Responding to Change: Searching for a Path through the Climate Haze

by Samir Saran
2010
in: Chevening Fellowship – Economics of Climate Change: A global perspective, University of Cambridge

For an emerging economy like India, the response to climate change will be shaped by a number of dynamic factors, complementary and competing at different junctures. The contours of this response will be determined by geopolitical power-play; economic growth; consumer behaviour; poverty and social justice; the influence of incumbent and new businesses; governance and political leadership at the centre and the provinces – and most importantly the ability to attract and generate finances. This paper discusses the influence and interactions of these factors at three distinct levels. First it discusses the global (dis)agreements on climate and some of the boundaries of policymaking. Then the paper discusses the Indian domestic imperatives that are decisively influencing its carbon choices. Finally, it shows that – with the growth in the aspirations and affluence of the Indian middle class – the ‘consumption economy’ will increasingly influence India’s carbon profile.

Here the link to the entire chapter (pdf-file).
For more information on the publication “Chevening Fellowship – Economics of Climate Change: A global perspective”,University of Cambridge, please visit this link.

In the News, Non-Traditional Security, Politics / Globalisation, Water / Climate

Book review on “South and Southeast Asia”, The Hindu, November 2010

Emerging geo-political and security challenges
by V. Suryanarayan
November 2, 2010

This compendium of 10 essays, presented at an interaction in 2009 among scholars of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, covers a wide range of subjects related to the political and security trends in South Asia and Southeast Asia.. They include: the role of extra-regional powers and their growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean; the evolving Asian regionalism; India’s ‘Look East’ policy; the political situation in Myanmar; and the non-traditional security challenges to Asian security.

Since the end of World War II, the pattern of international relations in the two regions has undergone a radical transformation. This is particularly true of the role of external powers in Southeast Asia. Though the relative clout of the United States and Japan has declined, the ruling elite of the region would like Washington to maintain a high profile. The growing economic linkages between China and the United States and between India and China have a momentum of their own. However, China’s recent assertive postures in the Indian subcontinent and the South China Sea have created a sense of unease and have even given rise to suspicion about its intentions and objectives.

In South Asia, profound changes are taking place. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has added a new dimension to the troubled region. The struggle for democratic rights, the fight for justice by the ethnic minorities, and the secessionist movements, with covert support from external powers, pose grave challenges to the stability of South Asia.

Given the space constraints that preclude coverage of all the essays, only a limited review touching upon a few of the striking contributions is attempted here. In his analytical piece, “Major Powers in South Asia: What is their game?” Dilip Lahiri projects the scenario that is likely to emerge, one that will have profound consequences. Despite their divergent national interests, the U.S., India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia are likely to come together to ensure that the rise of China is non-threatening and does not disturb the peace and stability of the region. Admiral P.S. Das and Vijay Sakuja examine the roles of China and India as growing maritime powers. China’s deepening ties with the member-states of ASEAN and their consequences are highlighted. Equally interesting, the authors pinpoint the strengthening of the links China has established with India’s immediate neighbours — Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. In this context, India’s ‘Look East’ policy assumes great significance. As Admiral Das points out, “looking East” is no longer an economic jargon; it is descriptive of the totality of India’s relations with Southeast Asia.

STRATEGIC UNEASE

Discussing the major powers vis-à-vis the security concerns of Southeast Asia, Daljit Singh makes the point that, while China’s image and standing in the region has “improved a great deal”, there is also a “strategic unease” about China on account of its “[huge] size, proximity, growing power, and uncertainty about its long-term intentions.” China’s bilateral relations are driven solely by considerations of realpolitik and strategic interests. Witness Beijing’s continuing support to the military regime in Myanmar, its military aid to Sri Lanka during the fourth Eelam War, and its covert support to Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

From India’s point of view, there is concern over a perceived shift in China’s position vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir. Hitherto, it had recognised India’s de facto control of J&K, while, at the same time, advocating a peaceful resolution of the contentious issues with Pakistan through bilateral negotiations. The recent denial of visa by China to Lieutenant General B.S. Jaswal is held out as a pointer to this subtle shift. Many scholars are so blind in their admiration for China and its remarkable achievements that they do not want to see any signal or be reminded of any historical evidence that shows it in a negative light. Such an approach will be detrimental to the interests of India. The essays — contributed among others by diplomats, naval officers and academics — are scholarly, absorbing and stimulating.

Link to original publication.

Books / Papers, Water / Climate

The Globalisation and Climate Change Paradox: Implications for South Asian Security

by Samir Saran
2010
in: “South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security Challenges”

The essays in this volume provide the Indian and Southeast Asian perspectives on some of the geopolitical and security challenges facing South and Southeast Asia. These include the interests and role of major outside powers in the two regions and the relations between these powers; the trends in Asian regionalism, especially the ASEAN-led regionalism and India’s place in it; the growing maritime and naval interests of the two rising Asian powers, China and India; and the impact of climate change. Also addressed are two specific issues of great potential importance for the security calculus of the two regions: the South China Sea and Myanmar.

