, all were ‘Darwinian’ and privileged their own survival without consideration and care for others. This is typified by the perverse ‘Vaccine Access’ world map.

As such, the postwar liberal international order—underwritten by the West under US leadership—had been facing an existential crisis since the turn of the century, with wars in South and West Asia and the Financial Crisis all challenging the old arrangements and aiding the rise of `China as a new revisionist power. And then the Virus from Wuhan exploded on the world stage, accelerating the processes that were already influencing modern geopolitics, a few of which are discussed here.

The 3 R’s of Modern Geopolitics

The first is readjustment, as countries are grappling with the impact of the rise of new regional and global actors. The American century has waned, and the rise of the Asian century—home to the growing economies in the world—is well on its way. The biggest challenge to the global balance of power comes from China, which is set to be the first major economy to rebound after the pandemic With the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s close integration with global supply chains, and its advancements in civilian and military technologies—Beijing’s rise appears to be an inevitable reality, howsoever much its international behaviour instills distrust among many, particularly the US and some of its allies.

A contest is, therefore, inevitable. In President Biden’s interim National Security Strategy Guidance, the rise of both China and Russia is treated as a challenge to a stable and open international system. President Xi Jinping—for his part—recently declared that Beijing will never allow any foreign forces to bully, oppress or enslave China and the focus of the party would be “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Will the two global powers head for a confrontation or choose to opt for a peaceful coexistence with limited and contained disagreements? The outcome of the US-China rivalry remains to be seen, and countries caught at the intersection of this evolving dynamic must take into account how they readjust their approach to this new age of geopolitics. Russia too will be asked some tough questions and will have to make some difficult choices. Can a positive Biden-Putin engagement play a stabilising role in the 21st Century? Or is a China-Russia nexus inevitable?

The outcome of the US-China rivalry remains to be seen, and countries caught at the intersection of this evolving dynamic must take into account how they readjust their approach to this new age of geopolitics. Russia too will be asked some tough questions and will have to make some difficult choices

Second, the hard-won consensus on the frameworks underpinning multilateralism and globalisation is undergoing a dramatic restructuring. The 2008 global financial crisis, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, have exposed the fragility of global economic interdependence. The growth of hyper-nationalism and populist politics assess globalisation and multilateralism as arrangements that impinge on the sovereign choices of a state. As such, there is potential for the creation of a ‘gated globalisation’—a globalisation that is less free and less open than before. Economic policies are no longer solely dictated by economic principles; they are now guided by strategic considerations, political trust, climate, health and technological threats. Countries, such as the UK, US and India have introduced trade restrictions, investment screening mechanisms, sanctions and monetary policies to reflect these new considerations. China had already perfected their own model of perverse global integration.

The disillusionment with multilateralism can be directly attributed to institutional inertia, lack of reforms and capture by vested interests, which continue to hamper decision making before these organisations. Countries are, therefore, leaning towards smaller groupings to forge fluid, issue-specific partnerships, which can expedite cooperation between like-minded countries. While this can be one way to overcome the malaise of multilaterals, they may hamper the development of broader and cohesive international strategies for ‘global bads’—from COVID-19 to climate change—which require the participation and commitment of all. The pandemic is not over till all are vaccinated and secured and the threat of climate change is not going to recede by unilateral actions of any single state. The ongoing restructuring calls for the need for new arrangements that can redress the inefficiencies of multilateralism and globalisation, without diminishing their larger benefits. Can a ‘consortium of plurilaterals groupings’ agree to a common minimum framework to address the challenges that confront us all even as they engage within their own clubs to maximise their economy and security?

In the midst of this churn, geopolitics has been reoriented to accommodate new actors, and emerging factors and considerations. Modern geopolitics is increasingly influenced by geoeconomics and geo-technology. Important works, such as War by Other Means, talk of the systemic use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical objectives—a form of statecraft that was present during the Marshall plan, and is present today as well through China’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and more generally the BRI.

Modern geopolitics is increasingly influenced by geoeconomics and geo-technology. Important works, such as War by Other Means, talk of the systemic use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical objectives—a form of statecraft that was present during the Marshall plan, and is present today as well through China’s ‘chequebook diplomacy’ and more generally the BRI

If the medium is the message, then technology is the future of our politics. The advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has resulted in the development of technologies that can be both a boon and a bane for humankind. While America was at the forefront of technological leadership in the recent past, this is being challenged by China as it invests heavily in emerging and dual-use technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, and biotechnology. First movers may not only take the mantle of technological leadership, but will also become the providers for other countries, creating asymmetric dependencies. ‘GeoTech’ opens a new realm of interstate competition, where concerns of national security and strategic autonomy implicate technology choices and arrangements. In an increasingly digital world, the capture of data—and not territory—and the compromise of critical information infrastructure—and not state borders—are the new security challenges for nations. As an individual’s attention, eyeballs and personal data become the coveted political prize, will the next domain of conflict be the human form and how we will protect it?

New Actors, New Geographies

While the above factors remain at the heart of this churn, new actors and geographies are influencing the conduct of geopolitics. Though the coronavirus hearkened the return of the ‘nation-state’, communities across borders represent a robust challenge to this primary unit of Westphalian sovereignty. The concentration of economic resources and power in global technology companies, from Twitter to Tencent, has driven home the fact that states are no longer the primary actors in the world. Hate, tribalism and irrational ideologies have returned with new vigour, riding on the reach and amplification of digital technologies. Technology giants are now the arbiters of economic and political choices and are challenging the writ of the older political systems.

The emergence of new geographies, such as the Indo-Pacific, Eurasia and the Arctic—in which all regional and global powers have stakes—demand the genesis of new norms, institutions and partnerships. In a universally parochial world, there is limited appetite or leadership to shape and create these. In sum, the pandemic confirmed the decline of the US as a superpower and sharpened questions on Beijing’s moral and political capability to step into the void. Even with its attendant equity and efficiency losses, the importance of‘multi-polarity’—first ideated by Primakov through the Russia, India and China trilateral mechanism—received a resolute confirmation. It has urged that we appreciate this shifting nature of global and domestic affairs to be able to adapt to an increasingly complex world, that is no longer tethered to a conventional understanding of geopolitics.

While the ability to project power globally resides with the US, the world is steadily moving towards political, economic, technological and normative multipolarity. The evolving contours of modern geopolitics is still in a state of flux, and there is wisdom in accepting the notion that the end result is perhaps indeterminable. The age of disruption is here, countries that thrive on disorder may do well in the short term, while nations who invest in stability may well define the future of globalisation and, indeed, the new world order.

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