Development Goals, Politics / Globalisation

Democracy, Diversity, Development: 2016 was dominated by their dark sides, can we channel the Force this year?

Times of India, Blog page, 10 January, 2017

Original link is here

2016 was witness to dramatic political changes. Everything that seemed improbable, even unthinkable somehow found new ways of manifesting itself, and that too repeatedly.

The impregnable walls of the European Union (EU) were breached when its largest security provider, Britain, decided to break free from the European project. A celebrity of a reality TV show was able to capture the imagination of a frustrated American public and walked away with a near impossible victory in presidential elections.

Liberal actors and voices were constantly defeated in many arenas by populist movements. The new energy of right-wing forces in several geographies competed with the new fanaticism among Islamic radicals. The defeat of liberalism defined the mood and events of 2016.

More than any year in the recent past, 2016 signified a metamorphosis of the global order itself. 2017 therefore becomes a very significant year as it brings together two unknowns for all of us to grapple with.

First is the future of global economics and financial systems, which are yet to be adequately restructured following the crises of 2008. Second are the political questions raised by the happenings of the year gone by. Both of these will have to be addressed discretely and jointly, if gains of the post-war order are to be maintained and strengthened.

Three, words must receive significant attention this year as we respond to the economic and political challenges that lie ahead: democracy, diversity and development. All three are today under threat, and all three by themselves are a threat to global stability.

In sheer numbers, more countries have adopted democracy as their principal political system than ever before. But there is also little doubt that there has been petty and political capture of democratic systems within these countries.

Democracy as a social ethic is under threat. It is assuming shades of majoritarianism in some instances – becoming a tool for convenient choices by the majority section of society. Democracy has also become a means for political leaders to absolve themselves from taking hard decisions. The moral fibre of democracy is being undermined by its numerical logic.

It can be argued that democracy is becoming a weapon to weaken pluralism. The ability of multitudes to take part in democratic debates through mass media, social media and other emerging platforms has certainly included new stakeholders. Yet the principles of the ensuing debates are no longer decided by what is right or wrong, but on the basis of right and left; ideologies multiplied by numbers are determining outcomes.

Democracy has also been hijacked as a legitimising tool by undemocratic forces. Be it Islamist parties in Turkey and the Middle East, or fundamentalist groups in Asia, the US and Europe, all of them have used democratic means to fulfil undemocratic objectives. In many societies, the word “democracy” needs to be re-thought, re-imagined, re-served, and made compatible with pluralistic principles.

Diversity is at one level being threatened by majoritarianism – by brute force that seeks to reduce those who are different, and marginalise those who belong to minority communities. On the other hand, diversity itself is now being used as the basis to recruit and create small communities, sub-national identities and radical movements that are fuelled by the difference that defines diversity – with violent consequences.

An extreme fringe of the Muslim community in Europe, the Buddhists in Myanmar, and Shia-Sunni postures in the Middle East: all of these are using this difference to either inflict violence on the ‘other’ or to motivate violence against those seen as irreconcilable enemies.

Technology and diversity together have created a new dynamic. Assimilation of outsiders in new communities has today become improbable as, instead of communicating with their physical neighbours, people remain locked in with those miles away.

This creates a basis of new exclusions, divisions and differences between those who may otherwise be in physical proximity. It makes the evolution of assimilative cultures and societies more difficult. In fact, it threatens to undermine syncretic civilisations that have existed over millennia. Diversity is both under threat, and is a threat in itself.

Development today is being threatened by a reluctance of large and important players to remain invested in liberal trading systems; to commit to the ideals of globalisation; to promote cross-border flows of finance, technology and people; and to achieve a convergence of lifestyles across continents.

Democratic forces, and fissures of diverse interests, vantage points and identities, make convergence on development goals near impossible. Institutionalised greed and the lack of enlightened action, masking itself as capitalist principle, will challenge both the global objective of responding to climate change as well as achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

But development is also a threat. Large actors, with large pools of funds, have begun to steer the processes of development to their own advantage. They seek to make life choices for all: to define healthcare for each citizen on Earth, write trade narratives for each society, define what constitutes the well-being and happiness of this planet, and adjudicate the boundaries to right to life itself. Development finance, aid, loans and know-how, under the garb of development partnerships, are seeking to create a landscape of economic growth, trade and transaction that will benefit a few.

The dark sides of democracy, diversity and development have defined global and local politics lately. Can 2017 be the year when the tide begins to turn and when a new light illuminates the essential and positive ethic associated with each of these three words?

DISCLAIMER : Views expressed above are the author’s own.

 

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Time to face up to cyber threats

Samir Saran

Cyber insecurity is now a global risk no different from the warming climate or forced displacement. Is such insecurity a business risk or a “public bad”?

 Cryptocurrency,Cyber Insecurity,Digital Economy,Digital India,Digital Infrastructure,Digital Payments,Global Commons,ICT,Innovation,Internet of Things
Courtesy: Gresham College

Crimes in cyberspace, by one estimate, now cost the global economy $445 billion a year. Cyber insecurity is now a global risk no different from the warming climate or forced displacement. Is such insecurity a business risk or a “public bad”? If the security of digital infrastructure is viewed as a business risk, who should mitigate it? Should states be responsible for the integrity of networks and data within their territories, failing which they will be classified as “risky” to do business in in the digital economy? Were cyber insecurity treated as a “public bad”, governments could justifiably conclude that vulnerabilities in one device or platform affect an entire ecosystem, and create a liability regime that shifts the burden on the private sector.

These issues are important to ponder as the Digital India programme and demonetisation encourage the rapid adoption of digital payments technologies. It is not only difficult to assess the “risk” of transacting in the digital economy, but also determine who such risks should be absorbed by. For instance, a high-end device may be able to offer security on the back of its tightly controlled supply chain, but what if an end user, by opening the door to a hidden exploit, compromised its operating system?

Three crucial trends will decisively influence the future of cyber security — the centralisation of data, the arrival of connected devices, and the rapid adoption of digital payments technologies. Centralised control over data can make access to databases easier and more vulnerable to attacks. The Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem is set to explode, with more than 24 billion devices expected to be connected to the Internet by 2019. The sheer scale, size and diversity of the IoT environment makes risk difficult to measure.

Read | The great 21st century data rush

Perhaps the most important factor is the scale and speed at which digital payments have been adopted across the spectrum of transactions. Payment gateways work the same for all users irrespective of the volume or commodities/services transacted, but they are accessed on devices that vary greatly in their ability to protect data. How would insurers gauge the risk inherent in such a diversified market? Consider then, these key questions and conundrums.

First, if cyberspace is a global commons, will the socialisation of “bad” follow the “privatisation of profits”?

Unlike the environment, the oceans or outer space, digital spaces are not discovered — they are created. Cyber insecurity has been made out to be a global threat but the fact remains that the economic gains from securing digital spaces still accrue to a few countries and corporations. Do developed markets have a common but differentiated responsibility to secure digital spaces? If it is the responsibility of all, can developing countries also get a share of the economic gains from electronic commerce?

Cyber insecurity has been made out to be a global threat but the fact remains that the economic gains from securing digital spaces still accrue to a few countries and corporations.

Second, cybersecurity is a private service — how can we make it a public good?

Digital spaces are common to all, but the provision of their security is increasingly guaranteed by the private sector. This is in stark contrast to governance models in emerging markets, where the state underwrites law and order. How can the public and private sectors work together to provide this common good?

Third, India is moving towards security by identity, but many advanced economies believe security comes through anonymity. Are we on the wrong side of history?

Encryption is becoming the norm in advanced economies, as a result of which data is increasingly out of the reach of law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, India has moved towards biometric identification programmes that place a premium on identity. The “Aadhaar impulse” is driven by a requirement to target beneficiaries effectively, but without strong data protection regulations, the digital economy would be less than secure.

Read | Framing multistakeholder conversations on encryption

Fourth, if cash-based systems, ATMs and payment gateways are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, are “distributed ledger technologies” going to make governments adopt cryptocurrencies?

Blockchain and other technologies that “crowdsource” the authentication of online transactions using bitcoins are more difficult to target, because they are by their very nature, distributed ledgers. Will the increasing insecurity of the fintech ecosystem push us towards cryptocurrencies?

Fifth, cyber security is an expensive proposition in advanced economies, where the most sophisticated instruments are also assumed to be the safest. How can India apply its famed “frugal innovation” in this space, and protect the user while providing affordable access to the Internet?

The ICT supply chain in India is only as strong as its weakest link: the end user. If the user is from rural India, with a limited understanding of the devices and transactions she accesses, her device is a point of vulnerability. If the device itself is “low-end”, which places a premium on cost over security, this forms a lethal mix that endangers the security of all users in the ecosystem. India cannot afford a false separation between access and security in digital spaces, as the qualitative nature of access will determine ICT security for a billion people.

Sixth, who determines the risk of transacting on the Internet, and how?

If transactions in cyberspace will invariably carry an element of risk, who will guarantee them? The buyer, seller or intermediary? As in the case of shipping, will we see a form of cyber-insurance applied to cover the risk of malicious attacks online?

