Cyber and Internet Governance, Cyber and Technology, Democratic Countries, Digital India, Infrastructure, tech and media

Digital Public Infrastructure – lessons from India

Public infrastructure has been a cornerstone of human progress. From the transcontinental railways of the nineteenth century to telecommunication in the twentieth century, infrastructure has been vital to facilitating the flow of people, money and information. Built on top of public infrastructure, democratic countries with largely free markets have fostered public and private innovation and, therefore, generated considerable value creation in societies.

In the twenty-first-century, technological innovation has created a tempest of ideological, geographical and economic implications that pose new challenges. The monopolisation of public infrastructure, which plagued previous generations, has manifested itself in the centralised nature of today’s digital infrastructure. It is increasingly evident that the world needs a third type of public infrastructure, following modes of transport such as ports and roads, and lines of communication such as telegraph or telecom – but with open, democratic principles built in.

​​Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) can fulfil this need, though it faces several challenges. There is a disturbing trend of the weaponisation of data and technology – or “Digital Colonisation” (Hicks, 2019) – resulting in a loss of agency, sovereignty and privacy. Therefore, proactively deliberating on how to build good DPI is key to avoiding such challenges.

The monopolisation of public infrastructure, which plagued previous generations, has manifested itself in the centralised nature of today’s digital infrastructure.

To begin with, it is important to crystallise what DPI is and what it does. Put simply, foundational DPIs mediate the flow of people, money and information. First, the flow of people through a digital ID System. Second, the flow of money through a real-time fast payment system. And third, the flow of personal information through a consent-based data sharing system to actualise the benefits of DPIs and to empower the citizen with a real ability to control data. These three sets become the foundation for developing an effective DPI ecosystem.

India, through India Stack[1], became the first country to develop all three foundational DPIs: digital identity (Aadhar[2]), real-time fast payment (UPI[3]) and a platform to safely share personal data without compromising privacy (Account Aggregator built on the Data Empowerment Protection Architecture or DEPA) (Roy, 2020). Each DPI layer fills a clear need and generates considerable value across sectors.

However, like in the case of physical infrastructure, it is important that DPIs not succumb to monopolisation, authoritarianism and digital colonisation. This can only happen through a jugalbandi (partnership) of public policy and public technology, i.e., through a techno-legal framework. Techno-legal regulatory frameworks are used to achieve policy objectives through public-technology design. For example, India’s DEPA offers technological tools for people to invoke the rights made available to them under applicable privacy laws. Framed differently, this techno-legal governance regime embeds data protection principles into a public-technology stack.

When aggregated, foundational DPIs constitute the backbone of a country’s digital infrastructure. These layers interface with each other to create an ecosystem that facilitates seamless public service delivery and allows businesses to design novel solutions on top of the DPI layers. In turn, this enables the creation of Open Networks as not seen before. India is now developing such open networks for credit (Open Credit Enablement Network[4]), commerce (Open Network for Digital Commerce[5]), Open Health Services Network (UHI[6]) and many more. When DPIs are integrated, they can generate network effects to create these open networks for various sectors.

Following India’s successful experiment, there is a desire across the world to replicate it (Kulkarni, 2022)[7]. Countries can choose from three potential models to mediate the flow of people, money and information: the DPI model, Web3 and the Big Tech model. Of these three, DPI has emerged as the most feasible model due to its low cost, interoperability and scalable design, and because of its safeguards against monopolies and digital colonisation.

For India’s DPI success to become a worldwide revolution, three types of institutions must be built. First, we need independent DPI steward institutions. It is important to have a governance structure that is agile and responsive. A multiparty governance process through independent DPI institutions will be accountable to a broad range of stakeholders rather than be controlled by a single entity or group. This can build trust and confidence in DPI. India has created the Modular Open Source Identity Platform (MOSIP[8]), adopted by nine nations and with already more than 76 million active users. MOSIP is housed at the International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore (IITB), an independent public university. IIITB’s stewardship has been critical to MOSIP’s success.