Here the link to the entire chapter (pdf-file).
For more information on the book “South and Southeast Asia”, please visit the publisher’s website.
Link to book review in “The Hindu”, November 2, 2010.

Books / Papers

Radical Islam: Competing with the Liberal Ethos of India.

by Samir Saran and Hemant Nair

June 2010

The terrorist attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008 (26/11) have been placed alongside other jihadi terrorist acts, like those of 9/11 in New York and ‘7/7’ in London, by the mass media and policy makers. This paper seeks to understand the emergence of radicalism in a multi-cultural and syncretic society like India and its implications and lessons for policy makers and society.

Here the link to the entire chapter (pdf-file).
For more information on the book “Radical Islam : Perspectives from India and Russia”, please go to the Macmillan Publisher website.

Non-Traditional Security

Radical Islam: Perspectives from India and Russia.

Observer Research Foundation and the Experimental Creativity Centre (ECC), Moscow, have completed their collaborative research project on Radical Islam. The first conference under this project took place in Moscow in October, 2009 while the final leg was held in New Delhi in March 2010. The papers and proceedings of these workshops have now been published in the form of a book titled “Radical Islam: Perspectives from India and Russia”.

The Russian language edition of the book was launched at the ECC premises in Moscow on September 27 2010. It was attended by senior faculty members of both ORF and ECC, including Mr. Sunjoy Joshi, Amb. M. Rasgotra, Mr. Samir Saran, Mr. Nandan Unnikrishnan, Dr Sergey Kurginyan and Dr. Yury Byaly. The launch was preceded by a press conference organised by the leading Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

This 480-page book is the result of cohesive and complementary research by 15 scholars from both India and Russia. The research for this project was based on both geography and themes. While geographies or nations provided the specifics on the interaction of the phenomena of Radical Islam with specific political units and local societies, the thematic research allowed the researchers to test the interaction of Radical Islam with other contemporary and older tendencies. This effort covers the experiences with Radical Islam in Maldives, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, Europe, Russia and spans the entire land mass between the Indian Ocean and the Arctic.

On the other hand, this project also tests the interactions between Islam and other contemporary challenges, including Global and Regional power struggles, Oil and Energy politics, Inequity and Poverty, evolving Identities, ancient Culture and tradition, Globalisation and indeed with Capitalism itself. This research proves the adage “the more we learn the lesser we know”. In spite of various assertions in the individual essays by the respective authors, Radical Islam is still indescribable and the very term “Radical Islam” is an attempt to describe the indescribable by reflecting a simplistic categorisation of a complex and dangerous impulse.

Speaking at the book launch, Amb. M Rasgotra said that it was essential for India and Russia to share their experiences in dealing with radical Islam since the nature of the problem is the same, even as its manifestations may be different. Mr. Sunjoy Joshi observed that elucidating the Indian and Russian perspectives on radical Islam is important because the West often “tends to look at Islam in black-and-white, while Indian and Russian researchers look at it in multiplicity of identities, discourses and ideas”.

Mr. Samir Saran asserted that Radical Islam in certain geographies is an expression for economic and political voice, while in other contexts, it is a hegemonic tool deployed by the West and the rest. In some other cases, it is an instrument of state policy deployed against the neighbour or rival…but universally, it is the story of two victims …the perpetrators who commit the crime and the civil population on whom suffering is inflicted…both collateral damage in the bigger game, he said.

“From an Indian experience, the attempt to describe, analyse and respond to Radicalism or Radical Islam becomes even more problematic…. after all we are turning the spotlight to ourselves…. to respond to radical Islam, we need to discover our own shortcomings…. it is as much about internal political and economic faultlines as it is about the exploitation of these faultlines by external actors,” Samir Saran said.

India’s interaction with Radical Islam is different to that of Europe or the West. It is mostly about internal reconfiguration and resolution. While some may look at this as an external tendency that needs excision or removal from their nation or society, in India we need a nuanced approach; one that balances security and equity, and if the scale should tilt …it should be in favour of equity.

The challenge of radicalism in India is real and imminent. With its fast paced growth, embrace of capitalism and western values and the rapid move away from the traditional and family oriented societies due to both poverty and aspirations are creating social conditions that prove to be incubators of violence and terror. This equation is exacerbated by insensitive policy making and poor governance leading to a rise in the constituency of those willing to live outside the civil society framework that seemingly serves the rich and the political elite. While violence and terror will deploy religion as an instrument of mobilisation, responses from policymakers and governments must remain secular.