Developments in cyber security leads one to surmise that economies will soon be subject to a risk-assessment based on the integrity of their networks. Risk-based assessments offer predictive value and guarantees of stability to businesses, but they should not perpetuate inequities that exist offline.

Limited means to enhance cybersecurity in developing economies should not set back investments in the digital economy, which in turn create a vicious cycle rendering the overall ecosystem insecure. The international community must articulate ways in which such risks can be mitigated, and facilitate access in emerging markets to technology and finance that generate investments in cybersecurity.

This commentary originally appeared in Hindustan Times.

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Energy, Water / Climate

The finance sector must sign the Paris pact

live mint, Dec 28, 2016

Original link is here

Without increased climate funding to the global South, the poor will end up underwriting a green future for a privileged few

paris-kkn-621x414livemint

The infrastructure gap, global financial sustainability, and a green future are recognized to be common global problems. Photo: Bloomberg


The Paris Agreement on climate action has an Achilles heel: the lack of a buy-in from the financial community. This absent and crucial signatory will need to play a significant role if any ambitious response to climate change has to be achieved.

This is easier said than done. “Sustainability” in financial market jargon has a very different meaning to when it is used in development-speak. In the market, this term largely disregards issues pertaining to employment generation, poverty eradication, inclusive growth and environmental considerations. Instead, it is monomaniacal in enhancing the “basis points” of the returns it generates for the community it serves—with only perfunctory interest in the “ppm (parts per million)” of carbon (mitigated or released) associated with the deployment of finance, or the human development index (HDI) effects of investments.

The regulatory responsibilities and the fiduciary duties that drive the functioning of this community are focused mostly on protecting the interests of investors and consumers (of financial instruments and banking services) by de-risking the financial ecosystem. Together, these present two specific hurdles, both of which make it difficult for the world of money to serve the ambitions of the Paris Agreement. The first hurdle pertains to geography, more specifically political geography. And the second pertains to democracy, more specifically the politics of decision making within institutions that shape and drive global financial flows.

Together, they have deleterious consequences. For instance, the major chunk of climate finance labelled as such finds it tedious to flow across borders. Thus, it is mostly deployed in the locality of its origin. This tendency is even starker for financial flows from the developed world to the developing and emerging world. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—Climate Policy Initiative (OECD—CPI) study found that “public and private climate finance mobilized by developed countries for developing countries reached $62 billion in 2014”. A separate study by CPI estimated that global flow of climate finance crossed $391 billion in the same year—implying that only about 16% of all flows moved from developed to developing countries.

This represents the most significant “collective action problem” that confronts the global community on the issue of climate change. While there is a near universal recognition that a) climate change is a global commons problem, b) the least developed countries are likely to be most affected, and c) significant infrastructure will need to be developed in emerging and developing countries to improve their low standard of living, the flow of money is (not surprisingly) blind to each of these. It recognizes political boundaries, responds to ascribed (and frequently arbitrary) ecosystem risks within these boundaries and flows to destinations and projects that enhance returns—as it was meant to.

The travails of this constrained flow of capital do not end here. In a discussion paper published by the climate change finance unit within the department of economic affairs at the Union ministry of finance, it has been highlighted that even this modest cross-border flow, which also accounts for pledges and promises made, does not adhere to the “new and additional” criteria. Flows of conventional development finance and infrastructure finance are on occasion reclassified as climate finance. And on other occasions these conventional flows are cannibalized to generate climate finance. The size of the pie remains the same.

Unless we are able to increase the total amount of resources available to cater to both the development priorities and climate-friendly growth needs of emerging and developing economies, we may only be able to build a future that is both green and grim. Everywhere, low-income populations will underwrite a green future for a privileged few.

Additional finance for meaningful climate action may be generated by simultaneously working on three fronts as we move to 2020. Successful climate action will first and foremost be predicated on the domestic regulatory framework within each country. Currently, a slew of regulations, from the flow of international finance into the domestic economy to those related to debt and equity markets, disincentivize capital from investing in climate action. It is imperative for policymakers to get their own house in order and create financial market depth and instruments that allow savings to become investible capital even as they continue to demand a more climate-friendly international financial regime.

Second, there currently exists a vast pool of long-term savings—which can be labelled “lazy money”. According to a recent International Monetary Fund report, much of this lies with pension, insurance and other funds, which have accumulated savings of approximately $100 trillion. Due to lack of political will and appropriate mechanisms, this money is neither invested in the climate agreement objectives nor in the sustainable development goals agreed to at the UN last year. This helps nobody. As a result of its inability to flow across borders, developed-world savers earn sub-par returns. And due to this source of finance remaining outside the climate purview, the investment gap in infrastructure, particularly in developing countries, has continued to increase. It now stands between $1 trillion and $1.5 trillion each year. Making this “lazy money” count will be extremely important.

And finally, it is time to bring the big boys controlling banking standards into the tent. The Basel III Accords, designed to create a more resilient international banking system through a suite of capital adequacy, leverage, and liquidity requirements, contribute little to global climate resilience. Given the dependency of emerging economies like India on commercial finance for capital-intensive projects, the Basel Accords need urgent review.

The infrastructure gap, global financial sustainability, and a green future are recognized to be common global problems. But the world cannot continue to solve them on three different tracks. If so, each of them will fail. Only once they are seen as inter-connected can they be addressed effectively.

Samir Saran is vice-president at the Observer Research Foundation.

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A reluctant digital power emerges from the shadows

Samir Saran

Earlier this week, the Dutch foreign ministry formally handed the reins of the Global Conference on Cyber Space (GCCS) over to the Indian government, capping a remarkable transformation in New Delhi’s cyber-politik. After being dubbed an outlier democracy that closed ranks with autocratic regimes in Internet governance, India will in 2017 be the first non-OECD country to host the GCCS. The global conference is an outcome of the 2011 “London Process”, set up to foster conversations towards “a secure, resilient and trusted global digital environment”. The GCCS, which has since travelled to Budapest, Seoul and The Hague is easily the biggest global platform of its kind. This process is shepherded by the US, UK and other European partners.

The 2017 iteration is a rite of passage both for the GCCS ­– which is now expected to open itself to a host of southern conversations on digital access and connectivity – and India, which is casting away its image as a reluctant digital power. On this count, New Delhi is now beginning to carve a new partnership with countries that it was earlier reluctant to engage through other collectives like the Non-Aligned Movement or the G-77.

India’s cyber diplomacy is reflective of its own internal transformation. The government appears willing to catalyse economic activity in this sector, engage the private sector (with an unmistakable soft spot for a public sector role as well) and create platforms like Digital India that build on and significantly expand the ambitions of previous national initiatives. New Delhi today aspires to be on the global board of directors who manage the governing architecture of the internet – strengthened by its rich and sometimes noisy debates, vibrant private sector, expanding security capabilities, entrepreneurial potential, and rich diplomatic history.

This story of this transformation began in the summer of 2015, when India understood that “multistakeholderism” was not only a posture of the strong, but also opened possibilities for those who could benefit from the “beyond government” eco-system. That its private sector is yet to seize this initiative fully is another matter. It was also important for India as a democracy to be in the right quadrant of this debate. New Delhi’s willingness to engage the liberal democracies on cyber norms and Internet governance, first as a core interlocutor and now as the host of the GCCS, is a sign of the times to come. The world’s largest democracy is today its fastest growing economy, so there is more than just normative value in the idea of Indian leadership.

An arena like the GCCS lends its host significant discursive space and agenda-setting abilities. The Netherlands used the platform to position itself as a European driver of global conversations on cyber norms, especially around stability. India must do the same. New Delhi can not only carry forward the agenda of the previous rounds but also tailor them for the next 4 billion waiting for access to cyberspace. Questions around affordable connectivity, improved quality of access and data security at the bottom of the pyramid do not serve an ethical endeavour alone; India’s pragmatic business interests are served in an environment where nearly half the world’s population are underserved by the systems and services developed in the West.

The next generation of Internet users in Asia, Africa and Latin America will rely on frugal innovation, open source software, local language computing and scalable enterprise solutions for “smart” cities or villages. These are areas in which India has shown promise or proven leadership. The GCCS should therefore serve as a platform to showcase the transformative potential of the Internet for emerging markets, and what role India can play in aiding this transformation.

The conference allows India to set a forward-looking agenda for the global digital economy, and steer the geo-political discourse on cyber stability that has been vitiated by the spate of serious, transnational electronic intrusions over the last two years.

To enable its effective stewardship of the London Process and the GCCS, India should

1) Develop the maturity to enter into, and entertain, multistakeholder conversations on issues it has normally been averse to broach: these would include offensive cyber norms, the role of the private sector in Internet governance, encryption and data integrity. Regardless of the final Indian “position” on the issue, it is important that New Delhi pays attention to the multiplicity of stakeholders and voices that influence global cyber politics.

