Digital Sovereignty, India Digital Infrastructure, India Satellite communication policy, Starlink India, Writing

Orbits, Oligarchs and the Republic

When the world’s richest man complains about oligarchs on a platform he owns, the mirror may be the better place to look

Last week, the world’s richest man told 1.4 billion Indians that they were victims of a crime. The culprits, Elon Musk announced on X, were “certain oligarchs” blocking Starlink to keep their grip on the Indian market. He named no one and offered no evidence, and he invited us to guess. The post was built to travel, and it did. With it, the entrepreneur slipped out of orbit and into ad hominem.

Begin with what India has actually built. A phone call here costs about three paise a minute, and a gigabyte of data roughly nine rupees, among the lowest prices anywhere on earth. More than a billion Indians carry a mobile connection, and the average Indian smartphone consumes some 32 gigabytes a month against a global average of 19. An American pays many times more for the same gigabyte. Affordable voice and data for 1.4 billion people is the India story, written through fierce competition, public digital infrastructure and patient policy.

If Mr Musk is searching for a connectivity crime, he might begin at home. Starlink faces no oligarchs in America and has operated freely there for years. Yet residents of upstate New York have reported more than four thousand dead zones, and the story repeats from the hollows of Appalachia to the ranchlands of the Great Plains. Washington’s own map still counts more than fourteen million American homes and businesses without 5G. When the regulator drive-tested rural networks, it found maps that oversold coverage, promising signal where there was none. Perhaps that is what happens when the powerful write the rules in Washington and answer to no one. Perhaps Starlink, and its founder, might connect America first before lecturing India on its villages.

Even on its own terms, his charge against India does not survive contact with the facts. The decisive policy fight in Indian satellite communications was over how spectrum should be allocated. India settled it in Starlink’s favour, choosing administrative allocation over an auction despite fierce objections from the incumbent telecom operators. If oligarchs were writing the rules, they wrote them remarkably badly.

One might also ask who the oligarch in this story really is. The richest man in history owns the rockets, the satellites, the social network on which he levelled the charge, and a direct line to the White House. If anyone holds a monopolistic chokehold on a conversation, it is the man who owns the platform and the orbit. When the world’s richest man complains about oligarchs on a platform he owns, the mirror may be the better place to look.

What remains between Starlink and Indian customers is a security review, which the Ministry of Communications says applies equally to all three prospective operators. Each must meet the same conditions before it can seek spectrum. That review deserves a serious defence. Satellite internet bypasses the terrestrial chokepoints that make lawful oversight possible. A terminal in a remote valley is a lifeline. The same terminal in an insurgent camp is a problem for the state.

Infrastructure that carries a nation’s data, finance and emergency communications is strategic infrastructure. We would not hand over a port, a power grid or a strategic petroleum reserve on the strength of a social media post. Orbital networks deserve the same care.

There is a larger pattern worth naming. A small number of technology owners now command networks, orbits and audiences larger than most nations. Increasingly, they treat national law as an opening bid, and their own platforms as a lever on governments. Musk’s X has already gone to court against the Indian government over content rules. The Starlink post belongs to the same playbook: frame due process as a conspiracy, cast the regulator as the villain, and let the crowd do the lobbying.

Infrastructure that carries a nation’s data, finance and emergency communications is strategic infrastructure. We would not hand over a port, a power grid or a strategic petroleum reserve on the strength of a social media post. Orbital networks deserve the same care.

I warned some years ago that runaway platforms and cowboy capitalism would become the defining governance challenge of the digital age. The argument then was that intermediary liability must give way to intermediary responsibility. Platforms that shape the public life of a nation have to answer to that nation’s laws and constitutional ethic. Orbital internet raises the stakes further, because the infrastructure literally sits above the reach of national borders.

The episode matters well beyond India. Starlink has just launched a direct-to-mobile service in Bangladesh, and the UAE granted it a ten-year licence in August. Across the Global South, governments will negotiate the terms on which orbital networks enter their skies. India’s approach offers a template worth sharing: welcome the capability, insist on accountability, and apply the same rules to the foreign giant and the domestic champion. A technology must answer to the geography it serves.

India has managed far heavier pressure than a viral post. It spent four decades building a self-reliant nuclear programme under sanctions, and it built the world’s most widely used public digital infrastructure without asking anyone’s permission. It will connect its last village on its own terms, with partners who accept that a republic’s rules are its foundation.

Starlink is welcome in India. Its founder’s impatience is his own affair. President Musk may own the White House dinner table, and he may be the most favoured oligarch of the Western Hemisphere, yet his place at that table comes with no free pass to every capital on earth. Some nations are still sovereign. The sky above India may be open, but the rules beneath it are written in New Delhi.

Source : Originally appeared in MoneyControl.

