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Digital Debates — CyFy Journal 2017

Samir Saran| Sean Kanuck

Technology and transformation

In many parts of the world, tensions offline are now mirrored online. In the manner of a Wachowskis movie, machines influence both realities and the perception of such realities, often expressed online. The challenge for those seeking to “govern” or “regulate” cyberspace, then, is the umbilical connection between digital networks and their offline effects. How do you cut the cord? One or another way of regulating cyberspace today may have unintended consequences for all facets of economic life, social engagements and political discourse. Many governments, acknowledging this problem, have tried to regulate the effects of technology, rather than the technologies themselves. This year’s edition of Digital Debates explores, in twelve engaging pieces, how this process of “cyber-“ regulation has been influenced by watershed political and military events, upending the role of state and non-state actors as traditionally understood.

The year 2017 was tumultuous for politics, economics, and international relations. While the global community was still coming to terms with the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the European Union, the American public voted for Donald Trump, who may be described as the unlikeliest yet of candidates to have contested the US presidency. President Trump ran a campaign that many had considered antithetical to the soul of America—the free flow of capital and people. By most indications, Trump is determined to reshape American foreign policy, global governance institutions, international trade and security.

President Trump’s ascent to the White House — and indeed, the manner in which this was made possible — gives the international community an opportunity to reflect on the questions that are confronting cyberspace. Three developments are noteworthy, foremost of which was the shadow cast by Russia on the US presidential campaign. In an operation previously unheard of in American shores, Russia hacked into the Democratic National Committee’s database and selectively leaked information that would eventually damage contender Hilary Clinton’s efforts and favour Donald Trump. With this act, Russia showed the world how influence operations and information warfare can disrupt even the most entrenched democratic processes. It also signalled the brazenness of new technologies; nothing is sacrosanct.

Elina Noor, in ‘Reconsidering cyber security’ and Sean Kanuck, in ‘Hacking democracy’write about Russia’s influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential elections, noting how attacks in the future will continue to affect integrity of information infrastructures.

The second issue deserving of attention was Hilary Clinton’s reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Big Data to make decisions during her campaign. For instance, confident in her team’s analytical model which predicted that it was not necessary to spend time on the ground in Michigan and Wisconsin, Clinton failed to address what might have been a key constituency. Analysts say this oversight contributed to her loss.

A third focal point was the role of social media: in his campaign, Trump relied heavily on Twitter and Facebook to reach out to his audience, effectively bypassing the traditional media of print and television. Importantly, through algorithmic tailoring and personalised news feeds, social media was also responsible for creating what is called “information echo chambers” and polarising voters in the process.

Since assuming office, Donald Trump has worked to influence the US’ digital policies and the government’s role in cyberspace. Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have represented approximately 40 percent of global GDP and 25 percent of world exports, has imperiled the US’ influence over digital norms. These norms would arguably have improved e-commerce and standardised internet rights amongst its member states. Similarly, Trump’s nationalist leanings have created uncertainty over America’s immigration policy; for one, he is adamant to institute changes in the US’ H1-B Visa programme to limit the number of foreign employees in the US’ technology industries.

Along the same line, Trump has also signed a bill repealing the US’ Internet Service Provider privacy rules, which currently impose limits on how ISPs can use and sell customer data. Defenders of civil liberties believe it is a blow to the people’s privacy rights. Further, Trump’s appointment of one of the fiercest critics of the open-internet norm, Ajit Pai, as head of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has challenged the principles of net neutrality which were laid out only two years ago under Tom Wheeler’s Open Internet Order.

Another stakeholder in the ongoing conversation on cyberspace is China. As American hegemony continues to wane, China is offering alternatives and is working relentlessly to ensure that it has a role in defining the future of cyberspace. Tomorrow’s digital trade and the flow of bits and bytes may well be very different from the model envisaged by the creators of the internet.

In the first half of 2017, China announced its ambitious blueprint to connect Asia through a series of rail, road, port and energy infrastructure projects. Even before that, it was already at an advanced stage of being a key player in the manufacture of global digital goods.  According to McKinsey, China is the world’s largest e-commerce market, accounting for more than 40 percent of the value of e-commerce transactions worldwide. Mobile payments in China amount to approximately 50 times that of the US, fuelled by the widespread adoption of e-wallets across its cities. One in three of the world’s 262 unicorns are Chinese, making up 43 percent of the global value of these companies. In 2015, the Chinese government signed off on its “Made in China 2025” and “Internet Plus” initiatives that aim to digitise China’s economy by integrating artificial intelligence, robotics, and digital services into manufacturing processes.

As part of its efforts to take the lead in the digital arena, China is making it clear that the retreat of the Atlantic powers will be complemented by Chinese propositions on digital commons. A March 2015 white paper setting out the vision for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) called for growth in digital trade and the expansion of communications networks to develop “an information silk road.” State-owned Chinese telecommunication companies are increasingly investing in Asian countries to develop digital infrastructure; even private players like ZTE are investing in fiber optic cables in countries like Afghanistan.

In 2016, China released its first ever “National Cyberspace Security Strategy” to set out its positions on cyberspace development and security. Interestingly, the strategy sees cyber security as “the nation’s new territory for sovereignty.” At the 2016 World Internet Conference in Wuzhen, President Xi Jingping declared, “We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyberspace development, model of cyberspace regulation and Internet public policies.”

In characterising the internet as a fundamental domain of state control, China is challenging the long-held assumptions and principles that have governed the internet and have allowed it to proliferate over the past few decades.

The US’ apparent withdrawal from international engagement in cyberspace and China’s economic and political advance may well rewrite the rules of digital trade and openness in ways not envisaged by the internet’s inventors. Neither of these two actors, however, will unilaterally script this new story, given that the effects of digital networks in economic and social activity are now widespread and diffused. From the very beginning, the evolution of technology has defied prediction and delineation. As it becomes more ingrained in human life, technology itself will rewrite traditional notions of ethics and social contract. This new ‘machine conscience’ will result in fresh challenges for policymakers and technologists alike.