October 2010, Moscow, Russia.

Columns/Op-Eds, Water / Climate

Interview: India blinked at the Cancun Climate Summit.

The Indian negotiating team, led by Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh shifted India’s position at the Cancun Conference on climate change, said Samir Saran, Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, in an interview to a website, bridgetoindia.com.

Asked whether India blinked at Cancun and the Indian Minister significantly shifted from India’s long-standing position that the developed economies take full responsibility for climate change by indicating that India would also take on binding emission targets, Samir Saran said “Yes, India blinked. Regrettably! I may add. Given that India has undertaken to contribute to the effort to limit temperature rise to a two-degree- limit, it may have opened itself to international pressure that will seek to both curb its’ emissions or direct its development pattern”.

He said this was not only unfair, given that Indians emit only a fraction of what the citizens of developed countries do, but it seemed part of a larger effort to weaken the obligations and commitments that the Annex 1 countries had undertaken after two decades of global negotiations and concerted efforts by the least developed countries and India. Samir Saran said the Minister and his team have not only shifted India’s negotiating position but have arguably undone the efforts of the past in an instant. “I hope we can salvage it,” he added.

He said the entire international climate debate is actually about national interests and power politics. “Take China, for example, now that they have built an industry that can export technology and the products needed for low carbon growth, such as renewable energies, there are signs that they are ready to support a more universal emission reduction regime. And perhaps that prompted India to play the part it did.. the fear of being alone… which, I believe, is greatly overstated. Perhaps there is no harm in being alone once in a while,” he said.

“But sadly, while we all understand that climate change is a great and grave risk and that there is an urgent need to reduce emissions by those best able to, international negotiations today remain hostage to power politics and national interest increasingly understood by the economic gains for respective national businesses,” Samir Saran told the publication.

For complete text of the interview, click here

Columns/Op-Eds, Non-Traditional Security

Mumbai Attacks 2008: A Call to Look Within.

Over the past two decades India has demonstrated remarkable consistency in the irrational and incoherent response of its policy makers, people and sections of its mass media to dramatic and outrageous terrorist violence inflicted on the country. The most recent episode, witnessed in Mumbai on November 26 has also been followed by a typical though distinctly more pronounced response from all quarters. Much of the public debate following these terrorist attack has focussed on internal security systems (or the lack thereof) and the effort to punish the perpetrators. The public sphere including the media and academic dialogue seem to be preoccupied with ways to bring in line the truant Pakistan.

This approach has failed consistently and the outcome is unlikely to be any different this time around too. The major flaw with placing the blame entirely on Pakistan is the premise that Pakistan or its proxy warriors could have executed any of these outrageous acts in the absence of serious internal vulnerabilities. Though some of these vulnerabilities are acknowledged by many after the Mumbai attacks, they remain limited to the domain dealing with foreign policy, internal security and intelligence gathering.

Even now there is complete silence on a most crucial aspect that we must recognise; Indian Nationals collaborated with the Pakistani perpetrators in planning and executing this barbaric incident. The law enforcement agencies and the politicians are yet to provide us any clue on the identity of the perpetrators who were killed and on the countless others who helped in the various stages of this act. India, its media and its polity have not even attempted to articulate this dimension in their prescription for preventing these events from occurring again. The increasing presence of radicals in India, in this case those who justify violence in the name of Islam, is a clear and present danger and must be halted if any degree of success is to be achieved in India’s endeavour to tackle the menace of terrorism. It is imperative that Islamic radicalism be recognised as such and then efforts be made to prevent its spread. It is equally important to enact policies that resolve conditions that aid the spread of this violent radicalism.

This reluctance to look within, it may be argued, is due to the inherent predisposition of nations and societies to externalise such incidents. The US and much of the western world has frequently treated terrorist violence as a distant third world phenomenon attributing its cause and origin to the ‘impoverished and backward regions’ of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle-East. This propensity of the western world is a legacy of the colonial/orientalist discourse. It also prevents societies from looking within and engaging with shortcomings in their own socio-political landscape. This is evident from the alacrity with which the West categorises its Muslim citizenry as ‘Moderate and Progressive’ while denouncing the Muslim perpetrators (even when they are from their own populace) as ‘Islamic Terrorists’ motivated and created in alien societies devoid of freedom and liberty. To admit to the existence of discontent and outrage amongst its own Muslim population would be to admit to shortcomings within their own brand of liberal pluralism.

