Cyber and Internet Governance, Cyber and Technology, European Union, India, media and internet, tech and media, USA and Canada

AI, Democracy, and the Global Order

Future historians may well mark the second half of March 2023 as the moment when the era of artificial intelligence truly began. In the space of just two weeks, the world witnessed the launch of GPT-4, Bard, Claude, Midjourney V5, Security Copilot, and many other AI tools that have surpassed almost everyone’s expectations. These new AI models’ apparent sophistication has beaten most experts’ predictions by a decade.

For centuries, breakthrough innovations – from the invention of the printing press and the steam engine to the rise of air travel and the internet – have propelled economic development, expanded access to information, and vastly improved health care and other essential services. But such transformative developments have also had negative implications, and the rapid deployment of AI tools will be no different.

AI can perform tasks that individuals are loathe to do. It can also deliver education and health care to millions of people who are neglected under existing frameworks. And it can greatly enhance research and development, potentially ushering in a new golden age of innovation. But it also can supercharge the production and dissemination of fake news; displace human labor on a large scale; and create dangerous, disruptive tools that are potentially inimical to our very existence.

Specifically, many believe that the arrival of artificial general intelligence (AGI) – an AI that can teach itself to perform any cognitive task that humans can do – will pose an existential threat to humanity. A carelessly designed AGI (or one governed by unknown “black box” processes) could carry out its tasks in ways that compromise fundamental elements of our humanity. After that, what it means to be human could come to be mediated by AGI.

A carelessly designed AGI (or one governed by unknown “black box” processes) could carry out its tasks in ways that compromise fundamental elements of our humanity.

Clearly, AI and other emerging technologies call for better governance, especially at the global level. But diplomats and international policymakers have historically treated technology as a “sectoral” matter best left to energy, finance, or defense ministries – a myopic perspective that is reminiscent of how, until recently, climate governance was viewed as the exclusive preserve of scientific and technical experts. Now, with climate debates commanding center stage, climate governance is seen as a superordinate domain that comprises many others, including foreign policy. Accordingly, today’s governance architecture aims to reflect the global nature of the issue, with all its nuances and complexities.

As discussions at the G7’s recent summit in Hiroshima suggest, technological governance will require a similar approach. After all, AI and other emerging technologies will dramatically change the sources, distribution, and projection of power around the world. They will allow for novel offensive and defensive capabilities, and create entirely new domains for collision, contest, and conflict – including in cyberspace and outer space. And they will determine what we consume, inevitably concentrating the returns from economic growth in some regions, industries, and firms, while depriving others of similar opportunities and capabilities.

Importantly, technologies such as AI will have a substantial impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, our relationships, the issues we care about, and even our most dearly held beliefs. With its feedback loops and reliance on our own data, AI models will exacerbate existing biases and strain many countries’ already tenuous social contracts.

That means our response must include numerous international accords. For example, ideally we would forge new agreements (at the level of the United Nations) to limit the use of certain technologies on the battlefield. A treaty banning lethal autonomous weapons outright would be a good start; agreements to regulate cyberspace – especially offensive actions conducted by autonomous bots – will also be necessary.

Technologies such as AI will have a substantial impact on fundamental rights and freedoms, our relationships, the issues we care about, and even our most dearly held beliefs.

New trade regulations are also imperative. Unfettered exports of certain technologies can give governments powerful tools to suppress dissent and radically augment their military capabilities. Moreover, we still need to do a much better job of ensuring a level playing field in the digital economy, including through appropriate taxation of such activities.

As G7 leaders already seem to recognize, with the stability of open societies possibly at stake, it is in democratic countries’ interest to develop a common approach to AI regulation. Governments are now acquiring unprecedented abilities to manufacture consent and manipulate opinion. When combined with massive surveillance systems, the analytical power of advanced AI tools can create technological leviathans: all-knowing states and corporations with the power to shape citizen behavior and repress it, if necessary, within and across borders. It is important not only to support UNESCO’s efforts to create a global framework for AI ethics, but also to push for a global Charter of Digital Rights.

The thematic focus of tech diplomacy implies the need for new strategies of engagement with emerging powers. For example, how Western economies approach their partnerships with the world’s largest democracy, India, could make or break the success of such diplomacy. India’s economy will probably be the world’s third largest (after the United States and China) by 2028. Its growth has been extraordinary, much of it reflecting prowess in information technology and the digital economy. More to the point, India’s views on emerging technologies matter immensely. How it regulates and supports advances in AI will determine how billions of people use it.