The rapid pace of innovation in AI is heralding a world that is keen on moving from governing through data to being governed by data. While these developments will have transformational effects on the economy, they will also challenge the basis of human autonomy and ethics. Hillary Clinton’s reliance on algorithmic decision-making during the US presidential elections has already offered us a glimpse into the inherent weaknesses of this new paradigm. As algorithms pervade every aspect of people’s lives, they will determine most personal choices. However, it is worrying that these developments are taking place at a time when it is still unclear how machines will replicate the social values and norms that human beings instinctively understand. This fear has prompted a fierce debate over the regulation of autonomous weapons, which are designed to be capable of making life-and-death decisions. Today, speculation is rife on what the future will look like when people’s decisions are, as one commentator put it, “more mathematical than inspirational.”

A future that is scripted through code, and not norms, may be cause for concern. As Vidisha Mishra and Madhulika Srikumar caution in ‘Gender bias in artificial intelligence’, algorithms written by humans should not reflect human biases and inequities. Instead, technology should be developed to empower, engage and enlighten. In ‘Vulnerability, dependency, and profitability in a digital universe’, Urvashi Aneja writes that people’s ever-increasing dependency on technology seems “unwise”, given the vulnerability of information infrastructures.

As the incumbent powers grapple with the changing dynamics of technology, emerging economies are gearing up to leverage it for the next billion users. Regulators are tackling the challenge of improving connectivity to harness the transformative potential of the internet. In ‘The Importance of the open internet in driving internet adoption and growth’, Michael Khoo and Peter Lovelock argue that governments in Asia need to ensure favourable market conditions and foster an open-internet environment that is non-discriminatory, neutral, and accessible.  Similarly, Amelia Andersdotter, in ‘Has the time come for less red-tape in Indian telecom?’, looks at the role of regulation in facilitating adoption. The piece describes the introduction (and eventual removal) of licence and registration requirements for public WiFi in Italy and the lessons that India might learn from that strategy.

In this respect, a parallel transformation that is equally significant is India’s digital payments explosion. Digital transactions in India have quadrupled in the past year, spurred in part by the demonetisation of 86 percent the country’s currency and, in part, from the impetus provided by the Aadhaar initiative. The Aadhaar platform that sought to increase access and assist in the provision of subsidies has mass-sourced efficiencies, cut down the cost of transacting online, and moved bigger populations into the mainstream, formal economy than any other policy in recent history.

The success in the adoption of the Aadhaar ecosystem can serve as a model for other emerging economies struggling with efficient delivery of services. Coupled with open application programming interface layers that allow private companies to utilise its biometric database in a secure manner, the Aadhaar ecosystem offers a unique model that has the potential to catalyse growth and innovation in digital economies around the world.

In turn, these developments have had the cascading effect of strengthening civil liberties and improving the security of cyberspace. In August this year, a nine-judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court unanimously ruled that privacy is a fundamental right under the Constitution, harmonising over 60 years of conflicting pronouncements and granting the strongest possible protections to people’s right to privacy. In fact, the Court has made specific references to informational privacy and the need to complement the right to privacy with strong data protection laws.

The Indian government, for its part, has established a 10-member expert committee to review existing data protection rules. These recommendations—likely to be tabled in the parliament later this year—can have the effect of modernising privacy protections and bringing them in line with international standards.

Governments in emerging economies should now go a step forward and make significant investments in newer technologies to give an additional spurt to their governance mechanism. Blockchain is one such technology. Originally seen as a financial innovation, blockchain’s potential is now being recognised in a wide array of industries such as land rights, defence, art, precious jewels, and music. This technology has the potential to address even more complex issues such as checking the proliferation of nuclear stockpiles. In ‘Licence in chains: Could media content be licensed through blockchains?’, Meghna Bal explores how this innovation could be used to facilitate a more transparent licensing scheme for artistic copyrights, allowing the industry to manage the challenges that come with large copyright societies.

In ‘Challenges for a new economy: the Fourth Industrial Revolution’, Logan Finucan describes how the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (4IR) will bring significant progress in productivity, such as in the use of advanced robotics and manufacturing techniques, the Internet of Things (IoT) and machine-to-machine (M2M) connections on a massive scale, autonomous vehicles, and new industrial materials, all powered by artificial intelligence (AI) and pervasive big data analytics.  Meanwhile, in ‘Applications and policy considerations for AI in cyber security and public services’, Ryan Johnson and Seha Yatim ponder the question of how to manage the complex interrelationships between these new technologies, as well as the disruption they are likely to cause.

As economies increasingly rely on new technologies, it will be critical for them to ensure the stability of cyberspace and the integrity of their networks. This will require cross-sectoral cooperation – including that with the private sector – fostered by mutual trust. Three contributions in this volume ponder the issues related to the interaction between the private and public spheres in administering security over the internet. Chelsey Slack, in ‘Tempering national and international tensions in cyberspace’,provides an outline of the global discourse on security in cyberspace and highlights the need for cooperation among different actors. In ‘The hybridisation of cyber security governance’, Dennis Broeders identifies the emergence of cyber security assemblages – made up of government agencies, transnational corporations and cyber security companies. Finally, Nikolas Ott and Hugo Zylberberg argue in ‘Addressing international security challenges while avoiding internet fragmentation’ for interoperable policy regulations.

In addition to cyber stability, an equally important task for states would be to manage the “real-world” effects of new technologies, which spill into offline considerations of security and prosperity. Technology is in the process of rewriting the nature of the relationship between individuals, states and businesses. Machine learning and AI will question dominant models of labour, economics and social stability. However, these very technologies have the capacity to usher in unprecedented innovation, growth and progress. As the next billion internet users emerge from Asia and Africa, governments around the world should explore technological solutions to expand the scope and effectiveness of their governance. But as the presidential elections in the United States and the rise of China indicate, there is enough evidence to guard against any positive and deterministic outcomes from technology. It is likely that new innovations are going to be political and politicised: no longer can evangelists sitting in the comfort of their offices in Silicon Valley claim to be neutral vendors of technology, selling their products for the public good. As technological effects on offline realities become more prominent,  state and non-state actors must be mindful of the effects of such rapid change on social structures. While technology can, and does, magnify existing faultlines between peoples and nations, it also offers a fleeting glimpse of greater harmony between humans, machines and states. The rules that will determine the nature of this relationship are still being written. The responsibility of all stakeholders is to ensure that new technologies do not lead to the creation of a world order that is haunted by the conflicts of the past, but rather of a new social contract that abandons the shackles of inequity and promises peace and progress.

