globalisation

Fourth BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration / Samir live on BBC World News

Was on BBC this morning….was asked to discuss BRICS….

Ques 1 – China will dominate BRICS because of its money and might?

Ques 2 – How will India counter China at the BRICS?

Ques 3 – How can this group work together without common ideology (or something like that)?

Was at my charming best while basically saying…China will be an important player in any grouping – why only BRICS….the questions are posed incorrectly…BRICS is not a platform for India countering China….it is indeed an opportunity to take the edge of the bilateral …..and some people do not see common ideology as being necessary….(this Euro Centric fetish for “Common Humanity”) and with our individual and rich experiences we can find ways to developing pathways (unique) for an equitable and prosperous future….

Synergy and Complimentarity are the operative words and BRICS are rich with these possibilities.

For some in India as well – it is all a zero sum game….maybe it is …but they need to know the rules of arithmetic are changing and the nation state may not be the unit of measurement any more – The BRICS Stock Exchange is the business thumbs up to BRICS and the 4th Academic Forum was the “experts” support to it….many more to follow….

The skeptics can continue to earn their salaries…while we build a new platform 🙂

The Political will is expressed in the Delhi Declaration and it is positive, decisive and firm on what the BRICS need to do together and how they need to interact with the developed world on many common issues. I am certain that in this instance the BRICS surprised themselves …..in what they were able to agree to ….In Sanya the BRICS went wider and added South Africa….In Delhi the BRICS went deeper and added substance….

Happy BRICS Day

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Fourth BRICS Summit – Delhi Declaration
March 29, 2012
Please find here the full version as PDF: Declaration Fourth_BRICS_Summit

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the

Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa,

met in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012 at the Fourth BRICS Summit. Our

discussions, under the overarching theme, “BRICS Partnership for Global Stability,

Security and Prosperity”, were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and warmth

and inspired by a shared desire to further strengthen our partnership for common

development and take our cooperation forward on the basis of openness, solidarity,

mutual understanding and trust.

2. We met against the backdrop of developments and changes of contemporary global

and regional importance – a faltering global recovery made more complex by the

situation in the euro zone; concerns of sustainable development and climate change

which take on greater relevance as we approach the UN Conference on Sustainable

Development (Rio+20) and the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological

Diversity being hosted in Brazil and India respectively later this year; the upcoming

G20 Summit in Mexico and the recent 8th WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva;

and the developing political scenario in the Middle East and North Africa that we

view with increasing concern. Our deliberations today reflected our consensus to

remain engaged with the world community as we address these challenges to global

well-being and stability in a responsible and constructive manner.

3. BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent

43% of the world’s population, for the promotion of peace, security and development

in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.

Coming, as we do, from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, the transcontinental

dimension of our interaction adds to its value and significance.

4. We envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress and

enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and

developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of

international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the

opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and

developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their

effectiveness in achieving this objective.

5. We are concerned over the current global economic situation. While the BRICS

recovered relatively quickly from the global crisis, growth prospects worldwide have

again got dampened by market instability especially in the euro zone. The build-up of

sovereign debt and concerns over medium to long-term fiscal adjustment in advanced

countries are creating an uncertain environment for global growth. Further, excessive

liquidity from the aggressive policy actions taken by central banks to stabilize their

domestic economies have been spilling over into emerging market economies,

fostering excessive volatility in capital flows and commodity prices. The immediate

priority at hand is to restore market confidence and get global growth back on track.

We will work with the international community to ensure international policy

coordination to maintain macroeconomic stability conducive to the healthy recovery

of the global economy.

6. We believe that it is critical for advanced economies to adopt responsible

macroeconomic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and

undertake structural reforms to lift growth that create jobs. We draw attention to the

risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows being faced by the emerging

economies. We call for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform,

strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision

cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and

banking systems.

7. In this context, we believe that the primary role of the G20 as premier forum for

international economic cooperation at this juncture is to facilitate enhanced

macroeconomic policy coordination, to enable global economic recovery and secure

financial stability, including through an improved international monetary and

financial architecture. We approach the next G20 Summit in Mexico with a

commitment to work with the Presidency, all members and the international

community to achieve positive results, consistent with national policy frameworks, to

ensure strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

8. We recognize the importance of the global financial architecture in maintaining the

stability and integrity of the global monetary and financial system. We therefore call

for a more representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the

voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment and

improvement of a just international monetary system that can serve the interests of all

countries and support the development of emerging and developing economies.

Moreover, these economies having experienced broad-based growth are now

significant contributors to global recovery.

9. We are however concerned at the slow pace of quota and governance reforms in the

IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 Governance and Quota

Reform before the 2012 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, as well as the

comprehensive review of the quota formula to better reflect economic weights and

enhance the voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries by

January 2013, followed by the completion of the next general quota review by

January 2014. This dynamic process of reform is necessary to ensure the legitimacy

and effectiveness of the Fund. We stress that the ongoing effort to increase the

lending capacity of the IMF will only be successful if there is confidence that the

entire membership of the institution is truly committed to implement the 2010 Reform

faithfully. We will work with the international community to ensure that sufficient

resources can be mobilized to the IMF in a timely manner as the Fund continues its

transition to improve governance and legitimacy. We reiterate our support for

measures to protect the voice and representation of the IMF’s poorest members.

10. We call upon the IMF to make its surveillance framework more integrated and

even-handed, noting that IMF proposals for a new integrated decision on surveillance

would be considered before the IMF Spring Meeting.

11. In the current global economic environment, we recognise that there is a pressing

need for enhancing the flow of development finance to emerging and developing

countries. We therefore call upon the World Bank to give greater priority to

mobilising resources and meeting the needs of development finance while reducing

lending costs and adopting innovative lending tools.

12. We welcome the candidatures from developing world for the position of the

President of the World Bank. We reiterate that the Heads of IMF and World Bank be

selected through an open and merit-based process. Furthermore, the new World Bank

leadership must commit to transform the Bank into a multilateral institution that truly

reflects the vision of all its members, including the governance structure that reflects

current economic and political reality. Moreover, the nature of the Bank must shift

from an institution that essentially mediates North-South cooperation to an institution

that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development

issues and to overcome an outdated donor- recipient dichotomy.

