For BIMSTEC to work, fix BBIN firs

Samir Saran

As Prime Minister Modi prepares to signal India’s leadership role in Kathmandu, an analysis of India’s role in the MVA process will prove instructive on the positive consequences of demonstrable Indian leadership and the costs of lost momentum.

Source: Press Trust of India

Ahead of the BIMSTEC Summit in Nepal, New Delhi would do well to take stock of its integration and development initiatives around the sub-continent. The fact remains that BIMSTEC, along with other regional initiatives such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Cooperation (BCIM-EC), has remained dysfunctional. Consequently, the intra-regional trade in South Asia has been abysmally low with Indian regional leadership being the principal collateral.

The only initiative with that appears to have shown some promise so far is the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) initiative, which signed a historic Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) in 2015, signaling a resurgence of ‘sub-regions’ as key loci for regional integration. India has spent a fair amount of diplomatic and investment capital in enabling the MVA. At present intra-regional trade accounts for only five per cent of total trade, according to a World Bank study — a reminder of why individual countries in South Asia are turning to China as a reliable trade partner instead. On the other hand, this trade is likely to increase by 117 per cent from the current USD 23 billion if transport connectivity is strengthened and cross-border trade facilitation improved.

Indeed, the economic potential that is born from of integrating just three states, who are all a part of the BIMSTEC, should suggest the possibilities of a more articulate and expansive regional connectivity agenda. If India wants BIMSTEC to emerge as an important forum for regional integration, the success of the BBIN will go a long way towards displaying intent and capability. As Prime Minister Modi prepares to signal India’s leadership role in Kathmandu, an analysis of India’s role in the MVA process will prove instructive on the positive consequences of demonstrable Indian leadership and the costs of lost momentum.

First, India needs to demonstrate leadership in regional connectivity through consistent execution. The Prime Minister’s reset of relations with Nepal in May is crucial to understand India’s re-orientation of regional outreach at a time when Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative is upending strategic equations across the continent. Nepal, vital to South Asian stability, stands to benefit the most from the BBIN and BIMSTEC connectivity projects. It secures access to its nearest ports and would be able to export Nepalese goods even beyond the region. The example of Nepal goes to show that if India can get the vehicles to move across borders, the reliance on Chinese built ports and infrastructure will reduce; and India can then replicate such initiatives with other BIMSTEC states such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand.

India needs to demonstrate leadership in regional connectivity through consistent execution.

It was unfortunate, then, that administrative hurdles from India’s bureaucracy have once again delayed the process. The protocol for passenger and cargo movement under the MVA were reviewed for the past two years, with the former being concluded at the last meeting in April 2018. Unfortunately, the Indian government decided to hold up finalising the passenger protocol until the cargo protocol is negotiated, which would take several further rounds of negotiations. While New Delhi’s reasons for doing so are unknown, the implications are clear — the agreement loses all forward momentum.

To add to the confusion, at about the same time the Indian government circulated a ‘letter of exchange’ to Nepal and Bangladesh to sign the three-country implementation of the MVA; and to Bhutan to counter-sign it. The signing of this additional agreement will go through another round of approvals. A further delay is not difficult to anticipate.

These delays are representative of India’s often messy regionalism. Just like the MVA, the cost of delaying the regional integration through the BIMSTEC is economically and politically high. The positives are equally great: BIMSTEC and the MVA allow New Delhi to tie up the loose ends of its ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighborhood First’ policy.

Which leads to the second point: if the BBIN is successfully executed, India has a replicable model to make BIMSTEC work. At present, BIMSTEC is in the doldrums, lacking sufficient commitment from Thailand, Sri Lanka and Bhutan. The ‘demonstration effect’ of well-functioning road connectivity between the three-nation BBIN bloc would catalyse the desired level of cooperation among the BIMSTEC countries. In a post-BRI world, reliance on Chinese-built ports and infrastructure will grow. For India, a way to preserve the arteries of sub-regionalism is essential, and BBIN represents a seed for that alternative. Building on the BBIN platform, India must be willing to commit significant financial, human and technical resources to strengthen BIMSTEC.

If the BBIN is successfully executed, India has a replicable model to make BIMSTEC work.

Third, the private sector needs to be represented more prominently in BIMSTEC. Perhaps the most glaring oversight of the BBIN was India’s failure to involve the private sector in its regional initiatives. The trial run along Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala and Delhi-Kolkata-Dhaka routes alone, for example, reported cost savings of about 20 per cent alongside a substantial reduction in travel time. The benefits of BBIN connectivity then, would extend to the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises in all three nations, the building of regional value chains, and advancing innovation and entrepreneurship. New Delhi must realise that adequate representation from the private sector during negotiations would bring to the forefront those operational issues that are relevant to companies’ logistical need — which would make the MVA, and by extension connectivity initiatives under the BIMSTEC, truly transformational.

India must lead the integration process in South Asia if it is to retain its economic and political significance in the region. For this to happen, New Delhi must reassess its internal decision-making machinery and processes. The unnecessary delays in implementing the MVA were self-inflicted wounds — something Delhi must avoid as it prepares to take on a larger role in the BIMSTEC. Just like the BBIN MVA, the BIMSTEC is a strategic, economic and socio-political opportunity for India to recalibrate its imperfect relationship with the neighbouring countries. The Prime Minister’s Office must step in to re-energise Indian leadership on regional connectivity and deliver on one of the PM’s key ambitions.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Uncategorized

70 Policies: A treatise on the evolution of India’s political economy

Samir Saran

Focused primarily on the Indian economy, Gautam Chikermane’s new book, 70 Policies, also explores the impact of external influences — legal, political and administrative — on Indian policymaking. Following is the speech by ORF President during the launch of the book earlier this week.

Photolabs@ORF

Dr. Rajiv Kumar ji, Vice-Chairman of NITI Aayog, Sri Manish Tiwari ji, eminent lawyer and spokesperson of the Congress party, Sri Ashok Malik, Press Secretary to the President, Dr. Shamika Ravi, Mr. Sunjoy Joshi, friends, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen — on behalf of Observer Research Foundation, it is my honour and privilege to welcome you this evening.

We are here, of course, to celebrate the launch of my colleague Gautam Chikermane’s book, 70 Policies that Shaped India: 1947 to 2017, Independence to $2.5 Trillion. A very compelling chronicle of the life of India since its Independence. Let me congratulate Gautam for this publication that is both comprehensive and pithy. Writing, at its very best, is about communicating complex ideas in an accessible and comprehensible format. I believe that Gautam might have actually achieved this remarkably well with 70 Policies.

He has managed to distill some of India’s most contentious economic debates into a manuscript that can serve the needs of everyone — from government to industry to academia.

I would like to remind the audience that Gautam’s masterful work is only the latest addition to his long and illustrious career. Building on his multiple personas — as a journalist, editor, an economic pundit and author engaging with mythology and ethics, Gautam, with this, has established himself as a formidable scholar; his description of each of the 70 reforms in just 350 words deserves applause not only for his masterful prose, but also for his diligent research, reflected in the 683 citations that allow the reader to uncover the provenance of each of his interventions.

Read the book here.

Indeed, the book lets the reader decide if they’re happy with just a peek — or if they’d like to dive headfirst into the debates that have shaped India’s political economy. Only an individual with great clarity of thought could have made this possible.

Having said that, I cannot fail to point out that Gautam’s true love continues to remain the complexities and subtleties of India’s greatest epic: the Mahabharata. And I hope public policy will give him enough room to engage with that pursuit as well.

Gautam’s book provided me with some unique perspectives, three of which I would like to share by way of the introduction to the book:

First, the book very ably chronicles the evolution of India’s left of center economy policy making. It reveals to us that while the 1990s and the 2000s certainly saw a break from the orthodox central planning that bottlenecked our economy for the latter half the 20^th century, India’s full embrace of the market remains hostage to the firm grip of our socialist ethos even today. Perhaps this is a reflection of who we are. Is this the New Delhi consensus?

Second, the book truly gives meaning to the words “past is prologue.” By gleaning insights from the errors of the past, it provides a clear guide for future generations of policy makers, entrepreneurs, business leaders and scholars to learn from. The book now serves as a permanent reminder that the unintended consequences of populist policy making can and will implicate India’s full potential as an economic power. A number of policies of the past remind of this.