To read the full issue, click here.

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This is the time to face up to cyber threats

Samir Saran

The ICT supply chain in India is only as strong as its weakest link: the end user. If the user is from rural India, with a limited understanding of the devices and transactions she accesses, her device is a point of vulnerability.

 CyFy 2017, ICT, cyber threat, Aadhaar, cyberspace, risk, ledger technologies, Digital India, ecosystem, payment gateways, demonetisation, cryptocurrencies, Samir Saran
Crimes in cyberspace, by one estimate, now cost the global economy $445 billion a year. Cyber insecurity is now a global risk no different from the warming climate or forced displacement. Is such insecurity a business risk or a “public bad”? If the security of digital infrastructure is viewed as a business risk, who should mitigate it? Should states be responsible for the integrity of networks and data within their territories, failing which they will be classified as “risky” to do business in in the digital economy? Were cyber insecurity treated as a “public bad”, governments could justifiably conclude that vulnerabilities in one device or platform affect an entire ecosystem, and create a liability regime that shifts the burden on the private sector.

If the security of digital infrastructure is viewed as a business risk, who should mitigate it? Should states be responsible for the integrity of networks and data within their territories, failing which they will be classified as “risky” to do business in in the digital economy?


These issues are important to ponder as the Digital India programme and demonetisation encourage the rapid adoption of digital payments technologies. It is not only difficult to assess the “risk” of transacting in the digital economy, but also determine who such risks should be absorbed by. For instance, a high-end device may be able to offer security on the back of its tightly controlled supply chain, but what if an end user, by opening the door to a hidden exploit, compromised its operating system?

Three crucial trends will decisively influence the future of cyber security — the centralisation of data, the arrival of connected devices, and the rapid adoption of digital payments technologies. Centralised control over data can make access to databases easier and more vulnerable to attacks. The Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem is set to explode, with more than 24 billion devices expected to be connected to the internet by 2019. The sheer scale, size and diversity of the IoT environment makes risk difficult to measure.

Perhaps the most important factor is the scale and speed at which digital payments have been adopted across the spectrum of transactions. Payment gateways work the same for all users irrespective of the volume or commodities/services transacted, but they are accessed on devices that vary greatly in their ability to protect data. How would insurers gauge the risk inherent in such a diversified market? Consider then, these key questions and conundrums.


Payment gateways work the same for all users irrespective of the volume or commodities/services transacted, but they are accessed on devices that vary greatly in their ability to protect data.


First, if cyberspace is a global commons, will the socialisation of “bad” follow the “privatisation of profits”?

Unlike the environment, the oceans or outer space, digital spaces are not discovered — they are created. Cyber insecurity has been made out to be a global threat but the fact remains that the economic gains from securing digital spaces still accrue to a few countries and corporations. Do developed markets have a common but differentiated responsibility to secure digital spaces? If it is the responsibility of all, can developing countries also get a share of the economic gains from electronic commerce?

Second, cybersecurity is a private service — how can we make it a public good?

Digital spaces are common to all, but the provision of their security is increasingly guaranteed by the private sector. This is in stark contrast to governance models in emerging markets, where the state underwrites law and order. How can the public and private sectors work together to provide this common good?

Third, India is moving towards security by identity, but many advanced economies believe security comes through anonymity. Are we on the wrong side of history?

Encryption is becoming the norm in advanced economies, as a result of which data is increasingly out of the reach of law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, India has moved towards biometric identification programmes that place a premium on identity. The “Aadhaar impulse” is driven by a requirement to target beneficiaries effectively, but without strong data protection regulations, the digital economy would be less than secure.

Fourth, if cash-based systems, ATMs and payment gateways are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, are “distributed ledger technologies” going to make governments adopt cryptocurrencies?

Blockchain and other technologies that “crowdsource” the authentication of online transactions using bitcoins are more difficult to target, because they are by their very nature, distributed ledgers. Will the increasing insecurity of the fintech ecosystem push us towards cryptocurrencies?

Fifth, cyber security is an expensive proposition in advanced economies, where the most sophisticated instruments are also assumed to be the safest. How can India apply its famed “frugal innovation” in this space, and protect the user while providing affordable access to the internet?

The ICT supply chain in India is only as strong as its weakest link: the end user. If the user is from rural India, with a limited understanding of the devices and transactions she accesses, her device is a point of vulnerability. If the device itself is “low-end”, which places a premium on cost over security, this forms a lethal mix that endangers the security of all users in the ecosystem. India cannot afford a false separation between access and security in digital spaces, as the qualitative nature of access will determine ICT security for a billion people.

Sixth, who determines the risk of transacting on the internet, and how?

If transactions in cyberspace will invariably carry an element of risk, who will guarantee them? The buyer, seller or intermediary? As in the case of shipping, will we see a form of cyber-insurance applied to cover the risk of malicious attacks online?


If transactions in cyberspace will invariably carry an element of risk, who will guarantee them? The buyer, seller or intermediary?


Developments in cyber security leads one to surmise that economies will soon be subject to a risk-assessment based on the integrity of their networks. Risk-based assessments offer predictive value and guarantees of stability to businesses, but they should not perpetuate inequities that exist offline.

Limited means to enhance cybersecurity in developing economies should not set back investments in the digital economy, which in turn create a vicious cycle rendering the overall ecosystem insecure. The international community must articulate ways in which such risks can be mitigated, and facilitate access in emerging markets to technology and finance that generate investments in cybersecurity.


This commentary originally appeared in Hindustan Times.