13. We have considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank for

mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in

BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the

existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and

development. We direct our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability

of such an initiative, set up a joint working group for further study, and report back to

us by the next Summit.

14. Brazil, India, China and South Africa look forward to the Russian Presidency of

G20 in 2013 and extend their cooperation.

15. Brazil, India, China and South Africa congratulate the Russian Federation on its

accession to the WTO. This makes the WTO more representative and strengthens the

rule-based multilateral trading system. We commit to working together to safeguard

this system and urge other countries to resist all forms of trade protectionism and

disguised restrictions on trade.

16. We will continue our efforts for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round,

based on the progress made and in keeping with its mandate. Towards this end, we

will explore outcomes in specific areas where progress is possible while preserving

the centrality of development and within the overall framework of the single

undertaking. We do not support plurilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental

principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We believe that such

initiatives not only distract members from striving for a collective outcome but also

fail to address the development deficit inherited from previous negotiating rounds.

Once the ratification process is completed, Russia intends to participate in an active

and constructive manner for a balanced outcome of the Doha Round that will help

strengthen and develop the multilateral trade system.

17. Considering UNCTAD to be the focal point in the UN system for the treatment of

trade and development issues, we intend to invest in improving its traditional

activities of consensus-building, technical cooperation and research on issues of

economic development and trade. We reiterate our willingness to actively contribute

to the achievement of a successful UNCTAD XIII, in April 2012.

18. We agree to build upon our synergies and to work together to intensify trade and

investment flows among our countries to advance our respective industrial

development and employment objectives.We welcome the outcomes of the second

Meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers held in New Delhi on 28 March 2012. We support

the regular consultations amongst our Trade Ministers and consider taking suitable

measures to facilitate further consolidation of our trade and economic ties. We

welcome the conclusion of the Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in

Local Currency under BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and the Multilateral

Letter of Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement between our EXIM/Development

Banks. We believe that these Agreements will serve as useful enabling instruments

for enhancing intra-BRICS trade in coming years.

19. We recognize the vital importance that stability, peace and security of the Middle

East and North Africa holds for all of us, for the international community, and above

all for the countries and their citizens themselves whose lives have been affected by

the turbulence that has erupted in the region. We wish to see these countries living in

peace and regain stability and prosperity as respected members of the global

community.

20. We agree that the period of transformation taking place in the Middle East and

North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of lasting conflicts but

rather it should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab-Israeli

conflict. Resolution of this and other long-standing regional issues would generally

improve the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus we confirm our

commitment to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-

Israeli conflict on the basis of the universally recognized international legal

framework including the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab

Peace Initiative. We encourage the Quartet to intensify its efforts and call for greater

involvement of the UN Security Council in search for a resolution of the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict. We also underscore the importance of direct negotiations

between the parties to reach final settlement. We call upon Palestinians and Israelis to

take constructive measures, rebuild mutual trust and create the right conditions for

restarting negotiations, while avoiding unilateral steps, in particular settlement

activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

21. We express our deep concern at the current situation in Syria and call for an

immediate end to all violence and violations of human rights in that country. Global

interests would best be served by dealing with the crisis through peaceful means that

encourage broad national dialogues that reflect the legitimate aspirations of all

sections of Syrian society and respect Syrian independence, territorial integrity and

sovereignty. Our objective is to facilitate a Syrian-led inclusive political process, and

we welcome the joint efforts of the United Nations and the Arab League to this end.

We encourage the Syrian government and all sections of Syrian society to

demonstrate the political will to initiate such a process, which alone can create a new

environment for peace. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Kofi Annan as the Joint

Special Envoy on the Syrian crisis and the progress made so far, and support him in

continuing to play a constructive role in bringing about the political resolution of the

crisis.

22. The situation concerning Iran cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict, the

disastrous consequences of which will be in no one’s interest. Iran has a crucial role to

play for the peaceful development and prosperity of a region of high political and

economic relevance, and we look to it to play its part as a responsible member of the

global community. We are concerned about the situation that is emerging around

Iran’s nuclear issue. We recognize Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy

consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues

involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue between the parties

concerned, including between the IAEA and Iran and in accordance with the

provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

23. Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential

access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain

lasting peace and stability. We support the global community’s commitment to

Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011, to

remain engaged over the transformation decade from 2015-2024. We affirm our

commitment to support Afghanistan’s emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic

state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective

regional and international cooperation for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, including

by combating terrorism.

24. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates

originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.

25. We reiterate that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any act of terrorism

in any form or manifestation. We reaffirm our determination to strengthen

cooperation in countering this menace and believe that the United Nations has a

central role in coordinating international action against terrorism, within the

framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of

international law. We emphasize the need for an early finalization of the draft of the

Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in the UN General Assembly

and its adoption by all Member States to provide a comprehensive legal framework to

address this global scourge.

26. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United

Nations playing a central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this

regard, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its

Security Council, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative

so that it can deal with today’s global challenges more successfully. China and Russia

reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in

international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

27. We recall our close coordination in the Security Council during the year 2011, and

underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our cooperation

and strengthen multilateral approaches on issues pertaining to global peace and

security in the years to come.

28. Accelerating growth and sustainable development, along with food, and energy

security, are amongst the most important challenges facing the world today, and

central to addressing economic development, eradicating poverty, combating hunger

and malnutrition in many developing countries. Creating jobs needed to improve

people’s living standards worldwide is critical. Sustainable development is also a key

element of our agenda for global recovery and investment for future growth. We owe

this responsibility to our future generations.

29. We congratulate South Africa on the successful hosting of the 17th Conference of

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 7th

Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

(COP17/CMP7) in December 2011. We welcome the significant outcomes of the

Conference and are ready to work with the international community to implement its

decisions in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated

responsibilities and respective capabilities.