2) Create domestic cross-sectoral buy-in to support the London Process as a host, which is a two-year responsibility that is not limited to convening the GCCS. India should go beyond the tactical selling of government programmes and strategically position itself as a global contributor willing to engage on issues that are critical to others. It may well be that the government’s flagship programmes can be replicated in other economies, but India’s private sector and civil society are crucial to fostering institutional linkages that make business and strategic inroads possible.

3) Be inclusive and welcoming to all who engage and seek to partner India as a liberal digital power and digital economy. New Delhi’s Internet diplomacy does not necessarily have to reflect its traditional moorings, because developments in cyberspace will both alter and question fundamental assumptions about global trade and data flows. In the interim, India would do well to invite capital, talent and technology, and nurture a domestic environment where they can flourish. It would be myopic not to recognise the trans-hemisphere connections and their political implications that the GCCS has now brought to bear. New Delhi must confidently pursue its engagement with advanced economies, keeping in mind its own political and economic bottomline.

4) Fashion a “whole of government” approach over the next two years and look beyond the security and ICT ministries. This effort must include other sectors that are digitalising and rely on digital technologies, and marry India’s cyber diplomacy with its economic diplomacy. It must be led by one or two cyber space envoys that India should appoint, formally or otherwise, for the next two years. And it must undertake the process of shaping the GCCS agenda immediately by engaging with as many nations as it can for the process to be inclusive.

India’s hosting of the GCCS and the London Process next year is a chance to consolidate its leadership in foreign policy frontiers like cyber and climate change, where the international regime is not yet on firm ground. New Delhi has demonstrated its willingness to move from the margins to the centre of these debates, but now it is incumbent on the government to build the eco-system that can support its diplomatic leadership. The global conference is an opportunity for India to demonstrate that multistakeholderism is sustainable, even desirable as countries chart out the social contract between their governments, internet companies and end users.

This commentary originally appeared in The Wire.

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जलवायु परिवर्तन और मानवाधिकार

Samir Saran|Vidisha Mishra

भारत समग्र रूप से ऊर्जा का दुनिया का चौथा सबसे बड़ा उपभोक्ता है, साथ ही दुनिया का तीसरा बड़ा कार्बन उत्सर्जक देश भी।

जलवायु परिवर्तन मानव अधिकारों पर प्रत्यक्ष और परोक्ष दोनों ही तरह के खतरे पेश कर रहा है। इनमें भोजन का अधिकार, पानी और स्वच्छता का अधिकार, सस्ती व्यावसायिक ऊर्जा हासिल करने का अधिकार और इसे विस्तार देते हुए विकास का अधिकार भी शामिल है। मजबूरी में किए गए व्यापक स्तर पर पलायन, जलवायु से जुड़ी संघर्ष की स्थितियों के खतरे, स्वास्थ्य और स्वास्थ्य व्यवस्था को सीधे और परोक्ष खतरे तथा जमीन और जीविका पर होने वाले प्रभाव, ये मुद्दे दर्शाते हैं कि जलवायु परिवर्तन और मानव अधिकार संबंधी चिंताएं बहुत नजदीक से एक-दूसरे से संबद्ध हैं। सम्मान पूर्वक जीने का अधिकार ही नहीं बल्कि जीवन का अधिकार भी दाव पर है।

जलवायु परिवर्तन की समस्या के मूल में एक अनोखी विडंबना है — जो देश इस समस्या के लिए सबसे कम उत्तरदायी रहे हैं, वे ही इससे सबसे ज्यादा प्रभावित होने वाले हैं। ग्रीनहाउस गैसें विकसित देशों की आर्थिक गतिविधियों की वजह से पैदा हो रही हैं, लेकिन जलवायु परिवर्तन का सबसे ज्यादा बदलाव देखने को मिलेगा गरीब देशों पर। विषम परिस्थिति का सामना करने की बेहतर क्षमता रखने वाले लोगों के मुकाबले वे लोग ज्यादा प्रभावित होंगे जो पहले से समस्याग्रस्त और वंचित हैं। जलवायु परिवर्तन का प्रभाव तो सभी देशों पर होगा, लेकिन यह सबको एक समान प्रभावित नहीं करेगा।

मौजूदा समय में, हर वर्ष होने वाली इंसानी मृत्यु में लगभग एक तिहाई के पीछे गरीबी से जुड़ी वजहें होती हैं। जलवायु परिवर्तन के बढ़ते प्रभाव को देखते हुए यह स्थिति भविष्य में और खराब ही होगी। गरीबों में भी महिलाओं और लड़कियों का अनुपात ज्यादा है जिसकी वजह से वे समस्या की चपेट में और ज्यादा आती हैं। उदाहरण के तौर पर ग्रामीण भारत में, खास तौर पर महिलाओं पर ही यह जिम्मेवारी होती है कि वे खाना और पानी उपलब्ध करवाएं। इसलिए जमीन की पैदावार पर पड़ने वाले जलवायु परिवर्तन के असर, जल की उपलब्धता और खाद्य सुरक्षा का बहुत सीधा असर महिलाओं पर पड़ता है। इसी तरह वर्ष 2004 में आए भूकंप और सुनामी ने दिखाया है कि आपदा के दौरान भारतीय महिलाएं कैसे ज्यादा प्रभावित होती हैं। इस दौरान प्रभावित इलाकों में महिलाएं पुरुषों के मुकाबले चार गुना ज्यादा संख्या में मारी गईं। यह एक उदाहरण है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन किस तरह मौजूदा विषमताओं को और बढ़ाता है। यह भारत के लिए जानलेवा हो सकता है, जहां लैंगिक के साथ ही जातीय और वर्ग संबंधी विषमताएं भी तय करती हैं कि किसी नागरिक को कितने मानवाधिकार हासिल होंगे।

जलवायु पर हो रही अंतरराष्ट्रीय बातचीत में जहां पर्यावरण की रक्षा और आने वाली पीढ़ियों के लिए प्राकृतिक संसाधनों को सहेजने पर जोर होना ही चाहिए, यह भी जरूरी है कि वे दुनिया भर की खतरे की जद में रहने वाली आबादी की तात्कालिक विकास की चुनौती को कतई दाव पर नहीं लगाएं। इसके लिए जरूरी है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन पर हो रही बहस समानता, ऊर्जा तक पहुंच और साझेदारी पर केंद्रित हो। विकास सिर्फ आर्थिक और सामाजिक जरूरत नहीं, यह जलवायु परिवर्तन को ले कर अपनाया गया बेहतरीन उपाय भी है। खतरे की जद में जीने वाली आबादी के जीवन, स्वास्थ्य और जीविका के मौलिक मानवाधिकारों को सुरक्षित रखने के लिए यह जरूरी है कि हम ऐसे विकास को बढ़ावा दें जो चुनौतियों का सामना करने की ऐसे विशेष वर्ग की क्षमता और उनकी संपत्ति को बढ़ा सके और साथ ही जलवायु परिवर्तन के उपायों को भी कामयाबी से लागू कर सके।

दुनिया की सर्वाधिक गरीब 1.2 अरब आबादी के अनुमानित 33% लोगों का ठिकाना भारत है। इस जैसी उभरती अर्थव्यवस्था के लिए खास तौर पर यह बहुत प्रासंगिक है। विकास के अधिकार की रक्षा करना यहां बहुत अहम है क्योंकि यहां यह तथ्य जीवन के अधिकार से जुड़ा है। इस लिहाज से सफल नजरिया वह होगा जिसमें पर्यावरण रक्षा और गरीबी उन्मूलन को पूरी तरह से अलग-अलग लक्ष्य के तौर पर नहीं देखा जाता हो। आप ऐसे ब्रह्मांड की रक्षा किस नैतिकता के आधार पर करेंगे जिसमें एक तिहाई मनुष्य जीवन के चार दशक से ज्यादा नहीं देख पाते, जबकि आबादी का सातवां हिस्सा आठ दशक से ज्यादा का जीवन जीता है।

जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी वार्ता में ऊर्जा उत्सर्जन को विकास से अलग रखने के सिद्धांत पर जिस तिव्रता से बात की जा रही है उसमें इस बात का भी खतरा है कि विकासशील देशों में मानवाधिकारों के हनन की आशंका और बढ़ जाए। उत्सर्जन को आर्थिक विकास से ‘पूरी तरह अलग रखने’ की प्रचलित कथ्य की संभावनाओं पर अर्थशास्त्री टिम जैक्सन ने विचार किया है। उनका निष्कर्ष है कि अर्थव्यवस्था के अनुपात में उत्सर्जन की बढ़ोतरी की रफ्तार को थामा तो जा सकता है, लेकिन जब अर्थव्यवस्था विस्तार ले रही हो, उसी दौरान उत्सर्जन को थामना या नकारात्मक विकास की ओर मोड़ना अकल्पनीय है, भले ही कार्बन-बचत तकनीक उपलब्ध हो गई हों।

