Samir Saran| Sushant Sareen

उदारवाद का आकर्षण दक्षिण एशिया में व्यापक रूप से धूमिल पड़ चुका है। राजनीतिक पार्टियां या तो चरम वामपंथ या चरम दक्षिणपंथ की ओर बढ़ चुकी हैं।

फ़ोटो: Ricardo Resende/Unsplash

वर्तमान सदी के आरंभिक दौर में एक संसदीय समिति ने पड़ोसी देशों के साथ भारत के व्यापार की स्थिति के बारे में अपेक्षाकृत निराशाजनक रिपोर्ट जारी की। इस रिपोर्ट पर सरसरी निगाह डालने से ही क्षेत्रीय व्यापार के प्रश्न पर भारतीय नौकरशाही की संकीर्ण सोच और व्यापारिक बुद्धि वाला पुराना नजरिया स्पष्ट हो जाता है। उदाहरण के लिए, श्रीलंका के साथ मुक्त व्यापार समझौते पर हस्ताक्षर होने के लगभग तीन साल बाद भी इस दिशा में मामूली प्रगति ही हुई। कारण? कृषि क्षेत्र से संबंधित भारत की लॉबियों का कड़ा विरोध,जिन्हें डर था कि श्रीलंका से मिलने वाली जबरदस्त प्रतिस्पर्धा के कारण वे कारोबार से बाहर खदेड़ दिए जाएंगे। क्षेत्र में भारत के सबसे बड़े व्यापारिक साझेदार बांग्लादेश के मामले में भी ऐसा ही हुआ । भारत ने हिल्सा मछली और जमदानी साड़ियों जैसी वस्तुओं के लिए बाजार तक व्यापक पहुंच देने की बांग्लादेश की मांग स्वीकार नहीं की। इन देशों के पाकिस्तान के साथ व्यापारिक वार्ता शुरु करने के बाद ही भारत ने इन संबंधों पर गौर करना शुरु किया।

यहां तक कि अब, जबकि भारत ने अपने संबंधों की शर्तों पर नए सिरे विचार-विमर्श करने का प्रयास कर रहा है, तो भी यह स्पष्ट है कि उभरती भूआर्थिक और भू राजनीतिक वास्तविकताएं क्षेत्र की दिशा बदल रही हैं।

पिछले 70 बरसों के दौरान ज्यादातर समय दक्षिण एशिया का विचार भारत पर आधारित था, जिसे सामंजस्य का वाहक (एजेंट) माना जाता था । भारत का प्रभाव महज धार्मिक, सांस्कृतिक और सभ्यतागत ही नहीं था, बल्कि दक्षिण एशिया के राजनीतिक चिंतन और आर्थिक मॉडलों के केंद्र में भी था।

अब यह आज के दौर में सच नहीं रह गया है। यूं तो दक्षिण एशिया आज भी एक भौगोलिक इकाई की तरह मौजूद है, लेकिन इसके आर्थिक और राजनीतिक महत्व का केंद्र लगातार भारत से दूर खिसकता चला गया है। इसके परिणामस्वरूप, दक्षिण एशिया की पुरानी संरचना अगर मिटी नहीं है, तो मिट रही है। इस प्रक्रिया की शुरुआत के लिए क्षेत्र में भारत की प्रभावहीन शासनकला के अलावा, दो प्रमुख परिपाटियां भी उत्तरदायी हैं।

पहली, उदारवाद का आकर्षण दक्षिण एशिया में व्यापक रूप से धूमिल पड़ चुका है। केंद्र के समाप्त या गायब हो जाने के कारण क्षेत्र की ज्यादातर उदार पार्टियां सिकुड़ कर हाशिए पर जा चुकी हैं। राजनीतिक पार्टियां या तो चरम वामपंथ या चरम दक्षिणपंथ की ओर बढ़ चुकी हैं। क्षेत्र में जहां एक ओर लोकतांत्रिक शासन के चिन्ह अब भी दिखाई देते हैं, वहीं देशों में अनुदारवाद के दौर ने उन्हें उदारवादी लोकतंत्र की विशेषता वाले मूलभूत नियमों से दूर कर दिया है — भले ही पाकिस्तान में जेहादवाद और इस्लामवाद हो, बांग्लादेश में एक दल का वर्चस्व हो, मालदीव में ढीला लोकतंत्र हो (हाल के चुनाव के नतीजों के बावजूद),या नेपाल में कट्टर राष्ट्रवाद हो। ये मूलभूत नियम काफी हद तक, क्षेत्र के लिए नेहरुवादी विज़न के अनुरूप हैं — और भारत लम्बे अर्से तक क्षेत्र की लोकतांत्रिक सामर्थ्य का सहारा रहा है। इस विजन को अब सिर्फ भारत में ही नहीं, बल्कि उसके आस-पड़ोस में भी चुनौती मिलने लगी है।

चीन ‘बेल्ट एंड रोड इनिशिएटिव’ के जरिए एशिया की औपनिवेशिक विरासतों — समुदायों को बांटने वाली एकपक्षीय राजनीतिक सीमाओं को — निरंतर मिटा रहा है। चीन की योजना में, दक्षिण एशिया, ढांचागत परियोजनाओं के जटिल नेटवर्क की महज एक गांठ भर है, जो आखिरकार अखिल यूरेशियाई व्यवस्था का सृजन करेगी। चीन इस उपमहाद्वीप में सुरक्षा, विकास और आर्थिक विकास के अकेले निर्णयाक के तौर पर उभरना चाहता है। चीन नहीं चाहता कि क्षेत्रवाद इस उद्देश्य का ध्यान बंटाए — न ही वह भारत जैसी ताकतों को अपना प्रभाव क्षेत्र कायम करने देना चाहता है। चीन के लिए, ऐसे में किसी तरह की विशिष्ट दक्षिण एशियाई पहचान कोई मायने नहीं रखती । इसकी बजाए वह पाकिस्तान और मालदीव जैसे मुट्ठी भर ग्राहक (क्लाइंट) देशों और बांग्लादेश, नेपाल और श्रीलंका जैसे देशों के साथ आर्थिक संरक्षण की व्यवस्था से उसकी महाद्वीपीय महत्वाकांक्षा की सुरक्षा और आर्थिक हितों की पूर्ति हो सकेगी। वास्तविकता तो यह है कि चीन के मानसिक विश्व मानचित्र में स्वतंत्र दक्षिण एशियाई संरचना के लिए कोई स्थान नहीं है।

लगभग सत्तर बरस के बाद दक्षिण एशिया 1.0 बहुलता की ओर बढ़ रहा है, ऐसे में भारत को हर हाल में दक्षिण एशिया 2.0 की दिशा में प्रयास करने चाहिए, जो आखिरकार बीटा वर्जन का स्थान ले सकेगा, जिस पर वर्तमान में चीन का वर्चस्व है।

चीन की शिकायत या नकल करने से कुछ खास मदद नहीं मिलेगी। लेकिन क्या चीन से प्रतिस्पर्धा करने या उसका मुकाबला करने से कुछ हासिल होगा? आर्थिक, तकनीकी और सैन्य क्षेत्रों में चीन और भारत की ताकत के बीच फासला आज और निकट भविष्य के लिहाज से बहुत ज्यादा है।

ऐसे में सामरिक प्रश्न यह उठता है : भारत इस क्षेत्र में अपना वर्चस्व और प्रभाव कैसे दोबारा हासिल कर सकता है?