And finally, it would be amiss to believe that the book servers merely as a chronical of our economic history. By exploring these 70 policies, whether it is the nationalisation of banks or the recently introduced GST, the reader gets a clear sense of the evolution of India’s political climate. Indeed, this book is as political as it is economic — and all its readers are better off for it. The political evolution is remarkably discernible.

Both Gautam and I hope that many of the vignettes captured in this book will continue to breed constructive introspection and help catalyze new ideas.

Of course, many of our ORF’s own initiatives will benefit immensely from a closer study of this book.

Gautam’s writing on the Jan Dhan Yojana and the Aadhaar initiative, for example, are relevant to our work of financial inclusion and the broader evolution of India’s digital economy. And his work on contemporary reforms such as the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the GST will certainly inform our initiatives of India’s economic policy.

I am certain that scholars, research organisations and members of our government will similarly find that his book adds great value to their own efforts.

Ultimately, the book reminds us that while history does not repeat itself, it does rhyme. India’s once protectionist and isolationist stance is gradually giving way to a nation that is beginning to embrace the full potential of its economic growth and yet the shadows of our past create hesitancy in our progress.

It is my hope that everyone gathered here today will find learning from it as enjoyable as I have.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Uncategorized

As India turns 71, what is the rising global power’s vision for the world?

Samir Saran

India requires a “consensus” — a new proposition that will not only guide its own trajectory for the better part of the 21st century, but one that appeals to communities around the world.

India, 15 August 1947, Indian Independence, liberal democracy, Sustainable Development Goals, business, civil society, industry, economic linkages, political differences, liberal international order, rising power, political boundaries, Samir Saran, British Empire, New Delhi, global economic power, Asia

Source: Press Trust of India

Seventy-one years ago — on 15 August 1947 — India gained independence. Over the subsequent decades, the country has managed its evolution in an international system largely created and guided by the United States and its partners. While it was not easy for India to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies within this system, the American-led order was preferable to the British Empire from which New Delhi had liberated itself.

Today, this global system is under serious threat. Washington, along with capital cities across the European Union, finds itself caught in a polarising debate on the social contracts of its society — questions of domestic inequality and identity have left the US and its allies incapable of effectively championing the values of the international order. Simultaneously, the balance of global economic power has once again tipped in favour of Asia.

Within this shifting global landscape, India has the opportunity to put in place a new framework for its own security, growth and development, and that of developing countries around the world. As a rising global power, this must be India’s principle endeavour in the coming decades.

The changing international order

The extraordinary rise of countries in Asia has spawned at least two new dynamics. First, political boundaries — many of them colonial legacies — are steadily becoming more porous through economic cooperation. Markets are converging across the Eurasian landmass as well as facilitating the geo-economic “union” of the Indian and Pacific oceans. This has resulted in new integrative dynamics; as cultures, markets and communities aspire for development and new opportunities. Second, even though territorial considerations acknowledge economic linkages, political differences are still being reasserted — not just to contest the consensus of the past, but to shape a new order altogether.

Asia is coming together economically but is also threatening to grow apart politically; market-driven growth in the region sits uneasily with a diverse array of political systems.

China is, in large part, responsible for both. While offering a political vision that stands in sharp contrast to the “liberal international order,” China has been equally assertive about advancing free trade, raising new development finance, and offering a new model for development and global governance. The prospect of China using its economic clout to advance its own norms is worrying for India.

A consensus to shape a new order

Given the velocity of change underway, the challenge for India on its Independence Day is to shape an inclusive and equitable international order by the centenary of its independence. To achieve this, India must prepare to act according to its capabilities: by mid-century it must build the necessary state capacity, industrial and economic heft and strategic culture that would befit its status as a leading power. The country could present this as a model for much of the developing world to emulate, and anchor faith in the liberalism and internationalism of the world order.

India, then, requires a “consensus” — a new proposition that will not only guide its own trajectory for the better part of the 21st century, but one that appeals to communities around the world.

What then are the tenets of a “New Delhi Consensus”?

First, India must sustain and strengthen its own trajectory of rapid economic growth, and show to the world that it is capable of realising its development goals within the rubric of liberal democracy. No argument for the New Delhi Consensus can be more powerful and alluring than the economic success of India. By IMF estimates, India already accounts for 15% of global growth. Even though nearly 40% of its population live in various shades of poverty and barely a third are connected to the internet, India is still able to proportionately shoulder the world’s economic burden. Imagine the possibilities for global growth if India can meet, and even exceed, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

States in the developing world yearn for replicable templates of growth, yet they find themselves with a binary choice between Western democracy, which is ill suited for deeply plural and socially stratified societies, and autocratic systems that have little room for individual freedom.

India, on the other hand has “emerged as a bridge between the many extremes of the world,” as former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once remarked. India’s plural and composite culture, he said, was “living proof of the possibility of a confluence of civilisations.” The global 2030 development agenda, for the most part, may as well be a story of India’s domestic economic transformation and of its defence of diversity and democracy.

Second and flowing from the above, Delhi must claim leadership over the global development agenda. It is worth pointing out that India sits at the intersection of the world’s two most dynamics regions, Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. The largest bulk of development finance will emerge from, and be invested in, these regions. It is incumbent on India to ensure that this is not a new means to maximise political interference, but a moment to offer unfettered opportunities.

In his recent address to the Ugandan Parliament, Prime Minister Narendra Modi affirmed that “India’s development partnership will be guided by [African] priorities” — a position that contrasts sharply with the West’s evangelical focus on governance reforms and China’s economic policies in the region. India’s recipient-led partnership framework will allow states to secure development pathways that are economically sustainable and politically acceptable. India now needs to articulate its intentions and the principles that will shape international development cooperation in the days ahead.

Third, Delhi must create and protect the space for equitable and inclusive global governance. For too long, leadership in the international system was considered a free pass to monopolise the global commons. India has always bucked this trend, emerging as a leading power that has never tempered its idealism of “having an interest in peace, and a tradition of friendliness to all,” as one official put it. Whether it is on free trade, climate change or international security, India’s non-interventionist and multilateral approach is well suited to support and sustain global governance in a multipolar world: the new reality of this century.

Finally, India must incubate a new social contract between its own state, industry and civil society. At the turn of the century, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee lamented that India’s democratic growth was held back by three failures: of the government to heed industry voices, of industry to appreciate the objectives of government, and of both in their commitment to the common individual.

Nearly two decades later, the imperative for India to correct these failures is even greater. The spread of information communication technologies and global supply chains implies that businesses and civil society must be made equal stakeholders if India is to develop its own unique consensus. Not only will this add greater legitimacy to India’s proposition, it will also create natural and grassroots champions for the country around the world.

For the first time since the end of the Second World War, a nation state that is wary of hegemonic tendencies and identifies itself with the equitable governance of the global commons is in a position to shape the international order. India is home to one-sixth of the global population and has sustained a unique democratic ethos and a foreign policy that is defined not only by national interest but also by solidarity with the developing world.

As a leading power, India must look beyond raw indexes of economic, political and military might, and craft a consensus that is consistent with its ancient and historic view of the world.

This article originally appeared on World Economic Forum.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Columns/Op-Eds, Indo-pacific, Uncategorized

India’s future as a world power depends on 4 key relationships

World Economic Forum

Original article here

China's President Xi Jinping and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in June 2018

In the 2040s, India is expected to surpass the United States (in PPP terms) and become the world’s second largest economy, behind China. Alongside this Indian emergence, the international order is undergoing significant change as well, with power increasingly diffused among states as a new, multipolar geostrategic landscape begins to emerge with fresh layers of complexities.

These developments have the potential to position India as the world’s most influential democracy in the second half of the 21st century, giving it the ability to shape the Indo-Pacific region and the dynamically evolving global order.

From the Indo-Pacific region to the world

At the Shangri-La Dialogue earlier this year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a speech in which he argued that the “destiny of the world will be deeply influenced by the course of developments in the Indo-Pacific region”. This bold claim has come within the context of both growing economic opportunity and expanding strategic challenges for the region.

Sheer numbers alone elevate the importance of the Indo-Pacific and its influence across the world. It is now home to more than 65% of the world’s population who collectively produce more than 60% of global GDP. Over half the world’s trade passes through this region, and it hosts the fastest-growing armada of naval fleets along with seven nuclear powers. This region will also have a disproportionately high contribution to global growth in the decades ahead and will therefore ink the pen that scripts the new terms of trade, financial flows and investments, growth, humanitarian assistance, and peace and security.

