By Emily Tamkin and Valeria Cardi

It is no secret that Washington is bullish about the idea of fostering closer ties with India in an effort to counter China. But tighter ties takes two. Is Washington, DC’s enthusiasm matched in New Delhi?

“We know that we don’t share a typical Atlantic-style relationship. It’s a more Asian relationship, more grays than black and whites in our relationship,” Samir Saran, the president of the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think tank in New Delhi, told me.

Dating back to the Cold War, India has maintained a formal policy of non-alignment. In reality, though, the Soviet Union, which supported India in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and provided the vast majority of its defence equipment, earned India’s support and sympathy. The US, meanwhile, was seen as an untrustworthy and unreliable actor; nor did it help that America was close to India’s neighbour and foe, Pakistan.

In recent years, however, relations between India and the US have improved. There are many reasons for this, but the most important one is arguably a rising China, which America is seeking to counter and contain by working with other countries, and with India in particular. Pakistan, meanwhile, cooperates closely with China.

A year after the US president Joe Biden’s election, and with China at the top of America’s foreign policy agenda, I turned to Saran to ask how, exactly, policymakers in New Delhi perceive US overtures, particularly given the fact that, historically, America has been seen as a less than reliable partner.

“I think much of what you sometimes may hear in Delhi or in DC could possibly be remnants of the 20th century, people holding on to positions of the past, people who have written books on India’s behaviour or American attitudes to the past, wanting to still be relevant in the 21st century,” he said. “I think there is a more pragmatic assessment of each other today.”

Still, he added, “I’m not saying that we trust the Americans all the time.”

One area in which America and India have traditionally not seen eye to eye is in India’s immediate neighbourhood, including Afghanistan. “I think the Americans had to leave [Afghanistan],” Saran told me. “Could they have left better? I think all of us would agree, yes. It was a bit of a messy withdrawal. I don’t think any amount of spin can change that.” He also noted that India could have been consulted, though added that Delhi has always seen America maintain a certain distance from India on Afghanistan. “And in that sense, it’s not surprising. It’s not that we’ve been let down heartbroken because America did not consult us.” In other words, the events of this summer were not enough to deter India from cooperating with the US.

Relatedly, if China is bringing India and the US together, some have wondered if Russia might tear them apart.

“Russia punches above its weight in terms of global affairs,” said Saran. “Russia is going to remain a relevant voice. And we do not want a situation where we paint Putin into the Chinese corner. I think that would be disastrous for us. So we will have to find ways in which we can accommodate Russia.

“I think that is now visible to all in DC, we have not let that come in the way of being more bold, more ambitious, more forward-looking with our American partners.”

This is, broadly speaking, true, though there are some in Washington who feel differently: for example, John Bolton, former president Donald Trump’s national security adviser, penned an op-ed in the Hill on 10 November in which he argued that India’s purchase of S-400 air defence systems from Russia “raises serious obstacles to closer politico-military relations between Washington and New Delhi”. Saran, unsurprisingly, sees it differently, painting a picture in which India can help the US by developing economic ties with Russia, thus moving Moscow away from Beijing.

Even issues as weighty as US-China or India-Russia relations, however, seem small next to the existential issue of our age: climate change. India is already battling air pollution and will be profoundly impacted by the climate crisis. Is there a sense there that America is not doing enough?

India, he told me, has been a strong proponent of climate justice, equity, and action. And this is an area where the US and India can “work together and create a new framework that would catalyse trillions of dollars of green capital to flow into green projects”. He didn’t mean aid or grants, he stressed. “We are talking about commercial capital from banks… We are talking about creating a whole new green financial ecosystem.”

And what about the gap between India’s rhetoric and, say, the reality of air pollution in Delhi? How does that gap close?

“​​The gap closes like it was closed in New York and London, by more advanced, cleaner, greener systems,” he said. “We are going to have to go through that decade of pain.”

The painful period would hurt less if it was accelerated, he acknowledged. Still, some element of what India will go through to get to the other, better, greener side will require discomfort. The same could perhaps be said of the US-India relationship itself.

Read the original interview here –


Obama 2.0: The Triumph of Hope Over Experience?

by Samir Saran and Dr. John C. Hulsman
30th of November 2012
Please find here the link to the original article

Second term presidencies, like second marriages, can be seen as the triumph of hope over experience. George W. Bush met with calamity in Iraq, Bill Clinton was impeached over the Lewinsky scandal, Ronald Reagan suffered through Iran-Contra, Richard Nixon perpetrated Watergate and resigned, and LBJ was engulfed and then devoured by the Vietnam War. Given this doleful record, what can realistically be hoped for in a second Obama term?