सबसे पहले, तो भारत को रणनीतिक संयम प्रदर्शित करना होगा। दूसरे शब्दों में कहें, तो भारत को चीन से सबक सीखने और तेंग शियाओपिंग के कथन ”सही समय आने तक अपनी क्षमताओं को छुपा कर रखो” का अनुसरण करने की जरूरत है।

मौजूदा सत्ता समीकरण को देखते हुए, भारत के लिए अपनी अर्थव्यवस्था का आकार दुगना करने यानी अगले दशक तक मौजूदा 2.6 ट्रिलियन डॉलर से बढ़ा कर 5 ट्रिलियन डॉलर करने तक ज्यादा व्यापक भूमिका निभा पाना नामुमकिन होगा। आवश्यक आर्थिक भार उठाए बगैर अपना प्रभाव आजमाने से सिर्फ पड़ोसियों के साथ रिश्तों में जटिलता ही आएगी। ऐसे में भारत के लिए अच्छा यही रहेगा कि वह फिलहाल कदम पीछे हटा ले। इस समय क्षेत्र के लिए नयी योजनाओं की घोषणा करने की बजाए, भारत को अपनी मौजूदा प्रतिबद्धताओं को पूरा करना चाहिए और तब तक इंतजार करना चाहिए, जब तक भारतीय क्षमताओं में मूलभूत वृद्धि स्वाभाविक तौर पर आस-पड़ोस में उसकी भूमिका और प्रभाव में इजाफा न कर दे।

दूसरा, भारत को दूसरे देशों के मामलों में हस्तक्षेप न करने के नेहरू के सिद्धांत का पालन करना चाहिए। ताकत और प्रभाव के बिना दूसरों को उपदेश देने से पड़ोसियों के साथ सिर्फ नफरत और फासले ही बढ़ेंगे।

भारत को जहां एक ओर अधिकारों पर आधारित एजेंडे के लिए अपनी प्रतिबद्धताओं से समझौता नहीं करना चाहिए, वहीं दूसरी ओर उसे इस एजेंडे को व्यापक रूप देते हुए नैतिकता का एंग्लो—सैक्सन संस्करण (या पाखंड) बनाने की लालसा त्याग देनी चाहिए।

तीसरा, भारत को दक्षिण एशिया भर में चीनी निवेश के लिए सहयोग करना चाहिए, उसे बढ़ावा देना चाहिए और उसका माध्यम बनना चाहिए। यह बात समझने में मुश्किल लग सकती है, लेकिन यदि लक्ष्य-क्षेत्र में भारत के प्रभुत्व को बहाल करना है, तो यह बहुत बड़ा सामरिक बोध है। चीन का अधिकांश निवेश बुनियादी ढांचा और विनियामक व्यवस्था भी तैयार करेगा, जो इन अर्थव्यवस्थाओं के साथ भारत के बाजार को भी जोड़ेगा। अगले दशक में, जब भारत की अर्थव्यवस्था को 5 ट्रिलियन डॉलर के निशान को पार करेगी, तो इस तरह के निवेश भारतीय मुद्रा को क्षेत्र में अपना प्रभाव बहाल करने में मदद करेंगे। ऐसा तभी हो सकेगा, जब चीन के धन के कुछ हिस्सा भारतीय माध्यमों के जरिए प्रसारित किया जाए। उदाहरण के लिए — एशियन इंफ्रास्ट्रक्चर इन्वेस्टमेंट बैंक की तर्ज पर साउथ एशियन डेवलपमेंट बैंक (एसएडीबी)की स्थापना की जाए। केवल इसी मामले में, संस्थागत व्यवस्था से भारतीय नेतृत्व को मदद मिलेगी, जबकि चीन उसका सबसे बड़ा साझेदार होगा। आखिरकार इंडियन ओशन डेवलेपमेंट बैंक की स्थापना के जरिए एसएडीबी के विचार का विस्तार किया जा सकता है, जो हिंद महासागर के तटीय देशों की विकास संबंधी जरूरतें पूरी करेगा।

वक्त आ चुका है कि भारत पीछे हटे और पड़ोसी देशों को चीन के बारे में अपने फैसले खुद लेने दें।

अंत में, भारत को अमेरिका और चीन के साथ अपने संबंधों में संतुलन कायम करने की जरूरत है। दक्षिण एशिया के लिए अपनी जंग जीतने के लिए, चीन और अमेरिका दोनों ही विरोधाभासी तरीके से भारत के लिए महत्वपूर्ण साझेदार है। भारत के दीर्घकालिक आर्थिक विकास के लिए भारतीय बाजारों में चीन का निवेश महत्वपूर्ण बना रहेगा, जबकि अमेरिका की सैन्य क्षमताएं चीन के उदय को संतुलित रखने और मैनेज करने में भारत की मदद करेंगी। एक तरफ, भारत को दक्षिण एशिया में अपने प्रतिनिधित्व को सीमित किए बिना अमेरिका को अपना सुरक्षा साझेदार बनाना होगा। अमेरिका अब ज्यादा महत्वपूर्ण ब्रांड नहीं रह गया है, ऐसे में दक्षिण एशिया से संबंधित भारत की व्यापक रणनीति के दायरे में अमेरिका को लाना प्रतिकूल भी साबित हो सकता है। वहीं दूसरी तरफ, भारत को चीन की क्षेत्रीय योजनाओं को चुपचाप स्वीकार किए बिना उसके धन को स्वीकार करना चाहिए। वास्तव में, यदि भारत को चीन से मुकाबला करना है, तो उसे चीन के ही कंधों पर सवार होना पड़ेगा। यह फैसला बेहतरीन मिसाल बन सकता है: भारत को चीन की महत्वाकांक्षाओं का लाभ उसी तरीके से उठाना चाहिए, जिस तरह चीन के उदय को अमेरिका की अर्थव्यवस्था से सहायता मिली थी। आने वाले दशकों में यही संतुलन कायम करना भारत की प्राथमिकता होनी चाहिए।

वास्तविकता तो यह है कि उपनिवेशवादी लालसा के विरोध के प्रति गहन, गंभीर और भावनात्मक प्रतिबद्धता होने के बावजूद, भारत बेपरवाही से मानता आया है कि भूराजनीति के केंद्र बिंदु आने वाले दशकों में भी यथावत रहेंगे।

