Cyber and Technology, Health care, India, media and internet, tech and media

Digital Epiphany? COVID19 and our Tech Futures

Processes that were once subject to national jurisdictions – be it political conversations, trade and commerce, or national security considerations – are increasingly migrating to ungoverned digital spaces, creating what I have earlier called a “platform planet”. It is clear that the coronavirus will accelerate this process and more permanently fuse our technological and
social systems while encoding inequities and cleavages therein.

Most pertinent to this is the issue of access to digital technologies. Think of the pressure on governments today to deliver governance and services in the age of social distancing, the clamour from parents whose children cannot access educational opportunities, or demands from historically marginalized groups who may not be able to work remotely. Life, protection, and livelihood will all need to be guaranteed virtually and most capitals around the world will struggle to provide these.

Some positive transformations will be driven by technology companies looking to break new ground and compete for consumers among the millions of social and commercial interactions that will now be permanently online. Videoconferencing platforms, for instance, have emerged as the go-to technology keeping governments and businesses running even as social distancing is being practised. And still more change will be driven by governments adopting digital tools to carry out health surveillance measures or to enforce quarantines. Evolving debates and assumptions on user agency, privacy and data protection may be significantly altered in the year ahead.

Undoubtedly, the most important structural change will be in the form and format of the relationship between technology and society. Over the past two decades, there have been two fundamental notions that have shaped this ever-evolving relationship. The first, roughly corresponding to the first decade of the 21st century, was a near universal belief in the emancipatory potential of emerging technologies and a social willingness to accept new technologically induced disruptions. The second perspective, corresponding to the second decade, was the antithesis of the first – a “tech-lash” or scepticism about the role of emerging technologies in our social lives and a growing degree of suspicion about the intent and actions of “big tech” and “strong states”.

The coronavirus outbreak will demand a synthesis of these, and other, perspectives under extraordinarily compressed timelines. The many decisions that will be made over the coming year will either become entrenched or will reinforce certain pathways in the decade ahead. Technologies that society would have once expected greater regulatory scrutiny around –such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare – will likely be fasttracked and deployed. Meanwhile, consumer technologies that are scaling rapidly, such as videoconferencing and fintech platforms, will face additional scrutiny from consumers and states as they become more utility-like in their deployment.

Technologies that society would have once expected greater regulatory scrutiny around –such as the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare – will likely be fast-tracked and deployed.

As this process of synthesis unfolds over the coming year, the international community will be confronted with a new set of opportunities as well as risks. Perhaps the first and most visible risk emanates from a largely ungoverned digital public sphere. Indeed, this pandemic has also been accompanied by an “infodemic”, with misinformation and disinformation flooding most social media platforms, which for all practical purposes play the role of both traditional media and discussions rooms of yore that shaped public opinion.

Fake news alone, however, is not the only dimension of this risk. The response to it may be equally dangerous. The COVID-19 outbreak may end up creating stronger censorship regimes in an attempt to curb the spread of disinformation. Equally worrying is the power of technology platforms to mediate these spaces during times of crisis and the dangerous collaboration or confrontation brewing between technology companies and governments. For instance, certain technology platforms took down content by President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil because they deemed it spread disinformation. But should platforms have the ability to censor the content of a head of state? On the other hand, should they partner with governments and dilute freedom of expression through new measures that may outlast this pandemic?

A second related risk is the data-sharing practices that technology companies, health institutions and governments are adopting – with little oversight or accountability – to combat COVID-19. This trend will not only be about the data generated today. Instead, the COVID-19 pandemic will likely create a new battlefield, one that will be defined by the datasets generated by the fusion of our biological and digital worlds. Indeed, one set of technologies that were already being deployed rapidly before the virus outbreak were those related to genomics. The practices around genetic privacy – and the institutions that manage them – in the year ahead may well create new and unexpected risks to our fundamental rights as unique living beings.

A third risk likely to challenge our technological futures are efforts to undermine the integrity of the cyber realm. While most nations remain worried about threats to critical infrastructure (the United Nations has already called for a digital ceasefire) the COVID-19 outbreak will also exacerbate “petty” cyber-crimes. These are minor cyber incidences; those that may not pose systemic national security threats but will affect the financial and social lives of individuals dramatically. The sudden uptick in COVID-related phishing scams, telemedicine scams and attacks on medical institutions all point in this direction. Trust in technology will be undermined at a time when the digital is the ether for globalization to survive.