A multiparty governance process through independent DPI institutions will be accountable to a broad range of stakeholders rather than be controlled by a single entity or group.

Secondly, we need to develop global standards through a multilateral dialogue led by India. If standards originating from developed nations were transplanted to an emerging economies’ context without deferring to their developmental concerns, smaller countries would simply be captive to dominant technology players. Additionally, without these standards, Big Tech would likely engage in regulatory arbitrage to concentrate power.

Finally, we need to develop sustainable financing models for developing DPI for the world. Currently backed by philanthropic funding, such models are at risk of becoming a tool of philanthropic competition and positioning.
The world needs a new playbook for digital infrastructure that mediates the flow of people, money and information. This will facilitate countries looking to digitally empower their citizens. They can then rapidly build platforms that address the specific needs of people, while ensuring people are able to trust and use the platform – without fear of exclusion or exploitation.

References

Hicks, J. (2019) ‘Digital Colonialism’: Why countries like India want to take control of data from Big Tech, ThePrint.  (Accessed: January 25, 2023).

Kulkarni, S. (2022) Emerging economies keen to replicate India’s Digital Transformation: Kant, ETCIO. The Economic Times. (Accessed: February 3, 2023).

Roy, A. (2020) Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture: Draft for Discussion. NITI Aayog. (Accessed: January 25, 2023).

Notes:

[1] See https://indiastack.org

[2] See https://uidai.gov.in/en/

[3] See https://www.npci.org.in/what-we-do/upi/product-overview

[4] See https://indiastack.org/open-networks.html

[5] See https://ondc.org/

[6] See https://uhi.abdm.gov.in/

[7] See https://mosip.io/

[8] See https://mosip.io/

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Development, Digital Finance, G 20, India, international affairs, Narendra Modi, Sustainable Development

India will prioritise data for development at G20

At the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Bali last month, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi pledged that the principle of “data for development” will be integral to India’s G20 presidency. New Delhi’s commitment to this principle and its vision of strengthening it through international cooperation are already apparent. The first side event of the G20 Development Working Group under the Indian presidency, held in Mumbai on Tuesday, addressed the theme “Data for development: The role of the G20 in advancing the 2030 Agenda”. Amitabh Kant, India’s G20 Sherpa, emphasised that the country’s strategic use of data for governance and public service delivery in its aspirational districts, for instance, has, in three years, wrought a transformation that would otherwise have taken six decades. Data has also powered India’s pandemic response, innovations in education, health care, and food security, and enabled digital financial inclusion at a near-population scale.

As a group composed of developed and developing nations, the G20 presents a microcosm of what a concerted global effort to achieve Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) might resemble. If the G20is to help accelerate progress towards SDGs, it must vigorously pursue two kinds of data-driven interventions: Rejuvenating legacy datasets using Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data analytics, thus converting data to intelligence; and using cutting-edge emerging tech — including drones, geospatial mapping, and AI — to generate futuristic new datasets.

The country is about to launch a major data initiative as a part of which it will share anonymised data sets collected under the National Data Governance Framework with the AI ecosystem, and the research and startup communities.

In both areas, India has much to offer the world. The country is about to launch a major data initiative as a part of which it will share anonymised data sets collected under the National Data Governance Framework with the AI ecosystem, and the research and startup communities. This vast database will be used to train AI models, catalyse innovation, and craft more effective policy and on-ground solutions. In May, NITI Aayog launched the groundbreaking National Data and Analytics Platform to democratise access to public government data by making datasets accessible and interoperable, and providing accompanying tools for analytics and visualisation. Each of these initiatives builds upon the PM’s vision of a Digital India characterised by a digitally empowered society and tech-enabled knowledge economy.

The creation of entirely new datasets is also exploding in India. Drones are scanning the country’s terrain in minute detail, and this aerial footage is being combined with other kinds of data to create extraordinarily detailed maps. Data generated by drones is also revolutionising agriculture and helping transform existing cities into smart cities. The World Economic Forum estimates that the new data economy resulting from drones could boost India’s Gross Domestic Product by $100 billion and create nearly half a million jobs in the coming years.