दुनिया में कहीं भी ये हकीकत नहीं हैं और काहिरा और बगदाद जैसे शहर अपने अतीत की परछाइयां भर हैं। दक्षिण एशिया 2.0 बनने के लिए भारत को इस क्षेत्र को ब्रिटिश राज के साम्राज्यवादी प्रिज्म से देखना बंद करना होगा। क्षेत्र में भारत की व्यापक नीति के मार्गदर्शक पुराने नारे नहीं, बल्कि नई वास्तविकताएं होनी चाहिए। भारत को आजादी के संक्रमण काल में जो संस्थागत कमजोरियां विरासत में मिली हैं, उन्हें सुधारना होगा, ताकि वह आधुनिक अर्थव्यवस्था की जटिलताओं का 5,000 साल पुराने सभ्यतागत लोकाचारों के साथ मिश्रण कर सके। भारत का दृष्टिकोण उदारवादी लोकतंत्र के प्रति संकल्पबद्धता के साथ त्वरित आर्थिक वृद्धि और क्षेत्रीय अखंडता के निरंतर प्रयासों से मार्गदर्शित होना चाहिए। अपनी प्रगति होने पर, भारत को क्षेत्र की प्रगति पर भी ध्यान देना चाहिए।। कहना आसान है, लेकिन करना मुश्किल है, भले ही क्षेत्र के लिए भारत की ओर से व्यक्त की गई कुछ प्रतिबद्धताएं उसके अपने कारोबारों के लिए कुछ अवधि के लिए देर के लिए मुश्किलों भरी हो सकती हैं। वे उपाय करने के लिए उदार हृदय, साहसपूर्ण दृढ़ता और दूरदर्शितापूर्ण प्रबंधन की जरूरत है, जो केवल नकली पक्षपातरहित राजनीतिक सर्वसम्मति की उपज हो सकती है।

ये लेखक के निजी विचार हैं।

Samir Saran

It will take a very prolonged series of successful trust building before more sensitive issues like Kashmir are even discussed with any credibility.

Beating retreat ceremony in the India-Pakistan border at Wagah. Photo: Press Trust of India

India and Pakistan made some significant overtures since the formation of new government in Islamabad, which rekindled hopes of peaceniks in both the countries. But the parleys proved short-lived. The battle lines are drawn again as accusations and counter-accusations fly thick and fast. This week, the foreign ministers of the two countries took their war of words to the UN General Assembly.

The following is an interview of Samir Saran with the Tehran Times.

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The formation of a new government in Islamabad had rekindled hopes of peace and reconciliation between India and Pakistan, after the two sides made a series of overtures and looked interested in opening a new chapter in their bilateral ties. But, now it has again been put on the backburner. What makes this relationship so fragile?

The relationship remains fragile for structural reasons. Issues of identity and a shared sense of historical animosity have hardcoded themselves into both countries’ politics. And in today’s polarised media environment, opinions on these issues are sharper and more amplified than ever before. These factors make any true reconciliation very difficult.

Imran Khan in his victory speech said he will take two steps if India took one. And Narendra Modi had called to congratulate him on his thumping victory in Pakistan general elections. Do you think the two leaders were really sincere in improving bilateral ties?

No, it is unlikely that they were. This welcoming rhetoric is often visible when new administrations take office, but rarely lasts very long for the reasons outlined in my first response.

Everything seemed to be going as per the script until India called off foreign minister level talks on the side lines of UNGA, citing killing of policemen in Kashmir and release of stamps in Pakistan commemorating a Kashmiri militant commander. Do you think there are shadowy forces working overtime to sabotage peace process?

The Pakistani Army remains a key interlocutor in Pakistan-India relations. Their overwhelming control over most aspects of Pakistan’s political and social life is built on a hardline Islamic identity and hostility towards India. Prospects of peace with India always threaten these realities — and the Army has often attempted to sabotage any attempts at constructive outreach.

Some experts opine that PM Modi decided to call off talks since he doesn’t wish to antagonise his loyal Hindu vote bank in India ahead of next year’s general election. What is your take on it?

Talks with Pakistan are always politically sensitive in India — irrespective of which party is in power. Having said that, no administration has ever hesitated to take this risk if real and constructive outcomes were on the horizon. At this time, it is evident that there was no such possibility — and any administration in India would have rather called off talks.

Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaking at the UN accused India of “financing, facilitating and orchestrating terrorism in Pakistan,” citing the case of Kulbushan Yadav, who he called “Indian state-sponsored terrorist.” How would you react to that?

This is not new rhetoric in Pakistan, nor will it be the last time it is used. It is merely a very weak attempt to delegitimise India’s credible complaints over the extent to which terrorism has been mainstreamed in Pakistan.

The crossborder shelling and ceasefire violations continue unabated. In recent years, the violations of the ceasefire accord the two countries signed in 2003 have assumed alarming proportions. What according to you is the most important trigger for it?

Unlike 2003, the global order today is far more strained and uncertain. With Pakistan now being bankrolled by the Chinese and India preparing to take on a global leadership role, both countries are likely more confident in their strategic capability to gain the upper hand against the other.

The civil society and think tanks in both the countries, including yours, are very strong and they have been relentlessly campaigning for peace and dialogue between the two countries. Do you think the strong political will is missing to resolve outstanding issues including Kashmir?

Political will is certainly important. As I have said earlier, however, the India-Pakistan relationship is held hostage by many structural impediments. It will take a very prolonged series of successful trust building before more sensitive issues like Kashmir are even discussed with any credibility.

Russian President Vladmir Putin visited India this week for 19th India-Russia summit. How do you view prospects of India-Russia defense cooperation taking into account US sanctions?

Russia is, and will remain in the foreseeable future, India’s primary defense partner. And American sanctions are unlikely to change India’s choices. In fact, India is likely to make a strong case for exceptions from Washington’s sanctions even as it continues security cooperation with Moscow.

India is yet to take the final decision on oil trade with Iran, although reports suggest that New Delhi will seek waivers from US to continue importing oil from Tehran. Why is there so much suspense and delay?

India will continue to expand its energy and development cooperation with Tehran. Unfortunately, however, Indian firms and businesses are quite dependent on the American financial system. Therefore, while the political rhetoric makes clear that India will pursue its independent strategic interests, commercial realities are often difficult to overcome.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Samir Saran| Terri Chapman|Rakesh Kumar Sinha|Suchi Kedia|Sriram Gutta

The future of work in India is uncertain, but full of opportunities. This report attempts to answer key questions around the present and future of transformative technology in India and its impact on job creation, workplaces, employment trends and relations, and the nature of work itself.

Our research reveals that companies in India are optimistic about the future and are open to the possibilities presented by new technologies and digitisation. This optimism is likely to stimulate innovation and adoption of new technology and drive transformation, growth and progress. This report sets out a roadmap for an inclusive future of work in India that capitalises on the opportunities presented by technological disruption and digitisation. By using the opportunities at hand, India can:

• Generate sufficient new employment opportunities for the existing and growing labour force.
• Create decent jobs with better wages, security, protections and safety, necessary for improving individual and household welfare and well-being.
• Ensure equal opportunities for women, youth and other marginalised communities previously unable to participate equally in the paid economy.
• Establish an ecosystem better equipped to prepare the workforce for changing skill and educational requirements.
• Create of an inclusive policy environment which balances the need for job creation with the interests of workers.