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उम्मीद की किरण है निजता के अधिकार पर फैसला

Samir Saran

सरकार को निजता के अधिकार से जुड़े हाल ही के न्यायिक फैसले को उम्मीद की किरण की तरह देखना चाहिए।

Samir Saran, Aadhaar, Supreme Court, Right to Privacy, Privacy, Fundamental Right, Digital Frontier

भारतीयों के निजता के मौलिक अधिकार की पुष्टि करने वाला उच्चतम न्यायालय का हाल का 547 पृष्ठ का फैसला टेक्नोलॉजी कम्पनियों के लिए किसी नई जानकारी सरीखा नहीं होना चाहिए। न्यायालय ने केवल वही संहिताबद्ध किया है, जो इंटरनेट प्लेटफॉर्म्स और कारोबार के लिए धर्मसिद्धांत रहा है: उपयोग करने वालोंकी दुनिया (यानी यूज़र्स स्पेस) उनका व्यक्तिगत स्थान है, जहां कदम रखने से पहले कम्पनियों, सरकारी या सरकार से इतर निकायों (यानी नॉट स्टेट एक्टर्स) को आवश्यक तौर पर अनुमति लेनी चाहिए।

आधार और उससे संबंधित व्यवस्था के तकनीकी स्वरूप को भी अब न्यायालय द्वारा निर्धारित किए गए कानूनी मानक के समक्ष परखा जाएगा, लेकिन सरकार को इस फैसले को उम्मीद की किरण की तरह देखना चाहिए।

इस फैसले में पर्याप्त संकेत हैं जो इस ओर इशारा करते हैं कि उच्चतम न्यायालय बायोमिट्रिक-आधारित प्रमाणित प्लेटफॉर्म को उपयुक्त मान रहा है। दरअसल, न्यायमूर्ति चंद्रचूड़ ने इस बात को रेखांकित हुए विशाल आंकड़ों के माध्यम से बेहतर शासन की संभावना बल दिया है कि यह ‘नवोन्मेष और ज्ञान के प्रसार’ को प्रोत्साहित कर सकता है और ‘समाज कल्याण से संबंधित फायदों के छितराव या अपव्यय’ पर रोक लगा सकता है।

न्यायालय का फैसला सरकार को “निजता के अनुरूप आधार” तैयार करने के लिए प्रेरित कर सकता है, लेकिन इसके लिए दूरदर्शियों और निर्माताओं द्वारा गंभीर और व्यवस्थित चिंतन किए जाने की आवश्यकता होगी। निजी क्षेत्र को भी उपभोक्ताओं को प्रस्तुत किए जा रहे उत्पादों और वचनबद्धता के मूल में “आंकड़ों की शुद्धता” और निजता को रखकर चलना होगा।

शुरूआत में, सरकार को आधार की सबसे बड़ी कमियों — उसके केंद्रीकृत डिजाइन और तादाद में बढ़ने वाले संयोजनों यानी लिंकेज के लिए उत्तरदायी ठहराया जाना चाहिए।

केंद्रीय आधारभूत आंकड़े  एकल, और अक्सर अपरिवर्तनीय विफलता का आधार तैयार करते हैं। सरकार को आवश्यक तौर पर आधार के आधारभूत आंकड़ों को विकेंद्रीकृत करना चाहिए। दूसरा, आधार आवश्यक रूप से एक अनुमति-आधारित व्यवस्था होनी चाहिए, जिसमें केवल यूआईडी के आधारभूत आंकड़े से ही नहीं, बल्कि उससे जुड़ी अनेक सेवाओं में शामिल होने और उनसे बाहर जाने की स्वतंत्रता होनी चाहिए। यह आवश्यक तौर पर पारदर्शी, सुगम और उपयोग सुलभ प्रक्रिया होनी चाहिए।

“निजता के अनुरूप” आधार के साथ, सरकार न सिर्फ उच्चतम न्यायालय के फैसले का पालन करेगी, बल्कि वह विश्व की सबसे अनूठी शासन व्यवस्था प्रस्तुत करने के करीब भी होगी, यह एक ऐसा अद्भुत कार्य है, जिसे प्रौद्योगिकी की दृष्टि से उन्नत अमेरिका और चीन जैसे राष्ट्र भी कर पाने में नाकाम रहे हैं।

उदाहरण के तौर पर, इस क्षेत्र में चीन के प्रयासों को ही लीजिए। वर्ष 2015 में, चीन की सरकार ने अपनी विशाल,बड़े पैमाने पर  विनिर्माण करने वाली अर्थव्यवस्था का डिजिटीकरण करने और एक डिजिटल समाज की रचना करने से संबंधित एक राष्ट्रीय परियोजना का प्रारंभ किया। इस परियोजना को ‘इंटरनेट प्लस’ का नाम दिया गया, जिसका लक्ष्य सामाजिक और आर्थिक गतिविधियों को सम्पूर्ण रूप से ‘सूचना आधारित बनाना’ (यानी उसका इंफॉर्मेशनाइजेशन करना) था तथा संग्रह किए गए आंकड़ों का उपयोग नागरिकों को बेहतर सार्वजनिक और निजी सेवाएं उपलब्ध कराने में किया जाना था। चीन के पास पूंजी या आईसीटी अवसंरचना की कोई कमी नहीं थी, लेकिन ‘इंटरनेट प्लस’ पहल ज्यादा सफल नहीं हो सकी और न ही उसे अंतरराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर ही कोई स्वीकारोक्ति ही मिल सकी। इस परियोजना को एक बुनियादी कमी का खामियाजा उठाना पड़ा : चीन को यकीन था कि व्यक्तिगत तौर पर पहचान योग्य आंकड़ों से लेकर उपयोगकर्ताओं के व्यवहार संबंधी ज्यादा जटिल पद्धतियों तक की जानकारी एकत्र करके सरकार भविष्य की आर्थिक प्रगति, उपभोग की परिपाटियों और वास्तव में सामाजिक या राजनीतिक एजेंडे के मध्यस्थ के तौर पर उभरेगी।

लेकिन डिजिटल व्यवस्था के प्रति विश्वास,  जैसा कि प्रौद्योगिकी समर्थ सोशल-इंजीनियरिंग के प्रति चीन की सरकार के नाकाम प्रयासों से जाहिर होता है,  केवल उन्हीं जरूरतों को पूरा करके कायम किया जा सकता है, जिनका दायरा अभिव्यक्ति, राजनीतिक संवाद और आर्थिक सचलता की आजादी की मांग तक सीमित हो। अपने संकीर्ण शासन मॉडल के कारण, चीन इंटरनेट का इस्तेमाल करने वालों के बीच ऐसा विश्वास कायम करने में विवादास्पद रूप से नाकाम रहा। इस विशाल डिजिटल परियोजना को अमल में लाने में चीन को मिली नाकामी भारत के लिए सबक है।

