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India has nowhere to hide

Going into a winning war is easy but wading into uncertain waters to safeguard vital interests is the true test of realpolitik. That is why India’s Afghan gambit must be gutsy and counterintuitive.

While John Kerry lauded India’s role in his June 23 speech in Delhi, events of the last 90 days tell a very different story; one in which the US disregards the concerns of both India and the Afghan government and continues to woo the Pakistani military establishment in search of its elusive salvation.

The US actions have allowed the Taliban to formally open an office in Qatar for direct negotiations, which the Taliban sees as the first step towards a new emirate. The victory of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, in collusion with fundamentalists, allows radicals in that country certain influence over the civilian government and the military’s shadow over foreign policy looms larger and stronger as the US consolidates General Parvez Kayani’s pivotal role, established by a hurried and reckless K-3 meeting (Kerry, Kayani, Karzai).

Consequently, India has nowhere to hide. Three eventualities have to be prepared for in Afghanistan, possibly unfolding concurrently. The first is a Karzai government under severe pressure from a heavily armed Taliban backed by the new mandate available to the civilian and military leadership in Pakistan. The second is a Taliban takeover of Kabul. The third is some form of dismemberment of the country again. Each of these eventualities leads to India having to shoulder a greater share of the blowback, than the western countries that seek to drive the current agenda.

India’s exclusion is symptomatic of the short-termism that has plagued western policy that has sought to create a closed information loop to filter out inconvenient truths. The problem is, as history repeatedly shows, an unstable Afghanistan destabilises the region. Importantly, as 9/11 showed, it also has the potential to threaten western power centres. Yet it would seem nothing has been learnt and India would need to very quickly write its own script again.

India’s Afghanistan policy has historically always been cold, calculating, uncompromising, long-term and more than capable of absorbing significant reverses in the short to medium term. Its response today must also support those who it does business with in Afghanistan. It cannot be coy in providing soft and hard military support to its friends and it must not be seen as an unreliable and indecisive partner.

India has in the past succeeded in maintaining Afghanistan as a viable partner for over 60 of 67 years of bilateral history. Wading through the precarious years starting 1989 and through the economic crisis of 1991, India still managed to support one dispensation or another that held inimical forces at bay till 1997. After 1997, India continued to support the Northern Alliance in the hope of better times. That time came in 2001, when, following the US invasion, a government whose core elements had been supported by India, were installed in power.

Pakistan, in spite of its advantageous geography, had succeeded in pacifying Afghanistan for just four to six years at best. Anybody with a cursory knowledge of the region will know that it takes a lot more than common borders to manage bilateral relations.

Going into a winning war is easy but wading into uncertain waters to safeguard vital interests is the true test of realpolitik. That is why India’s Afghan gambit must be gutsy and counterintuitive. Given the high stakes and high probability of failure, too much talk is counterproductive and blueprints for the post-2014 chaos that will be Afghanistan are urgently needed.

India in 2014 is not the economic cripple it was in 1991; a $290-billion reserve buys more loyalty and battle resilience than 15-day currency reserves. Over the last 12 years India has worked exceptionally hard to win over significant pockets of support among the Pashtuns. Unlike the 1990s when India’s support base was the ethnic minorities, support for India is now deeper and wider.

Taliban 2.0, therefore, will find a house divided, facing the enemy without and also within. India has four consulates in addition to the embassy in Kabul. These are the prime nodes of aid dispersal, which is counted as the most effective of any country’s efforts there.

The nearly $2 billion dispersed so far have gone to infrastructure, agriculture and education, especially self-sustaining schemes at the village and micro levels in Pashtun areas. It is precisely these schemes that connect India directly to the Pashtun’s day-to-day life and make India a friend in their view. It will be Pakistan’s inability to deliver – systemically and financially – on this score that will make Pakistan the outsider.

Afghanistan post-2014 must not by default become a neutra-lised backyard of Rawalpindi and its proxies. Any interference must necessarily require significant injections of Pakistani treasure and blood. India could lay for Pakistan the same trap that the US laid for the Soviets in Afghanistan.

If Pakistan marches in directly or by proxy it gets bogged down and alienates any residual western sympathy. If Pakistan does not, it loses the prize. Win or lose by default Pakistan loses and win or lose by default India is likely to succeed.

Courtesy : The Times of India, June 27, 2013

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Books / Papers, Politics / Globalisation

CIVIL 20 RECOMMENDATIONS ON STRONG, SUSTAINABLE, BALANCED AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

Original link is here..

 

 

India

 

By Samir Saran, Senior Fellow and Vice President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF);

Vivan Sharan, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)

 

India is a study in contrasts. In the post liberalisation era, since 1991, the country has witnessed a rapid GDP growth, secular expansion of its services sector, and a commensurate increase in per capita consumption. As a result, in 2012, the country overtook Japan’s GDP (in purchasing power parity terms), to become the third largest economy in the world. However, at the same time, a recent survey across 100 districts in the country revealed that 42 per cent of India’s children under the age of 5 are underweight and a shocking 59 per cent are stunted in their physical development98. Extrapolating these results to reflect the overall state of socio-economic development, the picture at once becomes stark. This paper will delve into some macro trends

through which it aims to unbundle facets of the country’s distorted growth narrative.

 

In March 2012, the Planning Commission of the Government of India set the poverty line at INR

28.65 (approximately USD 0.52) for urban areas and INR 22.42 (approximately USD 0.4) for rural areas in terms of per capita expenditure. Using rounded approximations of INR 28 and INR

22 (USD 0.5 and USD 0.4) for urban and rural areas respectively, National Sample Survey data from household surveys conducted in 2009-10 reveal that 22.98 per cent of India’s urban population and 36.58 per cent of its rural population spend less than the approximated poverty line (Table 1). Meanwhile, India’s ‘emerging’ identity, which derives from its significant middle class, is also exposed for what it is. Only about 4 per cent of India’s population earns more than INR 100 a day (approximately USD 1.8 a day in nominal terms). The rural urban divide is also particularly prominent and can be observed throughout this paper.