India, its government and people, have responded to the Mumbai attacks and other terrorist action in the past in much the same manner. The origin of these violent incidents have been distanced from within and located entirely in the ‘fundamentalist and undemocratic’ Pakistan. This is simplistic and dangerous. The sophistication, planning and increasing frequency of terror violence in India demonstrates strong local support for this radical Islamist ideology that propagates violence. Irrespective of the existence, contours and construct of a global Jihadi network, it is irrefutable that social conditions do exist within India that create disaffection and hopelessness and allow this population within the Indian Muslim community to be lured to the ideology that many today term ‘Radical Islam’. The existence of SIMI and their violent brand of political agitation confirm to this growth of radicalism in the local Muslim community. The participation of home grown terrorists from educated and middle class backgrounds points to the presence of this radicalism in all strata of society and within the urban mainstream of India.

Radical Islam is not a primeval phenomenon, nor is it unsophisticated. It is now a post-modern ideology able to attract a diverse demography. It also makes use of modern media and communication platforms and positions itself effectively as an alternative and preferred form of habitation for persons seeking an outlet and release from their existing social reality. This presence of Radical Islam demands two specific investigations that India must undertake if it is to effectively respond to its dangerous proliferation. The first must involve an honest study of political, economic and sociological factors that shape anxieties of the Indian Muslim today. This would help in identifying vulnerable sections and vulnerabilities in our systems that may be exploited. The second investigation must construct how Radical Islam offers its ideology to the Indian Muslims as a relief from their current anxieties. It should understand the substantive messages that are communicated by the supporters of this ideology that address the current day issues of the Indian Muslims across the social spectrum.

An understanding of these vulnerabilities and the messages may offer a point of departure for the policy makers and civil society and help to develop a response comprising of both, security and socio-economic dimensions. This would aid policies and processes that would not only make India safer but also enhance its democratic depth.

January 2009.
Link to ORF website.

Non-Traditional Security

India and Singapore discuss non-traditional security issues.

The Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore held their Second Dialogue on 28-29 May, 2009 in ISEAS campus, Singapore. The theme of this year seminar “South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security Challenges”, aptly reflected the rapidly changing economic and security situation with immense implications for South and Southeast Asia. The two-day seminar covered a wide range of issues affecting the region.

The first session dealt with the major power dynamics in South and Southeast Asia. Amb. Dilip Lahiri’s paper analysed the changing role of major powers in South Asia. He concluded his paper by suggesting that the US and India together with Japan, ASEAN, Australia and ROK may find their interests converge which may also ensure the peaceful and non-threatening rise of China in the region. In his paper, Mr. Daljit Singh examined engagement of major powers with Southeast Asia. The paper argues that ASEAN has promoted a “benign regional order” with the major powers. In the context of the rise of Asian powers and the dominant power of the US weakening, the possibility of increasing contestation among major powers looked likely if not managed effectively.

The second session of the seminar discussed the rise of Asian maritime power and its implications on Southeast Asia. Adm. Premvir Das’s paper on India’s maritime security underlined the emerging traditional and non-traditional threats. He argued that India’s maritime security interests have assumed increased importance and serve to secure India’s role and economic interests even beyond the Indian Ocean. Dr. Vijay Sakhuja’s paper examined the rise of China as a maritime and naval power from a historical perspective. He argued that the growth of China’s maritime economy will add to the country’s power potential.

The third session dealt with the security issues in Southeast Asia. Dr. Ian Storey’s paper on the South China Sea dispute reviewed the developments and their implications since the 2002 declaration on the conduct of parties and suggested that the dispute may well take centre-stage if the recent trends were any indications. The paper by Dr. K. Yhome analyzed the changing dynamics of external power interactions in Myanmar and their implications. He argued that while the international divide seemed to be narrowing down at the political level, economic and strategic cooperation among external powers in Myanmar looked unlikely in the current geopolitical context.

The fourth session examined the evolving Asian regionalism. Amb. Rodolfo C. Severino’s paper discussed regional institutions such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and AFR in East Asia and stressed the point that these institutions need to be strengthened to deal with regional security and non-traditional security issues. In his paper, Prof. K. Kesavan analyzed the role of regional institutions in India’s “Look East” policy and argued that New Delhi’s look east policy was a response to cope with the new challenges in the aftermath of the Cold War.

The fifth session explored the non-traditional security challenges focusing on climate change and its implications. Mr. Samir Saran provided an interesting perspective on climate change and security in South Asia. By redefining climate as “the operating system” for other elements/threats, he argued that there was a need to acknowledge climate as a variable in any emerging security paradigm. Dr. Lee Poh Onn’s paper examined the implications of climate change for Southeast Asia. Basing his argument on some reports he suggested that Southeast Asia has observed impacts of climate change in water resources, increases in temperature as well as health issues.

The papers generated interesting and fruitful discussion and debate thereby opening new perspectives in understanding the issues confronting South and Southeast Asia. The papers presented at the seminar will be compiled into a book for publication.