Even as this redistribution of wealth and power propels this region to the global high table, a position it long enjoyed up to the 15th century, the multiplicity of old and emerging actors, and their varied interests within the region and beyond are spurring greater unpredictability and new anxieties. There are simply no reliable 20th-century templates to manage such a simultaneous rise of multiple actors and interests in a region. China, which was the first mover, now finds itself having to deal with the pushback to its own expansive plans, as well as with propositions from other initiatives such as the “Quad” (comprising of India, the US, Japan and Australia) that seek to steer the region’s future. There is little doubt that new pathways to a new order need to be discovered soon.

Modi’s speech at Shangri-La signalled New Delhi’s acceptance of this reality, and its willingness to embrace greater responsibility in anchoring a “rules-based democratic order” in the region. Indeed, as a rising economic power with favourable demographic conditions – in 2020, the average age in India will be 29 years old (compared to 37 in China) – India is well positioned to shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.

India’s vision for the region

India’s geostrategic vision for the Indo-Pacific is unique. It rejects pitting China against the Quadrilateral Initiative in a zero-sum competition “between free and repressive visions of world order”, as the American vision postulates. It also rejects the Chinese proposition, which creates perverse dependencies through economic statecraft and military coercion in a manner better suited to the Cold War era.

Instead, India is positioning itself to take a different path – one that does not see the world in binaries, bifurcated between partners and allies on one side, and competitors and adversaries on the other. India offers an opportunity for engagement and dialogue to all states, big and small, democratic and authoritarian, advanced or developing.

The new vision moves away from conceptions of non-alignment or strategic autonomy, tools of foreign policy that may have outlived their corresponding geopolitical utility. When Prime Minister Modi stated that “the Indo-Pacific region is not a limited club of members”, he signalled New Delhi’s intention to lead a new configuration of states, guided by communities that yearn for development, markets that require connectivity and nations that seek security.

The strategy calls for India to lead by example and show that as its capabilities rise over the coming decades, it will not abandon certain norms that reflect uniquely Asian democratic tendencies, open and transparent economic governance, and non-interventionist security paradigms.

Four steps for India to take

To put in place a vision that shapes the region and attracts others, India needs to script its own expectations from four key relationships.

First, New Delhi should define its ‘China policy’. It needs to determine what it is looking for from Beijing and make clear what it will refuse to put on the negotiating table. At Shangri-La, Modi made clear that no nation can unilaterally “shape and secure” an Indo-Pacific order. Delhi must be prepared to enforce this statement of fact as a baseline norm. An Asian ethic cannot be scripted by China alone, whether it is on infrastructure connectivity or managing security disputes. The economic prosperity of the region will be implicated by the strength of the India-China partnership.

Second, New Delhi should develop a clear policy toward the US. Thus far, New Delhi has essentially muddled through, deferring to Washington regarding policy in the region. India must answer whether it is ready, willing and able to play a larger role in defining a vision for the concert of democracies in the region and beyond. If, as Prime Modi recently indicated, the answer to all these is “yes”, New Delhi needs to put forth a more confident proposition for Washington to support. Is it now time to hand the baton over to India?

Third, New Delhi must rethink its engagement with its neighbours, particularly around two existing regional architectures. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an eight-member union meant to advance economic and regional integration, is in tatters. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a seven-member organization meant to promote economic cooperation and trade, has turned into a forum for talk rather than action. Unless India presents a clear, enticing proposition to its neighbours, it will be hard-pressed to shepherd a new strategic vision in the larger region.

Finally, Delhi must engage more vigorously with the global institutional framework. At the World Economic Forum in January, Modi warned of a “gap between the old systems of [international] institutions and the needs of many developing countries”, echoing Delhi’s age-old grievance with the Atlantic institutions and a new sense that India must help close this ‘gap’. India’s pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific will be bolstered through its co-ownership of the institutions created by the developed world and in making them work in coherence with the new institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, in which India has significant stakes.

India’s Indo-Pacific vision exemplifies its ambition of being a “leading power”. Even so, it is merely the beginning of a decadal journey, which will see India shoulder the expectations that befit the world’s largest democratic economy. To do this, Delhi must constantly reassess the dimensions of change underway, visualize the possibilities that are on offer, anticipate the attendant risks and author the new order arising out of Asia.

Author: Samir Saran, President of Observer Research Foundation.

Uncategorized

India-US relationship: Is the top-down structure sustainable?

Samir Saran

How will the US establishment come to terms with the fact that for the better part of the 21st century, India will be the larger economic partner? Has Delhi realised the potential and consequences of this shift?

Photos: US Embassy New Delhi — Flickr/CC BY-ND 2.0

The postponement of the high level ‘2+2 dialogue’ between India and the US yet again has resulted in a flurry of commentaries, with some even suggesting a crisis in the bilateral.

The public differences on key issues, ranging from trade, to work visas and the Iran sanctions, coupled with questions around the personal chemistry between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald Trump have left many speculating on the future of this relationship. While this may be an over-reaction, we must use this opportunity to reflect and analyse the state of the bilateral and assess if we are indeed heading into choppy waters.

It is worth reiterating some characteristics and realities that have shaped the India-US partnership in recent decades. The transformational changes in world politics through the 1990s were important and sparked a realisation in both capitals that investing in each other was a priority. Overtime, top-level political leadership in both countries have translated this into a sustained partnership with great potential to shape regional and global affairs.

China’s rise only accelerated this strategic partnership, especially in the Western Pacific and the Eastern Indian Ocean, leading to the conceptualisation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region — its importance reinforced by the rechristening of the US (Indo) Pacific Command.

Throughout this, American ambivalence to the India-Russia relationship, and a willingness by both countries to temporarily set aside differences on Pakistan, Iran and economic policy allowed them to strengthen the bilateral agenda.

Today, the assessments in Delhi and Washington DC are visibly changing — in terms of the how the world is ordered, what the new covenants must be, and indeed, in their expectations of each other. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what has changed, what remains unchanged, and what is needed now.

For one thing, there is little evidence that would suggest any dilution in the investments that both PM Modi and President Trump have made in this relationship. While enthusiasm at the political leadership level is welcome, recent events suggest that the perception of ambivalence at the top may well give bureaucracies in both countries the opportunity to revert to the old policies of the 1970s and 1980s.

Which is why Washington and New Delhi must now interrogate if such a top-down structure for this important relationship is sustainable and if the relationship needs more champions. While both countries have done well to institutionalise their relationship over the past two decades, the economic and political demands on this partnership are going to grow manifold — and it is now necessary to strengthen and expand these structures in order to sustain continuity irrespective of the prevailing political mood.

Today the assessments in Delhi and Washington DC are visibly changing — in terms of the how the world is ordered, what the new covenants must be, and indeed, in their expectations of each other. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what has changed, what remains unchanged, and what is needed now.

Second, the Russia question continues to vex the foreign policy establishment in both countries. While India’s dependence on Russia for defence products reduces, the fact is that it will remain a key security partner for many years to come. At the same time, Moscow will increasingly become an important actor for India’s political, connectivity and energy projects in Eurasia. To sustain a long-term India-US partnership, it is now time for both countries to adopt a mutually accommodative position on Russia.

The US, for its part, must be flexible and account for the important role Russia plays in India’s security objectives. New Delhi, on the other hand, must invest diplomatic energy in convincing Washington to shed its cold war mentality towards Moscow and embrace an ‘entente cordiale’ with this superpower, especially as both countries begin to recalibrate their approach to China.

President Trump’s impending summit with President Putin this July is a welcome thaw in America’s orthodox approach to Moscow — a necessary move in the long-term, considering that neither India nor the US would benefit from Russia being in the Chinese corner.

Finally, and most importantly, it is time to enquire if the US can continue to unilaterally set the priorities for this relationship — and strong-arm India into accommodating its preferred posture on key issues such as Pakistan and Iran. The fact is that India’s economic growth will see its GDP surpass the US before the middle of this century on real terms and well before in PPP terms. This reality implies that New Delhi will increasingly set its own priorities and will retain independent beneficial relationships with countries like Iran and chart its own course with its neighbours.

How will the US establishment come to terms with the fact that for the better part of the 21st century, India will be the larger economic partner? More importantly, has Delhi realised the potential and consequences of this shift?

India and the US must embrace their roles as the most consequential democracies of the 21st century. However, their current differences may well stem from adjusting to this reality.