 

Table 1. Per Capita Expenditure and Population, 2009-10

 

 

All India

Urban

Rural

Expenditure

% of Population

% of Population

% of Population

< Rs. 28 per day

48.92

22.98

36.58

Between   Rs. 28 to 100 per day

47.09

65.54

62.21

More than Rs. 100 per day

3.99

11.49

1.21

Total

100

100

100

Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs

 

The world is still grappling with the ripples caused by the Global Financial Crisis. While the crisis found its origins in the West, it perhaps has greater absolute implications for the emerging and developing world. India has witnessed a slowdown in growth to around 5 per cent in 2012-

13. The fundamental assumption about GDP growth, echoed by Indian policymakers has been that faster GDP growth is a prerequisite to reducing poverty and concomitantly, enhancing development99. Such views are reflections of a wider international consensus that “there is every reason to believe that economic growth reduces poverty”100. In this case, the converse argument also holds, and every percentage point slowdown in India’s GDP growth impacts the sustenance prospects of millions of rural and urban poor.

 

There is of course a large volume of academic literature which questions such simplistic correlations. For instance the India Chronic Poverty Report (2011), states that “the issue arising

 

 

98 The HUNGaMa Survey Report, Naandi Foundation, 2011

99 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/india-needs-high-gdp-growth-to-reduce- poverty-at-faster-pace/article4153965.ece

100 Roemer, Michael and Gugerty, Mary K., “Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?”, Harvard Institute for

International Development, March 1997

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in some developing economies with large populations is not that there is poverty in spite of moderate to high economic growth, but that this poverty is often created by the very nature of economic growth itself’’101. While this view is open to debate, it is sufficiently clear that there has been a consistent rise in inequity between the rich and the poor in India. This is evidenced from the fact that those at the bottom 10 per cent of per capita wealth account for merely 3.6 per cent of total consumption, while the top 10 per cent account for 31.1 per cent102. Additionally, Pal and Ghosh (2007) have observed that “comparable estimates of the 50th (1993-1994) and

55th (1999-2000) rounds of National Sample Survey data reveal that inequality increased both in

rural and urban India”103.

 

Perhaps the starting point for any meaningful analysis or explanation of India’s unequal society must be an overview of aggregated expenditure profiles for different social groups. From table 2, it is evident that the traditionally disadvantaged groups (scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, and other backward classes), on average fare worse than those that fall  within the category of “others” in terms of per capita expenditure. On an all India level, less than 2 per cent of the disadvantaged groups spend more than the nominal equivalent of USD 2 a day. A majority (at an all India level) are below the approximated urban poverty line expenditure assumed here. It is

safe therefore, to infer strong causality between income classes and social groups104.

 

Table 2. Per Capita Expenditure and Social Group, 2009-10

 

 

 

 

Social Groups

 

< Rs.   28 per day

Between      Rs.

28 to 100 per day

 

Greater     than

Rs. 100 per day

 

 

 

Total

Scheduled Tribes

67.35

31.32

1.33

100

Scheduled Castes

61.1

37.69

1.22

100

Other Backward   Classes

50.86

46.65

2.5

100

Others

32.06

59.07

8.87

100

Total

48.91

47.1

3.99

100

Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs

 

When the multidimensional nature of poverty is taken into account, it is not surprising that self fulfilling spirals can trap millions within a variety of systemic constraints. Table 3 helps to illustrate that while nearly all of those spending more than INR 100 per (approximately USD

1.8) day have access to electricity for domestic consumption, over 35 per cent of those who spend less than INR 28 (USD 0.5) in rural areas, still have no access to electricity.

 

Table 3. % Population with Electricity for Domestic Use and per Capita Expenditure, 2008-09

 

Expenditure

All India

Urban

Rural

< Rs. 28 per day

64.61

90.25

86.66

between Rs. 28 to 100 per day

92.32

98.66

97.83

greater than Rs.   100 per day

99.05

99.98

99.98

Total

73.21

96.14

96.14

Source: NSS, 2008-09 @ ORF India Data Labs

 

 

 

 

101 India Chronic Poverty Report, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 2011

102 Mehta et. al., “India Chronic Poverty Report”, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 20011

103 Pal, Parthapratim and Ghosh, Jayati, “Inequality in India: A Survey of Recent Trends”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, United Nation, 2007

104 Expenditure can be used as a substitute for income, using the established economic relationship that savings =

income – expenditure; and assuming negligible savings at the bottom of the pyramid.

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Peeling through the multiple dimensions of social inequity and concomitant to the above described ‘sociology of the poor’ are issues around access to services and resources. Saran and Sharan (2012) point out that between 30 to 40 per cent of those belonging  to the various disadvantaged  groups still use kerosene for lighting in rural areas105. This is a particularly illustrative statistic on two counts. Firstly, typical kerosene lamps deliver between 1 to 6 lumens

per square metre of useful light compared with typical Western standards of 300 lux for basic tasks such as reading. There is no convergence of living standards for those at the bottom of the pyramid. The second is that those with least access are disadvantaged on multiple fronts.

 

Access to modern forms of energy is necessary for development. Access to resources such as water is necessary for basics sustenance which underpins development. Wide divergences in the access to drinking water across different income profiles are indicative of a serious structural deficit. This deficit has no doubt helped to perpetuate inter-generational infirmities. Table 3 shows that those with per capita expenditures greater than INR 100 (USD 1.8) a day are around two and a half times as likely to have access to drinking water within their premises as those in the bottom quartile assumed here (expenditure less than INR 28 (approximately USD 0.5) per day). Those at the bottom are much more likely to walk significant distances to access water than those at the top. There are multiple implications of such divergences in access, including on household productivity.

 

Table  4.  % Population  and  Distance  from  Drinking  Water  Sources  Mapped  to  per  Capita

Expenditure, 2008-09

 

Expenditure

Within

Dwelling

 

Outside Dwelling but   within the Premises

Outside Premises

 

 

 

Total

0.2 to

0.5 km

0.5 to

1.0 km

<  Rs.    28    per

day

 

15.74

 

22.68

 

50.47

 

9.18

 

1.43

Between      Rs.