भारत को अभी अपनी ऊर्जा खपत के चरम पर पहुंचना बाकी है और यह अभी भी प्रति व्यक्ति 2000 वॉट की न्यूनतम जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा उपलब्ध करवाने में संघर्ष कर रहा है। पहली दुनिया के नागरिक वर्ष 2050 में बिना अपने मौजूदा जीवन स्तर को घटाए प्रति व्यक्ति इतनी ही ऊर्जा की खपत कर रहे होंगे (1998 के फेडरल इंस्टीट्यूट ऑफ टेकनालॉजी, ज्यूरिक के अध्ययन के मुताबिक)। शोध बताते हैं कि विकासशील देशों में गरीबी उन्मूलन और जीविका के साधन उपलब्ध करवाने के लिए ऊर्जा तक पहुंच को सुनिश्चित करना आवश्यक है। हालांकि भारत में प्रति व्यक्ति ऊर्जा का उपयोग चीन, अमेरिका या यूरोपीय संघ के मुकाबले बहुत कम है, लेकिन भारत समग्र रूप से ऊर्जा का दुनिया का चौथा सबसे बड़ा उपभोक्ता है और साथ ही दुनिया का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा कार्बन उत्सर्जक देश भी। भारत को स्वच्छ ऊर्जा के एजेंडे पर चलते हुए जलवायु परिवर्तन पर जारी वार्ता में दोहरे लक्ष्य को हासिल करने के नजरिये पर चलना है जिसमें आर्थिक विकास और मानव विकास के लिए ऊर्जा तक पहुंच दोनों शामिल हैं।

विकसित दुनिया के अधिकांश हिस्से को इस बात की चिंता है कि जहां उन्होंने आम तौर पर अपने कोयला उपयोग को हाल के समय (वित्तीय संकट के बाद) में घटाया है, भारत ने इसी दौरान इसके उपयोग को बढ़ाया है। हालांकि विश्लेषण से पता चलता है कि उपयोग में इस बढ़ोतरी को जलवायु के प्रति किसी देश की जवाबदेही से जोड़ कर नहीं देखा जाना चाहिए। बल्कि इस बात पर जोर दिया जाना चाहिए कि प्रति व्यक्ति आधार पर कोयले के दहन में भारत का योगदान अमेरिका के मुकाबले पांचवां हिस्सा भी नहीं। यूरोपीय संघ के मुकाबले यह एक तिहाई है। हम 2050 तक, जब पृथ्वी की अनुमानित आबादी नौ अरब होगी, प्रति व्यक्ति उत्सर्जन को दो टन सीओ2 तक सीमित करना चाहते हैं, ऐसे में हमें व्यक्तिगत ऊर्जा उपलब्धता, कार्बन छूट, इंधन विकल्प और जीवनशैली उत्सर्जन इन सब को सम्मिलित रूप में देखना शुरू करना होगा। यहां हमें जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा और जीवनशैली ऊर्जा के बीच के अंतर पर खास तौर से जोर देना होगा। जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा वह न्यूतन ऊर्जा जरूरत है जिसके आधार पर हम मूल मानवीय जरूरतों को पूरा करते हैं। इसका आकलन जीडीपी विकास दर लक्ष्य और एचडीआई स्तर के साथ ही पूर्व निर्धारित विकास लक्ष्यों को हासिल करने के लिए आवश्यक ऊर्जा की जरूरतों के अनुमान के आधार पर किया जा सकता है। जीवन-रेखा ऊर्जा विकसित देशों के नागरिकों की न्यूनतम जीवनशैली संबंधी जरूरतों को पूरा करने के लिए पर्याप्त होती हैं, उससे ज्यादा ऊर्जा को जीवनशैली ऊर्जा की श्रेणी में रखना होगा। इसलिए भारत भले ही स्वच्छ ऊर्जा की ओर बढ़ने के लिए पुरजोर संघर्ष कर रहा हो, लेकिन अपने औद्योगिक आधार को और अर्थव्यवस्था को बढ़ाने के लिए इसकी कोयले के उपयोग पर निर्भरता लाजमी है। विकास और गरीबी उन्मूलन के बिना भारत नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा या जलवायु परिवर्तन के लिहाज से जरूरी चीजों में निवेश नहीं कर पाएगा। संक्षेप में कहें तो, ‘अगर भारत को सफलतापूर्वक हरित ऊर्जा के लक्ष्य को हासिल करना है तो इसे अपनी कोयला क्षमता को बढ़ाना होगा।’ कार्बन का मौजूदा असमान बंटवारा जलवायु न्याय और हिस्से को ले कर चल रही चर्चा से हमें दूर करता है।

इस साल दिसंबर के दौरान कांफ्रेंस ऑफ पार्टीज (सीओपी) की 21वीं बैठक के दौरान, 193 देश स्वैच्छिक और स्व-निर्धारित राष्ट्रीय लक्ष्य तय कर एक वैश्विक जलवायु समझौता तैयार करने की कोशिश करेंगे। पैरिस में होने वाले समझौते में यह जरूर सुनिश्चित किया जाना चाहिए कि भावी पीढ़ियों के अधिकारों की रक्षा पर इतना ज्यादा ध्यान केंद्रित न हो कि यह विकासशील देशों की खतरे की जद और संकट में रह रही आबादी के जीवन को ही खतरे में डाल दे।

भले ही जलवायु का प्रभाव धीरे-धीरे हमारे लिए सामान्य होता जा रहा हो, लेकिन जलवायु परिवर्तन से होने वाली प्राकृतिक आपदाएं और आत्यांतिक मौसम की घटनाएं पहले से ही उन आबादी पर कहर ढा रही हैं और आने वाले समय में ये और बढ़ने वाली हैं।

इस संदर्भ में अधिकार-आधारित नजरिये के जरिये ‘जिम्मेदारियों, असमानताओं और खतरों का विश्लेषण’ किया जा सकता है और ‘भेद-भाव तथा ऊर्जा के असमान बंटवारे का समाधान’ कर सकती है जैसा कि संयुक्त राष्ट्र मानवाधिकार आयोग ने निर्धारित किया है। यह सुनिश्चित किया जा सकता है कि ऐसी जिम्मेदारियां राज्यों के लक्ष्य और वादे पर लागू हों और इसलिए भविष्य में जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी व्यवस्थाएं जलवायु परिवर्तन की वजह से प्रभावित हो सकने वाली आबादी के अधिकारों की रक्षा पर ध्यान दे। यूएनएफसीसीसी की ओर से घोषित विकास के अधिकार की घोषणा में इन मानवाधिकार सिद्धांतों पर जोर दिया गया है और राज्यों की ओर से इन मुद्दों के समाधान पर जोर देता है। इस दौरान उन्हें साझा लेकिन भिन्न-भिन्न जवाबदेहियों और संबंधित क्षमता का ध्यान भी रखना होगा ताकि मौजूदा और भविष्य दोनों की ही पीढ़ियों को लाभ मिल सके।

अब तक बनी हुई भारी असमानता वाली मौजूदा दुनिया में सभी देशों के लिए कम कार्बन वाले, जलवायु-सक्षम और सतत विकास के लक्ष्य को हासिल करना तब तक संभव नहीं है जब तक कि वित्त, तकनीक और क्षमता निर्माण में अंतरराष्ट्रीय सहयोग नहीं हो। इस बात पर भी ध्यान दिए जाने की जरूरत है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन के शमन की तब तक कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती जब तक गरीबी उन्मूलन पर ध्यान नहीं दिया जाए और राष्ट्रों के बीच और उनके अपने अंदर जलवायु न्याय को सुनिश्चित नहीं किया जाए। मानवाधिकारों को जलवायु संबंधी कदमों के साथ जोड़ कर और विकासशील देशों में महिलाओं और बच्चों जैसे सबसे ज्यादा खतरे में रहने वाली आबादी को अधिकार संपन्न बना कर उन्हें जलवायु अनुकूलन और शमन की प्रक्रिया में भूमिका निभाने लायक बनाने से प्रभावों को दूर करने की यह प्रक्रिया काफी तेज हो सकती है। ऊर्जा तक पहुंच सुनिश्चित करना लैंगिक समानता, महिला अधिकार और सबको समाहित करने वाले विकास के लिहाज से भी सहायक होगी।

पेरिस सम्मेलन से पहले भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री ने वैश्विक समुदाय से अपील की है कि वे जलवायु परिवर्तन पर ‘जलवायु न्याय’ को तरजीह दें। गरीबों का कम-उपभोग अमीरों के अधिक-उपभोग के लिए सब्सिडी उपलब्ध नहीं करवा सकता, यह बात देशों के अंदर और विभिन्न देशों के बीच भी एक समान लागू होती है। भविष्य के समझौतों के टिकाऊ और सफल होने के लिए यह जरूरी है कि राज्य बयानबाजी और शक्ति प्रदर्शन से ऊपर उठ कर पर्यावरण संरक्षण के साथ ही जीवन और विकास (बराबर न हो तो समतामूलक ही सही) के अधिकार को भी आगे बढ़ाने की दोहरी जवाबदेही को उठाने को तैयार हों।

यह लेख प्रकाशन ग्लोबल पॉलिसी जर्नल से लिया गया है।

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Rethinking the future of Asia: Moving beyond US dominance

Samir Saran| Ashok Malik

Asia will shape the 21st century as much as the Atlantic consensus shaped the 20th century, or Europe the 19th. But to get there, Asia has to pursue a new project, one that begins to create a political Asia.