Already at the Shangri-La Dialogue, PM Modi outlined a vision for the Indo-Pacific that was distinct from Washington’s conceptualisation. With time, India will, and must, do the same on geo-economics, trade and in its pursuit of strategic partnerships.

In the end, India and the US must embrace their roles as the most consequential democracies of the 21st century. However, their current differences may well stem from adjusting to this reality and some others. Allowing such differences to snowball will be a very expensive mistake — especially as China wastes no time in executing its own agenda for the international order.

Indeed, now more than ever, Washington will need New Delhi to balance China’s rise, given the coterminous nature of India’s rise and its own relative decline.

Capitalising on the opportunity presented by the India-US partnership will require both countries to institutionalise dialogue and identify differences capable of derailing the relationship in the long-term. Elites in Washington and Delhi must realise that a partnership of equals will require a more finely tuned calibration of their foreign policy priorities.

This commentary originally appeared on News18.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

E-Commerce, FDI, India, MSME, tech and media

In rising e-Commerce storm, India protects its ship

MNC, investor, institutions, Swadeshi, disconnect, ownership, regulators, geostrategic, data, economy, platform, data, technology, companies, Silicon Valley, algorithms, Economic rights, civil liberties, autonomous, privacy, safeguards, MSME, FDI

The debate on the global governance, ownership and management of data is today confronted by three new realities. The first is that the custodians of data – technology companies in Silicon Valley that famously promised to bring the world together and solve most of its problems through innovative algorithms — have been found wanting in the protection of economic rights and civil liberties that accrue to their users in developing countries. Not only have digital platforms serially misused the data that their consumers hand over in trust, they have also done little to generate local value that can create jobs, contextual content and/or spur secondary and tertiary innovation.

Second, it is increasingly clear that local jurisdictions, however flawed or premature their regulatory ambience may appear today, are the most effective forums to guarantee even a semblance of protection to users of digital platforms. No longer can emerging markets seek refuge under foreign laws that promise enhanced privacy safeguards on paper, but in practice ignore the mischievous harvesting of such data by intelligence or law enforcement agencies of states in which technology giants are incorporated. Put simply, the hypocrisy of “autonomous” and responsible self-regulation stands exposed.

And third, digital markets don’t accurately drive valuations of technology. While IPOs may determine the growth expectations of a tech company, their worth must also be driven by the ability (or not) of their peers to provide the service at competitive rates. The debates on data localisation, done to death, appear to have altogether ignored this reality. The fact is that that India’s entry into the “data storage” market will exponentially bring down price points. The Y2K, BPO and Euro conversion episodes have proven that India is capable of providing digital services at a fraction of the cost sought by others. If India is a financially sustainable destination for data, should hackneyed arguments on localisation be revisited in the light of new economic realities?

All three realities are implicated in the debate on India’s e-commerce policy, which will define how the country trades, transacts and consumes in the coming years. E-commerce is where big-ticket investments are likely to happen; generating jobs, supporting MSMEs and incubating e-product creators along the way.

E-commerce is where big-ticket investments are likely to happen; generating jobs, supporting MSMEs and incubating e-product creators along the way.

Look at the facts as they appear. India has the world’s largest population in the 18 to 35 age group at over 440 million. An estimated half of this population is already in the workforce. As income levels rise, so will purchasing power, which in turn will implicate their choices ranging from clothes to shoes to books to gadgets to news to entertainment to food and beverages.

Affordable access to internet and smartphones (no more in the realm of possibility but already a reality) will facilitate both access to information (for instance, comparing prices and features) as well as greater agency (buying what meets your need at the best price). This is the ‘millennial opportunity’ that India is betting on and e-retail does not want to miss. It is unsurprising then that this sector has proven so controversial—and has become a flashpoint for debate about digital rules, policies and globalization around the world. India is not immune to these either and is witnessing a heated debate on some of its recent policy maneuvers.

Just over two years ago, it seemed like India was willing to fully integrate its emerging e-commerce market with the rapidly expanding global digital commerce, allowing 100% FDI via the automatic route. Big ticket investments by e-commerce giants like Walmart and Amazon were then seen as an endorsement of India’s continuing push towards globalisation and rejection of protectionist nationalism propounded by organisations like the Swadeshi Jagran Manch and practiced by previous governments through their decisions.

Global investors and institutions saw this as a natural consequence of India’s rise. After all, the assumption was that a $3 trillion economy aspiring to become a $5 trillion economy by its next elections cycle of 2024 must acquiesce to the financial and commercial logic of globalization. India, as all other capitalist democracies, would welcome the innovations and efficiencies of global MNCs, even though it ran the risk of their displacing or buying-out local peers.

Yet, last year-end’s revised rules — which the government claims have only elaborated and reasserted the terms set in 2017 — have proved that rising industrial powers with sense of sovereignty and alive to their size, rarely make such simple trade-offs.

First came a new FDI Press Note, which limited online retailers from selling the products of vendors that they had invested in and offering heavy discounting on selected products. Next came a new draft e-commerce policy, which tightened rules in relation to online retail practices (including intermediary liability) along with imposing a raft of new data sharing mandates.

With the e-commerce market set to grow from $35 billion to $100 billion by 2022, it is unsurprising that the stakes are high and that the Indian government has received flak from some quarters for what they perceive as an attempt to ‘protect’ local industries. All of a sudden, India is seen as abandoning its commitments to free trade and investment.

What explains this disconnect between the expectations that some in the global financial community have of India and the realities of its political economy and India’s choices?

The answer lies in the underlying shifts in the structure of the global economy and India’s own rising aspirations. Simply put, the global economy is undergoing a new industrial transformation, with digital technologies spearheading this change. A small group of technology platforms, largely based in the US and China, is increasingly mediating billions of dollars of global trade and trillions of bytes in information and communication flows.

Access to personal information and ownership over data infrastructures have allowed these firms to entrench their dominance in markets around the world. In the process they have restructured existing economic and even social relations in a manner that better suits their commercial interests. Unsurprisingly then, there is great uncertainty about how data flows, technology platforms and digital ecosystems will implicate market and state power in the international system.

India is emerging as a global power amidst these realities. It certainly does not aspire to re-orient the moorings of the liberal international order; having benefited from an extended period of peace for its own development. Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus in India that even as the United States and China pry open markets abroad, they are neither interested in creating value for those markets nor nurturing sustainable economic development in these destinations. Around the world, nation states are reassessing frameworks of law, regulation and industry practices that have governed the digital economy.

India’s objective with regards to its digital economy is three-fold:

First, to create regulatory stability (a precondition for investment that scores over other determinants) and a level playing field for all market actors. Agnostic or ambivalent regulations that merely preserve of the value generated by foreign technology companies will not help Indian consumers in any way. If India’s regulatory policy for digital technologies appears in flux, it is because the exact determinants of value creation are uncertain. Regulators around the world are currently attempting to quantify the digital economy and map out the disaggregated set of economic activities that comprise it. However, any sensible policy is likely to have a bias that offsets the current uneven playing field developed and controlled by a handful of transnational corporations.

Second, to create opportunities for local enterprise and value chains. For an economy that is aspiring towards a $5 trillion GDP, this is a natural compulsion—both for electoral reasons and for geostrategic ones. This does not necessarily imply relying on China’s techno-nationalist playbook. India does not seek to expel foreign firms from its markets in order to create domestic champions. Rather, it is attempting to create local value through digital supply chains that have high scale and increasing presence. India must respond to the demands of jobs, social mobility and domestic enterprise. It has a once in a century opportunity to use the “data economy” to transform from a mere collective of billion consumers to a large economy.

Finally, it has to create a globally competitive digital market. This is probably a central challenge of our times. Proprietary data sets have allowed a handful of technology companies to dominate existing and new markets through sheer information asymmetry. Even domestic competitors in the US and EU are questioning the relevance of competition jurisprudence and theory. It is only to be expected that India should develop its own policy propositions for the same.

The great industrial powers of the previous centuries have protected cutting edge industries in one form or another. In the late-19th and early-20th century, the United States ranked amongst the most enthusiastic levelers of tariffs on British goods. Japan’s then infamous Ministry of International Trade and Industry protected domestic industries through the 1950s and 60s until it became a cause of concern in the US. The rise of China’s internet giants was enabled entirely by keeping American technology firms out of the domestic economy. India will not follow that same playbook — it does not have the luxury of creating exceptions for its rise while trying to impose a different set of rules for its peers in the international system.