28 to 100 per   day

 

 

 

36.24

 

 

 

32.12

 

 

 

26.31

 

 

 

3.86

 

 

 

0.9

More than   Rs.

100 per day

 

76.57

 

18.91

 

3.34

 

0.69

 

0.26

Source: NSS, 2008-09 @ ORF India Data Labs

 

Household productivity is also closely linked to the levels of education attainment. Within a rights-based framework for development, the role of education is increasingly emphasised. Tilak (2005),  notes  that  “poverty  is  seen  as  deprivation  of  opportunities  that  enhance  human capabilities  to  lead  a tolerable life” and  importantly that  “education  is  one such important opportunity, deprivation of which in itself represents poverty”106. While it is up for debate

whether primary, middle and secondary education actually offers productivity gains that are commensurate with the contextual imperatives for human capital formation given the scale and nature of poverty; and whether higher education or vocational education should be prioritised; the statistics in table 5 illustrate that there is a clear causality between income and education levels. Indeed, many studies have argued that this causality runs both ways.

 

 

 

 

 

105 Saran, Samir, and Sharan, Vivan, “Identity and Energy Access in India: Setting Contexts for Rio+20”, Energy

Security Insight, TERI, Volume 7 (1), January 2012

106 Tilak, Jandhyala B.G., “Post-Elementary Education, Poverty and Development in India”, Working Paper Series

No. 6, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh

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Table 5. Education Levels Mapped to % Population sorted by Per Capita Expenditure, 2009 – 10

 

 

 

 

 

 

Education Levels

All India

Expenditure

<   Rs.     28 per   day

between   Rs.     28     to

100 per day

more than Rs. 100 per   day

 

 

Total

illiterate

42.93

25.65

9.25

33.45

upto primary

34.89

29.43

15.22

31.54

middle

12.46

15.87

10.48

13.99

secondary

5.96

12.7

14.26

9.47

higher secondary

2.7

8.6

15.53

5.99

diploma & certificate course

0.1

0.91

2.95

0.6

graduate & above

0.96

6.83

32.32

4.98

Total

100

100

100

100

Source: NSS, 2009-10 @ ORF India Data Labs

 

India is rated as having a moderate inequality relative to several other developing countries, with a Gini coefficient of 36.8 in 2004-05107. While the coefficient has likely worsened since then, India is leagues ahead of several other G20 countries, including the United States and China. However, the Gini coefficient cannot capture the nuanced trends of inequity, and the causal relationships that perpetuate it.

 

Development is a long term, complex process. It is clear from the socio-economic realities which have been outlined in this paper, that India’s development trajectory is steep, and the challenges, stark. Concomitantly, the public policies which have also been highlighted here, have been formulated by policymakers to bridge inequities between various socio-economic identities and promote inclusive  growth.  They aim  to  provide better  access  to  services,  employment  and information; and are certainly enablers of transformation when implemented right. Even so, they are necessary but not sufficient. A number of systemic initiatives are required to create the momentum and maintain the development gains required for a broad based transition to higher levels of prosperity and equity, particularly for those at the bottom of the pyramid. In this context, we suggest there are two fundamental questions that Indian policymakers must pose to themselves, to tailor effective and efficient interventions that can ensure that development in fact leads to growth:

 

1.   What is the threshold level of inequality for political and social stability?

2.   How can policy interventions resolve the strategic, but not necessarily binary choice between generating employment and increasing productivity?

 

Two decades have passed since India embarked on a new growth trajectory underpinned by a neoclassical economic framework. Liberalisation led reform has delivered unequally. With over

1.2 billion people and  an extremely heterogeneous socio-economic profile, any attempts to recalibrate policy prescriptions must be fully cognizant of diverse realities and trends that have become firmly embedded. Whether GDP growth has exacerbated inequities, or served as the template for improving living standards is not the most urgent question in the contemporary context. Rather, policymakers and political leaders must focus their energies on understanding the causal influences that have a bearing on socio-economic trends; and accordingly designing a progressive and contextual framework for development and growth. We suggest that such a framework must include and be complemented by the following crucial elements:

 

 

 

107 World Bank Indicators

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                           Nearly 12 million people enter the Indian workforce ever year. A majority lack the skills to gain meaningful employment, and face an abject lack of access to decent work. As a result those at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid are largely employed in the informal sector, without any form of job security or social security. The availability of productive and remunerative employment is central to enabling equitable growth. The Indian economy must employ a larger proportionate share of its workforce. In turn, minimum wages and domestic labour standards must be enforced universally; and the skills gap must be addressed through strategic emphasis on subsidised and targeted vocational education.

   The Indian economy relies asymmetrically on growth of the tertiary sector, particularly capital and skilled labour intensive sectors such as information technology which have not been  able  to  bridge  the  systemic  employment  gap.  Employment  creation  is  a  policy imperative for enabling equitable outcomes; and the revitalisation and reemphasis on the growth of the secondary sector is a necessary prerequisite for achieving broad based socio economic transformation. The industrialisation process requires a number of enablers, including improved infrastructure and service delivery; and the creation of a workforce with skill sets commensurate with a strategic vision for industrial growth.

   The competitive advantage of the  Indian  economy in  the export  sector  remains  largely untapped. With an export to GDP ratio of 16.5 per cent (in 2012), the Indian export economy has a vast potential. In this regard, high productivity, labour intensive sectors in particular demand a sustained policy focus. Greater integration with regional supply chains and increased leverage of regional trade agreements can provide the necessary momentum for secular growth of such sectors. Monetary policy, fiscal management and financial market depth must complement such growth.

   Policy Emphasis must be placed on facilitating access to markets with strong internal drivers demand. This will help the Indian economy to hedge against global demand volatility perpetuated  by disruptive  business  cycles.  The  Southwards  shift  of  Indian  exports  is  a positive sign in this context. According to the Indian Exim bank, the share of Asia, Africa and LAC regions has increased sharply from 47% in 2001-02 to 62.7% in 2011-12; and the share of Asia has risen from 40% to 52% during this period.

