China, economy, Research, Writing

Undermining institutions, underwriting OBOR: Beijing and the crisis of global governance

This article was co-authored with Mihir Swarup Sharma.

This article is part of the series The Beijing Heist: Making Global Institutions Serve the CPC Agenda


All good things must come to an end, and so must illusions of the promised common future. A fundamental assumption long held by many in the West is that the multilateral institutions instated over the six post-War decades would serve to constrain and direct the “peaceful rise” of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It was believed that a Beijing that was given the position it thought justified within the multilateral architecture would end up being a responsible steward of these institutions and of the global commons more broadly. The scandal at the World Bank that led to the end of the Doing Business report and index is the third time that this assumption has been proved as naïve, and, indeed, delusional.

The World Bank scandal is directly linked to the Xi Jinping regime’s growing sense of entitlement. An independent report commissioned by the Bank has revealed that its leadership— including a former senior official, Kristalina Georgieva, who is now head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—apparently manipulated the supposedly independent report to placate PRC officials worried about their ranking. The immediate context? Ownership shares at the Bank were going to be “re-calculated”; in other words, the PRC was going to see a big boost in its control of the institution. (Eventually, 52 countries had to reduce their voting share in the Bank to increase China’s.) It was the anticipation of Beijing’s increased power over the institution that led to this episode; it appears a careerist international bureaucracy was all too eager to please the new ownership. Many will now want to more closely examine Beijing’s position on the acrimonious selection in 2019 of a new IMF Chief from within the European bloc.

The World Bank scandal is directly linked to the Xi Jinping regime’s growing sense of entitlement. An independent report commissioned by the Bank has revealed that its leadership apparently manipulated the supposedly independent report to placate PRC officials worried about their ranking

Two other institutional pillars of global governance have already been left powerless and have faced global ridicule as a consequence of Beijing’s actions. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has lost the trust of the world in the two decades since the PRC’s accession; many of its members, developed and developing alike, feel that the PRC has not conducted the reforms that it had promised in order to join. As a result, it has retained an advantage in global trade that the WTO has been unable to rectify, leading to the institution itself being considered worthless. And then there is the World Health Organisation (WHO), which has been seen during this pandemic as prioritising Beijing’s sensitivities over warning the world about a deadly contagion—or even properly investigating its origins. The tight control of information by the Communist Party of China (CPC) means that questions remain unanswered about the virus’ origin, yet what is certain is that the pandemic’s initial spread is in no small part due to the CPC’s machinations and missteps, and the WHO leadership’s complicity with Beijing.

It is time to accept that ceding Beijing the control of the levers of global power leads to disastrous consequences. Liberal democracies such as India and those that designed the post-War multilateral structure understand the need for independent institutions. They may chafe at the pressure such independence brings to bear on their own domestic and geopolitical actions, but appreciation of the importance of institutional strength and independence is in their DNA. This is, of course, not true for the Communist Party of China. Why should anyone expect that a system that permits no independence domestically will not consider it necessary to seize control of global institutions as well? For them, those institutions are useful that perpetuate and further the party line.

Liberal democracies such as India and those that designed the post-War multilateral structure understand the need for independent institutions.

The Ease of Doing Business report and it’s deserved demise should not worry us. Concern about what will follow next should be more widespread. That Georgieva’s name has appeared in this investigation is worrying given that the IMF, in particular, is under siege. Its previous head, Christine Lagarde, explicitly made the point that Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative risked leading to a debt explosion in the developing world that would become the IMF’s problem. Under Georgieva, the pandemic did, in fact, cause an emerging-economy debt crisis in 2020. Other state-run lenders wanted to grant some measure of relief to those countries most under pressure. The PRC’s financial institutions refused to play along, demanding that they be treated like private-sector bond-holders instead. Georgieva seemed to excuse this behaviour, saying in October 2020, “What we are also hearing from China is a recognition that they are a relatively new creditor, but they are very large creditor, and they need to mature domestically in terms of how they handle their own lenders, the coordination among them.” The problem with the PRC’s external lending is not a lack of maturity or of co-ordination. If anything, the problem is the opposite: Too much co-ordination and political control. Will future bailouts spend IMF money to save Beijing’s bad Belt-and-Road loans? In a closed-door meeting in New Delhi some summers back, an American diplomat who had just finished meeting his counterparts in Colombo explained to Indian analysts that its Chinese debt that has ravaged Sri Lanka’s balance sheet and that a IMF bailout was inevitable—as, indeed, it turned out to be.