30. We are fully committed to playing our part in the global fight against climate

change and will contribute to the global effort in dealing with climate change issues

through sustainable and inclusive growth and not by capping development. We

emphasize that developed country Parties to the UNFCCC shall provide enhanced

financial, technology and capacity building support for the preparation and

implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries.

31. We believe that the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) is a

unique opportunity for the international community to renew its high-level political

commitment to supporting the overarching sustainable development framework

encompassing inclusive economic growth and development, social progress and

environment protection in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development, including the principle of common

but differentiated responsibilities, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of

Implementation.

32. We consider that sustainable development should be the main paradigm in

environmental issues, as well as for economic and social strategies. We acknowledge

the relevance and focus of the main themes for the Conference namely, Green

Economy in the context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication

(GESDPE) as well as Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD).

33. China, Russia, India and South Africa look forward to working with Brazil as the

host of this important Conference in June, for a successful and practical outcome.

Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa also pledge their support to working with

India as it hosts the 11th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on

Biological Diversity in October 2012 and look forward to a positive outcome. We will

continue our efforts for the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, with

special attention to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair

and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, Biodiversity

Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and the Resource Mobilization Strategy.

34. We affirm that the concept of a ‘green economy’, still to be defined at Rio+20,

must be understood in the larger framework of sustainable development and poverty

eradication and is a means to achieve these fundamental and overriding priorities, not

an end in itself. National authorities must be given the flexibility and policy space to

make their own choices out of a broad menu of options and define their paths towards

sustainable development based on the country’s stage of development, national

strategies, circumstances and priorities. We resist the introduction of trade and

investment barriers in any form on the grounds of developing green economy.

35. The Millennium Development Goals remain a fundamental milestone in the

development agenda. To enable developing countries to obtain maximal results in

attaining their Millennium Development Goals by the agreed time-line of 2015, we

must ensure that growth in these countries is not affected. Any slowdown would have

serious consequences for the world economy. Attainment of the MDGs is

fundamental to ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable global growth and would

require continued focus on these goals even beyond 2015, entailing enhanced

financing support.

36. We attach the highest importance to economic growth that supports development

and stability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realised their full

economic potential. We will take our cooperation forward to support their efforts to

accelerate the diversification and modernisation of their economies. This will be

through infrastructure development, knowledge exchange and support for increased

access to technology, enhanced capacity building, and investment in human capital,

including within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

(NEPAD).

37. We express our commitment to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis that still

affects millions of people in the Horn of Africa and support international efforts to

this end.

38. Excessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly those for food and energy,

poses additional risks for the recovery of the world economy. Improved regulation of

the derivatives market for commodities is essential to avoid destabilizing impacts on

food and energy supplies. We believe that increased energy production capacities and

strengthened producer-consumer dialogue are important initiatives that would help in

arresting such price volatility.

39. Energy based on fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix for the

foreseeable future. We will expand sourcing of clean and renewable energy, and use

of energy efficient and alternative technologies, to meet the increasing demand of our

economies and our people, and respond to climate concerns as well. In this context,

we emphasise that international cooperation in the development of safe nuclear

energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of

relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and

operation of nuclear power plants. We stress IAEA’s essential role in the joint efforts

of the international community towards enhancing nuclear safety standards with a

view to increasing public confidence in nuclear energy as a clean, affordable, safe and

secure source of energy, vital to meeting global energy demands.

40. We have taken note of the substantive efforts made in taking intra-BRICS

cooperation forward in a number of sectors so far. We are convinced that there is a

storehouse of knowledge, know-how, capacities and best practices available in our

countries that we can share and on which we can build meaningful cooperation for the

benefit of our peoples. We have endorsed an Action Plan for the coming year with

this objective.

41. We appreciate the outcomes of the Second Meeting of BRICS Ministers of

Agriculture and Agrarian Development at Chengdu, China in October 2011. We

direct our Ministers to take this process forward with particular focus on the potential

of cooperation amongst the BRICS to contribute effectively to global food security

and nutrition through improved agriculture production and productivity, transparency

in markets and reducing excessive volatility in commodity prices, thereby making a

difference in the quality of lives of the people particularly in the developing world.

42. Most of BRICS countries face a number of similar public health challenges,

including universal access to health services, access to health technologies, including

medicines, increasing costs and the growing burden of both communicable and noncommunicable

diseases. We direct that the BRICS Health Ministers meetings, of

which the first was held in Beijing in July 2011, should henceforth be institutionalized

in order to address these common challenges in the most cost-effective, equitable and

sustainable manner.

43. We have taken note of the meeting of S&T Senior Officials in Dalian, China in

September 2011, and, in particular, the growing capacities for research and

development and innovation in our countries. We encourage this process both in

priority areas of food, pharma, health and energy as well as basic research in the

emerging inter-disciplinary fields of nanotechnology, biotechnology, advanced

materials science, etc. We encourage flow of knowledge amongst our research

institutions through joint projects, workshops and exchanges of young scientists.

44. The challenges of rapid urbanization, faced by all developing societies including

our own, are multi-dimensional in nature covering a diversity of inter-linked issues.

We direct our respective authorities to coordinate efforts and learn from best practices

and technologies available that can make a meaningful difference to our societies. We

note with appreciation the first meeting of BRICS Friendship Cities held in Sanya in

December 2011 and will take this process forward with an Urbanization and Urban

Infrastructure Forum along with the Second BRICS Friendship Cities and Local

Governments Cooperation Forum.

45. Given our growing needs for renewable energy resources as well as on energy

efficient and environmentally friendly technologies, and our complementary strengths

in these areas, we agree to exchange knowledge, know-how, technology and best

practices in these areas.

46. It gives us pleasure to release the first ever BRICS Report, coordinated by India,

with its special focus on the synergies and complementarities in our economies. We

welcome the outcomes of the cooperation among the National Statistical Institutions

of BRICS and take note that the updated edition of the BRICS Statistical Publication,

released today, serves as a useful reference on BRICS countries.

47. We express our satisfaction at the convening of the III BRICS Business Forum

and the II Financial Forum and acknowledge their role in stimulating trade relations

among our countries. In this context, we welcome the setting up of BRICS Exchange

Alliance, a joint initiative by related BRICS securities exchanges.