June, 2009
Link to ORF-website

Books / Papers

BRIC – in the new world order: Perspectives from Brazil, China, India and Russia.

by Nandan Unnikrishnan and Samir Saran
Macmillan Publishers India, 2010

Summary
The BRIC countries are today an increasingly cohesive group of nations with a common vision and shared commitment to collaborate and shape a more equitable and prosperous world order. All four nations are leading economies, large markets and emerging knowledge creators; their interactions within the grouping, and with other nations, hold promise for their own people and for other developing countries. The BRIC country coordination at multilateral fora, such as the G-20, is helping to reorient the existing market economy framework, by stressing the need for greater transparency and accountability of the global financial systems. BRIC’s greater role in the IMF and World Bank is likely to ensure more support and assistance for developing nations, as well as keep surveillance of Western financial practices. While the four are yet to evolve a common position on Climate Change and WTO (Russia is still not a member), BRIC countries will certainly be crucial to any agreement on these vital issues. While there are expectations from this grouping on geo-political matters and international disputes, for the moment, these countries have decided to focus on finance, energy, trade, technology and multilateral pluralism.

This edited volume is the outcome of an event hosted by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) with the support of the Ministry of External Affairs, as a pre-summit discussion to assist in developing the framework for dialogue among BRIC leaders at Yekaterineburg, in June 2009 and consists of interesting thoughts on these subjects by experts from the four countries. ORF, on its part, is the coordinating think-tank and academic efforts among the BRIC countries and has an extensive partner network in China, Russia and Brazil in both government and private channels.

We are richly endowed collectively in terms of natural resources and other factors of production, and are today in a position to sustain our higher growth rates. Combined with our growing middle classes, and the young populations that most of us enjoy, BRIC can hope to be a factor of growth and stability in the world economy for decades to come.

ISBN : 9780230330665,
Rs. 810.00
To purchase the book, please visit Vedamsbook.in

Further material:
Please find here the link to the “New Edition to Parliament Library”, April 2011 (book # 110).
Book review in ‘Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security’, Volume 17, Issue 3, 2011. “BRICS – Dawn of a new era or business as usual?”

Uncategorized

Responding to Change: Searching for a Path through the Climate Haze(part II)

SAMIR SARAN

India’s power dilemma

According to the Central Electricity Authority, India’s installed energy capacity for thermal power as of February 28, 2010 is 100,599MW. India’s total capacity is 157,229MW. Nuclear energy is at 4,340MW, hydro energy is at 36,863MW and according to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, green energy is at 15,427MW. Captive power-generating capacity connected to the grid is an additional 19,509MW.²² India’s per capita energy consumption is less than 500kgoe (kilogrammes of oil equivalent), compared to the global average of 1,800kgoe.²³ According to India’s Integrated Energy Policy: 2032²⁴, the projected per capita energy consumption would be well below the 2003 levels in developed countries. Even to meet this modest energy supply, the required installed capacity that India would need for 2031-2 would be 760,000MW at 7% annual GDP growth and 960,000MW at 8% growth;²⁵ between 4.5-6.0 times the current capacity. Since the power sector emissions contribute nearly half of the per capita emissions²⁶ in India today, this sector alone would contribute an additional 3.5-4.0tCO2 per capita by 2032. This, in a sense, is the Indian dilemma and the global concern. A

Power sector investments have long lifecycles of 30-40 years, and therefore will shape India’s abilities to reduce emissions to 2tCO2 per capita by 2050. However, even if India was to opt for green alternatives for a fourth of the new generating capacity, an estimated additional annual expenditure of US$258 billion may be required.²⁷ These funds are not forthcoming and the irony is that the Annex 1 countries, many of whom are facing severe economic meltdown, may not be able to meet their financial obligation towards the climate response.

India’s transport dilemma

India’s existing Achilles’ heel has been its transport sector. Significant investments are underway and the current five year Plan²⁸ has estimated that the total investment in infrastructure during this period would be US$514.04 billion. Of this, roads and bridges are at US$78.54 billion, railways at US$65.45 billion, ports at US$22 billion and airports at US$7.74 billion. The positive aspect of this investment is the growing emphasis on moving traffic from road to rail and creating dedicated corridors for high density routes which can save up to 347-500MtCO2-eq in the next 20 years.²⁹ Some of the projects in this period include the creation of dedicated rail freight corridors between Delhi-Mumbai and Ludhiana-Kolkata; modernisation of 4 metro and 35 non-metro airports; constructing 7 green-field airports; further developing the Golden Quadrilateral highway network (connecting Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai) and other national highways; as well as developing 1,000km of expressways and construction of 129,707km of rural roads in India.³⁰ Each of these endeavours is carbon intensive (large quantities of steel, cement, fossil fuel and power are needed) and will test the ability of the country to improve its carbon intensity of GDP going forward. The climate nightmare is, however, the estimated increase in the car density. Currently, India has 8 cars/1,000 people; China 15/1,000; Brazil 165/1,000 and the USA 500/1,000. By 2050, India is likely to have 382 cars/1,000 people with Brazil having the highest number (645/1,000). The transport sector that currently contributes less than 10% of total Indian emissions is likely to double in the next 20-30 years. Transport policies and the introduction of mass rapid transport systems could significantly change the nature of the emissions profile in this sector, and as in the case of power, this would require investments from within and outside the country. Top