Unless all of us recognise the danger Beijing poses to global institutions, we will wind up paying for the expansion of Chinese ownership and political control over vast geographies.

An IMF that fears Beijing’s wrath is one that will not protect its shareholders or global private capital. Lending related to the Belt and Road initiative will cause more and more crises going forward, perhaps sooner rather than later, given the effect the pandemic has had on emerging economies’ balance sheets. An IMF intimidated by one activist minority shareholder might well direct the world’s savings into bailing out the PRC’s lending.

Unless all of us recognise the danger Beijing poses to global institutions, we will wind up paying for the expansion of Chinese ownership and political control over vast geographies. This is the global equivalent of the privatisation of profits and socialisation of loss—badly designed projects will create profits, power and growth for the benefit of the CPC, and their adverse economic outcomes will be left to the world to underwrite. The US has mishandled the World Bank already; does the European Union have it in them to save the IMF?

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China, COVID-19, Research, security, Writing

India’s security choices during the COVID-19 pandemic

At the start of the 2020s, India has been confronted with a massive viral spread and a relentless People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on its borders. Last year, even as India was responding to the pandemic that originated in Wuhan, it had to mobilise its forces to counter Beijing’s invasion on the Himalayan heights. Both resulted in loss of lives and both show no signs of going away. While the virus is threatening to rise again in a ‘third wave,’ China has literally dug in at high altitudes in its quest to secure real estate and territory that it believes is crucial for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that provides access to a warm water port in the Arabian Sea, and that is critical to a larger project that seeks to reshape the geopolitical map of Asia. While the two nations have taken modest steps to disengage, military and diplomatic negotiations have not yielded substantive results.

In June 2021, reports emerged that China had been ramping up infrastructure along the Tibetan border. Following this, around 200,000 Indian soldiers have been deployed on the frontier, an increase of over 40 percent from 2020. For India, China poses a clear and present danger. To respond to an expansive and belligerent northern neighbour, it has to reorient its conception of its security as well as deployment of its political and diplomatic resources. This was not the case until very recently.

For India, China poses a clear and present danger. To respond to an expansive and belligerent northern neighbour, it has to reorient its conception of its security as well as deployment of its political and diplomatic resources.

Pakistan had been the major preoccupation since Independence in 1947. Its occupation of parts of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, its export of terror to India as a means of waging an asymmetric war, and its nuclear proliferation had positioned it as the main threat to India’s national security. For long, China had escaped critical scrutiny despite provocative actions. The Indian security establishment was not very vocal when China tested an atomic device during President R. Venkataraman’s state visit in May 1992 — clearly intended to send a message to India. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes’ prophetic assertion at the turn of the century that China, not Pakistan, was India’s “potential threat No. 1” was not universally shared in the strategic community in New Delhi.

In their public speeches, Chinese leaders declared their preoccupation with the welfare of their people. They took great pains to position China as a responsible power that avoided international confrontation. In hindsight, they clearly succeeded. From the ‘returns seeking’ investors in the United States to the political leaders in Europe and Asia who wanted a piece of the Chinese economic pie, all bought into this masterly conduct of statecraft. For India, the urge to keep China in good humour was also implicated by the border conflict of 1962. Relations had thawed only a quarter-century later. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 paved the way for the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords inked in 1993 and 1996 to stabilise the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

From the ‘returns seeking’ investors in the United States to the political leaders in Europe and Asia who wanted a piece of the Chinese economic pie, all bought into this masterly conduct of statecraft.