48. We encourage expanding the channels of communication, exchanges and peopleto-

people contact amongst the BRICS, including in the areas of youth, education,

culture, tourism and sports.

49. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa extend their warm appreciation and sincere

gratitude to the Government and the people of India for hosting the Fourth BRICS

Summit in New Delhi.

50. Brazil, Russia, India and China thank South Africa for its offer to host the Fifth

BRICS Summit in 2013 and pledge their full support.

Delhi Action Plan

1. Meeting of BRICS Foreign Ministers on sidelines of UNGA.

2. Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on sidelines of G20

meetings/other multilateral (WB/IMF) meetings.

3. Meeting of financial and fiscal authorities on the sidelines of WB/IMF meetings as

well as stand-alone meetings, as required.

4. Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margins of multilateral events, or standalone

meetings, as required.

5. The Third Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture, preceded by a preparatory

meeting of experts on agro-products and food security issues and the second Meeting

of Agriculture Expert Working Group.

6. Meeting of BRICS High Representatives responsible for national security.

7. The Second BRICS Senior Officials’ Meeting on S&T.

8. The First meeting of the BRICS Urbanisation Forum and the second BRICS

Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum in 2012 in India.

9. The Second Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers.

10. Mid-term meeting of Sous-Sherpas and Sherpas.

11. Mid-term meeting of CGETI (Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues).

12. The Third Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2013.

13. Meeting of experts on a new Development Bank.

14. Meeting of financial authorities to follow up on the findings of the BRICS Report.

15. Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions in New York, Vienna and

Geneva, as required.

16. Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on the margins of relevant

environment and climate related international fora, as necessary.

17. New Areas of Cooperation to explore:

(i) Multilateral energy cooperation within BRICS framework.

(ii) A general academic evaluation and future long-term strategy for BRICS.

(iii) BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue.

(iv) Cooperation in Population related issues.

New Delhi

March 29, 2012

Column in The Hindu: “Banking on BRICS to deliver”

New Delhi, 27th of March 2012
Please find here the link to the original article

If conceptualised carefully, the Bank can help rebalance the global economy leading to equitable and resilient growth.

Even as New Delhi prepares for the arrival of BRICS Heads of States towards the later part of the week, media and experts across the world continue to debate the relevance, capacity and cohesiveness of the grouping. The common refrain in the western press is that it is a ‘motley crew’ with little in common and therefore with little capability to create institutions and multilateral platforms of substance. Well, they may be in for a surprise. In fact, BRICS may also surprise itself.

Besides the usual declarations on cooperation on political matters, social challenges, climate and energy, food and water, health and education, industry and trade, BRICS is likely to make two significant announcements this time, which will, in many ways, mark its coming of age. First — the formal launch of the “BRICS Exchange Alliance” in which the major stock exchanges of BRICS countries will offer investors index-based derivatives trading options of exchanges in domestic currency. This will allow investors within BRICS to invest in each other’s progress, expand the offerings of the individual exchanges, facilitate greater liquidity, while simultaneously strengthening efforts to deepen financial integration through market-determined mechanisms. From talking to people in the know, this alliance is good to go, and the operational modalities around currency, settlement cycles and inter-exchange regulatory coordination are all issues that have been thought through and resolved.

‘South-South bank’

The second announcement that has people most interested is on the much discussed “BRICS Bank” or the “South-South Bank” that many consider to be an Indian proposal for creating an institution that can serve the development needs and aspirations of the emerging and developing world. This proposal saw much debate (some heated) at the recent BRICS Academic Forum and surely was a key issue for deliberations at the recently concluded BRICS Finance Ministers Meeting. There are many complex and some contested issues that need to be discussed and thought through, but due to the growing support for such an institution among BRICS it is almost certain that the leaders will, at the very least, announce a working group to study the feasibility and operational modalities of such a multilateral bank. Whether they are bold enough to suggest a time line for its establishment remains to be seen but in the opinion of many, it is an idea whose time has come.

Foremost amongst the reasons for the creation of the institution is the need for BRICS to assume pole position in global financial governance. BRICS nations represent nearly half the world’s population. Two of them are already among the top five economies in purchasing power parity terms, and four are in the top 10. If conceptualised carefully, such an institution will have the potential to reshape and realign the global development agenda positively. It can also help to efficiently redistribute and redirect savings available with the emerging economies to infrastructure and social development in the same regions and, therefore, contribute to the rebalancing of the global economy.

Several multilateral banks already exist, that serve as templates for creating a new institution. The World Bank, which is deeply embedded in the global development narratives, serves as a particularly relevant example. If a multilateral BRICS bank is instituted, its functions would not supplant the role of existing multilateral banks that support development, but rather, supplement them. And this supplementary instrument is needed as multilateral banks such as the World Bank, ADB, etc., have not been growing significantly in terms of the total amount of loans disbursed. While there was a jump in disbursals following the financial crisis, the normalisation process is already under way. On the other hand, demand for funds for infrastructure and social transformation grows unabated in BRICS and the developing world.

But how would the BRICS Bank work? There are doubts expressed in some quarters on the process of capitalisation itself. The Bank would have to raise capital from open market operations; floating debt to finance lending operations. While the reliance on markets for raising capital would make the fiscal asymmetries within BRICS nations irrelevant, the sovereign ratings of some of the members, who will collectively be the shareholders of a BRICS Bank, are barely investment grade. This would limit the amount of capital that could be raised from the financial markets and also affect the cost of capital and therefore the cost of lending. One suggested solution is the sequestration of a proportion of foreign reserves of BRICS members into a trust fund that would back-stop the borrowed capital. In the case of the World Bank, the total paid-up capital is around 10 per cent while the rest is AAA rated ‘callable capital’, which has never been requisitioned. To enhance the creditworthiness further, existing multilateral banks, and other western countries could also be given minority stakes.