India’s agriculture dilemma

The least discussed sector globally is the agricultural sector. According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), it accounts for 20% of India’s total GHG emissions.³¹ While CO2 emissions in agriculture are barely 1% of the total, Indian agriculture accounts for 50% of India’s methane (CH4) emissions.

Nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions, at 0.31Mt, account for an even larger share. India’s livestock population is estimated to grow to 636 million by 2020. India’s paddy cultivation area of 432.3 million hectares is the largest in Asia, and accounts for the bulk of GHG emissions from agriculture. Though flood irrigation of rice is the second largest source of GHG emissions from agriculture, India’s per hectare emissions from rice cultivation are approximately 10% of the global average.³² Due to the highly sensitive and political nature of this sector, it is unlikely that any drastic policy changes could be expected. Perhaps, through the reorientation of consumption patterns and more directed subsidy schemes for the farmers, the emphasis on wheat and rice in agriculture could be reduced. Traditional grains may need to be reintroduced due to their drought-resistance and their suitability to the local agricultural conditions.

India’s peaking year dilemma

The other important determinant of India’s emissions profile would be the timeline for ’peaking’ its emissions. There already is intense international pressure on most emerging economies on this, and once an international agreement is signed in the coming years, there will be limited time available. However, success in achieving the goals of poverty reduction, infrastructure and social development must clearly inform the peaking year and must continue to remain non-negotiable for India when committing to any global timeline. The rate and pace of success in domestic action on these aspects will clearly involve strong central political leadership, and more importantly, a universal political buy-in from the 28 Provincial Governments is necessary to drive transformation at the grassroots if such change is to be effected. Success will clearly depend on the governance and institutional capacity (finance, know-how, skills) to mitigate existing deficiencies and steer their constituents towards a sustainable economy.

There are two nuances of the pace of change that must be briefly discussed. The first is how soon can the old economy relinquish its old models and opt for the new; and if the old economy is unwilling, then how soon can the green companies muster sufficient political capital to influence policies and governments? There is an underlying face-off between these two business models and the outcome will certainly influence the pace of transformation. This is further complicated by the fact that the old businesses (oil and gas, aviation, power companies, et al) are, in addition, IPR owners of the new green technologies.³³ This adds an additional economic dimension on how soon the new technologies can replace the fossil-fuel-based economy. It is the oil and gas companies who may actually decide the price point and the time for the commercial applications of existing green alternatives such as solar, wind and CCS (carbon capture and storage). If mass deployment of these technologies has to be achieved in bottom-of- the-pyramid economies like India and China, some innovative pricing mechanisms may need to be devised to make them attractive and affordable.

The second nuance is perhaps equally compelling. As per a study by Edmonds et al,³⁶ there is an economic and moral argument for emerging economies like India to delay the peaking of emissions. In the table on the previous page, if the emerging economies were to introduce a carbon tax (i.e. a price for carbon) in a phased

manner as per the 2050 set 3 scenario, their burden towards bearing the cost of mitigation would be 28% of the global effort. In comparison, if the emerging economies were to act now (2012), their burden of mitigation would be as high as 72% of the global effort. Clearly, there is a moral argument for the Annex 1 countries to bear a larger share of mitigation costs under 2050 set 3.

However, if the Annex 1 countries, under any global agreement, were to compensate unconditionally the cost of transition for the emerging economies early transition could be achieved and global economic costs would be minimised. The deliberations at Copenhagen suggest otherwise. The commitment of funds to the global cause is ’back-loaded’, with larger contributions only flowing from the Annex 1 countries at the end of the decade and beyond (projection). Early peaking of emissions will require front-loading of fund flows by Annex 1 countries. Top

Consumption dilemma

A day after the conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit, two narratives appeared in newspapers. The first described the role (negative) of India and China at Copenhagen which led to a watered-down agreement in the form of an ’Intent of Parties’. The second media report highlighted how China, India and the Philippines are leading the global economic recovery by the virtue of their consumption market.³⁷ This, in essence, is the climate paradox. China and India are expected to consume and help the global economic community and are also expected to reduce emissions to protect the climate. If in 2050 China and India account for 50% of the incremental emissions,³⁸ in the same year, household consumption and transport will contribute over 60% to global emissions.³⁹ As per a report by the US Department of Energy, only 25% of the emissions in the USA are from the industrial sector, while transportation and commercial sectors contributed more than 50%. Furthermore, 15% of the CO2 emissions come from the residential sector, which indicates that more than 60% of US emissions are directly linked to the consumption patterns of individuals and households in the USA, which are shaped by their lifestyles and behaviour.⁴⁰