This report outlines findings from the Future of Work, Education and Skills Enterprise Survey. Data was collected from 774 companies in India, from micro-sized firms to those employing more than 25,000 workers. It presents findings on the pace of technological adoption and digitisation among Indian companies, and its impact on job creation, displacement and nature of work. In addition to the effects of the changing nature of jobs on wages, contracts, protections and security. Finally, the report includes recommendations on policies, programmes and action needed for India to leverage the possibilities of technological disruption, manage the associated risks, and enhance its preparedness for the future of work in the digital age.

To read the full issue, click here.

Samir Saran

As Russia repositions itself as an Asian power, it has a unique role to play in the region.

File Photo

The following is a recent interview of Samir Saran with Valdai Club. Saran shares his view of the emerging Asia-centric world order and Russia’s place in it.

“Russia always identified itself as a European power, and Eurasia was a compromise,” he said on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok earlier in September. “It is now starting to see itself as a key actor, interlocutor and power in the Asian century.”

“Russia is a continental and maritime power simultaneously,” said Saran. “Which is why there can be no Asian order without Russia being a central part of the bargain,” he added. “There can be no Eurasian integration, and no Pacific or Arctic arrangement without Russia having an important stake in framing the rules.”

According to Saran, Russia must closely consider whether it is prepared to play this role. “Sometimes I think that Russia does not fully realize its own potential: it often sees itself as a disruptor; but not as a manager — a benefactor that must sustain and stabilize the system,” he pointed out.

“For that to happen, Russia’s economy has to grow in the coming decade to about four trillion dollars. Otherwise, Russia will be tempted to play the role of a political interrupter rather than that of a political guarantor — a responsibility it must bear if it is be a consequential actor in the 21^st century. To guarantee the Asian order, Russia will have to grow its ambitions, its economy and its institutions.”

That said, the two crucial powers defining the future Asian order are China and India. The question is whether they will try to create something new or adopt existing institutions and practices. According to Saran, the answer is both. “India and China have grown exponentially in less than three decades. India still has a journey to complete — maybe another 15 years before it becomes a 10 trillion dollars economy. Still, neither are fully capable of upending the rules of international institutions altogether. They will have to, in many ways, rely on the old ones, and maybe change and reform them.”

This means that the old institutions will work in new ways. “If one looks at some of the Western institutions like the OECD, the UN, and the World Bank — many of them are operating in consonance with China’s infrastructure projects and international agenda,” Saran said. “In that sense, China’s rise has changed the very character of international institutions.”

According to Saran, the same will happen with India within the next 15 years: “Size matters, and both India and China have reached their critical point. It is impossible for the world to be stable and prosperous without these two actors having an important role in the order of things.”

However, it would be wrong to suggest that the Asian order will be dominated by a few powers. It should be more plural than the current one, Saran believes. According to him, it will take seven or eight countries for the Asian order to finally emerge. Apart from China, India, and Russia, these would include Japan, some of the ASEAN states, and possibly Iran and Saudi Arabia.

On the institutional level, “any organisation that allows the countries to talk and synthesize diverse political systems, economic models, and ideas on peace and security will work,” Saran said. But since Asians are “highly sovereign,” any such arrangement has to be democratic and plural; it must be based on the “one country-one vote” principle.

Asked if the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could serve as a prototype for such an institution, Saran said that in its current version it is a “good beginning.”

“I think that institutions like the SCO are important, but this does not mean than the SCO is the best option. If is starts serving only Shanghai, then it will lose its meaning. But if it becomes a ‘round table,’ where seven or eight large countries could sit down and discuss key questions, then it is becomes useful and meaningful,” he pointed out.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Samir Saran| Lina Sonne

The last few years have exposed faultlines in what was once considered an integrated and seamless digital realm. These cracks have origins beyond the usual suspects. The “walls” dividing cyberspace have sprung up from within liberal democracies, throwing in question their commitment to — as the cliché goes — a “free and open” internet. The United States withdrew in 2017 from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and in the absence of its most powerful votary, the TPP’s promises on interoperability and uninterrupted flows of digital information ring hollow. The European Union has enacted one of the most far-reaching regulatory impositions on the flow of data to and from the continent in the form of the General Data Protection Regulations and the murmurings around control of the flow of technology have gained traction in the past weeks.

The GDPR, some have argued, will have the consequence of “exporting” strong privacy laws to emerging economies, which are yet to craft data protection legislations. A more likely outcome is that these economies will wean themselves away from, or script exceptional standards to manage digital commerce with the EU. Of course, opposition to the further integration of digital networks has also emerged from cybersecurity regulations in China and Russia. India’s own experiment with the data protection bill is promising to upend some old assumptions around doing business with the largest digital democracy.

This year’s Digital Debates picks up the pervasive distrust with Big Tech and the reactive regimes that have sprung up. It also discusses the often-negative spillover effects of digital communities on the real at an unprecedented velocity, emphasising the need to extend solutions beyond the virtual. Stephanie MacLellan explores this confluence of offline and digital tools to mitigate the effect of disinformation on social order across national boundaries.

Rajeev Mantri’s “Reassessing Received Wisdom”, as promised, calls for thinking through ownership, portability and control of data more carefully – not against the background of extant theories of regulation. Specifically, he recommends reimagining competition law for the digital economy. Fittingly, KS Park, author of “Data Socialism”, moves the needle and warns against over-regulating the data market or granting ownership of data to subjects if the effect is to the detriment of realising societal benefits from data sharing.

India’s recent data protection framework is the country’s first attempt to balance some of these competing priorities – protecting a nascent but fast-growing digital economy and the rights of a billion users. Laura Sallstrom et al. argue that the Indian iteration is “GDPR-lite” – mimicking their EU counterpart but not sucessfully. Data localisation, according to the authors, was considered and discarded by Europe since it poses economic risks. An approach they advocate India must follow—being an economic beneficiary to the incidence of cross-border data flows.

Instead of localisation, India can consider an alternative mechanism such as a data sharing agreement under the rubric of the US Cloud Act in accessing electronic information held in the US – Justin Hemmings et al. have elaborated on this workaround in “Foundations of a Potential Executive Agreement between India and the US”. Finally, Sidhant Kumar writes on the day-old judgement delivered by the Indian Supreme Court holding the world’s largest unique digital identity project to be constitutional. Conscious of performing a balancing act, the Supreme Court, according to the author, favoured dogged pragmatism and not ideological dogma. All of this indicates that property rights, sovereignty and virtual territoriality continue to vex the global stakehokders and are de jeure creating a splinternet.

The world is witnessing, therefore, comprehensive attempts by states to govern data, the infrastructure that it is hosted on, the platforms that harvest it, and even the people who use it. The recent sight of Silicon Valley CEOs making a beeline to testify and placate US Senate Committees underlines the reality that governments, whether good or bad, autocratic or democratic, are fundamentally skeptical about the social, political and economic consequences of new technologies, and will always seek to manage them.