China’s role

The second element that is always embedded in the discussions around the bank is the role of China. An impression is sought to be created that with its massive monetary reserves and political clout, China may exert undue influence in this bank. This is unlikely. Such a bank will not require too much paid-up capital (relative to the average size of respective sovereign reserves) if intelligent financial engineering can help sequester foreign reserves. This would mean that the smallest BRICS economy, South Africa, could easily commit an amount similar to that of China in the capital structure. Such doubts could be further allayed with the institution of a rotating Presidency of, say, a two-year term that could initially be restricted to the BRICS countries alone. In any case, the charter of any modern day banking institution with sovereign stakeholders would need to include the mandates of transparency and independence, which would make the institution as viable as any.

The third aspect that remains central to the viability of such a bank is the currency of business. There would be expectations that such a bank would transact in local currencies where possible and in international currency when needed. The bank would need to work with the right currency mix to mitigate credit risk while simultaneously balancing intricate political dynamics within BRICS. For instance, being a current account deficit country, India would not be averse to the U.S. dollar being the currency of disbursal while Brazil with its appreciating “Real’ may prefer local currency. The Chinese may see this bank as a platform for promoting the Renminbi as the currency of choice, especially among the emerging and developing countries. Ultimately, the right mix would need to take into account monetary policy and exchange rate imperatives of each of the primary sovereign stakeholders and in a manner that makes this venture uncomplicated and attractive to other stakeholders as well.

The fourth aspect is the business mandate of such a bank. An effective development bank would have to integrate the multiple economic priorities. Key areas such as infrastructure and the medium and small scale enterprises sector could be natural starting points. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) could be considered an exemplar. The BNDES disbursed close to $140 billion in 2011, with around 30 per cent going to the medium to small enterprises sector (MSME) and about 40 per cent going to large infrastructure projects. The BNDES also played a crucial role in stabilising the Brazilian economy after the financial crisis by stepping up development assistance. Similarly, a BRICS Bank could also assume the role of a financial support mechanism which appropriately responds to the variabilities in the global economy.

Corporations are the primary growth drivers of BRICS economies. They create economic momentum, new business opportunities and, most importantly, in the context of BRICS, employment. The creation of SPVs to cater to the investment and insurance needs of corporations would therefore complement the development agenda. The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provide readymade frameworks. The IFC provides investment solutions for the private sector through services such as equity finance and structured finance, while the MIGA provides non commercial risk insurance guarantees. Guarantees against political risk — which is a significant investment constraint in emerging markets — could facilitate a spurt of new business activity within BRICS, and lest we imagine this instrument to be risk-laden, MIGA has paid only six insurance claims since it was set up in 1988 and needs no counter guarantees.

Need for consensus

BRICS is in transition and cannot afford to lose growth momentum. Multilateral institutions such as a BRICS Bank can aid in sustaining directed, equitable and resilient growth. A consensus on the creation of such an institution would be a very real expression of intent by BRICS to craft alternative development trajectories to those passed down by the OECD countries. And it is also time to Bank with BRICS.

Samir Saran is Vice-President and Vivan Sharan an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. The foundation hosted the BRICS Academic Forum in March this year.

Article in “Russia and India Report”: Navigating the trust deficit

by Samir Saran and Jaibal Naduvath
February 17th, 2012

Please find here the original article

At the 17th round of the Indo-Russian Inter-governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Technological, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) held in November last year, the two governments agreed to set up an investment fund with public-private partnership to finance projects in the two countries. Barely a month later, after almost 18 years of negotiations, Russia was formally invited to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and, has until June of this year to ratify the accession agreement. Beyond reducing tariff barriers and eliminating non-tariff barriers, accession to WTO is also expected to reduce government interference in business, a key pre-condition for free enterprise. Russia’s evolving economy has been witness and victim to continued government interventions.

Nevertheless, given the impending WTO accession, the India-Russia joint investment fund has managed to get its timing right. Current India-Russia bilateral trade, estimated at around USD 9 billion, is admittedly far below its potential. Trade promotion initiatives such as this investment fund, a possible Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with the Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan Customs Union combined with the business confidence the WTO accession would inspire, is expected to double bilateral trade to USD 20 billion by 2015, an ambitious, though very achievable feat. With a Price to Earning (P/E) ratio of 6, compared to India’s 14, China’s 15 and Brazil’s 8.5, Russia’s market is attractively priced amongst the emerging markets with traditional industries such as oil and gas, metals and minerals remaining hugely undervalued.

Despite warm bilateral ties, and close political engagement and co-operation extending well over 55 years, India-Russia trade has rarely managed to go beyond the legacy confines of defense equipment, space, energy, metals and minerals, and, commodities, even while, ironically, both countries have independently managed to very successfully leverage new vistas of opportunity in economies they stood together against for a better part of the 20th century. Russia-European Union (EU) trade in 2010, for instance, stood at around USD 191 billion, with the bloc accounting for over 47% of Russia’s total trade turnover, representing a three-fold increase in just ten years. On the other hand, India-EU trade has grown to USD 107 billion this year and is expected to double in two years on the back of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) currently being negotiated. Compared to this, India-Russia bilateral trade of around USD 9 billion today pales in significance even though it represents a quantum leap from about USD 3 billion in 2006-07.

Russia-India two-way trade and investment has rarely ventured beyond government-controlled domains, which are also accompanied with government-backed guarantees of some kind. Russia’s active participation in several military, aerospace and nuclear projects in India and Indian investment in Russia’s energy sector and preferred trade in controlled commodities are part of this broader trend. But, the true test of any meaningful business relationship lies in the unmitigated ability of private enterprise on either side to confidently engage, invest and gain from each other’s economies, outside the security of sovereign assurance, even if notional. This is not so in the case of Indo-Russian trade.