Today, India’s affluence is not significant enough to impact its emission profile, but by 2050, personal consumption, personal transport and leisure and travel have the potential to be the most significant source of CO2 emissions. Even as India grapples with placing sustainability at the heart of its infrastructure and energy investments, consumption emissions still evade attention. This is the direct product of the lack of a similar debate in the Annex 1 countries. As per the IEA (International Energy Agency), despite an improvement of over 25% in energy intensity of GDP in both Europe and the USA, total emissions have only fallen by 1.5% in Europe, while in the USA they actually increased by 16.3%, due to a higher growth rate fuelled by increasing consumer demand. Furthermore, the use of electricity by appliances such as refrigerators and computers has increased by 48%, service sector electricity consumption increased by 50% and in households it increased by 35%.⁴¹ Even in the UK, over 50% of emissions are based on lifestyle. And if a reduction in emissions of 80% by 2050 is to be achieved, nearly half of the reduction would have to flow from the lifestyle carbon account. Can the global community achieve this? In the USA alone, over US$1 trillion are spent annually on advertising and marketing. If marketing were a vertical industry, it would represent close to 9% of the GDP of the USA, and it would rank as the fifth largest industry, behind manufacturing, government, real estate and professional services.

The total marketing costs are estimated in the vicinity of anywhere up to US$5 trillion globally. Some of the most popular advertising choices are the cartoon channels which are the most profitable of all media properties.⁴³ What does this imply? Much of the US marketing spend in the US is targeted at children below 10 years of age: teaching them the virtues of motor cars, electronics, houses and holidays.

At a young age, a powerful marketing force inculcates the fine art of carbon emissions into the very being of every child. And what is the global response? The mightiest nations get together at Copenhagen and very proudly announce an increasing commitment of up to US$100 billion a year to curtail emissions. It is an unequal battle. Even from these committed funds it is unlikely even a dollar would be spent on behaviour change and curtailing lifestyle emissions. The global discourse continues to largely ignore this most important half of the equation; you and I as consumers. India and any emerging economy can do very little to manage this end of the equation. They are susceptible to international marketing forces, the unfolding globalisation and the growing aspirations of their own populations. In the period that they were discarded as the ’third world’, each one aspired to the American dream. Now the question is, can the planet sustain an additional 2 billion Indian and Chinese living this dream?

If the global community is committed to capping our emissions at 450ppm by 2050, significant global efforts and policies would need to be designed to reverse this ’consumption pollution’. Should policies be based on curtailing advertisements on children’s television channels, or should there be greater censorship on the products advertised? Should the media be reigned in? Or should the last mile to the consumer be controlled? These are all questions that societies, national governments and the international community will need to respond to.

Conclusions

The Indian response to climate change will clearly be conditioned by global negotiations, domestic compulsions and the aspirations of its people. While most economists believe that pricing carbon or offering incentives to green alternatives for development are the most efficient tools of policy, it is also apparent that harsh decisions and ’command and control’ alternatives may also be appropriate if emissions are to be curtailed. The striking similarity between the Bruntland Report⁴⁴ and the Stern Review is that both criticise the existing liberal market framework as being the cause of unsustainability and in their conclusion, both reassert the primacy of the market in seeking a solution. Top

Governance cannot be ceded to markets and policy must be the purview of the polity. Tough decisions are also in store with respect to deployment and dispersion of green technologies. Should intellectual property rights (IPR) be subject to ’must provide’ regulations and compulsory licensing, or should new ways of protecting IPR be developed while encouraging their wider dispersion?

The distorted markets that we see across the globe are unable to disseminate technology at appropriate prices. If climate cannot be discounted, why should it be the basis for profiteering? A middle, effective path needs to be discovered.

Carbon markets and carbon trade are another area of keen interest which some see as resolving the redistributive and equity debate; but this needs to be deconstructed to examine their true effectiveness. As per a World Bank report,⁴⁵ CERs (certified emissions reductions) are ineffective in controlling emissions. Since 2008, while there has been a transfer of US$7 billion to the emerging economies under the emission trading scheme,⁴⁶ critics argue the transactions are at the entity level and between elites in the west and in the east. Moreover, the allowances that were traded were generously awarded and the real impact within the EU is marginal due to this distortion.

The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the EU-ETS and similar schemes that may emerge. In the case of India, perhaps the most effective financial mechanism would be based on the market opportunities and the improved business environment going forward.

The country would need to remove licensing and policy bottlenecks and fast-track investment in sustainable businesses.