One major over-arching priority immediately heads the to-do list. The fiscal cliff–an insane joint suicide pact agreed to by the outgoing Congress—promises automatic tax increases and spending cuts totaling $600 billion coming to pass on January 1, 2013. The only way to avoid this needless body-blow to the American economy, which it is estimated would amount to a full 5% of American GDP, thereby casting a feebly recovering American back into recession, would be for the Republican House and the President to reach a broader budget deal amounting to around $1.2 trillion in savings over the next 10 years. So, at least on paper, it is hard choices quickly arrived at or…Armageddon.

Given the stakes (and both parties desire to avoid the wrath of the American people at their persistent inability to behave as grown-ups) it is still more than even money that a patched-up compromise will be reached, a temporary deal which kicks the fiscal can down the road, without actually solving America’s long-term deficit and debt crisis. However, failure to reach such a deal (and it is important not to underestimate how politically dysfunctional Washington has become) would practically doom the president’s second term from the start.

If this is what the White House will do, the great White Whale of the next four years is a simple fiscal question: Can America arrest its trajectory of rather steep decline and enact a Bowles-Simpson style compromise that both raises taxes (as the Democrats dream about) while engaging in entitlement reform of Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security (the Republicans’ fondest wish).

In the Bowles-Simpson plan–a bipartisan compromise reached by the president’s own appointed committee in the latter days of his first term—there is a durable blueprint to do this. There would be three dollars in spending cuts for every dollar in tax increases, entitlements would be means tested, benefits would be cut and doled out slightly later in life, taxes would be simplified and cut for all, and loopholes and deductions would be curtailed. Such a grand plan would stabilize the American debt rate at around 60% of GDP, thus preserving American economic power for the next generation.

There are two fundamental problems in reaching for the Bowles-Simpson Holy Grail. The first is that it presumes that people in both parties are less ideological than they currently are. It is not just the right-wing Tea Party that is the problem here; House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and her left-wing followers have also shown no sign of being able to make the significant compromises that would be necessary to make this whole process work. Without the left agreeing to entitlement reform and the right agreeing to tax rises, the deal will never be done. It is an open question as to whether this level of compromise is now possible in a Washington more ideologically divided than at any time in memory.

The final problem in nailing down this ambitious domestic agenda is that it assumes the world will simply not intrude while America tries to sort itself out. History simply does not work like this. While it is highly unlikely there will be simultaneous: war with Iran, conflict between China and Japan over the Senkakus, the euro-crisis going septic, Syria’s civil war leading to regional instability or even regional war in the Middle East, there is a very good chance that some of this happens. Any foreign distractions could well doom the domestic-only focus the president is banking on.

Given this highly ambitious domestic agenda, Obama the second time around is likely to disappoint both the Wilsonian liberals who seek American intervention in troubled regions around the world to promote liberty and protect human rights (involvement of the Libya variety) and the neoconservative hawks who seek greater U.S. commitment to lead the 21st century world through the preponderance and use of its military might. If the first term is any indication, U.S. foreign policy will to continue to develop in a cautious, limited, pragmatic, yet largely reactive manner. There will be few American efforts to order the new multipolar world, or respond proactively to much of anything.

And therein lies the danger.


Column in The Hindu: “Looking beyond the honeymoon”

by Samir Saran and Seema Sirohi
New Delhi, 29th of September 2012

Please find here the link to the original article.

The relationship between India and the U.S. is emerging as one of the three that will shape Asia and global politics in the decades ahead, the other two being U.S.-China and India-China

It is rare for the ideas people to be behind the curve but those who say the India-US relationship has been reduced to merely “feel good” meetings and junkets are exactly that — a little behind the curve. Critics in both Washington and New Delhi complain about the preponderance of grand rhetoric which remains unmatched by delivery. Yes, India has signed some significant defence deals with the U.S. but where’s the real beef or the strategic content, they ask.

This reductive description is more a function of the traits typical of people in the two countries — if some Americans are driven by “instant gratification,” their Indian counterparts see “melodrama” as a virtue. But beyond these personality quirks, clues point to a maturing partnership that no longer needs the adrenalin rush of big-ticket developments such as the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement of 2008.