Russia, of course, dominates the Indian defense sector and is comfortable navigating through Indian officialdom, which still retains much of its controlled economy character from the 70s and 80s. However, this may not remain the case for long. Under greater media scrutiny and public glare, the defense relationship will need to become far more efficient in terms of reliability, time lines and price points, else Russian dominance in the sector could be potentially challenged. Further, as the offset policy starts playing out and thereafter as the Indian private sector becomes engaged in defense production and R&D, Russia may no longer be a competitive player in this segment. To really be a beneficiary of India’s transformation over the coming 2 decades, Russia needs to expand its portfolio by diversifying into the arenas of industry and infrastructure in India. In doing so, its ability to confront India’s dynamic and loud democracy, and an increasingly uncompromising civil society will be as severely tested as its ability to navigate the country’s highly regulated business terrain arising from complex land use norms, environment clearances, and fiscal regimes, all of which have shown to evolve over time.

On the other hand, Russia offers India minerals and land, besides a huge market for software, services, value added goods and consumables. The resource sector in Russia, though, continues to be dominated and overwhelmed by its government with significant self-interest. Agriculture and land based activities too would be prone to similar dynamics and one can expect Indian private sector’s trepidations to be strong on investing in either. Apart from large Public Sector Companies and select large Indian Multi National Corporations, it is unlikely that Indian private sector will invest in Russia, despite undervaluation and potential for attractive return. Indian businesses’ traditional risk aversion is demonstrated by flight of capital to low return economies of the Atlantic that have corresponding low risk political ecosystems as well.

When Indian businesses consider making investments in Russia, they still seem daunted by perceptions constructed by imagery of the powerful and manipulative oligarchy, political nepotism and uncertainty, and seemingly poor judicial and legal recourse frameworks. Fears to do business in Russia have been hyped by experiences of companies such as ExxonMobil, Total and Shell in Russian Oil Sector, which were divested of their interests by Russian political class in a manner that was viewed as ad-hoc, if not vindictive. This imagination has often resulted in investments by Indian entrepreneurs being channeled into markets such as UK, EU and US, which are far more taut than Russia in terms of economic opportunity.

Ironically, Russian investors feel the same way towards India, drawing from a regular narrative of chaotic democracy, policy inconsistency, political fickleness, and civil instability with commitment cycles perceived to not exceed the life of the dispensation in power. One of the collaterals of the 2G verdict of the Supreme Court, which saw the revocation of 21 of Sistema Shyam Telecom’s (SSTL) 22 telecommunications licenses, could be the flickering and faint Russian Interest in Indian business opportunity. Russia’s USD 28 billion telecom to tourism conglomerate, Sistema JSFC, operating in India through its subsidiary MTS, had invested USD $2.5 billion over the past three years into the project, in arguably, the largest private sector intervention by a Russian company in India’s new economy to date. Further, Russian state owned Federal Agency for State Property Management acquired a 17.4% stake in SSTL by investing a hefty $600 million just last year. Fortunately, there is a growing business constituency, which views such re-calibrations as an inevitable part of polity evolution, but nonetheless the experience of Sistema, which may see itself as a victim of judicial overreach as some argue, could well define Russia’s appetite for India’s growth story.

Russia’s accession to WTO this summer and the consequent abolishment of tariff and non-tariff barriers will heighten global interest in Russia. Pro-investment initiatives such as the proposed joint public–private investment fund combined with demonstrable political and economic will on both sides should result in heightened interest in private enterprise on both sides to explore and invest in each other. Multi-billion dollar National Minerals Development Corporation – Severstal Joint Venture steel project in Odisha or Indian companies negotiating long-term agreements for supply of diamonds from Russia are positive signs for medium to long term economic engagement between the two countries.

Samir attended Cambridge Central Asia Forum roundtable on Kazakhstan, OSCE and New Opportunities, 2010

February 12, 2010, UK
Link to roundtable summary
For more information on the Cambridge Central Asia Forum, please visit this website.

Samir in The Times of India: Home Alone in the Neighbourhood, 2010

by Arati R Jerath, TOI Crest
August 7, 2010
in: The Times of India

India was once the undisputed big power in the south Asian region, wielding substantial influence over its smaller neighbours. But, over the years, New Delhi’s strategic and diplomatic clout in its own backyard has weakened.

In April this year, a high-pitched anti-India campaign by the Maoists in Nepal forced President Ram Baran Yadav’s government to cancel a passport deal that had important security implications for us. The deal was a contract with India’s government press to print four million machinereadable passports for Nepal to stop misuse and forgery by suspected terror agents. New Delhi was perturbed enough by the cancellation of the deal to lodge a formal protest with the Nepalese government through its ambassador in Kathmandu. The contract has now gone to a French firm, Oberthur Technologies.

Maldives turned not to India but to the United States and Sri Lanka for help when a political crisis this month plunged the Indian Ocean island nation into turmoil with angry street protests and a constitutional impasse that saw the entire cabinet resign. Where once upon a time India used to rush special envoys at the first sign of trouble, this time it was Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapakse, who played mediator along with the US ambassador to Colombo, Patricia Butenis, and US assistant secretary of state Robert Blake. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have no qualms about using China as an outside balancer to India’s dominance in South Asia. Both buy arms from Beijing and are recipients of whopping sums of money from China for the development of infrastructure like ports, roads and airports in their countries. Bangladesh prime minister,Sheikh Hasina, candidly admitted during her New Delhi visit in January this year that there is an anti-India mindset in her country and she cannot change it.

Last year, Myanmar decided to divert to China gas that India had been eyeing. Although ONGC and GAIL helped to develop the gas fields, located in the resource-rich Arakan province of that country, and own equity in some blocks, India couldn’t get its act together on transportation issues. Tired of New Delhi’s shuffling, Myanmar offered the gas to China, which accepted it with alacrity and has already started constructing a pipeline from Arakan to feed its booming, energy-hungry western provinces of Yunan and Guizhou.

Despite receiving a reconstruction and rehabilitation package worth over $800 million from India, Afghan president Hamid Karzai has decided to ignore New Delhi’s objections and do business with Pakistan and the Taliban. He has received Pakistan’s avowedly anti-India army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, twice inKabul this year and also visited Islamabad to seek assistance in building bridges with the Taliban.