   The equitable growth of the Indian economy will to a large extent be determined by the degree   and   nature   of   private   sector   participation.   The   virtual   stagnation   in   the investment/GDP ratio (of which the private sector is a larger contributor than the public sector), which has grown by a mere 5 per cent since 2005-06 to 37.6 per cent in 2011-12, is indicative of inherent challenges. Greater participation of the Indian private sector can be driven by a better environment for doing business. Policy frameworks must address issues around corporate governance and labour reforms without compromising market competitiveness.

   Long term capital formation through increased participation in the financial markets must be prioritised. This will entail a broad based emphasis on imperatives such as financial literacy, financial inclusion, and investor protection. The nominal proportionate retail participation in the domestic capital markets is a cause of concern. Household savings must be productively and efficiently deployed in order to finance the widening current account deficit. Simultaneously, short term speculative participation must be offset by genuine market opportunities for growth. Commensurate emphasis must be placed on channelling global savings into long term asset creation in the Indian economy, with a supportive policy framework. Increased government emphasis on development of micro, small and medium enterprises as well as industrial clusters must be sustained despite political cycles. Policy disruptions can quickly reverse gains achieved over time, and political risk poses the greatest challenge to unleashing the entrepreneurial potential in the country. A coherent, inclusive and long term political vision must complement policy formulation. Robust legal frameworks must be employed to secure long term growth largely devoid of political risk uncertainties.

 

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References:

The HUNGaMa Survey Report (2011) Naandi Foundation.

URL:   http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/economy/india-needs-high- gdp-growth-to-reduce-poverty-at-faster-pace/article4153965.ece

Roemer, M., Gugerty, M. K. (1997), Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?, Harvard Institute for International Development, March.

India Chronic Poverty Report (2011), Indian Institute of Public Administration.

Mehta et. al. (2011), India Chronic Poverty Report, Indian Institute of Public Administration.

Pal,  P.,  Ghosh,  J.  (2007),  Inequality  in  India: A Survey  of  Recent  Trends,  Department  of

Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, United Nation.

Saran, S., .Sharan, V. (2012) Identity and Energy Access in India: Setting Contexts for Rio+20, Energy Security Insight, TERI, Volume 7 (1), January 2012.

Tilak, Jandhyala B.G. (2005), Post-Elementary Education, Poverty and Development in India, Working Paper Series No. 6, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Global Times | Samir Saran and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra
Published on May 20, 2013 22:18

Original Link is here

In a significant act of political signaling and foresight, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang chose India as his first ever overseas destination after taking charge of the premiership.

He arrived in New Delhi on Sunday evening and held meetings with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first. He also met Singh’s cabinet colleagues and flew to Mumbai and met with Indian industrial leaders.

This visit is important in more ways than one. At the purely bilateral level, an excruciating border episode was just recently brought to a close.

On a global level, the two countries are dealing with a once-in-a-century churning in the architecture of global governance, while at the same time trying to shake of the lethargy that both economies have fallen prey to.

For the first time in many centuries, this continent has the wherewithal to define itself on its own terms. Capitals in Asia will lead the process of shaping the Asian project.

China and India must be partners in this effort, and to get there they need to deal with the hard questions, as the time for sweet talk is now over.

We need to start having brutally frank conversations on our legacy problems and on the more recent challenges.

The parroting of old staid positions and whispering of diplomatic sweet nothings will yield little and allow others to intervene and impose.

It is time for the two countries to grow up and resolve the disputed border. And even as this resolution is discovered, progress on the bilateral relationship must be insulated from this process.

For this to happen, political leadership in both countries will have to demonstrate courage to make their respective security establishments toe the line.

Economic integration is not and will never be the answer to this political poser alone. It can provide the motivation for seeking a resolution, but it is not the answer by itself.

In fact, it can now be argued that the political discord and public perception in both countries are limiting greater economic integration.

Trade shows signs of plateauing, with Chinese firms struggling for access to all projects in India, be they shipyards, roads or telecommunications, despite some early and spectacular inroads.

The two countries now need to realize that they are confronted with the political moment that has been deferred and delayed but cannot be denied. Strong and purposeful measures must be crafted.

There must be a bold statement on the border issue that no matter what the differences, incidents like that in Ladakh recently will not happen again.

While the border management pact recently offered by China may not be the answer, an equitable arrangement that prevents any troop movements remotely close to each other’s claimed territory must be worked upon.

This conversation cannot be delayed. And the process of arriving at this accord needs to be a lot more transparent. Opaque political discussions lead nowhere, and public opinion must be built and sought.

China’s engagement with India must transform from one that is largely seen as transactional, such as the selling and buying of goods and commodities, and more recently functioning as a lender, to one of being a long-term investor and stakeholder in the Indian economy.

Chinese money, businesses and investments must bet on India and be located in this country.

This cannot happen however until businesses and people in China begin to perceive India as a friendly destination, an outcome equally determined by Indian attitudes to China.

India for its part must seriously consider identifying special industrial zones that Chinese firms can develop as centers of large manufacturing and R&D.

There must be a complete, honest and meaningful revamp of the current visa regime. The level of visits is abysmal, and security considerations cannot determine the level of engagement between the two countries destined to be the largest trading partners in a decade or so.

Finally, the two must bilaterally develop a substantial conversation on the cutting edge of global governance issues, including issues of the global commons like climate change, water, health and medicine, and Asian security architecture, as well as issues of space and proliferation, of rules and mechanisms of economic governance, and on new arenas of maritime and ocean governance.

This dialogue must help discover common ground that the two countries can articulate and put forth for the consideration of the global community.

Such articulation will be the first step toward an Asian century. Ultimately a political Asia will be born when New Delhi and Beijing can assume parentage of this Asian geography that until now has only seen many guardians.