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Geopolitics, Global Security, international affairs, Writing

The New Global Security Stakeholders: How Public-Private Cooperation Can Advance Security and Stability

September 15, 2026

Global security is increasingly complicated by conflicts, technologies and geopolitical developments, underscoring the need for new models of multistakeholder cooperation. Institutional partnerships between the public and private sectors will be crucial for protecting global stability and de-escalating conflict.

Originally Published in World Economic Forum

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Energy, Energy Efficiency, India, Writing

Energy Efficiency: India’s Next Strategic Power Resource

Samir Saran | Parul Bakshi

Indian philosophical traditions have long warned against excess without rejecting prosperity. ‘Aparigraha’, restraint in possession, does not demand denial but calls for mindful use. Reimagined for a modern energy economy, it offers a strategic insight: efficiency is not austerity but disciplined abundance.

As India engages with another season of record electricity demand – with peak power requirement expected to touch 300 GW in 2027 – the policy instinct is familiar: more generation, stronger grids, larger storage, faster transmission. However, in an era shaped by climate extremes and geopolitical uncertainty, how well a nation uses energy may matter as much as how much it produces.

India’s rising energy demand is a marker of development. Per-capita electricity consumption climbed to about 1,538 kWh in 2025, and demand is projected to grow a further 6% annually this decade. Cooling demand alone could account for nearly 1/3rd of peak load by 2030, with peak demand rising by more than 7 GW for every additional degree of daily average temperature.

Without major efficiency gains in buildings, appliances and cooling, this risks locking in higher generation needs and deeper grid stress for decades, since what is built today shapes demand for a generation. Efficiency is now a time-critical determinant of whether India’s energy future now stays affordable, stable and secure. The strategic question, therefore, is not whether India should consume more energy, but whether each additional unit can contribute more efficiently towards national growth.

Energy efficiency in India is treated as a technical intervention, rather than an instrument of national strategy. Mega-projects command visibility, financing and urgency, efficiency-driven avoided demand is less politically appealing, although even more vital.

Governance remains fragmented across ministries, regulators, utilities and states, with no institutional centre capable of elevating efficiency to core infrastructure. Capital, too, flows far more readily toward generation than efficient consumption, an imbalance increasingly at odds with fuel shocks, supply disruptions, climate-driven demand spikes and accelerating electrification, all redefining energy security.

In such a landscape, the most strategic unit of energy is not the MW newly produced but the MW never required. Saved energy is immediate, domestic and largely immune to geopolitical risk, an instrument of resilience and sovereign power that determines not only how India grows but how securely it does.

Energy security is often framed through availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability. Efficiency is one of the few interventions capable of strengthening all 4 at once.

Availability

Rapid growth in cooling demand could push ACs alone to account for close to 30% of projected electricity needs. According to some calculations, stronger efficiency standards can help avoid up to 60 GW of peak demand while saving consumers tens of billions of dollars. In effect, efficiency creates new ‘virtual capacity’ faster and more economically.

Accessibility and affordability

Efficient appliances and cooling technologies cut household bills and system-wide costs, while lower peak demand reduces the need for costly backup generation, storage and grid expansion. UJALA illustrates the potential, where more than 36 cr LED bulbs have generated 48 bn kWh in annual savings and cut consumer expenditure by over ₹19,000 cr each year. Acceptability, the climate dimension, follows naturally: meeting cooling and comfort needs with less energy cuts emissions and infrastructure pressure without constraining growth.

Acceptability

India has built a broad efficiency policy ecosystem. Programmes such as UJALA LED, the market-based Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme, and Standards and Labelling have demonstrated the potential of demand-side efficiency at scale, while the Energy Conservation Building Code, Eco-Niwas Samhita, and Green Rating for Integrated Habitat Assessment have sought to embed efficiency into the buildings shaping India’s urban future. India already has many of the tools. Few strategies improve all 4    pillars of energy security with comparable speed and economic logic. That combination makes efficiency foundational to energy policy, that is forward looking.

If efficiency is to function as infrastructure rather than aspiration, India must move from dispersed programmes to deliberate strategy, in 3 steps:

  • Embed efficiency explicitly within India’s energy-security architecture, alongside generation, grids and storage, as a core planning resource.
  • Govern the coming wave of urban construction, cooling deployment and digital infrastructure with performance standards that prevent decades of inefficient demand from locking into the system.
  • Accelerate market mechanisms, from demand response and utility incentives to scalable financing, so private capital flows toward optimising consumption with the same confidence as new capacity.

Efficiency is not simply a strategic resource. Every unit saved reduces future infrastructure needs, moderates import dependence and strengthens resilience. Making efficiency strategic is an exercise in long-term statecraft. Nations that learn to do more with less will shape the resilience of the 21st-c. energy order.

Appeared Originally in Economic Times,

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