Like the Atlantic order flourished on the basis of the Bretton Woods and UN systems, Asia needs a reordering of the global landscape. We need a new management, a new board of directors and a new security architecture.

Any usable platforms?

At the very least, this emerging Asian system needs to bring three resident actors (China, Japan and India) and two regional stakeholders (the United States and Russia) to the same table. Other sub-regional influencers should be drawn in as well.

Could the East Asia Summit, of which all these countries are members, serve as a possible platform for such an architecture? Not quite. The East Asia Summit cannot really address the concerns of Central and West Asia.

Alternatively, Ii an expanded mandate for the G20 (seven Asian countries, two more if one were to include Turkey and Russia) the answer? Or do we need to think about a greenfield institution?

Three possibilities

Three possibilities — distinct, but not mutually exclusive — emerge. At the commencement of the 21st century, Asia’s politics resembles the fraught, rudderless multipolarity of the beginning of the 20th.

It took 50 years and two world wars for that reckless order to settle into a multilateral equilibrium.

Asia has to do it better, faster and without the external “stimulus” of a “Great War.” As the dowager power, the United States can incubate new institutional arrangements in Asia, playing Greece to emergent Asia’s Rome, to borrow from Harold Macmillan’s description of the post-war relationship between Britain and the US.

Option 1: India as the bridge power

Should the United States choose to bequeath the liberal international order to Asian powers, India will be the heir-apparent.

However, India would not play the role of a great power, but simply that of a “bridge power.” Asia is too fractious and politically vibrant to be managed by one entity.

India is in a unique and catalytic position, with its ability to singularly span the geographic and ideological length of the continent.

But for that to become a distinct possibility, two variables will need to be determined:

1. Can the US find it within itself to incubate an order in Asia that may in the future not afford it the pride of place like the trans-Atlantic system?

2. Can India get its act together and utilise the opportunity that it has right before it to become the inheritor of a liberal Asia?

Option 2: An Asian “Concert of Nations

The second possibility for a future Asian order is that it resembles the 19th century Concert of Europe. That would mean opting for an unstable but necessary political coalition of major powers on the continent.

The practical result would be that the “Big Eight” in Asia (China, India Japan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Australia, Russia and the United States of America) would all be locked in a marriage of convenience (one hopes).

To be sure, aligning their disparate interests for the greater cause of shared governance, in one way or another, is a desirable outcome.

Difficult as it would be to predict the contours of this system, it would likely be focused on preventing shocks to “core” governance functions in Asia.

These include the preservation of the financial system, territorial and political sovereignties and inter-dependent security arrangements.

Given that each major player in this system would likely see this merely as an ad hoc mechanism, there is a potential major downside: Its chances of devolving into a debilitating bilateral or multi-front conflict for superiority would be high — very much like the (European) Concert of Nations eventually that gave way to the First World War.

Option 3: Sidelining the US?

A third possibility could see the emergence of an Asian political architecture that does not involve the United States. This system — or more precisely, a universe of subsystems — would see the regional economic and security alliances take a prominent role in managing their areas of interest.

As a consequence, institutions like ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the AIIB, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation would become the “hubs” of governance.

The United States, for its part, would remain only distantly engaged with these sub-systems. It would be neither invested in their continuity nor be part of its membership.

Which outcome?

Rather than crystal gazing these three possibilities, our objective is to gauge the political underpinnings behind an emerging Asian architecture. Very simply, the question is: Will it be defined by contestation or cooperation?

Quite a bit will depend on the stance of the United States. Can the US incubate a political order that is largely similar to existing multilateral systems? Or will the cost of creating disruptive institutions keep Asian countries from buying into them?

Beyond the U.S. dimension, can any credible pan-Asian governance institution successfully absorb — or at the very least acknowledge — the cultural, economic and social differences that characterize the continent?

Conclusion

The quest for the Asian century is not about finding the Holy Grail of shared governance, but diagnosing the right means to reach a sustainable and inclusive platform.

This commentary originally appeared in The Globalist.

 

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जलवायु परिवर्तन और मानवाधिकार

Samir Saran|Vidisha Mishra

भारत समग्र रूप से ऊर्जा का दुनिया का चौथा सबसे बड़ा उपभोक्ता है, साथ ही दुनिया का तीसरा बड़ा कार्बन उत्सर्जक देश भी।

जलवायु परिवर्तन मानव अधिकारों पर प्रत्यक्ष और परोक्ष दोनों ही तरह के खतरे पेश कर रहा है। इनमें भोजन का अधिकार, पानी और स्वच्छता का अधिकार, सस्ती व्यावसायिक ऊर्जा हासिल करने का अधिकार और इसे विस्तार देते हुए विकास का अधिकार भी शामिल है। मजबूरी में किए गए व्यापक स्तर पर पलायन, जलवायु से जुड़ी संघर्ष की स्थितियों के खतरे, स्वास्थ्य और स्वास्थ्य व्यवस्था को सीधे और परोक्ष खतरे तथा जमीन और जीविका पर होने वाले प्रभाव, ये मुद्दे दर्शाते हैं कि जलवायु परिवर्तन और मानव अधिकार संबंधी चिंताएं बहुत नजदीक से एक-दूसरे से संबद्ध हैं। सम्मान पूर्वक जीने का अधिकार ही नहीं बल्कि जीवन का अधिकार भी दाव पर है।

जलवायु परिवर्तन की समस्या के मूल में एक अनोखी विडंबना है — जो देश इस समस्या के लिए सबसे कम उत्तरदायी रहे हैं, वे ही इससे सबसे ज्यादा प्रभावित होने वाले हैं। ग्रीनहाउस गैसें विकसित देशों की आर्थिक गतिविधियों की वजह से पैदा हो रही हैं, लेकिन जलवायु परिवर्तन का सबसे ज्यादा बदलाव देखने को मिलेगा गरीब देशों पर। विषम परिस्थिति का सामना करने की बेहतर क्षमता रखने वाले लोगों के मुकाबले वे लोग ज्यादा प्रभावित होंगे जो पहले से समस्याग्रस्त और वंचित हैं। जलवायु परिवर्तन का प्रभाव तो सभी देशों पर होगा, लेकिन यह सबको एक समान प्रभावित नहीं करेगा।

मौजूदा समय में, हर वर्ष होने वाली इंसानी मृत्यु में लगभग एक तिहाई के पीछे गरीबी से जुड़ी वजहें होती हैं। जलवायु परिवर्तन के बढ़ते प्रभाव को देखते हुए यह स्थिति भविष्य में और खराब ही होगी। गरीबों में भी महिलाओं और लड़कियों का अनुपात ज्यादा है जिसकी वजह से वे समस्या की चपेट में और ज्यादा आती हैं। उदाहरण के तौर पर ग्रामीण भारत में, खास तौर पर महिलाओं पर ही यह जिम्मेवारी होती है कि वे खाना और पानी उपलब्ध करवाएं। इसलिए जमीन की पैदावार पर पड़ने वाले जलवायु परिवर्तन के असर, जल की उपलब्धता और खाद्य सुरक्षा का बहुत सीधा असर महिलाओं पर पड़ता है। इसी तरह वर्ष 2004 में आए भूकंप और सुनामी ने दिखाया है कि आपदा के दौरान भारतीय महिलाएं कैसे ज्यादा प्रभावित होती हैं। इस दौरान प्रभावित इलाकों में महिलाएं पुरुषों के मुकाबले चार गुना ज्यादा संख्या में मारी गईं। यह एक उदाहरण है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन किस तरह मौजूदा विषमताओं को और बढ़ाता है। यह भारत के लिए जानलेवा हो सकता है, जहां लैंगिक के साथ ही जातीय और वर्ग संबंधी विषमताएं भी तय करती हैं कि किसी नागरिक को कितने मानवाधिकार हासिल होंगे।

जलवायु पर हो रही अंतरराष्ट्रीय बातचीत में जहां पर्यावरण की रक्षा और आने वाली पीढ़ियों के लिए प्राकृतिक संसाधनों को सहेजने पर जोर होना ही चाहिए, यह भी जरूरी है कि वे दुनिया भर की खतरे की जद में रहने वाली आबादी की तात्कालिक विकास की चुनौती को कतई दाव पर नहीं लगाएं। इसके लिए जरूरी है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन पर हो रही बहस समानता, ऊर्जा तक पहुंच और साझेदारी पर केंद्रित हो। विकास सिर्फ आर्थिक और सामाजिक जरूरत नहीं, यह जलवायु परिवर्तन को ले कर अपनाया गया बेहतरीन उपाय भी है। खतरे की जद में जीने वाली आबादी के जीवन, स्वास्थ्य और जीविका के मौलिक मानवाधिकारों को सुरक्षित रखने के लिए यह जरूरी है कि हम ऐसे विकास को बढ़ावा दें जो चुनौतियों का सामना करने की ऐसे विशेष वर्ग की क्षमता और उनकी संपत्ति को बढ़ा सके और साथ ही जलवायु परिवर्तन के उपायों को भी कामयाबी से लागू कर सके।