India will need to attract greater domestic private- sector and international investments in the key sectors of power and infrastructure, and compete in this process with other countries that offer similar opportunities.

India has already introduced feed-in tariffs and other regulatory incentives⁴⁷ to support the development and deployment of renewable energy, in order to ensure a significant component of future growth is sustainable.

However, if innovation and intellectual property will be the key resources that will fuel the new economy, then India must invest in its human resources and research and development (R&D). Its current level of less than 1% for R&D is unacceptable and it must at the earliest opportunity strive for the OECD level of 2.25%.⁴⁸ School education and quality university education, along with a culture of innovation, can ensure that India uses its over 1 billion population gainfully in a new world energised by intellect and fuelled by technology.

Notes:

22 Facts and figures on installed energy capacity, as stated by Central Electricity Authority of India; http://www.cea.nic.in/

23 Ministry of Environment and Forests and Ministry of Power, Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Government of India, ’India: Addressing Energy Security and Climate Change’, October 2007; http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/ccd/Addressing_CC_09-10-07.pdf

24 Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, ’Integrated Energy Policy: Report of the Expert Committee’, August 2006

25 Central Electricity Authority and Confederation of Indian Industries, ’White Paper on Strategy for 11th Plan’, August 2007 August 2006

26 Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, ’India: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2007’, May 2010

27 Figure calculated using the estimate of 3,880 billion kWh given by the Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR) of total energy requirement in 2031-32 at 8% GDP growth. 25% of this figure was multiplied by ` 12 which is the average price for a basket of renewable energy sources such as solar, wind and biomass. The final figure was converted into US$ using an average exchange rate of ` 45 to the US$.

28 The Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure, Planning Commission, Government of India, ’Projections of Infrastructure during the Eleventh Plan’, August 2008

29 ’Goyal, A., ’Carbon Mitigation Strategies in Transport Sector – Complex issues Involved in Designing India’s Ultra Low Carbon Mega Rail Projects’, presentation given at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, November 19, 2009

30 The Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure, Planning Commission, Government of India, ’Projections of Infrastructure during the Eleventh Plan’, August 2008

31 Nelson, G.C. et.al, ’Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Issues for Indian Agriculture’, International Food Policy Research Institute discussion paper, September 2009; http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpridp00900.pdf

32 Climate Challenge India, ’India: Strategies for Low Carbon Growth’; www.climatechallengeindia.org/…/158-India– strategies-for-low-carbon-growth

33 Tannock, Q., ’The Economics of Climate Change: Taking the Lead, IP Ownership’ Presentation at Chevening Fellows Lecture, Wolfson College, Cambridge, January 28, 2010

34 ’Base case’ = universal harmonised carbon tax sufficient to meet the stabilisation target implemented without delay Lecture, Wolfson College, Cambridge, January 28, 2010

35 Edmonds, J., Clarke, L., Lurz, J. and Wise, M., ’Stabilizing CO2 Concentrations with Incomplete International Cooperation’, Climate Policy 8(4):355-376, 2008 Lecture, Wolfson College, Cambridge, January 28, 2010

36 ibid

37 ’India & China Leading World Recovery The Economic Times, November 15, 2009

38 Shalizi, Z., ’Energy and Emissions: Local and Global Effects of the Rise of India and China’ in Winters, A.L. and Yusuf, S., Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy, World Bank Publications, 2007

39 Sanwal, M., ’Climate Change and Global Sustainability: Need for a New Paradigm for International Cooperation’ paper presented at the Global Summit on Sustainable Development and Climate Change, New Delhi, India; organised by Observer Research Foundation, India and Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Germany, September 24, 2009

40 US Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, 2005 Buildings Energy Data Book, August 2005

41 International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy in the New Millennium; Trends in IEA Countries, 2007

42 BlackFriars Communication, Inc., 2005; http://blackfriarsinc.com/sizing-release.html

43 See, for example, Johannes, A., ’Chevy Forms Multi-Million Dollar Deal with Nickelodeon’, May 26, 2005; http://promomagazine.com/news/chevynick/

44 ’Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’, UN Documents, 1987; http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm

45 The World Bank Institute, Washington DC, ’State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009’, May 2009; http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_of_the_Carbon_Market_2009-FINALb.pdf

46 ibid

47 Tyagi, A., ’Renewable Energy Holds Promising Future in India” April 18, 2008; http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2008/04/renewable-energy-holds-promising-future-in-india-52214

48 OECD, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007: Innovation and Performance in the Global Economy, OECD Publishing, 2008

Concluded

Views are those of the author

Courtesy: University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership

Emerging geo-political and security challenges by V. Suryanarayan November 2, 2010

STRATEGIC UNEASE

Emerging geo-political and security challenges
by V. Suryanarayan
November 2, 2010