Instead, India will focus on creation of value for the Indian consumer, who is the primary producer and consumer of data. Foreign technology companies wanting to do business in India should sidestep shrill debates on data localisation .Their primary objective ought to be the elevation of the Indian digital economy from a high-volume, low-intensity engagement to high-volume, high-intensity engagement. The interaction of Indians with data in all its forms — audio, visual, text-based — will catalyse the creation of a new cadre of data scientists capable of tailoring platform engagement in multiple languages and cultural contexts. The value so generated, by jobs, experience and improved digital services, will not only benefit Indians but also the bottom lines of these companies and their ability to do business in any other part of the world. Fair and sophisticated rules on the management and ownership of data will follow subsequently.

Today’s reality is that globalization is increasingly being driven by voluminous flows of data. These flows are generating enormous value for those individuals, industries and geographies that can analyse and monetise them. It is also these very actors who well set the terms of this new globalization—the new rules of trade, commerce, investment and security.

India’s policy shifts must not be an attempt to choose between globalization and protectionism—the choice is obviously the former, even though electoral compulsions certainly do push political parties towards the latter. Instead, home to the world’s largest surplus of data and the largest cohort of consumers, India must attempt to ensure that it emerges as a beneficiary and rule-maker of the digital economy once this period of churn settles. The road to this would be paved with regulatory stability, policies that bias growth to cater to its size and specific needs and having the political courage to remain outside of popular herds and hashtags as it undertakes the above.

Uncategorized

इतिहास का बदला: यूरेशिया का उदय

Samir Saran

क्या भारत 21वीं सदी को परिभाषित करने वाले यूरेशिया और हिंद-प्रशांत के दोराहे पर खड़ा है?

भारत, 21वीं सदी, यूरेशिया, हिंद-प्रशांत, समीर सरन, चीन, संतुलित, सहमति, एशिया, एकीकरण, सांस्कृतिक, आर्थिक, सैन्य, बीआरआई

नासा का ब्ल्यू मार्बल प्रोजेक्ट

“हिंद-प्रशांत” खबरों में है। अमेरिका ने अपनी प्रशांत कमान का नाम बदलकर “हिंद-प्रशांत कमान” रख दिया है, भारत और इंडोनेशिया द्वारा रेखांकित साझा क्षेत्रीय विज़न इसकी केंद्रीयता को प्रमुखता देता है और भारत के लिए इस क्षेत्र का राजनीतिक महत्व सिंगापुर में प्रधानमंत्री नरेन्द्र मोदी के विदेश नीति से संबंधित भाषण का केंद्र था। ये सब चीन के हैरान कर देने वाले उदय का जवाब है। यदि ये सब क्षेत्र में चीन के प्रभुत्व को संतुलित करने के लिए विभिन्न ताकतों की भविष्य में बनने वाली सहमति का संकेत है, तो यह उपाय महत्वपूर्ण भले ही हो, लेकिन एशिया और यूरोप में फैले चीन के प्रोजेक्ट के लिए नाकाफी है।

धरती की सतह के 35 प्रतिशत भूभाग को कवर करने वाला यूरेशिया 90 से ज्यादा देशों में रहने वाले 5 बिलियन बाशिंदों का घर है, जो वैश्विक जीडीपी के 65 प्रतिशत के लिए उत्तरदायी हैं। सहस्त्राब्दि भर से फतह, व्यापार और प्रवासन ने एशिया और यूरोप को मूलभूत रूप से बांध रखा है — इस विशाल भूभाग में फैली महान सभ्यताओं का उतार-चढ़ाव अनगिनत राजनीतिक और आर्थिक गतिशीलताओं का परिणाम है।

अभी हाल तक, ऐतिहासिक संदर्भ में, यह सब निर्बाद रूप से जारी था। यूरोप की औद्योगिक क्रांति और उसके बाद एशिया और अफ्रीका में उपनिवेशवाद ने ‘पश्चिम में’ आर्थिक और सैन्य ताकत एकत्र करते हुए क्षेत्र में एक ऐसी कृत्रिम दरार उत्पन्न कर दी जिसका कोई भौगोलिक वजूद नहीं था। यह समुदाय दूसरे विश्व युद्ध का विजेता बनकर उभरा, जिसने केवल सत्ता के इन ढांचों और क्षेत्रों को संस्थागत रूप प्रदान कर दिया।

एशिया का समकालीन आर्थिक उत्कर्ष और उसके अपने समुदायों तथा बाजारों का एकीकरण तेजी से इस यथास्थिति को तितर-बितर कर रहा है। मौजूदा दौर में एक बार फिर से पूरे यूरेशिया में लोगों, वस्तुओं, नवाचार और वित्त का प्रवाह अपेक्षाकृत मुक्त रूप से हो रहा है। लेकिन इस सुपर कॉन्टिनेंट का नए सिरे से उदय टकरावों से अछूता नहीं है। ये नई एकीकृत भू-आर्थिक ताकतें नए राजनीतिक तनाव अपने साथ लेकर आईं हैं।

जिस तरह इतिहास खुद को दोहरा रहा है और यूरेशिया एकजुट हो रहा है, ऐसे में नई विश्व व्यवस्था की रूपरेखा इस आधार पर परिभाषित होगी कि इसका प्रबंधन कौन करेगा और इसका प्रबंधन किस तरह होगा। इसी सुपर कॉन्टिनेंट में लोकतंत्र, मुक्त बाजारों और वैश्विक सुरक्षा प्रबंधों का भविष्य तय होगा और इस परिदृश्य में तीन प्रमुख कारक आकार ले रहे हैं।

पहला, रॉबर्ट केपलान का यह कथन उद्धृत करना होगा कि यह भूगोल का बदला है। हालांकि यूरेशिया का एकीकरण स्वाभाविक है, लेकिन उसका वर्तमान ‘अवतार’ निश्चित रूप से चीनी है। यूरोप और एशिया के बीच की दरार को कृत्रिम, आधुनिक और “पश्चिम” द्वारा बनाई गई मानने के बाद चीन ने यूरेशिया को समझने, परिभाषित करने और फिर उसका प्रबंधन करने जैसे ऐसे कदम उठाए, जिन्हें करने का उत्साह किसी अन्य ताकत ने नहीं दिखाया।

यूरेशियाई सुपर कॉन्टिनेंट का विचार अपने आप में नया नहीं है: 1904 में, हेल्फोर्ड मेकिंडर ने अनुमान व्यक्त किया था कि पश्चिमी नौसैनिक श्रेष्ठता का युग ताकत कायम करने की राह तैयार करेगा, जिसमें यूरेशिया — “मुख्य केंद्र” — विश्व वर्चस्व का आधार होगा।

ब्रिटिश, अमेरिकी, जर्मन और रूसी रणनीतिकार लम्बे अर्से से इस विचार द्वारा प्रभावित रहे हैं। ज्बिगनीव ब्रेजजिंस्की ने लिखा कि सोवियत संघ को नियंत्रित करने का आधार “यूरेशिया की बिसात पर” अमेरिकी प्रभाव का विस्तार करना था। जबकि रूसी दार्शनिक अलेक्सांद्र दुगिन का विचार था कि रूस के नेतृत्व वाला यूरेशिया नेटो की “अटलांटिकवाद” की साजिश को प्रभावशाली ढंग से नाकाम कर देगा। प्रत्येक मामले में, विषय स्पष्ट था: भूमि आधारित सैन्य आपूर्ति श्रृंखलाओं के माध्यम से प्रतिस्पर्धी ताकतों को संतुलित करना।

चीन की योजना अलग है — भूराजनीतिक ब्लॉक्स की बजाए सुविधा पर आधारित गठबंधनों द्वारा परिभाषित परस्पर निर्भर वैश्विक अर्थव्यवस्था में, चीन का विस्तार ऊर्जा की आपूति, कच्चे माल और बाजार की तलाश में मल्टी डॉलर वाली भूराजनीतिक प्रेरणा से परिभाषित है।

चीन की पसंद बेल्ट एंड रोड इनिशिएटिव है, जिससे कनेक्टीविटी प्रोजेक्ट्स का विशाल नेटवर्क तैयार हो रहा है—उनमें से प्रत्येक की इस सुपर कॉन्टिनेंट के भूगोल में चीन की अर्थव्यवस्था पर अंतर्निहित निर्भरता है।