Given this climate, it should not surprise anyone that the Indian state too has pushed – not without opposition or controversy – for data localisation. The main trigger for this proposal has been the ceaseless troubles of Indian law enforcement agencies in securing data from abroad for criminal investigation or prosecution. But the idea has easily found takers from within India’s digital companies, which are keen to insulate themselves from foreign competition and create institutional architecture that can help leverage their data analytics capabilities with locally available data. Here too, the Indian state (and established players in the private sector) are pushing for certain favourable political and economic outcomes by altering the basic DNA of the internet. Time will tell whether those outcomes materialise, but the regulatory impulse is here to stay.

If regulatory decrees are to be implemented, home-grown legal and technical standards that can function as reliable and predictable metrics for businesses and digital platforms are necessary. Amber Sinha et al. drive this point home in “Reading ‘Necessity’ in India’s New Data Protection Bill”. The principle of necessity, for instance, is critical to determine if the information sought by the data fiduciary or collector is necessary for the purpose it seeks to achieve. The authors argue that while the term “necessity” is copiously used in the draft law and would be critical to its enforcement, the same principle is not well-defined in Indian jurisprudence. Anushka Kaushik reasons that technical yardsticks, specifically encryption, in the face of competing objectives of stakeholders must be the product of mutual trust and responsibility.

Securing cyberspace or safeguarding rights online is not the only prerogative of the regulator or the state in the digital economy. Governments hold the mandate of ensuring that those at the bottom of the pyramid can exercise their agency online, perhaps in ways more impactful than in the real world. As low-cost smartphones and data bring about an entire generation of first-time internet users, policymakers must strive to grant access and security in addition to rights. Lina Sonne evaluates this trend through the increasing democratisation of content production, distribution and viewership online – mobile phones have doubled up as TV screens providing entertainment on the move, bringing “primetime” to an end. Even as local language content online increases in volume, Ashwin Rangan notes that the internet is still predominantly “English”. In his contribution titled, “Breaking the Linguistic Barriers to Accessing the Internet”, he identifies the challenges to achieving a truly global internet.

Motivated by increasing inclusion, governments’ digitisation drives are determined to push digital payments. Sidharth Deb proposes that any such policy approach to increase adoption must be combined with promoting ecosystem integrity and building trust with end-users.

Just as we witness the internet being “weaponised” to serve different ends, we must be humble about the transformative potential of technology. The same tool of freedom can quickly turn into a tool of oppression, manifesting socio-economic inequalities found offline. Vidisha Mishra argues that while the flexibility of the gig economy may bring more women into the workforce, these platforms may not be empowering. Withoutaddressing structural inequalities, such as the wage gap, women stand to be disproportionately affected even after transitions in the labour market. Mihir Sharma in his contribution, “A 21-Century Social Contract”, believes that a new form of social protection must be designed to adequately address these labour transitions. He points out that the increasing individualisation of labour must be met with a 21st-century economy that can work for everybody. Amina Khairy further argues that education and skilling in STEM must increase offline to truly reap the benefits that the internet offers.

Crystal-gazing is seldom an advisable pursuit, especially to discern trends in technology policy, but two issues on the horizon bear mention. Efforts to craft technology restriction regimes have recently (re)gained momentum, although export controls are unlikely to have any meaningful effect in keeping “bad” technologies from “bad” actors. In most of the developing world, export controls are perceived as technology “denial” regimes, and only facilitate the creation of networks and communities that have a vested interest in suppressing democratic aspirations or destabilise digital and physical infrastructure. Creative and agile arrangements are required to tackle the problem of proliferation of malicious ICT tools: such an arrangement has to involve the concerns of the private sector, both from developing and advanced economies. While responses that will work are hard to fathom, it may be safe to suggest that they would be technological in essence and unlikely to work if they are premised on treaties or legislation.

And finally, developments in “intelligent” platforms and services throw up — with apologies to Donald Rumsfeld — two “known unknowns” and two “unknown unknowns”. The first “known unknown” is the effect of AI on bias. Pundits and technocrats both acknowledge that intelligent algorithms could perpetuate bias along the lines of race, gender and class. But we do not know what causal pathways of bias will look like and whether AI will simply mirror or exacerbate existing problems.

The second “known unknown” is the geopolitical consequences of differential access to AI. It is one thing to say some states will have lethal autonomous weapons and others won’t, but access to AI translates to more than just military superiority. It is also crucial to governance platforms and services. The North-South divide in technology is already grave, but will the effect of sentient machines, with their ability to disrupt supply chains, labour markets and livelihoods compound it?

The first “unknown unknown” is whether the current conversation on “ethics” in AI will eclipse a rights-based approach to developing intelligent machines. Just as the international community appears to be close to a consensus on the promotion of human rights online, the ethical “front-loading” of AI governance could well derail that conversation. Do we share universal ethics? If not, whose “ethic” does the machine represent? The developer, business or region in which it is developed?

The second “unknown unknown” is the interweaving of identity between human and machine. Reports have recently surfaced of men trying to pursue sexually laden conversations with smart assistants and even of brutalised treatment of synthetic lifelike toys. If we engage machines in any activity that involves “human” emotion, what does that make machines? More importantly, what does our engagement with them tell us about ourselves? The digital debates of today focus on how humans should govern machines — their data, infrastructure and stability. Those of tomorrow may well focus on the new identity discourse framed around our conversations with a new intelligent being albeit shaped in our image.

Digital Debates, the journal that chronicles contemporary thinking and dialogues and along with “CyFy: The India Conference on Technology, Security and Society” will continue to seek new voices, ideas, solutions and concerns.

To read the full issue, click here

Samir Saran| Terri Chapman| Rakesh Kumar Sinha|Suchi Kedia|Sriram Gupta

The future of work in India is uncertain, but full of opportunities. This report attempts to answer key questions around the present and future of transformative technology in India and its impact on job creation, workplaces, employment trends and relations, and the nature of work itself.

Our research reveals that companies in India are optimistic about the future and are open to the possibilities presented by new technologies and digitisation. This optimism is likely to stimulate innovation and adoption of new technology and drive transformation, growth and progress. This report sets out a roadmap for an inclusive future of work in India that capitalises on the opportunities presented by technological disruption and digitisation. By using the opportunities at hand, India can:

• Generate sufficient new employment opportunities for the existing and growing labour force.
• Create decent jobs with better wages, security, protections and safety, necessary for improving individual and household welfare and well-being.
• Ensure equal opportunities for women, youth and other marginalised communities previously unable to participate equally in the paid economy.
• Establish an ecosystem better equipped to prepare the workforce for changing skill and educational requirements.
• Create of an inclusive policy environment which balances the need for job creation with the interests of workers.

This report outlines findings from the Future of Work, Education and Skills Enterprise Survey. Data was collected from 774 companies in India, from micro-sized firms to those employing more than 25,000 workers. It presents findings on the pace of technological adoption and digitisation among Indian companies, and its impact on job creation, displacement and nature of work. In addition to the effects of the changing nature of jobs on wages, contracts, protections and security. Finally, the report includes recommendations on policies, programmes and action needed for India to leverage the possibilities of technological disruption, manage the associated risks, and enhance its preparedness for the future of work in the digital age.

To read the full issue, click here.

Suchi Kedia is Community Specialist, Regional Agenda — India and South Asia, World Economic Forum.