With stability along the boundary, trade and cultural ties between the two nations began to flourish. The boundary pacts mandated that large numbers of troops would not be amassed along the border, and that there would be no attempts to alter the status quo unilaterally. The Indian establishment believed that the border accords would be “peace for our time.” This search for fool’s gold would lead to India curtailing its multilateral naval exercises and slowing down infrastructure development in critical sectors of the India-China border. Influential voices in the Manmohan Singh government (2004-2014) believed India’s security interests would be served if it did not upset China.

Pushback came only in 2013, when transgressions by Chinese forces in Depsang were diplomatically and militarily countered. Yet, here too there was much discussion and debate in the upper echelons of government. Greater clarity was to emerge in 2014 when India, under the newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was at the receiving end of Chinese incursions in Ladakh even as a summit was under way with the visiting Xi Jinping. With two episodes in close succession, it would be fair to say that a change in India’s approach to its northern neighbour was thrust upon it.

The Indian establishment believed that the border accords would be “peace for our time.” This search for fool’s gold would lead to India curtailing its multilateral naval exercises and slowing down infrastructure development in critical sectors of the India-China border.

In recent years, India has been able to recalibrate its approach towards the Middle Kingdom even as the world order is changing. The US-India partnership has evolved rapidly. Washington has helped thwart moves by China to internationalise the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, enabled India’s entry into the international nuclear order and brought pressure on Pakistan to crack down on terrorism. The Quad grouping, where Japan and Australia join the duo to keep the Indo-Pacific region inclusive and open to all, is working on providing alternatives to the BRI and is seeking a number of resilient arrangements, including on technology supply chains. A Quad vaccine for all is on the anvil and other countries are looking to partner with the Quad on important global issues.

The ‘La Pérouse’ maritime exercises in the Bay of Bengal, with France joining the Quad members, and the Australia-France-India ministerial dialogue demonstrate that the idea and the ideals of ‘Quad Plus’ are gathering steam. The UK has floated the ‘Democracy 10,’ which includes the Quad countries, to tackle issues related to 5G and emerging technologies that may have a bearing on collective security. Whitehall’s recent assessment of its economic, security and diplomatic interests may see it engage more deeply with India in the Indo-Pacific. Old Europe is certainly finding a place at the core of India’s security calculations.

A testament to India’s recalibration is NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s pitch, at the Raisina Dialogue 2021, to broaden cooperation. NATO views the rise of China as having huge security implications and assesses India as its partner. PM Modi’s historic Porto Summit with leaders of the EU and 27 EU member-states helped boost cooperation on terrorism and maritime security. The ‘connectivity partnership’ between the EU and India seeks to finance projects in other nations, offering an alternative to China’s BRI.

NATO views the rise of China as having huge security implications and assesses India as its partner.

Even as India strengthens and redirects its relationship with the old world, Russia remains the X factor. New Delhi’s strategic ties with Washington have become a sore point for the Kremlin. If two new poles emerge — the US and its partners and allies, and the Beijing-Moscow ‘axis ’ — India’s room for manoeuvre may be affected. India is alive to this possibility and is redoubling its efforts to work with Russia, its largest weapons supplier over the past decades. India has to convince President Putin that the bilateral relationship allows him greater latitude while dealing with his southern neighbour. Through back channels, India also has to work towards a reset between the US and Russia and to convince the EU that pushing Putin into Xi’s corner is dangerous and counterproductive. The recent Biden-Putin summit may have gone some way in making this a possibility.

A resurgent China, with its plan to establish regional hegemony in Asia even as it tries to split and dominate Europe, is Delhi’s biggest security challenge. The Indo-Pacific will define the future of the Asian Century. India has been astute in ensuring that its partners and fellow stakeholders from the Atlantic order work closely with it to navigate the choppy waters of the Indo-Pacific.


An abridged version of the above was published for the Lennart Meri Conference.

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