दुनिया की सर्वाधिक गरीब 1.2 अरब आबादी के अनुमानित 33% लोगों का ठिकाना भारत है। इस जैसी उभरती अर्थव्यवस्था के लिए खास तौर पर यह बहुत प्रासंगिक है। विकास के अधिकार की रक्षा करना यहां बहुत अहम है क्योंकि यहां यह तथ्य जीवन के अधिकार से जुड़ा है। इस लिहाज से सफल नजरिया वह होगा जिसमें पर्यावरण रक्षा और गरीबी उन्मूलन को पूरी तरह से अलग-अलग लक्ष्य के तौर पर नहीं देखा जाता हो। आप ऐसे ब्रह्मांड की रक्षा किस नैतिकता के आधार पर करेंगे जिसमें एक तिहाई मनुष्य जीवन के चार दशक से ज्यादा नहीं देख पाते, जबकि आबादी का सातवां हिस्सा आठ दशक से ज्यादा का जीवन जीता है।

जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी वार्ता में ऊर्जा उत्सर्जन को विकास से अलग रखने के सिद्धांत पर जिस तिव्रता से बात की जा रही है उसमें इस बात का भी खतरा है कि विकासशील देशों में मानवाधिकारों के हनन की आशंका और बढ़ जाए। उत्सर्जन को आर्थिक विकास से ‘पूरी तरह अलग रखने’ की प्रचलित कथ्य की संभावनाओं पर अर्थशास्त्री टिम जैक्सन ने विचार किया है। उनका निष्कर्ष है कि अर्थव्यवस्था के अनुपात में उत्सर्जन की बढ़ोतरी की रफ्तार को थामा तो जा सकता है, लेकिन जब अर्थव्यवस्था विस्तार ले रही हो, उसी दौरान उत्सर्जन को थामना या नकारात्मक विकास की ओर मोड़ना अकल्पनीय है, भले ही कार्बन-बचत तकनीक उपलब्ध हो गई हों।

भारत को अभी अपनी ऊर्जा खपत के चरम पर पहुंचना बाकी है और यह अभी भी प्रति व्यक्ति 2000 वॉट की न्यूनतम जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा उपलब्ध करवाने में संघर्ष कर रहा है। पहली दुनिया के नागरिक वर्ष 2050 में बिना अपने मौजूदा जीवन स्तर को घटाए प्रति व्यक्ति इतनी ही ऊर्जा की खपत कर रहे होंगे (1998 के फेडरल इंस्टीट्यूट ऑफ टेकनालॉजी, ज्यूरिक के अध्ययन के मुताबिक)। शोध बताते हैं कि विकासशील देशों में गरीबी उन्मूलन और जीविका के साधन उपलब्ध करवाने के लिए ऊर्जा तक पहुंच को सुनिश्चित करना आवश्यक है। हालांकि भारत में प्रति व्यक्ति ऊर्जा का उपयोग चीन, अमेरिका या यूरोपीय संघ के मुकाबले बहुत कम है, लेकिन भारत समग्र रूप से ऊर्जा का दुनिया का चौथा सबसे बड़ा उपभोक्ता है और साथ ही दुनिया का तीसरा सबसे बड़ा कार्बन उत्सर्जक देश भी। भारत को स्वच्छ ऊर्जा के एजेंडे पर चलते हुए जलवायु परिवर्तन पर जारी वार्ता में दोहरे लक्ष्य को हासिल करने के नजरिये पर चलना है जिसमें आर्थिक विकास और मानव विकास के लिए ऊर्जा तक पहुंच दोनों शामिल हैं।

विकसित दुनिया के अधिकांश हिस्से को इस बात की चिंता है कि जहां उन्होंने आम तौर पर अपने कोयला उपयोग को हाल के समय (वित्तीय संकट के बाद) में घटाया है, भारत ने इसी दौरान इसके उपयोग को बढ़ाया है। हालांकि विश्लेषण से पता चलता है कि उपयोग में इस बढ़ोतरी को जलवायु के प्रति किसी देश की जवाबदेही से जोड़ कर नहीं देखा जाना चाहिए। बल्कि इस बात पर जोर दिया जाना चाहिए कि प्रति व्यक्ति आधार पर कोयले के दहन में भारत का योगदान अमेरिका के मुकाबले पांचवां हिस्सा भी नहीं। यूरोपीय संघ के मुकाबले यह एक तिहाई है। हम 2050 तक, जब पृथ्वी की अनुमानित आबादी नौ अरब होगी, प्रति व्यक्ति उत्सर्जन को दो टन सीओ2 तक सीमित करना चाहते हैं, ऐसे में हमें व्यक्तिगत ऊर्जा उपलब्धता, कार्बन छूट, इंधन विकल्प और जीवनशैली उत्सर्जन इन सब को सम्मिलित रूप में देखना शुरू करना होगा। यहां हमें जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा और जीवनशैली ऊर्जा के बीच के अंतर पर खास तौर से जोर देना होगा। जीवनरेखा ऊर्जा वह न्यूतन ऊर्जा जरूरत है जिसके आधार पर हम मूल मानवीय जरूरतों को पूरा करते हैं। इसका आकलन जीडीपी विकास दर लक्ष्य और एचडीआई स्तर के साथ ही पूर्व निर्धारित विकास लक्ष्यों को हासिल करने के लिए आवश्यक ऊर्जा की जरूरतों के अनुमान के आधार पर किया जा सकता है। जीवन-रेखा ऊर्जा विकसित देशों के नागरिकों की न्यूनतम जीवनशैली संबंधी जरूरतों को पूरा करने के लिए पर्याप्त होती हैं, उससे ज्यादा ऊर्जा को जीवनशैली ऊर्जा की श्रेणी में रखना होगा। इसलिए भारत भले ही स्वच्छ ऊर्जा की ओर बढ़ने के लिए पुरजोर संघर्ष कर रहा हो, लेकिन अपने औद्योगिक आधार को और अर्थव्यवस्था को बढ़ाने के लिए इसकी कोयले के उपयोग पर निर्भरता लाजमी है। विकास और गरीबी उन्मूलन के बिना भारत नवीकरणीय ऊर्जा या जलवायु परिवर्तन के लिहाज से जरूरी चीजों में निवेश नहीं कर पाएगा। संक्षेप में कहें तो, ‘अगर भारत को सफलतापूर्वक हरित ऊर्जा के लक्ष्य को हासिल करना है तो इसे अपनी कोयला क्षमता को बढ़ाना होगा।’ कार्बन का मौजूदा असमान बंटवारा जलवायु न्याय और हिस्से को ले कर चल रही चर्चा से हमें दूर करता है।

इस साल दिसंबर के दौरान कांफ्रेंस ऑफ पार्टीज (सीओपी) की 21वीं बैठक के दौरान, 193 देश स्वैच्छिक और स्व-निर्धारित राष्ट्रीय लक्ष्य तय कर एक वैश्विक जलवायु समझौता तैयार करने की कोशिश करेंगे। पैरिस में होने वाले समझौते में यह जरूर सुनिश्चित किया जाना चाहिए कि भावी पीढ़ियों के अधिकारों की रक्षा पर इतना ज्यादा ध्यान केंद्रित न हो कि यह विकासशील देशों की खतरे की जद और संकट में रह रही आबादी के जीवन को ही खतरे में डाल दे।

भले ही जलवायु का प्रभाव धीरे-धीरे हमारे लिए सामान्य होता जा रहा हो, लेकिन जलवायु परिवर्तन से होने वाली प्राकृतिक आपदाएं और आत्यांतिक मौसम की घटनाएं पहले से ही उन आबादी पर कहर ढा रही हैं और आने वाले समय में ये और बढ़ने वाली हैं।

इस संदर्भ में अधिकार-आधारित नजरिये के जरिये ‘जिम्मेदारियों, असमानताओं और खतरों का विश्लेषण’ किया जा सकता है और ‘भेद-भाव तथा ऊर्जा के असमान बंटवारे का समाधान’ कर सकती है जैसा कि संयुक्त राष्ट्र मानवाधिकार आयोग ने निर्धारित किया है। यह सुनिश्चित किया जा सकता है कि ऐसी जिम्मेदारियां राज्यों के लक्ष्य और वादे पर लागू हों और इसलिए भविष्य में जलवायु परिवर्तन संबंधी व्यवस्थाएं जलवायु परिवर्तन की वजह से प्रभावित हो सकने वाली आबादी के अधिकारों की रक्षा पर ध्यान दे। यूएनएफसीसीसी की ओर से घोषित विकास के अधिकार की घोषणा में इन मानवाधिकार सिद्धांतों पर जोर दिया गया है और राज्यों की ओर से इन मुद्दों के समाधान पर जोर देता है। इस दौरान उन्हें साझा लेकिन भिन्न-भिन्न जवाबदेहियों और संबंधित क्षमता का ध्यान भी रखना होगा ताकि मौजूदा और भविष्य दोनों की ही पीढ़ियों को लाभ मिल सके।