Sriram Gutta is Community Lead, Regional Agenda — India and South Asia, World Economic Forum, Geneva.

Samir Saran|Sushant Sareen

Around the turn of the century, an Indian Parliamentary committee released a rather pessimistic report on the state of India’s trade with its neighbours. Even a brief glance through the report would reveal the small minded and antiquated mercantilist approach of Indian officialdom when it comes to regional trade. For instance, almost three years after signing a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka, very little progress was visible. The reason? Stiff resistance from agricultural lobbies in India who feared that competition from Sri Lanka would drive them out of business. In the case of Bangladesh, India’s largest trading partner in the region, the story was the same. India would not concede to Bangladesh’s demands for greater market access for goods like Hilsa fish and Jamdani sarees. It was only when these countries began to talk trade with Pakistan did India pay some attention to these relationships.

Sitting in New Delhi nearly two decades later, it is hard to argue that this report has produced any new wisdom in India. The fact remains that India has failed to serve as an engine of economic prosperity for the entire subcontinent. South Asia remains one of the least integrated subregions in the world. Without benefiting from India’s markets or investments, its neighbours see India as an unattractive and increasingly unwelcome partner. And unlike two decades ago, a more ambitious power is willing to fill the void left by India: Beijing. Unsurprisingly then, India has been pushed to second place by the Chinese who are now the largest trading partners and investors in most of the region.

For most of the last 70 years, the very idea of South Asia was premised on India as the agent of coherence. Its influence was not just religious, cultural and civilizational, but was also central to the political thought and economic models of South Asia.

This is no longer true today. While South Asia continues to exist as a geographical entity, its economic and political centre of gravity has inexorably shifted away from New Delhi. As a result, the old construct of South Asia is dying, if it is not dead already. And apart from India’s ineffectual statecraft in the region, two key trends have engendered this process.

First, the appeal of liberalism has considerably diminished in South Asia. Most liberal parties in the region have been reduced to the fringe because of the death or disappearance of the centre. Political parties have either moved to the extreme left or the extreme right. While the trappings of democratic governance are visible in the region, the march of illiberalism has seen most countries move away from the Grundnorm predicated on liberal democracy—whether it is jihadism and Islamism in Pakistan, single party domination in Bangladesh, an enervated democracy in Maldives (notwithstanding the results of its recent elections), or ultranationalism in Nepal. To a great extent, this Grundnorm conformed to a Nehruvian vision for the region — and India has long anchored the region’s democratic potential. That vision is now not just being challenged in India but also in its neighbourhood.

Second, China’s ambitions are eroding the very identity of South Asia. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is steadily erasing Asia’s colonial legacies — the arbitrary political boundaries that separate its communities. In China’s design, South Asia is but one node in a complex network of infrastructure projects which will ultimately create a Pan Eurasian system. The Middle Kingdom intends to emerge as the sole arbiter of security, development and economic growth in this supercontinent. China cannot afford to let regionalism distract from this objective — nor can it allow powers like India to carve out their own spheres of influence. For China, then, a distinct South Asian identity is purposeless. Instead, a handful of client states like Pakistan and Maldives, and a system of economic patronage with countries like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka serve the security and economic interests of its continental ambition. The fact is that there is no space for an independent South Asian construct in China’s mental map of the world.

Complaining or cribbing about China is not going to be of much help. But will competing or confronting China serve any purpose? The power differential between India and China in the economic, technological and military spheres is just too great today and for the near term.

The strategic question, then, is: How should India regain its prominence and influence in the region?

Given existing power equations, it will be impossible for India to play a sufficiently expansive role until it doubles the size of its economy from the current $2.6 trillion to over $5 trillion over the next decade. Trying to exercise influence without the necessary economic heft will only complicate relations with neighbours. It would therefore be a better idea for India to step back for now. Instead of announcing new plans for the region at this point in time, India should meet existing commitments and bide its time until the organic rise of Indian capabilities naturally enhances its role and influence in the neighbourhood.

Second, India must follow the Nehruvian dictum of non intervention in the affairs of other countries. Preaching without power and influence only invites disdain and increases the distance between neighbours.

Third, India should collaborate, catalyse and become the conduit for Chinese investments across South Asia. While this may appear counterintuitive if the aim is to restore India’s preeminence in the region, it makes great strategic sense. Most of China’s investments will also create infrastructure and regulatory ecosystems that will ease integration of these economies with India’s own market. Over the next decade, when India’s economy exceeds the $5 trillion mark, these very investments will allow Indian money to reclaim influence in the region. This will work if a portion of Chinese money is also routed through Indian instruments — for example, by setting up a South Asian Development Bank (SADB) along the lines of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Only in this case, the institutional arrangement will support India’s leadership role while China will be the largest partner. The SADB idea can eventually be expanded by setting up an Indian Ocean Development Bank, which will address the development requirements of the Indian Ocean littorals.

Finally, India will need to balance its relations with the US and China. Paradoxically, both the US and China are critical partners for India to win the battle for South Asia. China’s investments in India’s markets will remain critical to Delhi’s long term economic growth; while the United States’ military capability will help India balance and manage China’s rise. On the one hand, New Delhi will have to embrace Washington as a security partner without limiting its own agency in South Asia. The US is not a very sellable brand today, and bringing the US into India’s grand strategy for South Asia may be counterproductive. On the other hand, India must accept Chinese money without acquiescing to its regional design. Indeed, India will have to ride on China’s shoulders if it is to compete with Beijing. This decision would have the best possible precedent: India must leverage Chinese ambition in much the same manner that China’s rise was supported by America’s economy. Finding this balance must be India’s priority in the coming decade.

Nowhere in the world is this true and cities like Cairo and Baghdad are mere shadows of their former selves. Incubating South Asia 2.0 will require India to stop looking at the region from the imperial prism of the British Raj. New realities and not old shibboleths must guide India’s grand policy in the region. The institutional weaknesses that India inherited at the cusp of independence will need to be fixed for India to be able to blend the sophistication of its modern economy with a 5000 year old civilisational ethos. Rapid economic growth combined with a commitment to liberal democracy within and sustained efforts at regional integration must guide India’s approach. As it grows, India must take the region with her. This is easier said than done, given that some economic commitments to the region may be painful in the short run to India’s own businesses. Those measures require a large heart, bold conviction and far-sighted stewardship, which can only be the product of a forged non-partisan, political consensus.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

Samir Saran

While the new Indo-Pacific construct continues to grab headlines, India’s recent diplomatic orientation points to a renewed appreciation of what American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski called the world’s “decisive geopolitical chessboard”: Eurasia. In order to grasp the significance of this strategic space, it is useful to compare it with the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific.

Source: PTI

The Indo-Pacific is a union of two maritime geographies, shaped for several decades by American presence and its grand strategy. This arrangement is now being challenged by the rise of China, with New Delhi seeking to carve out a new alignment of likeminded countries to sustain an order beneficial to its interests.