The fourth risk is of individuals being permanently left behind as the process of digitalization continues to accelerate. Inequality has been the defining political zeitgeist of our generation – one that digital technologies have often accentuated. In countries without full or robust access to the internet, citizens are suffering from multidimensional socio-economic challenges as the pandemic snatches away their access to essential public goods.

But the challenge goes beyond this. Just as individuals are beginning to learn that not all work requires formal office spaces, businesses may well realize that not all operations require humans. The rapid adoption of AI and robotics energized amid the pandemic could accelerate a process that governments and policy-makers have been concerned about for years – technology-induced unemployment.

The final risk could end up being a product of how states actually respond to these various challenges amid a rapidly digitizing global society. No two societies are the same – they are defined by different political values, social practices and economic priorities. With COVID-19 forcing more of our social lives, business operations and governance online, the race to infuse the global digital world with a particular set of values and technological standards will only accelerate. Digital “code wars” may well be this century’s ideological confrontation that may partition the world in the end.

Think of the UN, the centrepiece of the liberal international order, partnering with Tencent, the digital champion of a vast surveillance state, to conduct its remote work operations. This has become a cause for concern for many countries. Reports indicate that the UN is already backtracking from its decision under pressure from human rights groups and democratic nations. Indeed, the varied digital societies that are emerging may fuel loud “geotechnological” competition.

That said, policy-makers may also see in the COVID-19 crisis an opportunity to reform political and administrative practices that were earlier hobbled by legacy institutional constraints. The most obvious, perhaps, is the accelerated adoption of what the UN calls “digital public goods”. These are the common digital “railroads”, which act as force multipliers for a range of business and governance operations.

For instance, India’s Digital ID system has helped the country navigate the pandemic by ensuring cash transfers and digital payments for a range of essential goods. The demand for similar architectures has been growing around the world. Singapore had already signed an MoU with the Indian government, even before the virus outbreak, to develop such a system. Similarly, Google has cited India’s digital payments infrastructure to call on the Federal Reserve to enable similar innovations in the US. These trends could see universal strengthening at this time.

This moment offers an opportunity for states to respond to the needs of a growing global informal workforce. The informal labour force and the “gig economy” workforce need new systems of social protection. The absence of this has placed them at great risk and at the frontline of this pandemic. These political reforms may not be ignored much longer. The idea of a universal basic income – a measure that is supported both by the Pope and The Financial Times – could also find favour and catalyse a new dimension for the future of work.

Perhaps the most significant opportunity will be for states and individuals to realize the potential of a truly global digital society. Responding to COVID-19 has compelled governments and communities to share sporadic information, some best practices and critical technologies rapidly. Consider for, instance, a rapidly growing community of entrepreneurs sharing opensource 3D printing designs for ventilators. Perhaps civil society organizations and policymakers can use the COVID-19 moment to push for new pipelines that will enable the transfer of technologies and innovations and encourage them to rethink rigid intellectual property regimes, which hindered this earlier.

Over a century ago, when individuals were isolating themselves amidst a far deadlier Spanish Flu, many (primarily Americans) turned to the telephone to stay in touch with friends, family and colleagues. Of course, it was a nascent technology at the time and services promptly broke down because of the rapid rise in demand. But rather than crippling the industry and the technology forever, the Spanish Flu only served to underscore how essential it was to modern society. Over a century later, it is clear that the telephone was instrumental in shaping our global village.

We are at a similar junction today. And decades later, historians may well scrutinize the decisions made in the year ahead when studying how the digital shaped individuals, communities, nations and the world they inherited.

This essay originally appeared in World Economic Forum.

Elections 2019, Fake News, India, Media Studies, Misinformation, tech and media, Whatsupp

Subverting election 2019: International actors and the inside job

Samir Saran|Bedavyasa Mohanty

As India heads into a month-and-a-half long divisive and polarised general election, has the country woken up to the threat that fake news, misinformation and influence operations, conducted from within and outside, pose to this most sacred of democratic processes? Recent steps taken by the Election Commission, including the convening of top social media companies, are welcome but insufficient. While a voluntary code of ethics amongst these companies is important, the dimensions of the challenge cannot be adequately responded to by just taking down inappropriate political advertisements and establishing more efficient lines of communication with the Election Commission. It is unlikely that these 25th hour measures will address the multiple threats of election interference that have either been commissioned months in advance or are a product of the increasingly perverse election eco-system of India.