चीन की प्रेरणा का आधार विचारधारा नहीं, बल्कि दोबारा प्रचलित होने तथा विश्व में सांस्कृतिक, आर्थिक और सैन्य केंद्र होने की अपनी ऐतिहासिक स्थिति का विस्तार करने की इच्छा है। चीन के आर्थिक महत्व के साथ ही साथ यह अभियान साधारण रूप से संतुलन बनाने वाली रणनीतियों के स्थान पर अपने यूरेशियाई विजन को महत्वपूर्ण रूप से और ज्यादा प्रबल, दूरदर्शी तथा स्थायी बनाता है।

ऐसे में कोई हैरानी नहीं कि बीआरआई उप-क्षेत्रों के भूभाग का महत्व कम करता है, इस प्रकार स्थापित सत्ता संतुलनों को अस्थिर करता है। मिसाल के तौर पर भारत और यूरोपीय संघ (ईयू) यूरेशिया की राजनीतिक, आर्थिक और सुरक्षा वार्ताओं में चीन के धीरे-धीरे बढ़ते प्रभाव पर काबू पाने की जद्दोजहद कर रहे हैं।

“मुक्त और खुला” हिंद-प्रशांत विजन और क्वाड्रीलैटरल इनिशिएटिव जैसे नवविकसित मंच सामुद्रिक मोर्चे पर चीन के उदय को संतुलित बनाने के लिए प्रयास कर रहे हैं। महासागर, हालांकि चीन का महज एक मंच भर है और ऐसे में विशुद्ध रूप से सामुद्रिक जवाब नाकाफी है।

चीन बेहतरीन तरीके से इस प्रोजेक्ट: बुनियादी ढांचे का निर्माण करने और व्यापार को सुगम बनाने तथा वैश्विक संस्थाओं का विकल्प तैयार करने में अनवरत रूप से जुटा हुआ है। चीन लुके-छिपे ढंग से अपने राजनीतिक मॉडल: “चीनी विशेषताओं से युक्त पूंजीवाद” — सरकारी पूंजीवाद और अधिनायकवाद के अनोखे मिश्रण का निर्यात भी कर रहा है। जब तक उदार लोकतंत्र यूरेशिया में — एशिया और अफ्रीका में बुनियादी ढांचे और शासन की जरूरते प्रभावी ढंग से पूरी करने वाले विकल्प को प्रस्तुत नहीं करते, तब तक चीन का प्रस्ताव कामयाब होता रहेगा।

यहीं दूसरे कारक की बारी आती है: लोकतंत्र का बदला। चाहे अमेरिका हो या यूरोपीय संघ या भारत, लोकतंत्रों का पहले से कहीं ज्यादा ध्रुवीकरण हो चुका है। द प्यू ग्लोबल एटीट्यूड सर्वे लगातार यह दर्ज कर रहा है कि लोकतांत्रिक सरकारों का विश्वास अब तक के सबसे निचले स्तर तक पहुंच चुका है। ऐसा लगता है कि पहली बार उदारवादी लोकतंत्र इतने जटिल हालात में पहुंच चुके हैं कि उनके पास रणनीतिक योजनाएं बनाने के लिए ज्यादा ऊर्जा ही नहीं बचती। ऐसे समय में जहां एक ओर चीन का दस साल का घटनाक्रम है, वहीं लोकतंत्र अपने अगले चुनावों के लिए संघर्ष कर रहे हैं।

और अंतिम कारक, जनसांख्यकी है, जो समूचे क्षेत्र, खासतौर पर चीन के लिए एक दोधारी तलवार की तरह है। बहुत से यूरेशियाई देशों में, बीआरटी के आर्थिक लाभ जाहिर हैं। हालांकि ऐसे दौर में, जब राष्ट्रवाद राजनीति का मूड परिभाषित कर रहा हो, ऐसे में चीन की मौजूदगी अप्रिय हो सकती है। चीन का श्रम निर्यात युवा आबादी वाले मेजबान देशों में तनाव उत्पन्न कर रहा है, जो अब रोजगार के अवसरों के लिए प्रतिस्पर्धा कर रहे हैं। इस बात का खतरा है कि बीआरटी अस्थिर देशों में केवल उग्र और कट्टर संगठनों के लिए बुनियादी सुविधाओं के नेटवर्क तैयार करेगा।

घरेलू स्तर पर, जनसांख्यकीय दबाव चीन को अपेक्षाएं पूरी करने की उसकी योग्यता पर पुनर्विचार करने के लिए मजूबर कर सकते हैं। जैसे-जैसे चीन की युवा आबादी आमदनी की सीढ़ी चढ़ेगी, अपनी सरकार से उनकी अपेक्षाएं बढ़ेंगी। साथ ही साथ, शहरी क्षेत्रों में अकेले युवाओं की अधिकता और उम्रदराज होती गांवों की आबादी के कारण चीन के समाज में हिंसा और अशांति का खतरा उत्पन्न हो जाएगा। ये जनसांख्यकीय दबाव यूरेशियाई एकीकरण के प्रोजेक्ट के लिए क्या पूर्वाभास देंगे? क्या चीन के पास दुनिया भर में प्रभाव को अंधाधुंध खरीदने के लिए राजनीतिक पूंजीवाद या पॉलिटिकल कैपिटल होगी? क्या जनसांख्यकीय जटिलताएं अन्य देशों को बीजिंग सर्वसम्मति से निपटने की जल्दी से कोई व्यवस्था तैयार करने की इजाजत देंगी?

भारत में, यह बात इससे ज्यादा स्पष्ट नहीं हो सकती कि भारत का विकास का मार्ग जटिलता से यूरेशिया से बंधा है। भारत 21वीं सदी को परिभाषित करने वाले यूरेशिया और हिंद-प्रशांत दोनों क्षेत्रों के दोराहे पर है।

भारत, हालांकि ऐसे देशों के समूह में से एक होगा और उनके विजन के अनुसार खुद को ढालने, और तो और उस विजन को आकार देने की उसकी योग्यता आने वाले दशकों में यूरेशियाई वार्ताओं को प्रभावित करेगी।

रूस, जो अपनी आर्थिक जरूरतों और अमेरिकी ताकत के प्रति साझा नफरत के कारण चीन से कमजोर स्थिति में है, चीन के प्रति प्रतिकूल संबंध रखता है। इस वास्तविक यूरेशियाई सुपर पॉवर की हैसियत इस समय गौरवशाली पुलिसकर्मी — या ज्यादा उदारता से कहें तो चीनी विस्तारवाद के लिए चतुर जोखिम प्रबंधन सलाहकार — से ज्यादा नहीं है।

जिन दो आर्थिक विजनों को वे एकीकृत करना चाहते हैं वे — बीआरआई और यूरेशियाई आर्थिक संघ हैं, जो विविध तर्कों के अंतर्गत ऑपरेट करते हैं। इनमें से पहला चीन को व्यापार के वाहक के रूप में स्थापित करने की मंशा से बाजारों को नए सिरे से स्थापित करना चाहता है, जबकि दूसरा रूस के सीमित आर्थिक प्रभाव का विस्तार करने के लिए एकल बाजार का निर्माण करना चाहता है। साथ ही, रूस की चिंता का सम्मान करते हुए, चीन अब तक क्षेत्र में कड़ी सुरक्षा प्रतिबद्धताओं को टालता आया है — जिसका दीर्घकाल तक टिकाऊ रह पाना मुश्किल है।

रूस की साधारण क्षेत्रीय क्षमता और चीन की बहु-महाद्वीपीय महत्वाकांक्षा के अंतर से यह प्रश्न उठता है : क्या हो अगर दोनों स्वायत्तता और भौतिक रूप से यूरेशिया के दो अलग विजन्स तक पहुंचे? या उन दोनों के बीच प्रतिस्पर्धा पहले से ही अस्थिर क्षेत्र में जटिल सुरक्षा गतिशीलता की रचना कर दें?