Indeed, India is rapidly emerging as a world leader in the geospatial sector. Addressing the United Nations World Geospatial Information Congress in Hyderabad in October, PM Modi emphasised that geospatial technology is a “tool for inclusion” that has been “driving progress” and established itself as an enabler across development sectors. In fact, this is a space in which India has already begun to support its South Asian neighbours with communications and connectivity.

Across nations, data must be emancipated from its current silos, and progressively larger volumes of data must be made public and easily discoverable.

As India and its G20 partners forge collaborations centred on data for development, they should adhere to certain core principles. Across nations, data must be emancipated from its current silos, and progressively larger volumes of data must be made public and easily discoverable. To be used effectively, data must be simple, high-quality, and offered in real-time. A culture of experimentation and innovation must be fostered around data operations, and countries must invest in tools for analysing datasets in creative ways. To enhance outcomes, constructive competition could be promoted among stakeholders in the data ecosystem.

Two crucial tasks lie before the G20. Its members will have to try and arrive at a common understanding of sensitive and non-sensitive data, and to reflect on frameworks that could help share data across borders. There is an in-principle consensus that open repositories should be built where nations can store public-value data. But a prudent balance will need to be struck between the imperatives of data sovereignty and protection, and the notion of a data commons that could benefit the global community. Ultimately, the G20’s data regulations should embed the norm of reciprocity — nations should be able to share and benefit from development data.

A culture of experimentation and innovation must be fostered around data operations, and countries must invest in tools for analysing datasets in creative ways.

As 2030 nears, the Indian presidency could be an inflection point for the G20’s deliberations around data for development. Since 2019, the theme’s importance has been consistently reaffirmed by G20 leaders, and the recent Japanese, Saudi Arabian, Italian and Indonesian presidencies have all recognised that the wealth of data produced by digitalisation must be harnessed. But government-to-government dialogue must increasingly be supplemented by systematic engagements with the private sector, civil society, women and young people, if data-led empowerment is to be mainstreamed. This is a key element India could underscore in the G20 playbook, thus shaping past achievements and present priorities into what could become a part of the grouping’s legacy to the world.

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G 20, G20, Writing

Thinking Progress: Making ‘G20’ Fit for 2020s

With India’s presidency of the G20 commencing, it would be an understatement to suggest India would be at the helm of the most powerful plurilateral group at a very crucial moment in world history. Certitudes and certainties are words from the past. Ideology, geography, and demography are implicating and being acted upon by technological innovation, climate action, and economic volatility. Weaponisation of everything is the norm, as discord has replaced dialogue. This is the landscape confronting India’s Presidency, and this is where India may be the lighthouse in the tempest.

India is a civilisation that celebrates heterogeneity, shaped by multiple histories and incubated over millennia by a rich kaleidoscope of cultures. Over the past 75 years, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to accommodate and even thrive amidst differences. The adage, “unity in diversity”, is a truism for India, irrespective of the noise on social media platforms. This is an exemplar of what the world needs most today. If multilateralism is to work, G20 countries must work harder to make that happen, and strengthen dialogue within and with others. The ‘India Way’ will assist in this. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi reminded us in his monthly radio broadcast for November, “India must utilise the opportunity of G20 leadership by focusing on global good and welfare.”

India is a civilisation that celebrates heterogeneity, shaped by multiple histories and incubated over millennia by a rich kaleidoscope of cultures.

The Think20 and its Task Forces for G20 Engagement

The Think20 is a group of think tanks and scholars that form the “Ideas Hub” of the G20. This is an official engagement group, which supports the Sherpa Track and provides inputs to the G20 Leaders for their consideration. At a moment of global economic churn, it is an imperative to define a common G20 assessment and response framework to assist communities and countries in distress. Appropriately, a specially constituted Think20 task force will examine the relationship between trade and investment policy and global supply chains, and how national macroeconomic policies impact them. The task force will focus on the need for better monetary policy synchronisation with fiscal policies within and among nations. It will offer ideas on how to protect supply chains and trade from the negative impact of unilateral decisions that some countries have undertaken. As such, it will offer ideas and proposals to safeguard and catalyse jobs and livelihoods.