Samir Saran is a vice president and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra a program coordinator at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

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Time for hard questions on Sino-Indian relationship’s future

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http://carnegietsinghua.org/2013/03/21/u.s.-rebalancing-to-asia-view-from-india/g0upU.S. Rebalancing to Asia: A View From India

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Faced with the limitations of economic relations without political integration, Asian states have begun to reevaluate their prior relations and coalition structures to meet the demands imposed by U.S. rebalancing within Asia. Nowhere is truer than in the nuclear arena, where China, India, and the United States face questions over their ability to redefine their partnerships and the global nuclear order. Samir Saran, vice president and senior researcher at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, spoke in the twentieth session of the “China-South Asia Dialogues” seminar series for senior experts. This was followed by presentations by three Tsinghua University master’s degree students: Mao Keji from China, John McGowan from the United States, and Ece Duygulu from Turkey. The students’ presentations were part of the “China and South Asia’s Future” seminar series for rising scholars. Carnegie’s Lora Saalman moderated.

Rebalancing Within Asia

Saran noted that while the United States is often seen as rebalancing “to” Asia, much of this reorientation has actually occurred “within” Asia. Even as Washington seeks to redefine the role that it will play, regional powers have begun to delineate their own identity, he asserted. In doing so, economic integration has begun to “reach its limits” in the face of unresolved political tensions and obstacles. Without addressing political integration and rebalancing among regional players, Saran suggested that an integration project designed and implemented by Asians themselves would be difficult to achieve.

•U.S. Regional Role:

Saran asserted that one of the driving motives behind U.S. rebalancing within Asia has been China’s reluctance to enter into a G2 construct, under which Washington and Beijing would serve as the primary players. Rather than resulting in comity or competition in a bipolar order, Beijing and Washington are both jockeying for their own national interests, said Saran. However, he added, the United States maintains a strong isolationist streak that could result in significant drawdowns in how it engages the region and guarantees its security. In the face of this uncertainty, Saran maintained that regional players would be best served by coordinated political integration fashioned by capitals in the region.

•India’s and China’s Regional Roles:

The futures of China and India are inextricably linked, Saran said. Chinese refusal to sign onto the bilateral U.S.-China agenda, coupled with the fact that Washington has already made its unsuccessful play for a G2 construct, means that Beijing is in the driver’s seat. As a result, he maintained that the U.S. pivot to Asia will ironically be “made in China.” In looking further afield for energy stores and cooperation, Beijing and New Delhi will also be faced with the need to guarantee passage throughout the Indo-Pacific, Saran added. Beyond the bilateral, he noted that engagement at multilateral forums has proven to be most viable for China and India, since it obviates confronting mutual tensions. Enhancing Cooperation

•India’s Role in Security:

Saran noted that preoccupation with traditional security misses the economic fallout and necessity of integrating political, economic, and military solutions, particularly when faced with new territorial disputes, piracy, drug running, and other asymmetrical threats. To this end, Saran asserted that India has a role to play. However, when it comes to territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, he remained reluctant to predict a role for New Delhi. When asked about ties between New Delhi and Tokyo by one of the Chinese participants, Saran responded that Japan and India have similar interests, which become all the more evident in the context of China’s regional rise.

•Identity Crisis:

One of the Chinese participants spoke of allegations of China’s aggressiveness when it comes to its neighbors and suggested that this was tied to internal shifts in how China defines itself. He questioned whether India is undergoing a similar case of self-reevaluation. Saran responded that part of Beijing’s crisis of perception comes from the fact that despite its growth and creation of regional dependencies through donations and economic benevolence to its surrounding countries, it has not changed its behavior towards these countries. Similarly, given New Delhi’s growth, it seeks accommodation on its desire to be a “global manager.” Unlike China, however, he noted that India has global aspirations, but continues to be bogged down by domestic issues. A Chinese expert added that he felt China and India have more in common with each other than with the United States, advocating increased interaction and exchange to build strategic mutual trust.

•Mutual Respect:

A Chinese participant queried what measures would increase China’s respect for and willingness to cooperate with India. Saran responded that people-to-people contact, expanded media interaction, and investments leading to greater integration between Beijing and Delhi on all levels are key. Mao, McGowan, and Duygulu offered their takes on how this dynamic has played out in the nuclear sphere, with India’s pursuit of a nuclear capability to solidify its status and respect from countries such as China. A Chinese expert noted that when it comes to multilaterally binding arms control treaties, India still has a role to play, particularly with the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Saran responded that trust must be mutual; as such, India’s signing of treaties like the CTBT will be dependent upon the actions of China and its decision whether or not to ratify them.

•Demographic Pressures:

Much like “China’s Dream,” Saran cited “India’s Promise,” asserting that Beijing is waking up to New Delhi’s potential over the next ten to fifteen years. However, he cautioned that while demographic windfalls may shore up India’s production capacity in the short term, they are likely to pressure New Delhi to meet the employment demands of a young and disenfranchised population. As these numbers soar, Saran further predicted that the long-term implications of caring for the elderly would threaten the sustainability of India’s economic growth. Despite such pressures and the recent decline in Sino-Indian trade, Saran maintained that the two countries share common aspirations and challenges. More than simply reacting to U.S. rebalancing within Asia, Beijing and New Delhi should conduct their own regional recalibration, Saran concluded.

BRICS, In the News, Politics / Globalisation

U.S. Rebalancing to Asia: A View From India

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BRICS, Columns/Op-Eds, Uncategorized

BRICS and mortar for India’s global role

ImageDEVELOPMENT PARTNERS: The grouping’s members can not only learn from each other’s development experiences and understand views on subjects like climate change but also define new rules for health care, education and Intellectual Property Rights.

 

New Delhi finally has a platform to assert its might and rewrite the rules of global, political and economic governance

India is at a unique geopolitical moment. On the one hand its neighbourhood and the larger Asian continent are being unpredictably redefined. The United States has declared, if somewhat ambiguously, its reorientation or “pivot” towards Asia, recognising the region’s economic force moving forward, or perhaps merely countering enhanced Chinese power. India and China are charting new geographies of contests, the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The “Arab Spring” has exposed the fundamental inadequacies in Middle Eastern and North African governing structures but has also given rise to an uncertain political future in an important energy-producing region. Last, but certainly not least, China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region has led to increased, if sometimes seemingly unnecessary, conflict with neighbours in Southeast Asia and Japan.