Datasets, Fake News, Lynchmobs and Politics

In 2018, over 30 individuals were lynched by mobs in India over suspicions that they were child-lifters. The trigger for these acts of violence was a campaign of doctored videos and images warning people of child-lifters and organ-harvesters prowling in their neighbourhood. These, like most other instances of mob violence in India, have often targeted nomadic tribes or religious and cultural groups, exploiting old cleavages and uncovering new fissures. A second iteration of the campaign now appears to be underway, and much like the first it could take on communal undertones with direct implications for the upcoming general election.

What distinguishes these campaigns from the rumour-mongering pervasive over the internet is their coordinated nature and the tailoring of the messages (by context and geographies) to create paranoia among certain groups of people. Other, more election-specific content that is currently being generated, also seems to follow the same pattern – driving a deeper wedge into pre-existing social divides. This has manifested in the form of fake news ranging from Priyanka Gandhi wearing a cross around her neck while campaigning, to false images of the Pakistani flag being waved at Rahul Gandhi’s election rally. Similarly, WhatsApp messages spreading fake information painting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in poor and sinister light are also circulating in the social media space. Ironically, as both Congress and BJP increasingly depend on targeted messaging through WhatsApp groups and text messaging, malevolent actors have also found these same mediums useful for their purpose.

The digital medium is critical for this form of messaging. Hyper-targeted campaigns such as these can hardly be conducted over traditional media like television and radio.

The digital medium is critical for this form of messaging. Hyper-targeted campaigns such as these
can hardly be conducted over traditional media like television and radio. Social media allows political parties to build a multiplicity of identities depending on the recipient of their messages: a message of growth for the urban educated, a party of benevolence for the rural poor or a defender of identity for those with an elevated nationalist fervor. Once these data sets and dissemination pathways are created it is only a matter of time before other actors are able to leverage it for subversion. Russia, for instance, famously used Facebook’s hyper-targeted ads during the US presidential election in 2016 to spread inflammatory messages spun around race and immigration to further divide an already polarized voter base.

The speed and distance that social media campaigns are able to cover over the internet have made them a ‘must have’ in the toolkits of both state and non-state actors. Notoriously, influence operations in the run-up to the German election were able to orchestrate political rallies that were coordinated remotely over social media. The effect of influence operations in cyberspace, therefore, is no longer confined to the virtual; rather, they have very real and tangible consequences in the physical world.

The Indian, European and American experience is part of a common and continuing saga that incriminates three actors. The model of capitalism that seeks to create value from identity and personal information will also offer abundant opportunity for the same information sets and personal data to be used against individuals, communities and countries. Second, the ease (and low cost) and process of building and accessing these databases is the same for startups, corporations and countries wanting to leverage them. Data administration (or the lack of) is the single biggest national security threat in a hyper-connected and hyper-volatile world. Third, political parties in all these geographies are implicated in helping create a personal information base, which they have found vital for electioneering. From the legendary ‘Obama Campaign‘ based on sophisticated use of social media and citizen engagement (and information) to the highly sophisticated ‘Modi Campaign‘ which bypassed old communication channels to create a personal line to the voter, both of these and others have built huge databases of citizens and their preferences. Who regulates these databases? How safe are these? And is it time for a regulator to intervene to ensure these are not used against the state by external actors or by the proverbial ‘inside man’.

Facebook, Twitter, Algorithms and God: Who is in charge?

Today, the targets of influence operations are democratic structures – seeding doubts over the credibility of institutions such as the mainstream media and regulatory agencies. Far too often, signs of such external interference elicit a knee-jerk reaction among states. For example, in response to the cases of lynching caused by rumors that were spread over WhatsApp, the Indian government in late-2018 proposed amendments to intermediary liability laws. Among other things, the amendments impose an obligation on intermediaries (or communication service providers) to introduce traceability to their systems – the ability to identify the original sender of the message. For platforms that are designed with complete end-to-end encryption, this is a near technical impossibility. Compliance with the law, therefore, would require companies to roll back encryption over their services, fundamentally compromising the integrity of the platforms that users rely on.

The self-regulatory code that the technology companies have now adopted gives them a wide latitude in determining what qualifies as objectionable political advertising.