अब तक बनी हुई भारी असमानता वाली मौजूदा दुनिया में सभी देशों के लिए कम कार्बन वाले, जलवायु-सक्षम और सतत विकास के लक्ष्य को हासिल करना तब तक संभव नहीं है जब तक कि वित्त, तकनीक और क्षमता निर्माण में अंतरराष्ट्रीय सहयोग नहीं हो। इस बात पर भी ध्यान दिए जाने की जरूरत है कि जलवायु परिवर्तन के शमन की तब तक कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती जब तक गरीबी उन्मूलन पर ध्यान नहीं दिया जाए और राष्ट्रों के बीच और उनके अपने अंदर जलवायु न्याय को सुनिश्चित नहीं किया जाए। मानवाधिकारों को जलवायु संबंधी कदमों के साथ जोड़ कर और विकासशील देशों में महिलाओं और बच्चों जैसे सबसे ज्यादा खतरे में रहने वाली आबादी को अधिकार संपन्न बना कर उन्हें जलवायु अनुकूलन और शमन की प्रक्रिया में भूमिका निभाने लायक बनाने से प्रभावों को दूर करने की यह प्रक्रिया काफी तेज हो सकती है। ऊर्जा तक पहुंच सुनिश्चित करना लैंगिक समानता, महिला अधिकार और सबको समाहित करने वाले विकास के लिहाज से भी सहायक होगी।

पेरिस सम्मेलन से पहले भारतीय प्रधानमंत्री ने वैश्विक समुदाय से अपील की है कि वे जलवायु परिवर्तन पर ‘जलवायु न्याय’ को तरजीह दें। गरीबों का कम-उपभोग अमीरों के अधिक-उपभोग के लिए सब्सिडी उपलब्ध नहीं करवा सकता, यह बात देशों के अंदर और विभिन्न देशों के बीच भी एक समान लागू होती है। भविष्य के समझौतों के टिकाऊ और सफल होने के लिए यह जरूरी है कि राज्य बयानबाजी और शक्ति प्रदर्शन से ऊपर उठ कर पर्यावरण संरक्षण के साथ ही जीवन और विकास (बराबर न हो तो समतामूलक ही सही) के अधिकार को भी आगे बढ़ाने की दोहरी जवाबदेही को उठाने को तैयार हों।

यह लेख प्रकाशन ग्लोबल पॉलिसी जर्नल से लिया गया है।

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PM must ensure demonetisation does not increase government’s role in citizens’ lives

Samir Saran|Vivan Sharan

By demonetisation move, PM has enacted strong policy that has removed nearly all currency from circulation, without an immediate recourse to replenishment.

 Cashless, Denomination Notes, Surveillance

The Cashless society

By the demonetisation move, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has enacted a strong policy that has removed nearly all currency from circulation, without an immediate recourse to its replenishment.

This move again positions him as a disrupter of the status quo, an attribute increasingly being endorsed by voters across the globe. If he has to carry this disruption to its logical political outcome, significant support will need to come from the ‘JAM ecosystem’ (Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile).

This political gambit puts into sharp relief the importance of what the government does next. Its job has just begun and uncertainty about long-term outcomes will persist until complementary steps are taken. Since the central proposition put on the table is that business as usual is no longer acceptable, the important question is: what next? To answer this, it is useful to first benchmark India’s cash economy against ‘emerging market’ peers.

In terms of ‘narrow money’, which includes coins and notes in circulation and other currency equivalents easily convertible to cash, India has a higher cash-to-GDP ratio (11.77%) than all its Brics counterparts. There are also extreme benchmarks set by advanced countries such as Sweden, which aims to go completely cashless (something that may be neither desirable nor doable in India’s case), and has a cash-to-GDP ratio of close to 2%.

Within Brics, South Africa is a standout performer with a cash-to-GDP ratio of under 5%. Like India, South Africa has well-developed telecom networks, large and rising number of internet users and a thriving innovation culture in digital payments. The additional South African ingredient that seems to be missing in India is a supportive institutional environment. Modi’s litmus test will be whether he can overcome legacy issues that plague India’s institutional ecosystem that inhibit the evolution to a cash-light economy.

One such issue is the over-reliance and unhealthy prioritisation of the government-run digital payments solution to the detriment of private service providers. Modi’s promise of ‘less government, more governance’ should certainly not include the perpetuation of a digital payments ecosystem dominated by government-backed entities. Instead, it must focus on building partnerships that leverage entrepreneurial energies outside of the government. Digital payments currently constitute only around 5% of all consumer transactions and need a dramatic and exponential ramp-up.

While the RBI has adopted a digitalfocused ‘Payments and Settlement Systems Vision’ in June, there is no mention of any competition issues that should ordinarily be considered when safety, efficiency and universal access are stated goals of this vision. Further, there exists a conflict when the government-sponsored digital infrastructure backbone, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), also establishes the terms of engagement of the emergent digital payments ecosystem. The NPCI promotes the RuPay card, which has been pushed out to most citizens who have opened Jan Dhan accounts.

After demonetisation, the NPCI has waived switching fees paid for all RuPay issuing and acquiring member banks for points of sale and e-commerce transactions (till the year-end), ostensibly to promote its own product. Here, the licenser, regulator and the business entity are one, and are perversely gaming politics and policy. This is not avirtue for any market seeking to promote itself as business-friendly.

But it’s more than just the ‘ease of doing business’ that is at stake. It would be clear to incumbent card networks that they may have lost the opportunity to service the 800 million who make up the bottom of the economic pyramid to the supply-led RuPay proposition. But the government must also recognise that an army of stakeholders will be required to increase both the volume and value of digital transactions. For instance, there is negligible payment acceptance infrastructure in rural areas, despite RuPay’s dominant presence over the last few years.

The immense task of ensuring ubiquitous acceptance infrastructure is not something government can achieve alone. RuPay will need to work with its counterparts. Risks that come from having created a single point of infrastructural failure through the NPCI are immense and real. One such threat materialised when cyber attacks were witnessed over the last few months that affected 3.2 million debit cards.

GoI must ensure that demonetisation is not seen as a time for increasing the role of government in the lives of citizens, rather as a moment to rationalise it. The government has the responsibility to balance security, access and competition as the digital economy evolves. This has to be done through sensible policies and regulations, not through predatory business interventions.

This commentary originally appeared in The Economic Times.

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Muddling through Marrakech

Samir Saran

To those gathered in Marrakech to respond to what is inarguably one of the most important political and economic challenges of our times—climate change

 Earth, Water, Climate Change

As the UN climate conference got underway on 7 November, fate and the US electorate delivered a body blow to the ambitions of many gathered in Marrakech to respond to what is inarguably one of the most important political and economic challenges of our times—climate change. Voters in the US exhibited their disdain for a globalisation that was perceived to have favoured only a few. They rejected the internationalist proposition of the Hillary Clinton campaign. They vented their frustration at the notion of global governance that took away the rights of communities to decide their own future by placing political agency within a complex architecture that was distant and cold.

And they rejected the solutions offered by liberal elites on various issues, including trade, employment, growth and sustainability, by casting their votes in favour of Donald Trump. In the end, he had the more appealing manifesto, rejecting facets of US policies that had sustained over two decades of unfettered globalisation.

Marrakech’s outcome was sealed on 8 November. It was only the evangelical obstinacy of those present that allowed the forum to continue to plod along a path that arguably had been rejected by world’s most influential and oldest democracy.

Perceptions and assessments of climate-change action, climate governance and response to global warming mirrored a growing secular view on the negative experiences of globalisation itself.

These experiences can be clubbed in three broad sets of issues.

First, global action diluted democratic agency as a result of the processes of global governance. These processes had allowed themselves to be captured by a small group of ideologues spanning the globe and proliferating different sectors. Their world view inhabited a narrow spectrum of thought with no room for dissent and only contempt for those who did not conform. Global governance worked for those who could reach the forums where debates unfolded. Contrarians, even if they did reach the gates of such forums, found their ability to weigh in and be heard meeting insurmountable barriers.

The second grievance stemmed from a sense of injustice, where at least the popular perception was that globalisation favoured a select elite. Rules were made to perpetuate the hegemony of some and while all may have benefitted from it a little, transformational change continued to be available to only a few. Globalisation and its agents and institutions lacked legitimacy, and they did not even care to rectify this impression.

The third issue was the inherent hypocrisy in the communications and intent of those defending and promoting the ideal of one planet and one humanity. Rich countries, communities and individuals had done little to demonstrate their intention to share their prosperity with those left behind. Their manipulative attempts to evade tax, dilute their commitment to global development aid, and profit under the garb of “innovation rewards” of what were described as “global challenges” and “public bads” had diminished an internationalism that sought to create trade, economic and social interconnectedness.