Engaging with India is a priority for both the US and the European Union, as evidenced by the recent US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and the EU-India Trade and Technology Council, which met in Brussels this month. But ensuring that these efforts succeed will require a reasonable accommodation of cultural and economic contexts and interests. Appreciating such nuances will help us achieve a prosperous and secure digital future. The alternative is an AI-generated free for all.

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China, India, international affairs, Neighbourhood, Russia, Strategic Studies

The new world – shaped by self-interest

A series of far-reaching events are shaping the 21st century. The current conflict in Ukraine, while grabbing headlines and engrossing the G7 summit in Hiroshima, may not seem as pivotal if one is situated in a different part of the world. To most, this is still a festering neighbourhood conflict that Europe must manage. It does not animate lives everywhere; neither does it shape anxieties or future partnerships.

India, Africa and Latin America are not indifferent to the crisis in Europe. They simply have more pressing matters to attend to — the imperatives of nation building being the most urgent. That they now also must navigate the collateral impact of the war makes them all but an interested party.

The first lesson from global reactions to the war is geography still matters. East-West and North-South binaries may be captivating, but proximity and the neighbourhood are considerably more important. We may be hyper-globalised, but we are also more local than ever before. Social media, trends in technology and politics, and a host of other factors have bracketed us into narrow spheres of interest. Thus, while India respects Europe’s difficulties, for it the 2020s began not with Ukraine but with Chinese aggression, the virus from Wuhan and the surrender of Kabul.

Social media, trends in technology and politics, and a host of other factors have bracketed us into narrow spheres of interest.

The second lesson pertains to the UN vote condemning the Ukraine war. Of the 140 countries that voted and condemned Russia, only a fraction sanctioned Russia. Studying the list of countries that were the earliest to receive vaccines in the pandemic could prove to be productive. It might explain which countries have sanctioned Russia. It will also offer valuable lessons about globalisation, its hierarchy and therefore, its discontents. Those sanctioning Russia today are not merely the victors of World War II, but also of globalisation and development. Others are well within their rights to challenge the status quo.

It is often stated, unthinkingly, that India is on the fence. India is not on the fence — it is only standing its ground. It will choose its priorities just as every other country has done. The recent spate of visits by European leaders to China shows that value-based frameworks are untenable. Nations are driven by self-interest and in this case, the need to maintain lucrative economic relations. India is no different. Even as it confronts the Chinese on the Himalayan heights, trade continues where the economy needs it. Distance matters; interest matters even more.

The third lesson derives cumulatively from four recent events: The pandemic; the fallout of the Doha Agreement and the abandoning of Afghanistan; the Chinese aggression on India’s borders; and new sanction regimes and their impact on the loosely termed “Global South”. The Covid-19 outbreak saw the overt hijack of medical equipment and access to vaccines, and growing gaps in treatment capabilities.

Nations are driven by self-interest and in this case, the need to maintain lucrative economic relations.

Indeed, when the pandemic struck, there was no superpower, there was no great power, and there was no big power.  There were only selfish powers. Similarly, the Afghan people were betrayed and abandoned because it was expedient for higher powers to flee the country at a particular moment. And Chinese territorial incursions have provoked a range of self-serving responses from different actors otherwise keen to defend democracy.

Put bluntly, there is no moral high ground. All that remains is the ruthless pursuit of national self-interest. Two actors epitomised this approach in the 1960s and 1970s, one actor in the 1980s and 1990s, and several new voices have joined the fray in this century.

If meaningful international dialogue is to be conducted, nations must right-size some of their perceptions about each other and themselves. In this context, the tendency to frame the Global South as a possible bridge actor between competing positions has its merits. But the “Global South” is itself a deeply reductive term, which elides the group’s innate heterogeneity. Very few countries would like to be categorised as “southern” as they continue to rise and shape global systems. Five years from now, Brazil and India might bristle at such a label themselves.

The neatly packaged idea of the Global South fails to recognise that there will soon be far more decisive swings within the group than outside it. How the countries of the South organise themselves over the next decade will have a far more profound impact than the West on the global balance of power, and on the contours of the new world order. As this century progresses, an East and West will emerge within the Global North and South.

LLPs will come to constitute the geometry of politics, and countries will work together on specific issues, for specific purposes, and for specific outcomes.

Concomitantly, international engagements of the future will organise themselves around the standard operating principle of law firms — as limited liability partnerships (LLPs). LLPs will come to constitute the geometry of politics, and countries will work together on specific issues, for specific purposes, and for specific outcomes. With the transition to the new LLP ethos of geopolitics, we will not be burdened by the need to focus on anything other than the narrowly defined collaborative interest at hand, and can build relationships that are more strategic, if also more transactional. This is a gritty, realist world. We may not like it, but it’s here — and here to stay.