दूसरी ओर, यूरोपीय संघ यूरेशिया को मुश्किल मान रहा है। एशिया की राजनीतिक अस्थिरता से अलग-थलग, यूरोप ने सत्ता की राजनीति को छोड़ दिया है और अमेरिकी सुरक्षा की छाया तले बहुसंस्कृतिवाद का अपना विजन विकसित कर लिया है।

हालांकि पश्चिम एशिया में फूट के कारण, शरणार्थियों की भीड़ पहले से कर्ज में डूबी अर्थव्यवस्थाओं में जा पहुंची है, जिसने यूरोपीयनों को महाद्वीप के साथ अपनी निकटता याद दिलाने के लिए बाध्य कर दिया है।

अब यूरोप भीतर और बाहर से टूट चुका है। यहां तक उम्रदराज होते यूरोपीय समाज प्रतिक्रियावादी लोकप्रियता और सुस्थापित राजनीतिक और आर्थिक सर्वसम्मति के विघटन से जूझ रहे हैं, उनकी सीमाएं बेल्ट एंड रोड इनिशिएटिव द्वारा धीरे-धीरे नष्ट हो रही हैं। यूरोपीय संघ को अब हर हाल में कुछ मुश्किल फैसले लेने होंगे: या तो अपनी एजेंसी के संरक्षण और विस्तार में जुटना होगा या एक समय पर एक ही काम करना होगा।

अमेरिका ने, अपनी ओर से पिछले नौ दशकों के दौरान, इन दोनों क्षेत्रों में अपने लिए विशिष्ट स्थान बरकरार रखने के लिए रक्त और धन बहाया है। हालांकि, रूस और चीन को संतुलित करने के प्रयास और “आतंकवाद के खिलाफ युद्ध” करने में उसकी ताकत और प्रभाव नेटो, केंद्रीय कमान और हाल में नए नाम पाने वाली ‘हिंद प्रशांत’कमान के बीच बिखर कर रह गए हैं, जिनकी अपनी रणनीतियां और विरासत हैं। क्या अमेरिका, अब अनपेक्षित रूप से आर्थिक राष्ट्रवाद के साथ खिलवाड़ करते हुए, जवाब देने की अपनी संस्थागत क्षमता से ज्यादा तेजी से संयुक्त और एकीकृत हो रहे विश्व में नेतृत्व का दावा कर सकता है?

महत्वपूर्ण होगा कि सभी और खासतौर पर भारत और अमेरिका, हिंद-प्रशांत से परे यूरेशिया के केंद्र में व्यवस्था की कल्पना करें। यह कल्पना लोकतंत्र के मानदंड संबंधी विचारों को नजरंदाज करते हुए, यूरेशियाई भूराजनीति वित्त और प्रौद्योगिकी के प्रावधानों, सम्पर्क तथा व्यापार तथा विविध राजनीतिक व्यवस्थाओं को समायोजित करने की इच्छा द्वारा परिभाषित होगी।

ये लेखक के निजी विचार हैं।

Uncategorized

Liberal world must stand up and be counted, or step aside and watch Pax Sinica unfold

Samir Saran

“Indo-Pacific” is in the news. The US has renamed its Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command, the shared regional vision outlined by India and Indonesia has emphasised its centrality, and the region’s political importance to India was at the core of the expansive foreign policy speech delivered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Singapore. All of these are a response to the spectacular rise of China. If this points to a future concert of powers in the region to balance Beijing’s power play, it will be an important yet insufficient measure in reaction to the Chinese project that connects Asia and Europe.

Covering 35% of the earth’s surface, Eurasia is home to five billion people living in over 90 different countries and producing nearly 70% of global GDP. For millennia conquest, trade and migration have organically bound Asia and Europe – the ebb and flow of great civilisations across this vast landmass spawned myriad political and economic dynamics of global history.

Only in the recent past, in historical terms, have these been interrupted. The Industrial Revolution in Europe and the subsequent colonisation of Asia and Africa created an artificial divide, concentrating economic and military power in ‘the West’.

Asia’s contemporary economic ascendance allows people, goods, innovation and finance to flow relatively freely across Eurasia again. But the re-emergence of the supercontinent is not frictionless. New integrative geo-economic forces bring with them new political tensions.

As history repeats and Eurasia coheres, the outlines of a new world order will be defined by who manages it and how it is managed. It is in this supercontinent that the future of democracy, of free markets and global security arrangements will be decided. And there are three key factors influencing this.

The first, to borrow a phrase from Robert Kaplan, is the revenge of geography. As much as Eurasian integration is organic, its current ‘avatar’ is decidedly Chinese. Having assessed that the divide between Europe and Asia was an artificial, modern and ‘Western’ construct, China is doing what no other power had the appetite for: conceive of, define and then manage Eurasia.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing’s choice of instrument, is creating sprawling networks of connectivity projects – each designed to embed dependency on China’s economy into this geography. Simultaneously, BRI dilutes the importance of the landmass’s sub-regions, thereby upsetting settled balance of power arrangements.

India and the European Union (EU), for example, are struggling to curb China’s creeping influence on their sub-regional political, economic and security conversations.

A “free and open” Indo-Pacific vision, and nascent coalitions like the Quadrilateral initiative seek to balance China’s rise on the maritime front. The oceans, however, are but one of China’s platforms – and a purely maritime response is inadequate.

China is relentless in pursuing this project: building infrastructure, facilitating trade, and creating alternative global institutions. Surreptitiously, China also exports its political model: “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” – a unique blend of state capitalism and authoritarianism. Unless liberal democracies propose an alternative in Eurasia that effectively addresses the infrastructure needs of countries in Asia and Africa, China’s proposition will succeed.

Here lies the second factor: the revenge of democracy. Whether it is the US, EU or India, democracies are more polarised than ever before. The Pew Global Attitude Survey consistently records that trust in democratic governments is at an all-time low. More than ever it appears that liberal democracies are bogged down by domestic crises, leaving them little energy for strategic planning. At a juncture when China’s timelines are decadal, democracies are struggling to look past their next election.

And the final factor, demography, is a double-edged sword for the entire region – especially for China. For many Eurasian countries, BRI’s economic benefits are obvious. However, in an era when nationalism is the defining mood of politics, China’s presence can be unwelcome.

China’s labour exports create tensions with younger host country populations who must now compete for employment opportunities. There is the risk that BRI will merely create infrastructure networks for extreme and radicalised organisations in unstable countries.

At home, demographic pressures might force Beijing to reconsider its ability to deliver. As younger Chinese move up the income ladder, their expectations from their government will increase. Simultaneously, the preponderance of single young men in urban regions and ageing rural populations makes Chinese society susceptible to violence and unrest. What will these demographic pressures portend for the project of Eurasian integration? Will the Chinese state have the political capital to recklessly buy influence across the world? Will demographic complexities allow others to cobble together a viable counter to the Beijing consensus?

The US has expended blood and treasure over the past nine decades to maintain its privileged position in these two regions. Russia, the original Eurasian superpower, is reduced to a glorified policeman, or more charitably, a crafty risk management consultant for Chinese expansionism. And EU can either choose to be an actor or be acted upon, one slice at a time.

It is critical that all of them, and more particularly India and the US, imagine an arrangement beyond the Indo-Pacific, into the heart of Eurasia. China’s continental-sized poser requires a supercontinental answer. It is for the liberal world to stand up and be counted, or step aside and let Pax Sinica unfold.

This commentary originally appeared in The Times of India.

Indo-pacific, Uncategorized

Eurasia: Larger than Indo-Pacific – Liberal world must stand up and be counted, or step aside and watch Pax Sinica unfold

Original article

As history repeats and Eurasia coheres, the outlines of a new world order will be defined by who manages it and how it is managed. It is in this supercontinent that the future of democracy, of free markets and global security arrangements, will be decided. And there are three key factors influencing this.

India and the European Union (EU), for example, are struggling to curb China’s creeping influence on their sub-regional political, economic and security conversations. A “free and open” Indo-Pacific vision, and nascent coalitions like the Quadrilateral initiative seek to balance China’s rise on the maritime front. The oceans, however, are but one of China’s platforms – and a purely maritime response is inadequate.

And the final factor, demography, is a double-edged sword for the entire region –, especially for China. For many Eurasian countries, BRI’s economic benefits are obvious. However, in an era when nationalism is the defining mood of politics, China’s presence can be unwelcome. China’s labour exports create tensions with younger host country populations who must now compete for employment opportunities. There is the risk that BRI will merely create infrastructure networks for extreme and radicalised organisations in unstable countries.

Sitting in New Delhi, it cannot be more obvious that India’s development and security is inextricably tied to Eurasia. India sits at the crossroads of continental Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific – the two regions that will define this century. The US has expended blood and treasure over the past nine decades to maintain its privileged position in these two regions. Russia, the original Eurasian superpower, is reduced to a glorified policeman, or more charitably, a crafty risk management consultant for Chinese expansionism. And EU can either choose to be an actor or be acted upon, one slice at a time.