यदि ‘आधार’ जैसी परियोजना को सफल बनाना है, तो उसका बुनियादी दर्शन आवश्यक तौर पर दो लक्ष्यों पर आधारित होना चाहिए : पहला,  इंटरनेट इस्तेमाल करने वालों की बढ़ती तादाद के बीच भारत की डिजिटल अर्थव्यवस्था के प्रति विश्वास और भरोसा बढ़ाना और दूसरा, यह सुनिश्चित करना कि डिजिटल प्लेटफॉर्म में नवोन्मेषों की परिणति आर्थिक और रोजगार के अवसरों तक पहुंच बढ़ाने में भी हो।

निजता के अनुरूप ‘आधार’ व्यक्ति और सरकार के बीच भरोसा जगाता है, सरकार को सार्वजनिक सेवाएं प्रदान करने संबंधी अपने दृष्टिकोण को नए सिरे से परिभाषित करने की इजाजत देता है। आधार इंटरफेस, जिस पर यूपीआई और अन्य नवोन्मेष निर्भर करते हैं, सामाजिक सुरक्षा का ‘विविध अर्थों वाला’ मॉडल तैयार कर सकता है, जहां समान अनुप्रयोग (यानी एप्लीकेशन्स) डिजिटल प्रमाणन, नकदी रहित हस्तांतरण (यानी कैशलेस ट्रांसफर्स), ‘सबके लिए आमदनी’ (यानी यूनिवर्सल बेसिक इनकम) के जरिए वित्तीय समावेशन, कौशल विकास और स्वास्थ्य बीमा जैसी विविध प्रकार की जरूरतों को पूरा कर सकते हैं। लेकिन शासन के ऐसे मॉडल किसी जबरदस्ती या अनिवार्यता  पर आधारित नहीं होने चाहिए। यह बेहद प्रशंसनीय है कि देश के राजनीतिक वर्ग ने न्यायालय के फैसले को स्वीकार किया है, भाजपा के अमित शाह जैसे नेताओं ने ‘सुदृढ़ निजता की संरचना’  तैयार करने और उस बारे में सिफारिशें करने संबंधी श्रीकृष्ण समिति के प्रयासों के प्रति अपनी प्रतिबद्धता पुष्टि की है।

यूआईडी प्लेटफॉर्म के बारे में वर्तमान में जारी बहस से इसके प्रबंधन के लिए सरकार की जवाबदेही जैसा महत्वपूर्ण सुधार गायब है । इस उद्देश्य के लिए आधार में मुख्य निजता अधिकारी या दरअसल ‘निजता नीतिशास्त्री’ होना चाहिए, जो टेक्नोलॉजी कम्पनियों से भिन्न न हो जो सुदृढ़ स्वायत्तता के साथ शिकायतों का आकलन, निजता के संभावित उल्लंघनों का परीक्षण और पड़ताल कर सके।

आधार पर आधारित व्यवस्था, जो निजता के अनुरूप भी है और पिरामिड के आकार वाली वित्तीय संरचना की बुनियाद की निर्माता भी है, वह अन्य उभरते बाजारों को भी भारत की सहायता से इस प्लेटफॉर्म को अपनाने के लिए प्रेरित करेगी।

कम्पनियां और प्लेटफॉर्म इस बात को अवश्य स्वीकार करें कि निजता और आंकड़ों को शुद्धता के प्रति  ब्लैक बॉक्स का वादा लम्बे अर्से तक पर्याप्त नहीं रहेगा। इन प्रतिबद्धताओं को आवश्यक तौर पर व्यापक पैमाने पर व्यक्त किया जाना चाहिए और उनके साथ संलग्न प्रत्येक उपयोगकर्ता तक प्रेषित किया जाना चाहिए। प्रमुख स्थानों पर उपयोगकर्ताओं (यानी यूजर्स)और नियंत्रकों  के साथ संपर्क के लिए आंकड़ों की शुद्धता के निरीक्षक नियुक्त किए जाने चाहिए।

भारत की डिजिटल प्रगति की दास्तान आवश्यक तौर पर उसकी जनता द्वारा और उसकी जनता के लिए लिखी जानी चाहिए।  भारत सरकार की हालांकि यहां एक महत्वपूर्ण भूमिका है — उसे नागरिकों तक विश्वनीय, किफायती और गुणात्मक इंटरनेट पहुंच उपलब्ध कराने वाले टेक्नोलॉजी प्लेटफॉर्म शुरू करने चाहिए। लेकिन सबसे महत्वपूर्ण बात यह है कि सरकार को एक ऐसा साहसिक राजनीतिक, कानूनी और दार्शनिक विवरण स्पष्ट करना चाहिए, जो देश और विदेश में, सार्वजनिक और निजी दोनों तरह के संगठनों द्वारा नवोन्मेष को प्रेरित कर सके। निजता के अनुरूप आधार के साथ, यह विवरण डिजिटल नेटवर्कस द्वारा समर्थ अधिकारप्राप्त, समावेशिता और समृद्धि में से एक हो सकता है।


इस लेख का लघु संस्करण द इकॉनोमिक टाइम्स में प्रकाशित हुआ है

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Uncategorized

A Decade of BRICS: Indian Perspectives for the Future

Samir Saran

As the BRICS grouping nears a decade of existence, this GP-ORF volume offers commentary from pre-eminent scholars and emerging next-generation researchers on measures that can separate and insulate the group from the vagaries of international discord. It provides area-specific insights and recommendations to promote a greater focus on key issues important to each BRICS nation and the continued institutionalisation of the grouping. The chapters cover the following themes: governance, development, energy, health, gender, security, smart cities, and the cyber sphere.

  • Editor’s Note | Samir Saran
  • BRIC’s Role in Global Governance Processes | H.H.S. Viswanathan and Shubh Soni
  • The Case for the New Development Bank Institute | Samir Saran and Aparajit Pandey
  • Rebuilding BRICS through Energy | Aparajit Pandey
  • Scripting a New Development Paradigm: India and the BRICS Partnership | Pulin B. Nayak
  • BRICS & SDGs: Prospects of Minilateral Action on a Multilateral Agenda? | Vikrom Mathur
  • Common Health Challenges and Prospects for Cooperation in BRICS | T.C. James
  • BRICS Vision for Smart Cities | Rumi Aijaz
  • Gendering the BRICS Agenda | Urvashi Aneja and Vidisha Mishra
  • The BRICS Security Agenda: Challenges Galore | Harsh V. Pant
  • China’s Cyber Sovereignty Vision: Can BRICS Concur? | Madhulika Srikumar

To read the full issue, click here.