These discussions are happening against the backdrop of hyper digitalisation and the fourth industrial revolution. A Think20 task force will focus exclusively on Digital Public Infrastructure and its importance. It will examine accountable, affordable, and equitable digital evolution across sectors and find ways to make digital supply chains more resilient and decentralised. The purpose of this group of experts from various G20 countries is to discuss means to promote inclusive entrepreneurship, jobs, and livelihoods; social protection; and financial inclusion in the digital domain.

The task force will focus on the need for better monetary policy synchronisation with fiscal policies within and among nations.

Any such endeavour must consider planetary considerations and be part of the larger green transition. This will entail making transition financing more urgent and inclusive, and catalysing proliferation of key technologies and new energy solutions. A related task force will assess and discuss the role and reform of Multilateral Development Banks, the shape of innovative financial instruments and tools, and means to unlock the full potential of global private capital in emerging and developing countries. It will highlight an actionable outcome for the G20 to assist in these endeavours.

Macro-economic policies, trade and investment, and, indeed, green transitions and digitalisation must all have one core objective – the service of all humans and lifeforms, and of Planet Earth. Agenda 2030, and the quest to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), must now form part of the G20 as the presidency passes from Indonesia to India, and then to Brazil and South Africa. The G-20 has done reasonably well to protect banks and financial institutions; its challenge now is to serve “people and planet”.

A Think20 task force will focus on just this aspect. SDGs took a beating courtesy the pandemic and conflicts in various geographies. Changing climate and erratic weather patterns have added an additional burden. We are all acutely aware of the importance of societal resilience; and science, innovation, and technology facilitation for SDGs remain necessary means of implementation. These will form the crux of the G20 and T20 work during the year, in addition to emphasis on water security, promoting holistic outcomes in health and nutrition, gender-led development models and growth outcomes, and protecting biodiversity.

The task forces themselves will have more than 100 experts across themes and sectors, and will also see a vibrant pan-Indian participation from nearly 40 institutions across the country.

All of these will be attended to by a talent pool that ensures larger participation from G20 countries that were under-represented in past discussions. Voices from emerging geographies will take centre-stage. The task forces themselves will have more than 100 experts across themes and sectors, and will also see a vibrant pan-Indian participation from nearly 40 institutions across the country. A Global Advisory Committee will be established. It will include Think20 Chairs of past presidencies and distinguished think tank experts from upcoming presidencies. This group of elders will share its experiences and ambitions with the India-led process. In the end, the intellectual aggregation during India’s presidency will be qualitatively and quantitatively different from any previous year. With luck and effort, India would have changed the G20 lexicon and made it ready for the 2020s.

*Dr Samir Saran, President, Observer Research Foundation and Chair of Think-20 Secretariat

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India, international affairs, Political Economy

India takes charge on the world stage

In a historic moment, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi unveiled the logo, theme, and website of India’s Group of 20 (G20) presidency on Tuesday. The vision and objectives he outlined for India and the world have raised the already massive expectations from the presidency and further entrenched India as an architect of the global agenda. India’s assumption of the G20 presidency is consonant with the PM’s mission of undertaking leadership roles on the international stage that will allow the nation to steer change, engineer sustainability, champion the causes of emerging economies, and advance growth.

With PM Modi framing India’s imminent interventions at the G20 within the ethos of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family), there is every indication that the qualities of inclusiveness and cooperation for the common good will prevail. Major Indian climate initiatives have recently been set into motion with the invocation of Mata bhumiah putroham prithiviyah, signifying that the earth is our mother, and we are her children. Similarly, the names of initiatives, such as the One Sun, One World, One Grid programme that India will build upon with partners at G20, reflect a spirit of unity and a shared future. As the PM observed while unveiling the G20 logo, the lotus represents shared knowledge, prosperity, and hope. These ideas stem from India’s tradition of building consensus through dialogue.