The self-regulatory code that the technology companies have now adopted gives them a wide
latitude in determining what qualifies as objectionable political advertising. This is especially concerning when social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook are already under review by regulators for allegedly harboring a liberal bias and unduly stifling conservative voices. More subjective power to the platforms, therefore, assigns an adjudicatory role to an organisation that is not democratically created and has limited accountability to citizens and policymakers in countries such as India. While most would argue against ‘hate speech’ in all its manifestations, letting Facebook and Twitter play the role of the censor should worry us all.

Institutionalizing these reactionary responses to the dangers of influence operations threatens to whittle away at the core of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Instead, efforts should be focused on creating resilient and long-term solutions like creating counter-narrative mechanisms that can dispel disinformation. Close coordination between fact-checkers, official channels and the mainstream media can render many sources of disinformation unviable. Companies are already exploring ways in which identification and flagging of coordinated fake news campaigns can be done by artificial intelligence. While this is unlikely to be a silver bullet, automating the process can significantly arrest the spread of malicious content. Regulatory attention should be paid to determining the rules that should govern the algorithms to ensure fairness, accountability and transparency in their operation. In the coming days, algorithmic accountability will be the single most Important debate across the digital sector.

iCovet your Democracy

India and its democracy is an outlier in the region that it resides in. Our two special neighbours to the west and the north would like nothing more than to see the demise of this Indian experience and institution. Democratic India is their enduring failure as states, peoples and communities. Economic travails, perverse politics and terrorism infused across the borders has been unable to deter Indians from the path of plural and democratic politics. Openness and pluralism, however, are not things that we should take for granted as recents developments have proven.

Two trends/realities should be evaluated with utmost seriousness. First, this technological age allows interference with an unprecedented velocity and reach which old institutions protecting elections and the state are not designed to operate on. The instruments (technologies and corporates) that will be active are no longer regulated or sanctioned by the state. The cost and relative ease allows smaller and weaker states to be attracted to this option. And, the data sets used to win voter favour can be deployed to attack democracy itself. The most dangerous feature of digital operations is not to actually interfere or shape outcomes; it is to only create a perception that the outcome was perverted by interventions – a tactic used by the former Soviet Union during the Cold War to demoralise the psyche of the target nation. Response to this will need to be both real and social, actual and perceived.

Second and related to the above is the growing debate on ‘surveillance capitalism’ and its impact on countries and peoples. Even as this perverse ‘data mercantilism’ evokes a variety of responses, in countries such as India we are witnessing a ceding of space to corporations and media platforms to arbitrate the contours of public engagement. The algorithms designed to amplify user engagement and ad revenues are now deployed to restrict political speech that these companies find objectionable – creating a ‘surveillance democracy’ in the process.

The algorithms designed to amplify user engagement and ad revenues are now deployed to restrict political speech that these companies find objectionable – creating a ‘surveillance democracy’ in the process.

The Indian state, its political parties, its corporates and those operating in its territories and most of all its people need to wake up, work together and respond to this huge challenge, a reality that is now playing out on a daily basis. Each of these actors has contributed knowingly and ignorantly to the perverse political economy of elections and unless each resets their engagement with this most important asset in India’s treasury, the death and diminishing of democracy will be an ‘Inside Job’ even as the hand, handler and beneficiary may well be just another IP address.

The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

India, Media, Neighborhood Studies, tech and media

We cannot have a vibrant democracy without strong media

Samir Saran, Bangladesh, Asian Age, India-Bangladesh, ASEAN, India Ocean Rim, Kashmir, EU, BNP

The Asian Age (AA): Thanks for coming to The Asian Age. How would you evaluate the current status of India-Bangladesh relationship?

Samir Saran (SS): At the level of the two governments the relationship between India and Bangladesh is stronger than ever before. Bangladesh has very sound political engagement with India. However, the people-to-people relationship needs to be catalyzed and strengthened. We need to do more in terms of trade, connectivity, climate change and regional industrial clusters that create value for our people.

The region can learn from Bangladesh as far as inclusive growth, health, education and grassroots interventions are concerned. Can the two countries work together in showcasing solutions and experiences in these vital sectors for the benefit of others? India and Bangladesh also have an opportunity to play a leadership role in connecting the wider region — for example, South Asia with ASEAN — and harnessing the potential of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Can we together shape the politics and economics of the Indo-Pacific in the coming decade?

AA: What is the condition of democracy in South Asia in your assessment?