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BRICS, Columns/Op-Eds, Uncategorized

After Doklam, India and China must begin anew at the Xiamen BRICS meet

India will have to learn the fine art of staring down the dragon to preserve its political space, while embracing China for some important economic opportunities. At Doklam, it did the former; will a different India turn up at BRICS?

Hindustan Times, September 3, 2017, Opinion

Original link is here

pm-modi_32f6a540-8f0f-11e7-a11b-07a9009e9c44.jpg

PM Modi with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, Chinese President Xi Jinping and South African President Jacob Zuma after the welcome ceremony at the 7th BRICS Summit in Ufa.(PTI)


Leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) have gathered this past weekend for the ninth annual BRICS summit in Xiamen, China. The prolonged Himalayan standoff between India and China will cast its shadows on this meet and will certainly add a new dimension to discussions on the future of this plurilateral.

The BRICS emerged out of a global order dominated and managed by the United States (US) post the break of the Soviet Union. The US led institutions catalysed global trade and financial flows, which in turn also helped in the organic growth of most of the BRICS economies. Despite their growth, their marginal role in management of key global institutions created an undesirable asymmetry in world affairs. BRICS came about as a vehicle to respond to this, and together they hoped, they would be able to loosen the vice-like grip the Atlantic system had on existing governance institutions.

There were two unstated principles that shaped the ethics of the BRICS formation. First, each nation placed a premium on sovereignty and its importance in the conduct of world affairs, and second, each state sought greater pluralism and equity in decision-making processes in a multipolar world.

The China and India standoff at Doklam compels us to revisit these organising principles. The Doklam incident was a contest around sovereign concerns. These concerns are rooted in history and muddied by China’s determination to implement a political and economic arrangement across Asia that is insensitive to the territorial rights of India. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the associated China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are but thinly veiled attempts to shape an Asian order that plays by the Chinese rulebook alone. While BRICS symbolises a multipolar world, BRI and CPEC are the harsh face of an undesirable and unipolar Asia.

Further, China’s latest attempt at creating a ‘BRICS Plus’ platform, comprised of states who happen to be key actors in the BRI, makes it clear that it sees BRICS as an adjunct of the BRI and merely as a vehicle to catalyse its larger ambitions.

These events make it clear that we must shed the romantic notion that ideological convergence is possible within BRICS. Each member must see the group for what it is—a twenty first century ‘limited purpose partnership’ among states to achieve specific sets of outcomes. There is nothing inherently improper about such an alliance, however, if progress is to be made, it will be predicated on creating effectively designed institutions.

The most successful BRICS endeavour has been the creation of the New Development Bank. The time has come to build on this initiative and focus on creating more institutions for greater cooperation in issues such as finance, urbanisation, sustainable development and the digital space. This could include setting up a BRICS credit ratings agency, a BRICS research institution and institutionalising the process of managing the global commons such as the oceans and outer space.

It is obvious that each of the BRICS members will have their own reasons for being at Xiamen. Russia continues to see it as a geopolitical bulwark against the US, all the while tacitly acquiescing to Chinese leadership. South Africa will present itself as the leading voice of the African world and will raise issues of peace and development for the continent at the summit, while Brazil, which is undergoing a period of domestic turmoil, is unlikely to be too innovative or demanding. China is far more certain of what it seeks.

For India, this year’s summit becomes important. India will have to learn the fine art of staring down the dragon to preserve its political space, while embracing China for some important economic opportunities. At Doklam, it did the former; will a different India turn up at BRICS? Forums like Xiamen allow India and China the chance to begin anew.

As we enter the second decade of BRICS, Xiamen would have to be the arena where the members recommit to upholding the founding principles of the BRICS. Thereafter, they must chart a new roadmap for greater institutionalisation of the group’s interests.

Samir Saran is vice president at the Observer Research Foundation and tweets at @samirsaran

The views expressed are personal

 

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New technologies are radically transforming our idea of community – and subsequently statehood. How will future states look like? And how should they look like? Disaster researcher Malka Older, author of the highly acclaimed cyberpunk thrillers “Infomocracy” and “Null States” will discuss digital governance with Shoshana Zuboff. Since the early 1980s Zuboff’s career has been devoted to the study of the rise of the digital, its individual, organizational, and social consequences. She coined the term “commercial surveillance” and is now working on her book “Master or Slave? The Fight for the Soul of Our Information Civilization”. This final discussion about new forms of digitalized governance and its impact on the individual will be moderated by one of the world’s leading experts on cyber security Samir Saran, Vice President of the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi.

Uncategorized

Privacy Inc.: The one where Supreme Court saved Aadhaar

Samir Saran

The Supreme Court’s recent 547-page verdict affirming the fundamental right to privacy of Indians should not come as news to technology companies. The court merely codifies what should have been an article of faith for internet platforms and businesses: the user’s space is private, into which companies, governments or non-state actors must first knock to enter.

The technical architecture of Aadhaar and its associated ecosystem too will now be tested before a legal standard determined by the court, but the government should see this judgment for what it is – a silver lining.

The verdict bears enough hints to suggest the Supreme Court sees the merits in a biometrics-driven authentication platform. In fact, Justice Chandrachud impresses upon the possibility of better governance through big data, highlighting that it could encourage ‘innovation and the spread of knowledge’, and prevent ‘the dissipation of social welfare benefits.’

The court’s words should spur the government to create a “privacy-compliant Aadhaar”, but this requires a serious and systematic thinking on the part of its visionaries and architects. Private sector too will have to put “data integrity” and privacy at the core of their consumer offerings and engagement.

To begin with, the government must account for Aadhaar’s biggest shortcomings — its centralised design and proliferating linkages.

A central data base creates a single, and often irreversible, point of failure. The government must decentralize the Aadhaar database. Second, Aadhaar must be a permission-based system with the freedom to opt-in or out, not just from the UID database but from the many services linked to it. This must be a transparent, accessible and user friendly process.

With a “privacy-compliant” Aadhaar, the government would not merely be adhering to the Supreme Court verdict. It would also be on the verge of offering the world’s most unique governance ecosystem, a feat that more technologically advanced nations such as America and China have failed to achieve.