Eurasia, on the other hand, is the intersection of two continental and normative spaces: Europe and Asia. Russia is the archetypal Eurasian power; its foreign policy is shaped in equal measure by the ever-changing dynamics of both Asia and Europe, and balanced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As in the Indo-Pacific, this region is also seeing new engagements spurred by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Given this state of affairs, India renewed interest in Eurasia and its engagement with Moscow acquires further salience.

Between these two regions, however, lies a predicament for India’s foreign policy.

On the other hand, India’s engagement with Eurasia is further complicated by Moscow’s partnership on connectivity projects with Beijing and an emerging Indo-Pacific nexus between the two states.

The situation is not unlike Britain’s dilemma in the late 19th century, when London sought cooperation with France to meet the continental challenge of Germany and preserve the balance of power in Europe, but opposed French efforts to assert maritime dominance in Asia. But all comparisons should end there -the first signs of British decline were evident then, and thus London’s options were limited. India, on the other hand, is ascendant.

Nevertheless, these complex triangular relationships add tension and uncertainty to the India-Russia bilateral, given that the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia are not neatly segregated strategic theatres. Partnering with Washington in the seas and with Russia on the continent is, to put it mildly, a delicate balancing act for any country. However, two realities suggest that such a state of affairs will continue to co-exist for India.

For one thing, India is a rising economic power; with estimates suggesting that it will become the world’s second largest economy in PPP terms in the 2040’s. The fact remains that a $1.6 trillion Russian economy simply cannot provide New Delhi with the investment opportunities and commercial partnerships that it requires. Washington, on the other hand, is a dynamic and global economy, well placed to facilitate India’s rise with finance and technology. America’s long standing naval presence and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific also assist India’s integration and capacity for leadership in the regional order.

Second, Delhi cannot afford this entente with Washington to compromise its security relationship with Moscow. Indeed, India is well aware that no other country will assist in building its defence capability to the extent that Russia is already doing, whether it is the lease of a nuclear-powered submarine; co-development of missile systems such as the Brahmos; or the sale of the S-400 missile defence systems. Ultimately, India will go ahead with these deals despite the threat of US sanctions because it must prioritize its security interests over American goodwill.

In Eurasia, these realities make matters difficult. Engagement with Moscow remains critical if India is to respond to intractable conflicts in Afghanistan, persistent security risks in the Middle East and Central Asia, and China’s steady westwards expansion. Such a partnership may also help prevent the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from becoming a de-facto police force for China’s Belt and Road Initiative; instead giving the forum a more legitimate and plural voice on Eurasian conversations on connectivity, finance, security and development.

Having said that, Russia’s ‘axis of convenience’ with China is more an axis of dependency; Beijing is the only country capable of sheltering Moscow from American pressure. Politically or economically, India cannot do the same—leaving Moscow with few options. And while Washington has displayed some flexibility in willing to exempt India’s defence purchases from sanctions, America’s security priorities in Eurasia are entrenched—and hostility to Russia runs deep in its foreign policy establishment. It is not fully clear yet what Washington’s red-lines are for India.

Eurasia is a fundamentally different proposition, and India’s pivot will rest on the strength of its bilateral with Moscow. New Delhi must assess its interests in the region, communicate mutually acceptable leeway on partnerships, and re-imagine the Russia relationship for the better part for the 21^st century.

This commentary originally appeared in Valdai Discussion Club.

Samir Saran

अगर BBIN पर अमल कामयाब रहता है तो भारत के पास BIMSTEC में काम करने के लिए एक मॉडल होगा।

स्रोत: PTI

नेपाल में BIMSTEC समिट से पहले बेहतर होगा अगर नई दिल्ली इस बात का आकलन कर ले कि उपमहाद्वीप को जोड़ने और इसके विकास से जुड़ी उसकी पहल की स्थिति क्या है। यह तथ्य है कि सार्क और बांग्लादेश, चीन, भारत और म्यांमार (BCIM-EC) के साथ BIMSTEC भी निष्क्रिय बना हुआ है। नतीजा यह है कि दक्षिण एशिया के देशों का आपसी कारोबार बिल्कुल डूबा हुआ है और इसका ख़मियाजा सबसे ज़्यादा भारत के प्रादेशिक नेतृत्व को भुगतना पड़ रहा है।

जिस इकलौती पहल में अब तक कुछ उम्मीद की झलक दिखती है, वह भारत, बांग्लादेश, भूटान और नेपाल (BBIN) की पहल है जिसने 2015 में ऐतिहासिक मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट (MVA) किया — यह क्षेत्रीय जुड़ाव का अहम बिंदु था जिससे ‘उपक्षेत्रीयता’ के उभार की एक संभावना दिखती थी। मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट पर अमल के लिए भारत ने ख़ासी कूटनीति और पूंजी का निवेश किया है। फिलहाल विश्व बैंक के एक अध्ययन के मुताबिक इंट्रा-रीजनल कारोबार दुनिया भर के कारोबार का बस 5% है — जो याद दिलाता है कि क्यों दक्षिण एशिया के अलग-अलग देश इसकी जगह कारोबार के भरोसेमंद सहयोगी के तौर पर चीन की ओर मुड़ रहे हैं। दूसरी तरफ़ अगर ट्रांसपोर्ट कनेक्टिविटी मज़बूत हो और सरहदों के आरपार कारोबार की सहूलियत बढ़े तो यह कारोबार 117 फ़ीसदी बढ सकता है जो फिलहाल 23 अरब US डॉलर का है।

वाकई, BIMSTEC से भी जुड़े बस तीन देशों को जोड़ने से जो आर्थिक संभावना पैदा हुई है, उससे ज़्यादा मुखर और विस्तारित क्षेत्रीय कनेक्टिविटी के एजेंडे की संभावना समझ में आनी चाहिए। अगर भारत चाहता है कि BIMSTEC क्षेत्रीय आपसदारी के एक अहम मंच के तौर पर विकसित हो, तो इसमें BBIN की सफलता इरादे और क्षमता के प्रदर्शन के लिहाज़ से काफी अहम रहेगी। जब प्रधानमंत्री मोदी इस तैयारी में हैं कि काठमांडु में भारत के नेतृत्व वाली भूमिका का वे सिग्नल दे दें, तब मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट की प्रक्रिया में भारत की भूमिका का विश्लेषण यह समझने में मददगार होगा कि इस मामले में ठहराव की क़ीमत क्या है और भारत के प्रत्यक्ष नेतृत्व के सकारात्मक नतीजे कैसे आ सकते हैं।