On the other hand, the world is seeing a once-in-a-century churn. The global board of directors that sit on the high table and define rules for conduct of political and economic governance are now unrecognisable from the lot just after World War II. India must seize the moment to shape these revisions of rules devised by the Atlantic countries and defend its growth and development interests in areas such as trade, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), space, climate, and energy policy, among others.

Regional order and global governance are both in flux and demanding India’s attention. This is not unique by itself. What is different this time around is that India has the capacity, increased capabilities and enhanced level of demonstrated intent to engage with this dual external relations challenge. In order to attain the global power status it desires, India must walk and chew gum at the same time. It must tend to its immediate and extended Asian neighbourhood while also engaging with the task of shaping a new rules-based political and economic order. BRICS represents a uniquely appropriate platform and flexible mechanism with which India can address this dual imperative.

Role for three

Engaging with China and Russia in an environment free of the sharp edges often wrought in bilateral negotiations will catalyse congruence over an array of mutually important issues. Any stable Asian order must have at its core, a certain level of accord among these three large continental powers. The past would need to be defrayed and the path for future integration would need to sidestep suspicion and history. Annual BRICS summit-level discussions on political and economic matters allow the three countries such an arena of tactical camaraderie. The current moment allows a unique opportunity for the three to shape a new construct for Asia amidst the regional flux. Perhaps at some stage it may be worthwhile having a summit level RIC meeting on the sidelines of BRICS to discuss this Asian project.

On resetting and reshaping economic and political governance, BRICS has the potential to be the new (and often criticised) game changer. The sheer size and rate of growth of intra-BRICS trade and economic exchange will allow each of these countries to exert their collective weight for their individual gains. Who gains more should not matter, as long as every member benefits from this dispensation and the order is visibly equitable.

There are a few benefits that India must seek through and with the BRICS. First, there are many multilateral organisations within which a “BRICS-bloc” can exert significant leverage. The U.N. and World Trade Organization are two such forums. While geopolitical and economic thinking among BRICS is not always in-sync, where there is consensus (and the areas are increasing rapidly) BRICS could be a compelling voice. Like they did on the debates on non-interference and “Responsibility to Protect.” Similarly, India’s views on climate change, financial norms, trade rules and so on could also benefit from BRICS’s aggregate voice. Of course the UNSC membership issue strikes a discordant note but it should not cannibalise the possible coming together on other matters.

Barrier against slowdown

Second, as economic powerhouses and regional hubs, intra-BRICS market integration can insulate these nations from western economic slowdown. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stagnation is impacting BRICS growth, with multi-percentage point GDP dips in India and China. BRICS market integration could leverage the economic power of emerging world economies by sparking increased trade and foreign investment, especially if done in local currencies. Only China is part of India’s top 15 trading partners, making the BRICS forum an attractive stage from which India can promote economic ties with other dynamic economies. The BRICS development bank, option of holding each others’ currencies as reserves, stronger trade facilitation and eventually a comprehensive BRICS economic partnership agreement are all worthy possibilities.

For inclusive growth

Third, the BRICS are each experiencing rapid development with uniquely national characteristics. However, despite growing middle class populations, BRICS hold the lion’s share of the world’s impoverished population. These nations must take increased responsibility for a new global development agenda, incorporating inclusive growth, sustainable development and poverty alleviation. BRICS is a platform not only to learn from each other’s development experiences but also the instrument that can define new rules for health care, education and IPR for the billions at the bottom of the pyramid.

The collective BRICS experience around social policy could be beneficially shared with others as well. A forum (like the OECD) or clearing-house to disburse this information would prove a relatively low-cost measure producing substantial insight into development efforts, technology sharing, low-cost and sustainable energy generation, information technology and manufacturing.

By drawing on collective BRICS brainpower, local development efforts will be catalysed. For example, sharing China’s experience on infrastructure development or poverty reduction or Brazil’s in clean-fuel generation could be beneficial for India currently lacking the ability to take full advantage of its economic potential.

Is BRICS just a catchy acronym masking the haphazard, slapping together of five developing, yet ultimately incompatible, nations? India should respond with an emphatic no. At this unique moment, when India faces a multitude of challenges seeking its attention both towards the region and the global stage, BRICS provides a flexible platform to respond to both.

(Samir Saran is vice president and Daniel Rubin is Henry Luce Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.)

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BRICS, Columns/Op-Eds

Why BRICS is important to Brazil

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Original article can be found here

Brazil has a prominent role to play in the global governance architecture. The country has sustained structural economic growth on the back of favourable demographic drivers, growing middle class consumption and broad scale socio-economic transformation. As a result, the business environment in the country has steadily improved; and the number of people living in extreme poverty have halved over the last decade. It is time for the country to place commensurate emphasis on consolidating its position as a regional leader; and as a key stakeholder on the global governance high table. BRICS provides the perfect platform to marry the dual imperatives.

                       

HOT TOPICS: BRICS

Brazil boasts of one of the world’s largest domestic markets and a sophisticated business environment. It ranks 53rd on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (2001-12), and is ahead of the rest of the BRICS nations in the availability of financial services among other key indicators of financial market penetration. Brazil’s upwardly mobile middle class and its elite have inexorably embraced the liberal globalisation framework, promoted by the developed world. Consequently, since the 1990’s they have shown a greater willingness to engage with the international system, and accept transnational regulations and norms.

As a willing signatory to international norms, ranging from those around mitigation of climate change to preventing nuclear proliferation, Brazil has often broken its own historical typecast of being defensive. What superficially seems to represent a systemic re-prioritisation – requires deeper investigation. According to the Economist’s Economic Intelligence Unit, domestic savings rates in the country are below 20 percent. Mid-sized industries still largely rely on external markets for raising money and channelling investments. By default, international perception about the Brazilian economy is an important component of national strategy. Concomitantly, the Latin American identity is one that successive governments have strived to shed.