The language

It is apparent that India and the U.S. have made a long-term bet on each other even though the language reflects a cautious discretion bred in political realities. In India it is still not kosher for many to call America a good friend, a useful partner. It is ever so easy to point to the long history of Washington’s coddling of Pakistan and its disregard of Indian concerns as exhibit A. Their counterparts in Washington complain: what has India done for the U.S. lately? Remember the promise of commercial dividends from the nuclear deal?

Fortunately, those who make decisions are largely unfettered by this narrative. They don’t want the present to be completely hostage to the past. They are already moving ahead, pushed by new geographies and challenges. The India-U.S. relationship is emerging as one of the three bilateral relationships that will shape Asia and perhaps define global politics in the decades ahead. The other two being U.S.-China and India-China.

Four trends

The new India-U.S. partnership has four broad trends, which were apparent during recent discussions between Indian parliamentarians and scholars with senior officials in the departments of State and Defence, and at the National Security Council as part of a delegation organised by the Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey Bay and the Observer Research Foundation.

The relationship has moved beyond “parallel actions” where both countries despite a congruence of interests moved separately, whether in Myanmar, the Middle East or Afghanistan. The old distrust has been replaced by a new respect for this kind of independent parallelism, which now seems to be converging. This has opened up the field to a wide variety of issues for frank discussion and an exchange of ideas between the two. From Pakistan to cyber security to space, no subject is taboo.

The two main drivers for American consolidation of thought: an externality called China on the one hand, and internal doubts about the merits of unilateralism, on the other. American people have no appetite for new, expensive engagements. They imagine themselves better off “leading from behind” despite the hawkish clamour from conservative talking heads.

The second noticeable trend is the understanding between the political leadership in both countries, stressed and repeated at very senior levels. In the U.S., bipartisan support for India is public and enthusiastic, putting New Delhi in the sanguine position of not having to fret about a change of administration in Washington this November. In India, the support is pledged quietly and firmly and repeated through itinerant former foreign secretaries and retired generals. The challenge here is to overcome the inertia of the mid-level bureaucracy on both sides which can puncture their political masters’ biggest dreams with pinpricks born of residual institutional memories.

Also apparent is a new appreciation at high levels that the bet on India cannot and should not be purely for its large market. India’s emergence is good in itself because of strategic convergences. Short-term transactional expectations around that odd contract or defence deal gone awry will continue to disappoint, but policymakers understand the need for “patience” — a word that has become part of official U.S. speak on India. The understanding has opened the door to Washington looking at India in the medium-term instead of just for short-term gains. A growing number of thinkers in Washington believe the strengthening of India will be one of the main features of the U.S. presence in Asia this century.

The last and perhaps the most interesting development is the real entry of the U.S. Defense Department to try to “own and guide” the India relationship in ways that were unimaginable a few years ago. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Deputy Secretary Ashton Carter have taken a decision to act on some of India’s perennial complaints about tech and weapons transfer to put real meat on the bones. Almost all key U.S. relationships are driven by the Department of Defense (DoD) because of the high element of the strategic content. The trajectory from the early 1990s when the DoD hardly had any interest in India to reach a point where it wants to be the main driver is significant.

Regional issues

This has important benefits. Plain talk is one. Senior U.S. officials have apparently conveyed to the Pakistani generals that India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan far outweigh theirs because India has greater capacity, reach and ultimately more robust goals in the region. So they had better get used to the idea. The de-hyphenation is complete. This attitudinal change is a far cry from even two years ago when the Americans were hedging their bets between the two countries. But today there is greater appreciation of India’s pain. The Americans are equally perplexed about how to deal with a country that has allowed its own slow radicalisation and despite opportunities, has failed to stem the tide.

Where will the new trends lead? There could be a mismatch of expectations and capacity. For instance, the U.S. may now be willing to see India as a key balancer in the region and in Afghanistan. New Delhi, however, may be more comfortable with a far modest role. India is unlikely to agree to be a net provider of security and its strategic outlook may be limited to ensuring that anti-India forces don’t dominate Kabul. The green-on-blue attacks against U.S. troops may have already given the Indian political class jitters about training Afghan forces.

Then there is the brute reality of India itself, which can alienate the strongest ally. The Democrats and the Republicans are united in their support for India but what about the political climate in a country with narrow horizons and where short-term obsessions manifest in “tactical” moves that can derail the country’s larger strategic goals?

Seema Sirohi is a columnist based in Washington DC. Samir Saran, Vice-President at the Observer Research Foundation, was a part of the recent Track-2 interactions with the U.S. establishment.