सबसे पहले भारत को क्षेत्रीय संपर्क के मामले में लगातार अमल दिखाते हुए अपने नेतृत्व का प्रदर्शन करने की ज़रूरत है। ऐसे समय, जब बीजिंग की रोड और बेल्ट पहल पूरे महाद्वीप में उसके रणनीतिक समीकरणों को विस्तार दे रही है, तब इस साल मई में नेपाल के साथ प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी ने रिश्तों की जो नई शुरुआत की है, वह इन देशों से जुड़ने के नए भारतीय रुझान को समझने के लिहाज से महत्वपूर्ण है। नेपाल दक्षिण एशिया की स्थिरता के लिए अहम है और BBIN और BIMSTEC की कनेक्टिविटी की योजनाओं से सबसे ज़्यादा फायदा उसे ही होने वाला है। इससे आसपास के बंदरगाहों तक उसकी पहुंच आसान होगी और वह नेपाल में बने सामानों का निर्यात दक्षिण एशिया में ही नहीं, उसके बाहर भी कर पाएगा। नेपाल का उदाहरण बताता है कि अगर भारत सरहदों के आरपार परिवहन को गति दे सके तो चीन के बनाए बंदरगाहों और बुनियादी ढांचों पर निर्भरता घटेगी और भारत ऐसी पहल को BIMSTEC के दूसरे देशों — बांग्लादेश, म्यांमार और थाइलैंड के साथ भी दुहरा सकता है।

यह दुर्भाग्यपूर्ण था कि भारतीय दफ़्तरशाही की प्रशासनिक रुकावटों ने एक बार फिर इस प्रक्रिया में देरी पैदा की है। मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट के तहत मुसाफ़िरों और माल को ले जाने के प्रोटोकॉल पर दो साल से समीक्षा चल रही थी, मुसाफ़िरों का मामला अप्रैल 2018 में हुई आख़िरी बैठक में निबट गया था। दुर्भाग्यवश, भारत सरकार ने तय किया कि जब तक कार्गो प्रोटोकॉल पर बातचीत पूरी नहीं होती, मुसाफ़िरों के प्रोटोकॉल पर आख़िरी फ़ैसला रोका जाएगा। कार्गो प्रोटोकॉल पर बातचीत कुछ और दौर चलेगी। नई दिल्ली ने यह फ़ैसला किस तर्क से किया, यह साफ़ नहीं है, लेकिन उसके नतीजे साफ हैं — समझौते ने अपनी रफ़्तार खो दी है।

भारत सरकार ने इस गड़बड़झाले को कुछ और बढ़ा दिया जब उसने लगभग इसी समय नेपाल और बांग्लादेश को मोटर वेहिकिल ऐक्ट के त्रिदेशीय अमल पर एक ‘लेटर ऑफ एक्सचेंज’ पर दस्तख़त करने और भूटान से भी प्रति-हस्ताक्षर करने को कहा। इस अतिरिक्त समझौते के दस्तख़त में कुछ और मंज़ूरियों की ज़रूरत पड़ेगी। अनुमान लगाना मुश्किल नहीं है कि इससे कुछ और देरी बढ़ेगी।

ये देरियां अमूमन भारत के उलझे हुए क्षेत्रवाद का ही आईना हैं। MVA की ही तरह, BIMSTEC की मार्फ़त क्षेत्रीय जुड़ाव में देरी की क़ीमत आर्थिक और राजनीतिक तौर पर काफी बड़ी है। जबकि इसके सकरात्मक पक्ष भी उतने ही बड़े हैं — BIMSTEC और MVA के ज़रिए नई दिल्ली अपनी ‘ऐक्ट एशिया’ और ‘नेबरहुड फ़र्स्ट’ नीति के ढीले तार ठीक से कस सकती है।

इसी से दूसरा बिंदु निकलता है — अगर BBIN पर अमल कामयाब रहता है तो भारत के पास BIMSTEC में काम करने के लिए एक मॉडल होगा। फिलहाल BIMSTEC असमंजस में है — थाइलैंड, श्रीलंका और भूटान की प्रतिबद्धता इसमें पूरी नहीं दिख रही है। BBIN ब्लॉक के तीन देशों के बीच कारगर सड़क संपर्क दिखने का असर BIMSTEC देशों के बीच भी वांछित सहयोग का स्तर हासिल करने में प्रेरक बनेगा। चीन की बेल्ट-रोड पहल वाली दुनिया के बाद, चीन निर्मित बंदरगाहों और बुनियादी ढांचे पर निर्भरता बढ़ेगी। भारत के लिए उप-क्षेत्रीयता की धमनियों को बचाए रखना ज़रूरी है और BBIN में इस विकल्प के बीज दिखते हैं। BBIN के मंच को आधार बनाते हुए, भारत को BIMSTEC को मज़बूत करने के लिए प्रचुर मात्रा में तकनीकी, मानवीय और वित्तीय संसाधन लगाने के लिए प्रतिबद्ध और तैयार रहना चाहिए।

तीसरी बात, BIMSTEC में निजी क्षेत्र को और ज़्यादा शामिल किए जाने की ज़रूरत है। शायद BBIN की सबसे बड़ी चूक अपनी क्षेत्रीय पहल में निजी क्षेत्र को शामिल करने में भारत की नाकामी रही। मिसाल के तौर पर, कोलकाता-ढाका-अगरतल्ला और दिल्ली-कोलकाता ढाका के रूट पर जो ट्रायल रन हुआ, उससे सफर का काफी समय ही नहीं बचा, यात्रा की लागत भी क़रीब 20 फ़ीसदी घट गई। तो BBIN के संपर्क के फायदे सभी तीनों देशों के माइक्रो, छोटे और मझोले उद्यमों तक, क्षेत्रीय क़ीमत-शृंखला के निर्माण तक, और प्रयोग और उद्यमिता को बढ़ावा देने तक जाते हैं। नई दिल्ली को यह समझना होगा कि बातचीत के दौरान निजी क्षेत्र की पर्याप्त नुमाइंदगी से वे ऑपरेशनल मुद्दे सामने आएंगे जो कंपनियों की लॉजिस्टिक ज़रूरतों के लिहाज से प्रासंगिक होंगे और MVA को — और साथ ही BIMSTEC के तहत होने वाली कनेरक्टिविटी की पहल को — सच्चे अर्थों में बड़े बदलाव का वाहक बनाएंगे।

अगर भारत को दक्षिण एशिया में अपनी राजनीतिक और आर्थिक अहमियत बनाए रखनी है तो उसे इस इलाक़े को जोड़ने की प्रक्रिया का नेतृत्व करना होगा। यह हो सके, इसके लिए नई दिल्ली को अपनी अंदरूनी निर्णय प्रक्रिया और इसके तंत्र का फिर से मूल्यांकन करना होगा। मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट में ग़ैरज़रूरी देरी अपने ही ऊपर चोट है — जिससे दिल्ली को खुद को बचाना होगा, चूंकि वह BIMSTEC में कहीं ज़्यादा बड़ी भूमिका अख़्तियार करने जा रही है। BBIN के मोटर वेहिकिल ऐग्रीमेंट की ही तरह, BIMSTEC भी भारत के लिए एक आर्थिक और सामाजिक-राजनीतिक अवसर है कि वह अपने पड़ोसी देशों से कुछ उलझे हुए रिश्तों को सुधार ले। प्रधानमंत्री कार्यालय को इस मामले में दख़ल देना होगा और इस इलाक़े की कनेक्टिविटी पर भारतीय नेतृत्व को नई ऊर्जा देनी होगी ताकि प्रधानमंत्री की एक अहम महत्वाकांक्षा का लक्ष्य हासिल किया जा सके।

ये लेखक के निजी विचार हैं।