The names of initiatives, such as the One Sun, One World, One Grid programme that India will build upon with partners at G20, reflect a spirit of unity and a shared future.

The very colours of the Indian flag on the logo assume a certain symbolic significance. Saffron has traditionally been associated with strength and courage, and these qualities are amply borne out by India’s pragmatic, bold stand on climate action. The PM has set about dismantling the West’s hollow and fitful climate commitments. His newly launched mission, LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment), aims to promote sustainable and healthy lifestyles. It will democratise efforts to tackle the climate crisis, going beyond policymaking and encouraging every individual to contribute to the climate response. PM Modi has become perhaps the first political leader to state upfront and honestly that climate action will require lifestyle changes and sacrifices. Hitherto, heads of government across the world, particularly in the West, have provided glib assurances of zero lifestyle and consumption compromises while still promising to fight the climate crisis. For that courageous mindset change alone, India’s G20 leadership provides hope.

The green of the Indian Tricolour symbolises the fertility of the land and the richness of its biodiversity. Equally, it appears to reflect the seriousness with which India has approached its green commitments. India’s annual per capita carbon footprint is well under 2 tonnes, about a fourth of China’s and one-eighth of that of the United States. Nonetheless, the country pledged ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions, committing to reduce the emissions intensity of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030, and, by the same year, install around 50% of electric power from energy resources that are not fossil-fuel-based.

Even as much of the global discourse around climate response continues to focus on mitigation, India’s G20 presidency will allow it to push the adaptation agenda. This will be especially important for developing nations as they struggle to adapt to emissions already released by industrially advanced countries. India must continue to counter the tendency of developed nations to hold their lessadvanced counterparts captive to their caprices. Climate justice and equity must become the norm.

India must continue to counter the tendency of developed nations to hold their lessadvanced counterparts captive to their caprices.

Reimagine the blue chakra (wheel) at the heart of the Tricolour as a blue earth in silhouette. The World Economic Forum has argued that G20 must promote a sustainable blue economy. Oceans, coasts, and the resources they harbour could act as engines of economic growth. G20 nations — which make up 45% of the world’s coastline and 21% of its exclusive economic zones — are extraordinarily well placed to foster blue development. As India leads the G20, its farsightedness about the blue economy could prove exemplary. India is finalising its national policy on the blue economy, a holistic plan to optimise all maritime sectors and develop coastal areas sustainably. Once ready, the policy could well serve as a model for other G20 nations.

Finally, India’s G20 presidency comes at a moment when the country is well on track to become a $5-trillion economy, despite the multiple challenges to growth caused by the pandemic. Technology is working for and with citizens to unleash unprecedented value and entrepreneurial potential. The resulting model is uniquely Indian. Not only has the nation emerged as the world’s first and largest truly digital democracy, but it is also catalysing the evolution of digital public goods, and citizens are producing value using them.

Digital payments in India could reach $10 trillion by 2026, and the country’s digital economy alone is expected to cross $800 billion by 2030. Boosting the global digital economy has been a core G20 objective. Helmed by India, the group will be able to draw on a wealth of cross-sectoral experience, technical expertise, and innovations that can be applied at scale.

Driven by political will, spurred by technological breakthroughs, and fuelled by an unusual optimism, 2023 will be a watershed year for India. There could not be a more consequential time to lead the comity of influential nations.

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China, climate change, Climate Disaster, climate sins, Commentaries, Cop 27, emissions, European Union

COP27: India can’t be expected to pay for climate sins of the West

The 27th Conference of Parties — COP27 — is once again the subject of enormous expectations. Will countries meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt be able to go beyond talk? Climate disasters are reaching unprecedented levels. And the impact has disproportionately fallen on low and middle-income countries like India. According to a UNDRR report, the proportion of climate-related natural disasters between 2000-2019 almost doubled from the previous two decades. Such disasters claimed 1.23 million lives and levied an economic cost of $2.97 trillion. Eight of the top 10 countries hit by these disaster events were developing countries from Asia.