All of these developments point to the fact that over the years, India’s ability to win friends and influence people in its neighbourhood has taken a massive hit. Call it benign neglect. Or put it down to thrills from the first flush of romance with the United States and the tantalising prospect of joining the international high table. Despite a rapidly growing economy, a flourishing democracy, the unrivalled soft power of its popular culture and an army that boasts of being the third largest in the world, India’s geopolitical influence acrosssouth Asia falls sadly short of expectations. As a rising China, with an economy poised to become the world’s largest by 2025, casts its giant shadow over Asia and as Beijing eagerly fills the gaps New Delhi has unthinkingly left in its backyard, the question being asked in strategic and diplomatic circles is this: is India dealing itself out in south Asia?

“Yes,” is the emphatic response from Observer Research Foundation analyst Sameer Saran. “Clearly, we are. We should be creating more robust integration with our neighbourhood. But are we devoting enough time to this? I don’t believe we are.” Says a retired senior diplomat who wished to remain unidentified, “The concepts are all there and they are bandied around regularly. It’s important for our security and economic growth that we manage our periphery. But to do this, we need to be continuously engaged with our neighbours. The trouble is we keep taking our eyes off the ball.”

Today, with the exception of Bhutan, India cannot count a single all-weather friend in the region. From tiny Maldives in the west to Bangladesh and Myanmar in the east to Sri Lanka in the south, national interest need not converge with Indian interests and a little bit of China on the side adds heft to smaller nations when dealing with big brother India. As for Pakistan and China, former national security advisor Brajesh Mishra believes that both are jointly following a containment policy designed to keep India embroiled in tensions with all its neighbours.

“China’s presence has grown all around us. It shows the paucity of India’s influence in her neighbourhood,” Mishra says.

Analysts are perplexed and concerned by the apparent disinterest of successive governments in developing and nurturing an intense engagement with the neighbourhood, especially the south Asian nations that comprise SAARC. Consider these facts: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not paid a bilateral visit to a single SAARC country during his six years in office. Nor did his predecessor Atal Behari Vajpayee, save for one famous trip to Lahore when the India-Pakistan bus link opened in February 1999.

A secret note prepared by the external affairs ministry four years ago lists countries in order of strategic importance to India. The US tops the list, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Japan and Russia, in that order. Surprisingly, China, a budding superpower and a neighbour with which we share a disputed border, ranks sixth, while Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka round off the top ten. Despite Bhutan being India’s closest ally in the immediate neighbourhood, the ministry put it way down on the list along with countries like Belgium and Australia. Bewildering?

It’s inexplicable, certainly. Just as India’s Pakistan’s policy is, with its diminishing returns. This is the one neighbour in which every prime minister since Independence has invested personal time and energy. And ironically, it has proved to be our most troublesome, with sections of the Pakistani establishment pursuing a policy that is downright hostile. “Somehow, we always seem to forget that the first task should be to secure our neighbourhood. This is an imperative if we want to play a global role,” says Mishra.

Analysts believe that India’s neighbourhood conundrum is largely self-created, thanks to our fatal fascination for the West, particularly the United States. While they acknowledge that it was necessary to mend fences with Washington to remain relevant in the new world order that emerged with the end of the Cold War, they feel that policy-makers in New Delhi lost sight of priorities in the chase for a seat at the high table. The last five years were a turning point, as the Manmohan Singh government locked up all its capital in pushing the Indo-US nuclear deal through.

“In our excitement at being feted by Western powers and joining the G-20, the East Asia Summit and so on, we’ve ended up ignoring our traditional constituencies. We seem to see our neighbours as pesky countries rather than important strategic partners in our growth trajectory,” said a former diplomat who did not want his name disclosed.

A senior official in the Prime Minister’s Office downplayed warning notes about the hiatus that has crept into relations with neighbouring countries. He also pooh-poohed the China factor in south Asia, pointing out that Beijing is very cautious about its activities in India’s neighbourhood. For instance, although it built the Gwadar port in Pakistan, a Singapore company is running the facility, he said, adding that the US put pressure on Pakistan to take the port out of the Chinese ambit. “So, you see, there are natural balancers in every country,” he insisted.

Explaining the dip in engagement levels, he said that virtually all the neighbouring countries have been in political turmoil for the past several years, making it difficult for India to build longterm assets in the region. While Nepal is still in crisis, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have stabilised and the Manmohan Singh government is trying to repair ties with both by loosening its purse strings. Economic assistance to the two countries has been stepped up several times. Rajpakse returned to Colombo after a state visit to India in June with an assistance package amounting to $1 billion.

But the elephant moves slowly. Although India-friendly Sheikh Hasina’s victory in the Bangladesh elections last year presents New Delhi with just the opportunity it needs, signs of strain are already there. A recent article in a leading Bangladesh newspaper carried a report that blamed India for non-implementation of trade agreements concluded during Hasina’s January visit to India. In a goodwill gesture to Hasina, India had conceded a long-standing demand from Dhaka on the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers on Bangladeshi goods. The newspaper report said that bureaucrats on both sides were holding things up.

“It’s unfortunate,” says former diplomat G Parthasarathi. “If India doesn’t deliver to Bangladesh in the next five years, it will weaken Hasina and the price will be paid by us. I don’t know why we can’t be more generous with our neighbours. China sees all its neighbouring countries as an extension of its market and places no restrictions on the movement of goods. We demand reciprocity with every neighbour instead of adopting a larger philosophical approach like China.”

Saran puts this niggardly attitude down to an inability to shake off old mindsets. “We worked in poverty mode for so long that we haven’t come out of it yet, although our economy is growing at 8-9 per cent every year. We need to realise that not only has the world changed, so have we,” he says. Mishra warns, however, that economics alone cannot give India the clout it should have as an emerging power. It is equally important to develop military muscle. “We must be able to defend our borders by building up our military strength. There is an impression that India can be taken for granted because it’s a soft state. We’ve neglected our military for too long,” he says. He acknowledged that the Vajpayee government was as much to blame as the Manmohan Singh government for going slow on the much-touted fighter aircraft deal under which the Indian Air Force is slated to acquire 126 war planes as part of its modernisation plans.