SS: Democracy is under threat globally. Sections of the young populations and those that are marginalized or have lost out are disenchanted. We as individuals and communities need to do more to ensure its sustenance. We have to demand more of our leadership in these times.

Democracy also must not be viewed only from the perspective of electing leaders. It is also as much about building and sustaining institutions that serve all citizens and protect their rights.

Therefore, the quality of governance and equitable outcomes will also implicate the health of democracy. In my view democracy is the most pragmatic political arrangement for the people of South Asia. The diversity within the region can only sustainably aggregate under plural political systems.

AA: What is your opinion about the Kashmir conflict?

SS: The Jammu & Kashmir dispute is certainly a legacy of the partition of the sub-continent and also stems from a viewpoint that religion must be the sole determinant of political unions. India rejects this perspective and as a secular country it has successfully demonstrated over the last seven decades that syncretic and plural nations are viable and desirable. Pakistan, on the other hand, does not hold this view and has fanned organic unrest and incubated terrorist organizations that destabilize the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir and indeed the wider region.

Jammu & Kashmir as a conflict zone also suits the military leadership in Pakistan as it helps them control the society, politics and economics of their country. The Pakistani Army sequesters a huge amount of the country’s annual budget and diverts funds that could be used productively for the development of the country. All disputes must be resolved through dialogue and no country must ever bow down to terror which has become the favored instrument of the Pakistani state.

It is for Pakistan to halt cross-border terrorism and create the right conditions for any meaningful bilateral dialogue. Till that happens, India will exercise all options to protect its territorial integrity and national security interest.

AA: Please share with us your views on freedom of press.

SS: We cannot have a vibrant democracy and a fair society without a strong media. News and information cannot be censored in this Information Age when social media is a reality, nor can the circulation of fake news be entirely prevented. Engaging with and responding to emerging narratives and headlines is the only option. Media can play a role in promoting accountable governance and preserving democracy.

AA: We often see that communal violence breaks out in South Asian countries. What should South Asian countries do to preserve communal harmony?

SS: Preserving communal harmony is a vital challenge for our region. Globalization and technology have made it easy for the transmission of radical ideologies across the world. Radical religious groups adeptly use social networks to propagate their propositions.

Just law and order is not enough to fight communal forces. We need a new awareness, a new coalition of people and governments, and an international resolve to purge this menace. Political parties should desist from fanning hatred. Also, families have an important role to play in guiding the youth and the vulnerable.

AA: Bangladesh has recently held its eleventh parliamentary election. What is your appraisal of these polls?

SS: The process of electing the political leadership is crucial. All democracies must constantly strive to enhance this process and ensure that wider participation and vibrant politics are part of it. All societies and countries organically discover their own pathways and as a young nation Bangladesh is striving to do the same. The political leadership in India has already welcomed the democratic process that was followed in Bangladesh in the recent elections.

AA: Euro is the common currency for all the countries belonging to the European Union (EU). The member countries of EU also have visa free entry facilities for each other. For what reasons do you think the South Asian countries could not do so?

SS: Unfortunately the partition of 1947 has created rigid walls and boundaries between the South Asian countries. We are disappointingly one of the least integrated regions of the world. Ideally we must dispense with such rigidity and should work towards soft borders through sub-regional arrangements.

It is difficult, but not impossible. In the coming days we need to create robust physical infrastructure that connects us, create soft infrastructure that allows information and data to be shared across jurisdictions, and create a regional growth and development plan that responds to the aspirations of all. We share a common future and therefore we must coordinate our individual efforts with greater intensity.

AA: How can Bangladesh become more democratic? Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has rejected the results of the latest parliamentary polls. BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia has been inside jail for more than one year. How can Bangladeshi political parties overcome the existing divides with each other?

SS: Legacy battles between parties are not unique to Bangladesh. Like elsewhere, differences are not easy to reconcile. However, what national political parties can do is to create a consensus on a grand vision for the country even as they choose different paths to achieve that. They can also agree on creating, sustaining and strengthening institutions and processes that are important for the evolution of democracy.

AA: The opposition parties of India like Trinamool Congress, Congress and Communist Party of India have complained that dalits and religious minorities have been subjected to a great deal of torment under the present Indian government. What are your views on this?

SS: As per political theory, one of the founding principles of democracy is that while the majority will invariably elect governments, the prime responsibility of these governments is to protect the rights of the minorities. India has always adhered to this as an article of faith and any deviation has seen substantial intervention by the institutions and people that make up the Indian state.