Most global action revolves around efforts to “mitigate” climate change by reducing the volume of carbon emissions. Too little attention is paid to the developing countries’ need for “adaptation” to the effects of the carbon that is already in the atmosphere.

As with much else in the climate debate, this is deeply revealing of western hypocrisy. It is argued that climate change is so real and urgent that difficult, expensive action must be taken on mitigation, so as to cut emissions. Fair enough — but what about the real and urgent problems that people and economies are suffering due to emissions that have already happened? These emissions cannot be prevented or mitigated. Communities need support in adapting to them. Adaptation — including ‘loss and damage’ accounting for the overall effects of climate change — must be at the centre of all climate negotiations.

Too little attention is paid to the developing countries’ need for “adaptation” to the effects of the carbon that is already in the atmosphere.

It is a truth that all accept but few wish to acknowledge: there is a direct relationship between overall well-being and carbon emissions. The growth trajectories of advanced economies have been achieved by exploiting the world’s carbon budgets. The developed world’s depletion of global atmospheric commons has led to extreme climatic events across the planet. Climate change is already upon us due to industrialisation in Europe and North America in the past, and in China more recently. Countries that have contributed the least towards historical global emissions — countries that are still developing and poor — are left to fend for themselves. Global poverty has underwritten the riches of the developed world.

Climate finance contributions from the Global North have been insignificant and incommensurate with the transition costs for emerging economies. Developing countries will require at least $1 trillion in energy infrastructure alone by 2030, and up to $6 trillion across all sectors annually by 2050 to mitigate climate change. In addition, annual climate adaptation costs in these economies could reach $300 billion by 2030 and as much as $500 billion by 2050. Further, developing countries are likely to face $290-580 billion in annual “residual damages” by 2030 and over $1 trillion in damages by 2050 from the impact of climate change that cannot be prevented by adaptation measures. There is hardly any acknowledgement, let alone support, for this crisis.

The debate on Loss and Damage (L&D) is mired in ambiguity. It was only in 2013, at COP19, that Loss and Damage became officially recognised. It was later included as the distinct Article 8 of the Paris Agreement at COP21, with no reference, however, to finance or equity. The segregation of L&D and adaptation was viewed as a geopolitical gambit to separate the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) from other emerging economies. This deprived large developing countries of climate finance and technology by conflating them with developed nations. Since global climate funds are constrained, it has been argued that opening a window for L&D would impact finance for adaptation and mitigation, and reduce the ability of larger emerging economies like India to tackle climate change.

The segregation of L&D and adaptation was viewed as a geopolitical gambit to separate the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) from other emerging economies.

The conclusion is unavoidable: L&D financing must emerge as an independent stream in climate negotiations. Instituting special arrangements for strengthening L&D finance, independent from mitigation and adaptation, is particularly vital.

India’s climate action will be constrained by its development imperatives. Despite ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) commitments, the realisation of India’s climate goals is strongly linked to the availability and quality of capital at its disposal. India needs about $2.5 trillion till 2030 for NDCs. Currently, the tracked green finance in India represents approximately 25% of the total required across sectors for mitigation alone. Adaptation flows are even more pitiful. Given India is among the most vulnerable to climate change, adaptation clearly needs more resources. But these demands are unlikely to be met by global adaptation funds, which are limited and expected to prioritise small and fragile island states. Therefore, it stands to reason that India privileges adaptation to support its communities and people from its own domestic budgets. Mitigation actions must, then, be backed by international finance flows. India — and indeed no developing country — can do both. It cannot be expected to pay for its future as well as pay for Europe and America’s past.

COP27 is an opportunity to voice the Global South’s collective demands and reconcile various channels of climate financing. The international community must respond. Else the developing world will find itself preaching to the parish of the prejudiced.