Climate Change, Morocco, Marrakech
COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco, 2016 | Source: Climate Change Org

For many who had spent a better part of the decade achieving the gains (modest) that were signed into an agreement in Paris, the 2016 US election appeared as a mandate against climate action. Rejection of Barack Obama and Clinton-style globalism does implicate the future of climate action as a collective. But exactly how?

Climate debates suffered from all the failings of “Project Globalisation”. They were designed in a manner that any climate action would benefit the few winners and burden the many. Some new winners would be admitted if they signed up to the “new deal”. Climate action reeked of hypocrisy, with rich countries unable and unwilling to commit any significant amounts to support the “loss and damage” and adaptation challenges of the poor. Even on mitigation, the global commitment of a $100 billion remains implausible.

Finally, national actions are defined through a club of woolly eyed “multilateral elites”—all belonging to a Hegelian land. And all reaching the same policy prescriptions irrespective of context, capacity, capability and reality. In the age of hypermedia and an intensely participative public sphere, climate politics appeared distant, cold and undemocratic.

Marrakech points to three much needed next steps.

Climate Change, Morocco
Opening Ceremony of the Marrakech Climate Change Conference | Source: UN Climate Change

First, nations matter, and any effective climate response will be national and regional. Allow them agency and choice, and do not impose solutions and alien pathways. The “rule book” to monitor national actions should be thrown out lest it be seen as another elite attempt to undermine popular will.

Second, do not allow hypocrisy to destroy the planet. If the rich are concerned for their grandchildren, they must at least guarantee decent living for the current generation of the poor. Put the $100 billion on the table. Then allow your funds and banks to invest in emerging and developing countries and begin to price innovation for the bottom of the pyramid.

Third, climate change as we conceive it, is already upon us and will not suddenly manifest itself in 2020. The rich must underwrite and take responsibility for the devastation that many confront today, and only then will they be able to enlist and seek action from others. Else, climate is a great leveller. We will all boil together, and the poor may have less to leave behind.

This commentary originally appeared in The Mint.

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Columns/Op-Eds, Water / Climate

India’s perspective on post-Paris climate negotiations

ORF, Expert Speak, Nov 8, 2016

Original link is here

Fletcher Forum: How do you propose an amenable bridge between global responsibilities of combatting the legacy of historic emissions from OECD countries versus controlling increases in current (and future) emissions of BRICS nations?

Samir Saran: The pre-Paris paradigm of “strict” differentiation with regards to mitigation responsibilities has now evolved into that of “universal action.”

However, the induction of the term “climate justice” still attempts to ensure the existence of a bridge between global historical responsibilities and the future emissions of developing and emerging economies. Climate justice, defined as the recognition of equitable rights to use the atmospheric global commons, is weighed in terms of mitigation and adaptation costs. Any effort to redistribute the emissions between the OECD and the global south will need to account for the cost of differential impacts caused by reduction or avoidance of emissions. In many ways, climate justice takes forward the moral arguments of the CBDR (Common But Differentiated Responsibility) and Equity debate while discarding the rigid politics that have evolved around these concepts and made agreements impossible.

That being said, there are four distinct yet overlapping future potentials of “just” climate action:

One, developed countries will have to achieve their self-designed pledges on climate finance and support for technology transfer. Greater political leadership and action from the global north will encourage developing countries to walk an extra mile in meeting their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). For instance, Indian and Brazilian NDCs have mentioned additional commitment to climate action provisional to availability of finance and technologies from the industrialised economies.

Second, a global set of rules could be developed to tax or regulate the higher emissions by corporations, institutions, and other parties across the globe, irrespective of their country’s development status. This type of normative framework must be universally agreed upon. All corporations above a certain size in certain sectors and irrespective of their geographical location must adhere to a framework of efficiency and climate awareness.

Thirdly, technology transfer from the west won’t be enough to strengthen climate action to the level that is required to limit global temperatures at two degrees or below two degrees Celsius. Indigenisation of technology innovation — both products and processes — will be critical to resolving the climate-development nexus. A more transparent knowledge sharing approach along with technology transfer will have to be put in place to support long-term climate resilience.

Fourth, “loss and damage” in the longer term must be operationalised. The Paris Agreement’s weak language regarding loss and damage, mainly the exclusion of a non-liability clause, was perhaps part of an effort to generate consensus on minimum level of commitment. Going forward, we can’t escape from setting an institutional apparatus to compensate for climate related losses that especially affect Small Island States, Least Developed Nations, and developing countries.

Global per capita emissions are negligible for India, but 13 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in India. What is your take on the environmental policies undertaken by some of the state governments? Do you feel there is sufficient political intent to address environmental concerns at the central level, particularly on issues like forest cover?

SS: Environmental policies alone cannot resolve India’s urbanisation challenge. There is an underlying structural and political issue, which gets veiled under the supposed “techno-managerial” clarification. A case in reference is the odd-even license plate scheme in Delhi aimed to decongest traffic and reduce air pollution. In the absence of robust infrastructure and comprehensive regulatory measures, the odd-even scheme hit a dead end. Lack of an efficient public transport system, misdirected notions of how the mega-city’s transport system should work, and the conception of the scheme itself, wherein the focus was on the number of vehicles on the road rather than the time they spent, are a few shortfalls that failed the broader intended impact of the odd-even scheme. But as I have written elsewhere, this scheme needs to be re-introduced accompanied by a slew of other measures including ‘congestion charge’, ban on diesel vehicles, rationing of vehicles per household and relooking at the notion of ‘home office’ which becomes increasingly an attractive option with communication technology and digital connectivity.

Such structural problems are mirrored by the water and waste management sector. Yamuna Action Plan I, II, and III, and the latest “Maili se Nirmal Yamuna Revitalisation” Project 2017 have endeavoured to clean one of India’s most polluted rivers. None so far have produced the desired results. This is a result of infrastructural shortcomings for waste disposal, derisory and fraudulent penalties and punishment for polluting, and growing waste generation. So we now have a situation where judicial and socio-environmental activism has maintained the pitch of the debate, but political deafness to the challenge is palpable.

How would you suggest enacting reforms in India’s overburdened and inefficient utilities or the coal sector?

SS: The Indian coal power sector is growing. In 2015–2016, coal production rose to 638 million tons (from 70 million tons in 1970s), and imports dropped by 43 percent from the previous year. The current government’s thrust on modern technologies combined with reforms in coal imports, auction, mining, extraction, and evacuation have started showing signs of sectoral improvement. However, an ambition to double coal production to 100 crores tons by 2020 will require massive improvement in the efficiency of both the product and process. Investments in research and development for clean coal technologies, improvements in boiler efficiency, and super critical technology are the lowest hanging fruits. Two aspects are critical in this sector from a climate perspective.

First, since OECD countries are neither investing in nor are mandated to develop coal technologies, the emerging economies will have to pick up the baton on research on mining technologies and boiler efficiencies. Second, every percentage gain in coal energy across the mine to power plant value chain will reduce Indian annual emissions equivalent to the entire annual emissions of some countries in Europe and elsewhere. This is a low hanging fruit that is not being bagged due to the evangelical anti-coal sentiment that is blind to its inevitable use in OECD countries and developing world.

There is much enthusiasm surrounding India’s focus on renewable energy — what lessons can India provide to other countries to develop their renewable energy sector?

SS: India’s renewable energy development trajectory presents a unique case. The country is endowed with an estimated 896 GW of renewable energy potential in the form of biomass, solar, wind, small hydro, and tidal. Besides this, the energy deficit in rural areas, increasing energy demands, and climate concerns have been the key drivers of renewable energy development in India.

To exploit this potential, India created a separate Ministry of New and Renewable Development, set national goals for biomass and solar generation, and made ambitious targets to increase the share of renewables in the total energy mix from 32 GW (2014) to 175 GW by 2022.

To provide further thrust to the sector, Prime Minister Modi along with France launched the International Solar Alliance in Paris in 2015. This group of 121 countries aim to mobilise one trillion dollars for solar investments by 2030 and improve access to solar technologies.

While it too early to present India as a successful case to learn lessons from, its vision to balance green growth along with the sovereign obligation to meet at least the lifeline energy needs of its population is an endeavour with no precedence. In a country of 400 million energy poor people, renewables offer only a fraction of a solution for energy security and economic growth. Yet, an impressive 175 GW target from renewables demonstrates the new ambition of India’s political leadership and the sense of responsibility towards global climate action. To put this ambition in perspective, India is seeking to install more renewable capacity in the next decade than the total capacity installed in Germany over multiple decades of industrialisation.

If India can pull this off, its model will be unique. India would be the first country in the world to move from a low-income society to a middle-income economy, driven significantly by renewable energy and climate conscious infrastructure. It would also be a model that is exportable to other countries similarly placed on growth ambitions and development priorities.

This interview originally appeared in The Fletcher Forum of International Affairs.

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