Author: Samir Saran, President of Observer Research Foundation.

Uncategorized

Globalisation and the celebration of unique cultures work together within BRICS

Samir Saran

The BRICS today is a manifestation of a post ideology world — a world that can coalesce on principles, not necessarily based on political theologies.

Opening address by ORF President at the BRICS academic forum, 2018.

It is my honour to be here and share this dais with you all, my esteemed colleagues — Dr. Ivan Oliveira from Brazil, Professor Georgy Toloraya from Russia, Ms. Dong Weihua from China and lastly of course Professor Ari Sitas who is the host and leading the South Africa team. Thank you, Professor, and a thank you to your excellent team. Please accept our congratulations and gratitude for your exceptional hospitality and for the curation of an excellent agenda for this forum.

We’ve already had a great start to the academic forum — thank you Minister Pandor for your insightful opening address touching on key issues that will shape the world and our common futures over the next three decades.

Personally, I am delighted to be back in South Africa. For many of us in India, travelling to South Africa is like a journey home. Our modern history was scripted by a noble soul who found his calling on this soil. It was in South Africa where the most significant modern Indian project was born and visualised by the father of our nation, Mahatma Gandhi.

We are at an important juncture in world history, in African history and certainly in the brief BRICS journey. We are now entering the second decade of BRICS and the next decade could see the grouping play a decisive and compelling role — a constructive role in a world characterised by disruptions and despondency that looks ever more parochial and partisan and seeks new energy and leadership if it is to continue to work together, grow together and prosper together. South Africa is a perfect venue for us, academics from the BRICS countries to commit ourselves to offer ideas for our political, business and civil society leaders to consider.

South Africa is turning a new chapter. Its institutions have valiantly defended democracy and these institutions and associated laws have allowed the country to tide over some of its most difficult moments. I’m a big believer in President Cyril Ramaphosa and I’m a part of “Ramaphoria”. This is a special moment for this very special nation and we are all with you.

I believe the blueprint for Africa may well be scripted by this new administration and I am also convinced that this new administration will infuse greater energy into South Africa’s international engagement not only in this forum but also in forums such as IBSA. It is evident that South Africa is important to the world and the world is important for South Africa. The next ten years may well see South Africa take a leadership role in ideas, innovation and sustainable development — not only for its own communities and people, but also by creating a template for the entire continent.

The South African leadership of BRICS therefore comes at an appropriate time. The world is struggling with democracy and South Africa has shown us how democracy can be preserved, how peaceful transition of power can be achieved, how bitter political contests can use democratic means to discover resolution. As such, in a world where pluralism is being threatened, South Africa is a shining beacon for this continent and much of the world.

As South Africa moves to version 2.0 and renews its journey, economic and political, the second decade of BRICS will deeply benefit from this. In the 90’s South Africa promised the world a new charter for itself and a vision for a New Africa. It has more than delivered — yet, as with all our nations, there remains more to be done.

As South Africa moves to version 2.0 and renews its journey, economic and political, the second decade of BRICS will deeply benefit from this.

Even as we discuss issues on health, gender, social protection, security, education and research, economics and finance, and energy and resources, each of these themes are and will be implicated by three overarching global realities that are shaping communities, politics and societies.

The first reality is that of identity – and imbedded in this identity debate are issues around nationalism, race, ethnicity. Technology has spawned digital communities that are shaping and challenging traditions and indeed our interactions with the “other” and with ourselves. Globalisation itself has disrupted notions of who we are. We are today all global citizens with unfettered exposure to our surroundings — near and far. Yet, we are increasingly seeking old anchors in uncertain times.

The BRICS project in many ways can help us un-clutter the identity challenge. While this group adopts an increasingly outward looking approach, the collective remains deeply cognisant of its own individual cultural and historical moorings. Globalisation and the celebration of unique cultures and diversity work together within BRICS. It is not necessary for global citizenship and local cultures to be in contest — rather they can work well together and serve the larger common purpose.

Yet, as we seek globalisation, we must ensure it is a version that leaves no person behind. We must seek globalisation that serves diversity and unique perspectives that make this world richer. We must seek technologies that serve humankind and are not designed only to further wealth and prosperity for a few. We must seek global institutions that serve people and not just those who fund them and create them.

As we seek globalisation, we must ensure it is a version that leaves no person behind. We must seek globalisation that serves diversity and unique perspectives that make this world richer. We must seek technologies that serve humankind and are not designed only to further wealth and prosperity for a few.

21st Century identity challenges are shaped by the residues of the past and are further compounded by today’s complexities — issues pertaining to technology, financial access and intellectual property.

For instance, with the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, we experience a reconfiguration of traditional social and economic classes. The farm, factory and office are no longer the nodal point of economic activity and human interaction. As the importance of traditional workspaces erode, we have seen a regression to social, political, and religious beliefs of yore. The future of the work space, and work, then, will implicate our imaginations of our selves.

The BRICS community and the BRICS academic forum with their inherent diversity should provide a new template that is better able to address the challenge of identity in this digital age.

The second is the challenge of inequality. While the world has rightly focused on the undeniably important challenge of poverty eradication — it has not done enough on devising policies to respond to growing inequality. This single factor is implicating political and social stability all over the world. Inclusivity is not only about lifting individuals out of poverty but also about providing the same opportunities to all. The contours of inequality today are complex — there is inequality around access to resources, infrastructure, health and education. There is inequality around political agency. There are deeply embedded biases that prevent women leadership of political, social and economic spheres. There is inequality that still lingers from racial divides and colonial legacies.

The BRICS community and the BRICS academic forum with their inherent diversity should provide a new template that is better able to address the challenge of identity in this digital age.

The BRICS academics gathered here must take leadership in developing ideas and solutions that serve the purpose of equality and equity. We have an opportunity to be propositional and assume thought leadership on this most important risk and opportunity of our times.

Which brings me to the last challenge, that of ideology. The BRICS project of the next decade must take into account the ideological challenges arising from identity and inequality. How do we move from the development of women to women led development? How do we move from affordable housing to housing that affords basic dignity for all? How do we move from education for all to economic agency and upward mobility to all? How do we create financial models of investments that do not prey on people and countries? How do we invest in technologies that serve aspirations of all rather than scavenge data from people?

One of the pitched debates today is on the management of data. If data is to drive economic growth in the future, then data inequality must also be addressed. While the rich may be able to safeguard their data, the poor cannot afford the same luxury. Further, most of our data is housed outside of our borders, across the Atlantic. The question then is, how do we ensure the fair use of data and confer its ownership and benefits to the owners themselves. Perhaps the BRICS can provide a model for the rest of the world — it is replete with alternate solutions. Take for example the Aadhaar platform of India, the Chinese BAT framework, the Russian comparative advantage in mathematics and cryptography, the South African experimentation with financial inclusion and technology and, of course, Brazil, which pioneered the Bolsa Familia program of social inclusivity. These all offer templates that are non-Atlantic and more importantly templates catering to a whole new class of people. In our own experiments we have a treasure trove of successes and failures and we must share and then together shape a new ethic of digital growth devoid from the 20th century dogmas around socialism or capitalism, market or command economy. We must work with ideas and solutions that serve us and we must devise a new template for a digital world that makes ideas richer and ideologies weaker.

The BRICS project of the next decade must take into account the ideological challenges arising from identity and inequality.

The last decade of contemporary history has seen a vigorous renewal of ideology — from religious to economic to ethnic beliefs and cultural ecosystems. We have seen how each of them have had a significant impact on political systems and political outcomes. The digital revolution and social movements based on hashtags are creating new mobilisations that are challenging the normative order of the past, the implication of which are still unknown.

The BRICS today is a manifestation of a post ideology world — a world that can coalesce on principles, not necessarily based on political theologies. The Russian democratic system, the Chinese socialism based on new characteristics, the Indian model of political and economic choice, the South African experience and the Brazilian politics are all shaped by different histories and experiences. As an academic community it is important for us to catalogue and map these diversities of systems and to tease out and define the principles that have allowed us to work together.

The plurilateral BRICS club is proof that ideas can trump ideology. BRICS is an ideas project and the academic community must be in the driver’s seat of the ideation process. We can’t let our today restrict us from visualising a fairer and better tomorrow. Progress will not happen by chance — rather it will require the world’s collective efforts. Let us commit to this today at the summit of BRICS academics and with this spirit engage in informed debates and exchanges this week among this wonderful BRICS family.