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Commentaries, Diplomacy, G 20, Global Economy, India, India-Russia, international affairs, Narendra Modi, USA and Canada

India leads: Two to Tango with in 2023

It is a busy season on Raisina Hill as India assumes stewardship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and takes charge of the Group of Twenty (G20) in December. Leading these two plurilateral groups will be complex and challenging. The groupings have divergent goals, purposes, and memberships even as they grapple with Covid-19’s disruptive impact on the global economy and conflicts during and after the pandemic. India will need to ensure that the concerns of developing countries are not relegated to the margins by the European conflict.

At the heart of the endeavour lies the challenge of dialogue and conversations with all, even as a subset of like-minded countries invest in frameworks that respond to decadal objectives. “Talk to all and work more with some” will have to be India’s mantra for 2023 as it has a rare opportunity to make two distinct agendas align with its own.

At SCO, China’s dominant position is inescapable, and it overwhelms the preferences and perspectives of others. Here, India and Russia may share a common imperative to balance China and make SCO focus on a broader policy and development agenda. As Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi pointed out during the SCO summit last month, this is not the time for war. Moving away from conflict to attend to the frailties of the economy may be beneficial for SCO and less contentious too. Many in the group are uncomfortable with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and would rather see this group focus on the development and human challenges the region is saddled with. India will have to reset the playing board skillfully. If China is playing “go”, and Russia is playing “roulette”, New Delhi will need to play smart chess.

Many in the group are uncomfortable with the Russia-Ukraine conflict and would rather see this group focus on the development and human challenges the region is saddled with.

However, the nature of SCO and its purpose will ensure that politics takes centre-stage. In Samarkand, the Indian PM showed the way. Niceties need to be dropped, and hard questions must be posed, including on sovereignty, the expansionist tendencies of some countries, including China, and terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

Simultaneously, India must inject its growth imperative around technology, sustainability and green transitions into discussions and state its concerns over cyber security, online malfeasance, and white elephant infrastructure projects, among others. At SCO, India would do well to initiate debates on these issues, irrespective of the outcomes, and create space for discussions that may not have Beijing’s blessings.

Diplomacy sometimes misconstrues the role of the host country to imply benign or agnostic participation. India, however, must maintain its determination to have an assertive foreign policy that seeks to shape and steer conversations towards the outcomes it desires.

All of this cannot be starkly divergent from India’s G20 agenda. There needs to be a bridge linking what we aim to achieve through SCO and G20, although the methods and formulations used in each forum may differ. G20 requires a different type and style of hosting. India can leverage its experience to communicate with all actors involved and curate conversations that cater to diverse constituencies. “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas and Sabka Prayas” (inclusive development for all, everyone’s trust and efforts) is an all-encompassing Indian approach that fits G20.

India can leverage its experience to communicate with all actors involved and curate conversations that cater to diverse constituencies.

Here, India will need to ensure that the clouds of war that loom over Europe do not pour down on its presidency. India must make it clear to its western partners that it will view any attempt to reduce the impact of its G20 presidency seriously. At the same time, New Delhi must make clear to Moscow that steps towards de-escalation are essential from its end.

External factors will inevitably distract the grouping from anything that is discussed within it. The agenda that is engaged with and outcomes delivered at G20 may be bold (unlikely) or sub-optimal (more probable). However, thanks to G20’s structure, global action will always be evolutionary. India’s efforts must draw from Indonesia and deliver to Brazil and then South Africa.

PM Modi’s reiteration of the importance of “democracy, diplomacy, and dialogue” at the SCO Summit is a message that the G20 leaders should also remember as they prepare to engage at the upcoming G20 Summit in Indonesia and beyond. G20’s ability to navigate through economic and social crises should not become hostage to regional or bilateral politics.

India must make a clear and robust case to address larger goals in the spirit of cooperation. It must focus precisely on what it wants to achieve from each working group at G20 and aim to create a legacy and a futureoriented architecture, which will lend continuity to what it incubates.

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