While agreeing with Mishra, Parthasarathi laments that emotions get in the way of India’s dealings with its neighbours. “We make a mistake when we ask them to love us. No big country can have a comfortable relationship with smaller neighbours. We will have to learn to be realistic and ignore anti-India sentiments around us. Our neighbours should respect us. We need to create long-term assets everywhere to give them a stake in maintaining good ties with us, everywhere, that is, except Pakistan. That needs to be put in a different basket,” he declares.

PLAYING CATCH-UP
Since last year, India has tried to correct the imbalance in its neighbourhood diplomacy by welcoming almost all the heads of south Asian governments. And in an uncharacteristic show of generosity, it has also loosened its purse strings by offering unprecedented assistance packages

SRI LANKA
Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapakse returned home from his June visit to India with promises of approximately $1 billion in credit lines for various projects. This almost equals China’s $1.2 billion worth of loans to Sri Lanka for development projects across the island nation. Most of the Indian-aided projects are in Tamilpopulated northern Sri Lanka. They include: Construction of 50,000 houses in the northern and eastern provinces for Tamil refugees displaced during the war against the LTTE Reconstruction of at least four railway lines Construction of a new signalling and telecommunication network Rehabilitation of Palaly airport and Kankesanthurai harbour Renovation of the Duraiappah stadium Construction of a cultural centre in Jaffna Construction of a coal-fired power plant in Trincomalee.

BANGLADESH
A range of assistance measures were announced during Bangladesh president Sheikh Hasina’s Delhi visit in January this year. They include: A $1 billion credit line for infrastructure development such as construction and upgradation of railway lines and supply of BG locomotives, passenger coaches and buses Removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and port restrictions on Bangladeshi goods and reduction of items on India’s negative list Supply of 250 MW of electricity from India.

MYANMAR
While India’s assistance to Myanmar does not in any way match China’s , the country’s military leader, General Than Shwe, found New Delhi more responsive when he visited in July this year. The agreements include: Assistance totalling around $200 million for construction of roads, electricity transmission lines and a microwave link as well as procurement of railway and agriculture equipment from India New impetus to stalled power projects on the Chindwin river basin in Myanmar Numerous HRD projects such as setting up centres for English language training, entrepreneurship development and industrial training Restoration of the historic Ananda temple in Bagan by the Archeological Survey of India.

NEPAL
With the political crisis in Nepal continuing amid Maoist allegations of Indian interference, New Delhi has been reluctant to be generous with Kathmandu despite hosting Nepalese president Ram Baran Yadav in February this year. It did, however, promise $250 million in credit for the following: Setting up a railway link Building a polytechnic institute Construction of a new convention hall near the India-Nepal border Supply of 80,000 tonnes of food grains.

AFGHANISTAN
Although there were no announcements of assistance during Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s April visit to New Delhi, India has pledged over $800 million in reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The projects are almost in every part of Afghanistan and include the following: Construction of a new parliament building in Kabul Construction of transmission lines to bring power from neighbouring countries to Kabul Construction of roads Supply of high protein biscuits for school feeding programmes Reconstruction of a dam project in Herat province Building a national TV network Skill development and training programmes in a variety of sectors including civil services and medical missions in at least five cities.

In Economic Crisis, Conference Points to New Needs in Global Governance and Redistribution of Wealth

March 15, 2009
Brown University, RI, USA

Link of the video of Samir Saran speaking at the event (video II, 4.09 min onwards)

In the runup to the economic crisis meeting of the Group of 20 nations in April, a major international conference at the Watson Institute last week looked into global governance issues hindering the search for solutions, as well as ways in which a fundamental restructuring of the world system may in fact occur. The event, “Regional Powers, New Developmental States, and Global Governance: BRICSA in the New World Order,” was co-sponsored with the University of Wisconsin Law School. It focused on the role of the newly emergent regional and continental powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in this time of economic crisis, highlighting the risks and opportunities they face.

In addition to global governance reform, themes emerging from the two-day meeting also included a move toward redistribution of wealth – with a new emphasis in such countries as China and India on solving internal inequalities while refocusing on domestic growth. On governance, Nehru University Professor Bhupinder Chimni, a visiting professor at the Institute, said: “The way forward is for countries like India, in alliance with the BRICSA countries, to frame and articulate an alternative discourse on the future of global governance relying on its own experiences – pre-colonial, colonial, and post colonial. It should not simply react to Western proposals.” On the redistribution of wealth, Former Austrian Chancellor and Institute Visiting Professor Alfred Gusenbauer said: “If you want to have a recovery of the world economy, it only can work if there is a redistribution of wealth.”

Short videos below expand capture these two themes. Speakers in the videos include:
• “Conference Report I: Global Governance in an Economic Crisis”: Nehru University Professor Bhupinder Chimni, a visiting professor at the Institute; South African High Court Judge Dennis Martin Davis, a visiting professor at the Institute; and Watson Institute Professors David Kennedy ’75 and Barbara Stallings.
• “Conference Report II: Risks and Solutions in an Economic Crisis”: Universidade de São Paulo Professor Glauco Arbix; Former Austrian Chancellor and Institute Visiting Professor Alfred Gusenbauer; Indiana University Assistant Professor Ho-fung Hung; Observer Research Foundation Vice President Samir Saran; and attorney Leopold Specht, a visiting fellow at the Institute.

A summer institute at Watson on “Law, Social Thought and Global Governance,” organized under the new Brown International Advanced Research Institutes (BIARI) program, will explore these issues further as it convenes scholars from around the world for two weeks in June.

An in-depth report and video of the BRICSA conference will be posted in coming weeks.

ORF Issue Brief: India and the economic meltdown – challenges and possible responses

by Samir Saran and Siba Prasad Tripathy
April 2009

The financial crisis across the globe and the ensuing responses by nations and non-state actors has dominated both public consciousness and political debate in the recent past. The discussion on suitable stimulus packages, the causes for the financial disorder and future restructuring of the financial systems has often been dominated by the rhetoric of specific constituencies serving individual interests even as it loses sight of the substantive argument. In India too, the eagerness to commend our regulatory practices has tended to brush the larger debate on the actual economic fallout of the crisis under the carpet.

Please find the entire paper here.