Being part of the BRICS grouping has helped Brazil to leverage its ‘emerging market’ identity and de-hyphenate from its Latin American identity (which had its own convoluted dynamics in any case). This is evident both in the global economic and political spheres. BRICS has provided Brazil with a platform to engage with the international system more progressively. It can now navigate the international rules based architecture, with greater bargaining power and seek greater representation in institutions of global economic and political governance. Using the BRICS identity, Brazil no longer has to drive a wedge between its development and growth imperatives. It can shield its poor from international regulations, without fear of its ‘investment worthiness’ being diluted. It can participate at the global high table, while simultaneously catering to nuanced regional imperatives.

The recent death of Hugo Chavez was termed “an irreparable loss” by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. This serves as an example of the ideological flexibility, which the country employs to engage with a neighbourhood that is strictly divided on the Venezuelan President’s legacy. Indeed fine balancing tactics are not new to Brazilian foreign policy, also termed ‘a study in ambivalence’. The pluralistic construct of BRICS fits perfectly with Brazil’s strategic outlook on its neighbourhood and the world. Brazil has taken on more regional commitments over the same twenty year period during which it has enhanced its engagements with the international system. This is evidenced from increased participation in regional working group meetings, official summits and informal gatherings by the government.

There are numerous accounts of Brazil’s deployment of regional priorities as a bargain chip. Through MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), Brazil has been able to successfully negotiate trade agreements in favour of its national interests. It is a pivotal founder member of the five-member trading bloc, which recently included Venezuela within its fold. In the on-going negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union (EU), Brazil has pulled out all the stops, shielding its local industries from cheaper foreign made imports; with support from other members including Argentina. Similarly, common interests rather than common ideologies dictate the BRICS agenda. Brazil’s membership of the grouping is in complete consonance with its regional and global strategic imperatives.

Aside from the adaptive flexibility that the informal BRICS grouping offers, it allows Brazil great latitude in bringing specific agendas around innovation, intellectual property rights and green growth at its core. Brazil is home to nearly half of the world’s biodiversity; the overarching sustainable development agenda is not surprisingly a national priority. Similarly, Brazil has the opportunity to use mechanisms such as the BRICS Exchange Alliance for attracting investments. While the current framework enables investors to trade in cross-listed futures indices, if there is political will, the mechanism could eventually encompass various products with different underlying assets including equities. Another relevant sector specific example is commercial aerospace cooperation, where Brazil has unmatched expertise within the grouping.

There are in fact multiple opportunities for Brazil within BRICS, not limited to the economic sphere. In many ways, the grouping brings Brazil from the left corner of the world map to the centre, where the geopolitical theatre is most active; in Asia and the Indo – Pacific. However there are two oddities in the Brazilian agenda which would require circumnavigation if Brazil is to be brought to the heart of the geopolitical discourse. The first is to moderate its insistence on pursuing ‘euro-styled’ agendas such as interventionist doctrine ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), with an ambiguously defined alternative ‘responsibility while protecting’. Sovereignty matters to other BRICS and there is some time before supra-national initiatives would pass muster. And the second is to shed its reluctance on the agenda for creation of a BRICS led Development Bank. In this instance Brazil, with its considerable Development Bank experience, can help shape a credible institute that will empower billions south of the equator.

Vivan Sharan is Associate Fellow and Samir Saran is Vice President at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi.

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A French Five-Course Meal: The French president brings an extensive menu of strategic partnership options with him

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Original of this article can be found here

 

French President Francois Hollande is arriving in the Indian capital today for confabulations with the Indian leadership. This first visit of the new French president is missing the hype and hoopla that would have accompanied, say, a visit by the US president. Perhaps this is a reflection of the persona of the man, who is stated to have an understated style. Or is it a sign of the strength and maturity of the bilateral relationship?

France is arguably India’s longest standing all-weather friend, save Russia. It sought to limit the impact of the US-led anti-India sanction regime following the nuclear tests in 1998. It was the first to propose the integration of India into the global order, and it has been the first and most vocal supporter for India’s inclusion in the Security Council as a permanent member.

This is indeed a good time to move the engagement from one that is still tactical and transactional to one that is more strategic and sustainable. This partnership must be consummated with determined progress on five fronts.

The first is to realign cooperation in the defence sector. Multibillion dollar transactions are on the anvil with sales of aircrafts under negotiation, agreements on co-production of missiles, technology for the Tejas aircraft and a submarine deal. India has served as a lucrative market for French defence industry; the relationship now needs to move beyond this ‘vendor-buyer’ paradigm.

It must strive to unleash the market potential and entrepreneurial dynamism of the Indian private sector in tandem with French capabilities. While the glass ceiling that excludes private enterprise remains, some developments give hope and direction.

The local subsidiary of DCNS, a French company, has teamed up with private Indian defence component manufacturers to coproduce equipment for Scorpene class submarines. Can we be ambitious and jointly build nuclear submarines as well? This is something that the French are working on with Brazil already. Similarly, can

the French Thales Group and an Indian company create armoured personnel carriers like they have done with Australia? Can we hope to jointly develop drones and unmanned combat aerial vehicles, needed for the asymmetric battlefields of the 21st century?

This ambitious co-creation agenda leads us to the second project that India and France must embark upon. There is urgent need for a roadmap leading to India’s entry into the four global export control regimes. France must work with the Europeans and the US to facilitate India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Membership of the four regimes will allow partnerships and development of new markets in the large high-tech sector for defence and civilian applications.

The third area of focus must be India’s civil nuclear sector. India and France have partnered on civil nuclear energy initiatives since 2008, with France being the first country to sign a civil nuclear agreement with India. Nicolas Sarkozy had promised “full’’ civil nuclear cooperation, including the transfer of uranium enrichment technology. Hollande must now implement that promise.

Without access to enrichment technology, the growth of nuclear energy in the country will remain modest and India’s ability to emerge as supplier of a full range of nuclear services will be limited. The opportunity to develop India’s manufacturing industry to cater to the nuclear sector at home and abroad is immense. France is the most obvious partner and co-beneficiary.