Take Beijing’s efforts in this space, for instance. In 2015, the government of the People’s Republic of China unveiled a national project to digitize its large, manufacturing-intensive economy and to create a digital society. The “Internet plus” initiative, as it was called, aimed for the complete “informationisation” of social and economic activity, and harvest the data collected to better provide public and private services to citizens. China has no dearth of capital or ICT infrastructure, but the ‘Internet plus” initiative has struggled to take off in any significant way, nor has it found any international takers. The project suffered from a fundamental flaw: Beijing believed by gathering information — from personally identifiable data to more complex patterns of user behaviour — the state would emerge as the arbiter of future economic growth, consumption patterns and indeed, social or political agendas.

Supreme Court, Digital Frontier, Judgement, Chandrachud

But trust in the digital ecosystem, as the failed Chinese government attempt at technology enabled social-engineering shows, can only be built by addressing those needs which extend to the demand for freer expression, political dialogue and economic mobility. On account of its closed governance model, Beijing has arguably failed to generate such trust among internet users. China’s failure to move forward on its grand digital project bears lessons for India.

If a project like Aadhaar is to succeed, its underlying philosophy must be premised on two goals: first, to increase trust and confidence in India’s digital economy among its booming constituency of internet users, and second, to ensure that innovations in digital platforms also result in increased access to economic and employment opportunities.

A privacy compliant Aadhaar creates trust between the individual and the state, allowing the government to redefine its approach to delivering public services. The Aadhaar interface, that UPI and other innovations rely on, could well generate a ‘polysemic’ model of social security, where the same suite of applications cater to multiple needs such as digital authentication, cashless transfers, financial inclusion through a Universal Basic Income, skills development and health insurance.  But such governance models should not be based on a relationship of coercion or compulsion. It is heartening that the country’s political class has embraced the court verdict, with BJP’s leaders like Amit Shah affirming their commitment to create a “robust privacy architecture” and the Srikrishna Committee’s efforts to recommend one.

A key reform missing in current debates about the UID platform is the government’s accountability for its management. Aadhaar, to this end, should have a chief privacy officer — or indeed a “privacy ethicist” not unlike the major technology companies —who will be able to assess complaints, audit and investigate potential breaches of privacy with robust autonomy.

An Aadhaar based ecosystem which is both privacy-compliant and has built a bottom-of-the-pyramid financial architecture would inspire confidence in other emerging markets to also adopt the platform, with Indian assistance.

Companies and platforms must internalise that promise of black box commitments towards privacy and data-integrity may no longer suffice. These commitments must be articulated at the level of the board and communicated to each user that engages with them. Overseers of data integrity must be appointed to engage with users and regulators in major localities.

India’s digital growth story must be scripted by its people and for its people. The Indian state, however, has an important role to play here — it should catalyse technology platforms that provide reliable, affordable and qualitative internet access to citizens. But most importantly, the state should articulate a bold political, legal, and a philosophical narrative that can drive innovations, both by public and private organizations, in India and abroad. With a privacy compliant Aadhaar, this narrative could be one of empowerment, inclusivity and prosperity enabled by digital networks.

(A shorter version of this article was published in Economic Times)

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Columns/Op-Eds, Cyber Security, Digital India

Opportunity knocks, Aadhaar enters

Economic  Times, August 29, 2017

Original link is here 

The Supreme Court’s verdict affirming the fundamental right to privacy should not come as news to technology companies. The court merely codifies what should have been an article of faith for Internet platforms and businesses: the user’s space is private, into which companies, governments or non-state actors must first knock to enter.

The technical architecture of Aadhaar and its associated ecosystem, too, will now be tested before a legal standard determined by the court. But GoI should see this judgment for what it is: a silver lining. The verdict bears enough hints to suggest the court sees the merits in a biometrics-driven authentication platform.

In fact, Justice DY Chandrachud impresses upon the possibility of better governance through big data, highlighting that it could encourage “innovation and the spread of knowledge”, and prevent “the dissipation of social welfare benefits”. The court’s words should spur GoI to create a ‘privacy-compliant Aadhaar’.

But this requires systematic thinking on the part of its architects. The private sector, too, will have to put ‘data integrity’ and privacy at the core of their consumer offerings and engagement.

For starters, GoI must account for Aadhaar’s biggest shortcomings — its centralised design and proliferating linkages. A central data base creates a single, and often irreversible, point of failure. GoI must decentralise the Aadhaar database.

Second, Aadhaar must be a permission-based system with the freedom to opt-in or out, not just from the (unique identification (UID) database but from the many services linked to it. This must be a transparent, accessible and user-friendly process.

With a ‘privacy-compliant’ Aadhaar, GoI would not merely be adhering to the Supreme Court verdict, but also be on the verge of offering the world’s most unique governance ecosystem. Take Beijing’s efforts, for instance.

In 2015, the Chinese government unveiled a national project to digitise its large, manufacturing-intensive economy and to create a digital society. The ‘Internet-plus’ initiative aimed for the complete ‘informationisation’ of social and economic activity, and harvest the data collected to better provide public and private services to citizens.

China has no dearth of capital or ICT infrastructure. But the ‘Internet plus’ initiative has struggled to take off in any significant way. The project suffered from a fundamental flaw: Beijing believed by gathering information — from personally identifiable data to more complex patterns of user behaviour — the State would emerge as the arbiter of future economic growth, consumption patterns and, indeed, social or political agendas.

If a project like Aadhaar is to succeed, its underlying philosophy must be premised on two goals: first, to increase trust and confidence in India’s digital economy among its booming constituency of Internet users; and second, to ensure that innovations in digital platforms also result in increased access to economic and employment opportunities.

A privacy-compliant Aadhaar creates trust between the individual and the State, allowing the government to redefine its approach to delivering public services. The Aadhaar interface, that the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and other innovations rely on, could well generate a ‘polysemic’ model of social security, where the same suite of applications cater to multiple needs such as digital authentication, cashless transfers, financial inclusion through a Universal Basic Income, skills development and health insurance.

But such governance models should not be based on a relationship of coercion or compulsion. It is heartening that India’s political class has embraced the court verdict.

A key reform missing in current debates about the UID platform is GoI’s accountability for its management. Aadhaar, to this end, should have a chief privacy officer who will be able to assess complaints, audit and investigate potential breaches of privacy with robust autonomy.