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Africa, climate change, Energy, India, international affairs, USA and Canada

The just transition framework is unjust

The idea of a “just transition” away from fossil fuels is now a common refrain in the climate debate. However, what constitutes such a transition remains narrow, ambiguous and difficult to apply in most contexts. The current framework, originating from the Global North, emphasises the “just” need to provide alternative “green jobs” to coal workers at risk from the desired energy transition; in other words, it seeks to replace coal power plants with green energy sources and minimise its societal collateral. In contrast, the developing world may want to focus on a more comprehensive economy-wide transformation, linking just transitions to broader issues of energy security, poverty reduction, and climate finance.

Despite this gap in ambitions and aspirations, the G7 has recently been pushing a new international mechanism for implementing just transitions in emerging economies — Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-P). These arrangements demand ambitious coal phase-out targets from recipient countries in exchange for G7 financial support. The “just” component includes social considerations during the transition. Already South Africa ($8.5 billion), Indonesia ($20 billion), and Vietnam ($15.5 billion) have signed onto JET-Ps.

India has repeatedly declined to engage on this issue due to a substantial disconnect between the G7 and its idea of what constitutes a “just transition”. India has strongly opposed the demand to include specific targets for phasing out coal, reiterating that any deal which requires a potential tradeoff between development and decarbonisation cannot be considered “just”, as growth and development gains in the G7 countries have been and still continue to rely on fossil fuels.

The coal sector in India employs an estimated 3.6 million people (direct and indirect), compared to around 100,000 workers in South Africa.

The nature of India’s coal economy does not lend itself to the existing structure of JET-P deals. The coal sector in India employs an estimated 3.6 million people (direct and indirect), compared to around 100,000 workers in South Africa. The impact of an unplanned transition would be substantially larger in India. Moreover, JET-P benefits are unlikely to reach the more vulnerable informal, low-income, and non-unionised workers in the sector.

Finally, the current JET-P relies heavily on loans, which are not well suited to address the social aspects of the transition. Providing alternative livelihoods for coal workers will necessitate an economic transformation of coal-dependent districts and re-skilling of coal workers, which will require grant-based and concessional financing.

The G7 countries will continue to struggle to reach a deal with India unless they can reimagine what constitutes “just” and what may be an optimal “transition”. To resolve this, there is a need to preserve the ethic of animating JET-Ps while being open to operationalising these in discreet ways for specific geographies. The focus, therefore, must be on deploying funds to enable transformative change that complements existing decarbonisation efforts, creates the maximum bang for the buck, and crowds in a flow of capital larger than the footprint of the scheme. And most importantly, rather than obsessing with coal, CO2 reduction must become the principal outcome.

For example, deploying even about $20 billion for a deal to phase out a few coal plants in India would only result in a small mitigation impact, and this, too, may fade in relative terms as funding dries up. The budgeted outlays could instead be deployed in other ways for more compelling outcomes.

India is showcasing great ambition in decarbonising several sectors of the economy. A similar amount deployed in these sectors can have a transformative impact by crowding in additional capital that aligns with India’s development agenda. This would also help position India as a solution provider for these sectors for other developing and emerging economies. Two areas, in particular, hold much promise for such a reconceptualised JET-P.

A JET-P for this sector could have a catalytic effect by directing funding towards augmenting R&D and developing a manufacturing base for climate-friendly technologies.

The cooling sector is one of these. Cooling demand in India is expected to increase eight-fold by 2038 as affordable thermal comfort will be closely linked to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. The World Bank estimates that a green cooling pathway could unlock a $1.6 trillion investment opportunity by 2040 with the potential to create a massive 3.7 million jobs. A JET-P for this sector could have a catalytic effect by directing funding towards augmenting R&D and developing a manufacturing base for climate-friendly technologies. India’s Cooling Action Plan would be boosted further by such financial flows.

Electric mobility is the second big opportunity. In 2022, India hit a million electric vehicle sales for the first time and is expected to become a $100-billion industry by 2030. India already has multiple policies in place to create a complete EV ecosystem, covering vehicle manufacturing, batteries, and charging infrastructure. A JET-P could look to aid these efforts and channel investments to nascent EV segments, such as long-distance freight and passenger transport. JET-Ps could also explore options to utilise grant-based funding for the reskilling of millions of workers currently employed in the ICE ecosystem.

In sum, the G7 should adopt a smart and country-specific approach. Instead of using JET-Ps to further its own agenda, it must look to prioritise the delivery of transformative agreements that align with the recipient countries’ objectives for significant and lasting impact.

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