Fourth, homeland security offers broad scope for collaboration. Faced with threats ranging from cyber attacks to terrorism, India can benefit from best in class French security technologies. The Safran Group offers a spectrum of security solutions and is a world leader in biometric technologies. It is already engaged with the Unique Identification Authority of India.

The Thales Group offers a range of integrated security solutions for urban infrastructure and has been in India since 1953. There is a growing appetite for the sector within Indian corporations. The two governments must act in concert and provide policy signals that catalyse this private sector interest.

Finally, both countries must start looking together at the region and the world. The Indian Ocean is an important region for both countries. France has long been an Indian Ocean power with numerous bases in the region, and is dependent on oil imports from the region much like India.

A Franco-Indian vision document could be a vital first step towards developing a cooperative framework for stability and security in the region. It would help the two countries understand capacity hurdles and technology gaps that need to be overcome. Be it cooperation on maritime domain awareness, submarines, missiles or at the very least joint operations, anti-piracy efforts, information sharing and data access, the scope is immense.

The relationship must be purposeful, nimble and creative. If the Rafale negotiations hit turbulence on price issues, India’s interests in obtaining certain technologies could offset this hurdle. Similarly, a repeat order for Scorpene class submarines could be considered alongside co-development of nuclear submarines that India seeks for a credible triad. As the world becomes increasingly fragmented, and interests dictate relationships, France and India have a historic opportunity to circumscribe their interests within a comprehensive strategic framework of cooperation.

The writer is vice-president, Observer Research Foundation.

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No solace in this quantum of accountability

samir abhi

The original article can be found here

 

 

On February 11, the Supreme Court issued notice to the government, seeking its response on making intelligence agencies accountable to Parliament. This question is pertinent and in some ways captures the sentiments expressed by many and best vocalised by two leaders in recent times. Vice-President Hamid Ansari had said in his 2010 speech on this subject “….responsibility to the legislature, and eventually to the electorate, is an essential element of democratic governance to which we are committed by the Constitution.” Thereafter, the Private Members Bill introduced by Manish Tiwari (now Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting), The Intelligence Services (Powers & Regulation) Bill 2011, sought to empower intelligence agencies through a legally mandated charter that included well-thought-out elements of supervision and oversight.

Mr. Tiwari’s effort was supported by a research initiative at the Observer Research Foundation over a period of about two years. Views of and feedback from over 150 experts, politicians, social scientists, mediapersons and security professionals were solicited. The resulting analysis questioned obsolete notions of national security liberally deployed by the security community to protect turfs, prevent change and indeed to defend the indefensible. In this context, four core issues stood out and need early resolution even as the court is appraised of this matter.

 

Regulatory framework

In modern democracies, intelligence agencies are legally created by and operate under a charter drawn up by the legislature. India’s agencies however bear a chilling resemblance to Haiti’s Tonton Macoute, a voodoo police named after a phantom bogeyman having no charter, rules or limits. In effect it is an extra-constitutional body, prey to individuals and politics and, like such institutions, is totally unaccountable. Setting a charter improves efficiency, focussing resources and minds on what needs to be done. It directs operations on the basis of policy, not individual whim. For example if folklore has it right, if RAW had a charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated ground assets and priceless reach.

Intelligence ombudsman

Intelligence agencies such as Mossad, CIA and MI6 have reformed their structures to include operation and financial audits which have improved their efficiency. These agencies, prior to reforms, had a history of personal and political abuse. Institutions are based on trust, but there is no incompatibility between trust and verification. The taxpayer needs to know from a competent authority that his rupee is not being misused on ballerinas, champagne and settling personal scores. The state has a responsibility to verify and audit. The reports that these agencies are used to spy on political opponents, blackmail them and purchase parliamentary votes are too regular and too consistent to be ignored. “Watergate” was the most visible example of such abuse. Closer home, leaked telephone conversations (recorded dubiously) and allegations of keeping a tab on political opponents tell us that “Trust me” is simply not an argument — unless the government can prove that these agencies are staffed by people with a special mitochondrial DNA that makes them free of incompetence, inefficiency and corruption. As all details obviously cannot be divulged, an independent intelligence ombudsman with the highest level of security clearance is the optimal answer.

Collective responsibility

A National Intelligence and Security Oversight Committee will address the issue of control. Democracy is about deferring to the wisdom of the many. In our system, the Prime Minister is primus inter pares; all governmental decisions are passed by cabinet committees. The Prime Minister therefore, must not have permanent and exclusive control over such agencies. Far from making the process of intelligence collection tedious, collective control leads to better absorption of intelligence and enables the system to efficiently analyse the same. Interdisciplinary inputs would allow holistic analysis insulating the Prime Minister from tainted or bad intelligence. Inconsistencies may be better detected resulting in moderation and course-correction. Optimally, such a collective must include parliamentary opposition to ensure national consensus and continuity. A recent example of abuse is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was because powerful individuals hijacked the intelligence apparatuses of the United States and the United Kingdom that intelligence was allowed to be concocted to build a bogus case for war.

Protecting the protectors

There is a case for a National Intelligence Tribunal that protects the public at large but also those serving within such institutions. Extra-constitutional institutions are usually rife with turf wars: a person trapped within such a phantom has no way to protect himself against individual caprices with no system of grievance redressal. Becoming a breeding ground for cronyism and negating merit has an enormous negative impact on professionalism and morale. After all in such a dangerous line of work, personal enmity can translate into a death sentence. A special tribunal will protect both the interests of intelligence employees as well as shield the general public from their excesses.

Deploying the “National security” argument against reform is a fig leaf for defending cronyism, incompetence, inefficiency, and corruption. A proper regulatory mechanism can only strengthen national security, not weaken it. It is time to bring in facts and lessons from global best practices to this debate as it unfolds in the highest court of the land.

(Samir Saran is vice-president and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is programme coordinator at the Observer Research Foundation.)

 

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