A privacy-compliant Aadhaar, with a bottom-of-the-pyramid financial architecture, would inspire confidence in other emerging markets to also adopt the platform, with Indian assistance. Companies and platforms must internalise that promise of black box commitments towards privacy and data-integrity may no longer suffice. These commitments must be articulated at the level of the board, and communicated to each user that engages with them. Overseers of data integrity must be appointed to engage with users and regulators in major localities.

The writer is Commissioner, Global Commission on the Stability of cyberspace

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Columns/Op-Eds, Politics / Globalisation, Water / Climate

How India and the US can lead in the Indo-Pacific

the interpreter, Friday, August 18, 2017

Original link is here

Although the Pacific and Indian Oceans have traditionally been viewed as separate bodies of water, India and the US increasingly understand them as part of a single contiguous zone. The US Maritime Strategy (2015), for example, labels the region the ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’, while Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump referred to it in their recent joint statement as the ‘Indo-Pacific.’

India and the US have a strong stake in seeing this unified vision become a reality. It would increase the possibility that they could promote liberal norms and structures such as free markets, rule of law, open access to commons, and deliberative dispute resolution not just piecemeal across the oceans, but rather in a single institutional web from Hollywood to Bollywood and beyond. Given the region’s economic and demographic dynamism and the importance of its sea lanes to global trade and energy flows, the significance of such a liberal outcome cannot be overstated.

India and the US have publicly called Indo-US cooperation the lynchpin of their strategy in the region. But it has not been as productive as it could be. Robust maritime cooperation between the two countries began only after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which demonstrated the increasing capabilities of the Indian Navy. Even since then, however, India has generally not been a proactive partner, and in fact often has refused US offers of cooperation. In some cases it appears to have done so out of concern for Chinese sensibilities. For instance, a senior Indian official recently suggested that New Delhi had rejected numerous US Navy requests to dock ships at the Andaman Islands in part because of China’s ‘displeasure’ about the US presence in the Indian Ocean.

The US, for its part, has repudiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership, once touted as the economic bedrock of its Asia strategy, and is distracted by Russian machinations in Europe and the Middle East, and the continuing war in Afghanistan. In addition, bureaucratic divisions between US Central and Pacific Commands hamper Indo-US cooperation west of the Indo-Pakistan border, where the US-Pakistan relationship dominates.

China has taken the real initiative in constructing a wider Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Its strategy is multi-faceted. China erodes the autonomous politics of sub-regional groupings, using its economic leverage to create differences amongst ASEAN members, denying strategic space to India through economic projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and using North Korea to limit Japanese and US influence in East Asia. China also employs institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, construction and finance projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, and trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to create a network of physical infrastructure and strategic dependence across the region. This network includes ports in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Pakistan; oil and gas projects off the coast of Myanmar; and a military base in Djibouti.

China’s strategy will increasingly put it in a position to create institutions, generate norms, and make and enforce rules in a zone stretching from East Asia to East Africa. Although Chinese preferences are uncertain, it seems unlikely that such a Sino-centric model will adhere to the liberal norms and practices that the US and India hope will take root in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Indeed, Chinese behaviour, which includes territorial reclamations, rejection of maritime-dispute arbitration, establishment of an air-defence identification zone, and confrontations such as the ongoing Sino-Indian standoff over borders in Bhutan, suggest an authoritarian approach to the region.

Recognition of these dangers has been a central driver of US-India strategic cooperation. If the US-India partnership is to confront them effectively, however, the two countries must think more creatively about how better to work together, particularly in the defence sphere.

The core elements of Indo-US defence partnership include movement toward the adoption of common platforms and weapons systems as well as shared software and electronic ecosystems; closer cooperation on personnel training; and the convergence of strategic postures and doctrines. These elements can realise their full potential only if the two countries enable large-scale US-India data sharing, which will significantly enhance interoperability between their two militaries. This, in turn, will be possible only through the signature of the so-called Foundational Agreements, which provide a legal structure for logistical cooperation and the transfer of communications-security equipment and geospatial data.

India has historically resisted signing these agreements. But many Indian objections are rooted in domestic political calculations rather than substantive strategic concerns. Moreover, with the 2016 signature of the logistics agreement known as LEMOA, India may have crossed an initial hurdle. Perhaps a concerted effort to reconsider objectionable language, without fundamentally altering their substance, could make the remaining agreements palatable to Indian leaders. Given the impact this would have on India’s ability to cooperate with the US to meet the Chinese challenge, it could get serious consideration in New Delhi.

India and the US can take a page from China’s military strategy. Much has been made of the dangers of China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities. But India can also leverage its geography to impede access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. For example, with US assistance, it could transform the Andaman and Nicobar islands into a forward-deployed base for surveillance and area-denial assets. This would exploit natural Indian advantages, hamper China’s ability to expand its reach and consolidate its gains across the region, and not require India to shoulder unrealistic burdens in far-off areas of operation.

India and the US also need to take a diplomatic and developmental approach to the region that is geographically holistic and offers credible alternatives to Chinese projects; they should not adopt disparate strategies east and west of the Indian Ocean, or promote projects that are rhetorically attractive but lack financial and diplomatic ballast. Recent announcements of pan-regional projects such as the Indo-Japanese Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and the revived US Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor and New Silk Road initiative, are welcome developments. It will be essential to ensure that these projects continue to receive adequate support, and to create synergies between them that can help to make the whole greater than the sum of its parts.

Additionally, India must cultivate political relationships in its close neighborhood with countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the ASEAN members to project its influence into the Indian Ocean. Regional states have already begun to fall prey to China’s ‘debt trap’ diplomacy. For instance, Sri Lanka has struggled to service its debt owed to China for the construction of the US$1 billion Hambantota port, which has put the government in Colombo under considerable political and economic duress. India should offer its neighbors sustainable infrastructure projects and strong economic incentives that can provide an alternative. These efforts will be more likely to succeed if the US, Japan and Australia support them diplomatically and through co-investment in economic ventures.

None of these measures will be easy to implement; they will face resource constraints, political opposition, and strategic competition. But the stakes – who gets to construct the legal, economic, and military architecture of an integrated Indo-Pacific region – are enormous. Without bold policy from the US and India, the answer will be China.

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