AA: Rabindranath Tagore is equally loved and honored in India and Bangladesh. How can Bangladesh further strengthen its cultural bonds with India?

SS: Rabindranath Tagore is an icon in both countries. To honour his legacy it would be fitting if Bangladesh and India can work to create a cultural bridge that helps nurture more talent that transcends geographical borders. The present Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Riva

Ganguly Das is someone who can do this. I believe she will play a significant role in the growth of cultural ties between Bangladesh and India. India and Bangladesh should provide more opportunities, scholarships and arenas to artists and youth in both countries to harness our common creative heritage and potentialities.

This interview originally appeared in Dailyasianage.

Cyber and Technology, India, Media Studies, tech and media

Babel as narrative: The media, a mediated war and I

Even as the dust settles on the Balakot airstrikes, public sentiment in Pakistan and India is anything but settled. The aggravation of public opinion is in no small part attributable to the role of the media—both old and new. While Vietnam was the first televised war, though limited to American TV, what we are seeing today in India is more easily comparable to the unprecedented global television coverage of the Gulf War of 1990-91. Then, as now, a breathless public was glued to live prime-time reporting of missile strikes and battalion movements.

Today, of course, the times, the actors and the technologies are different. In 1990-91, and then again in 2003, the American media took war to living rooms around the world. In 2019, a global network of netizens took it to every smartphone. Prime time is no longer just the nine o’clock news. Instead, prime time is whenever a ‘social media influencer’ disseminates viral information. Still, the relationship between media, politics, power and war is just as interdependent as ever before. And the current cacophony in our public sphere gives us the perfect opportunity to interrogate what has changed and what hasn’t.

Media has always been complicit in allowing itself to be co-opted by the state. Time and again it has provided outlets for the government’s narrative on foreign policy and war.

In their seminal book ‘Manufacturing Consent,’ Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman argue that “official sources” and beat reporters have always enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. The latter obtains access to strategic leaks and breaking news, while the former can set the agenda with no extra effort.

It is not surprising that we see this dynamic playing out on social media as well.

When individuals possess viewership and influence that are as large, or even larger, than many traditional news platforms, they become natural outlets for government leaks. The medium may have evolved, but the motivations stay the same.

Second, the nature of strategic communications has altered dramatically. In the 20th century, America had an absolute monopoly over media and telecommunications infrastructure. Its society could influence sentiment at a global scale with no competition. They decided how the world perceived the first Iraq war (1990-91). Today, no country, agency or actor enjoys this monopoly. The diffusion of information communication technologies has democratised story-telling. Every individual is the media. A single video, blog or photo can and will alter the course of events.

In times of war, it is essential for the state to respond nimbly and proactively to real time events. It must set the narrative and even stay ahead of the news cycle. There must be consistency in message and meaning across mediums. After the Balakot strikes, it was clear that the Indian government had struggled to achieve this, even as the Pakistani state leveraged the void to relocate its malevolent designs within the mediated halo of ‘statesmanship’.

Third, South Asia now regularly identifies ‘peaceniks’ as the new enemy of the state and the purported masses. Just as communism was a red line for American media over much of the 20th century, advocating peace in the subcontinent appears to be the South Asian red line. In both India and Pakistan, we witness a certain ‘othering’ of those who would propose peaceful options and solutions. Chomsky and Herman write that the concept of “anti-communism” could easily mobilise electorates because “the concept is fuzzy [and] it can be used against anybody” even as the anti-communists can “do and say anything” without oversight.

This basic premise holds true in both India and Pakistan today. And it has only been aggravated by those who would rather collect followers than constrain themselves by considerations of ethics and responsibility.

While peace is certainly not on the horizon, our media establishments and social media warriors have made it a veritable crime to even consider the prospect of peace.

Fourth, in the age of social media, tailored messaging is ineffective. The success of Hollywood, for example, was also tied to its ability to employ sophisticated communications to engage large constituencies. In other words, its stories enjoyed a large appeal. Effective messaging must share this virtue—it must be polysemic.

Too often, politicians tend to appeal to their narrow electorates in pursuit of political power. Of course, anyone who believes that this is not a natural consequence of democratic politics is naïve. Nevertheless, Indian governments and political actors (including those in the opposition) must learn how to communicate both universally and to their base. If these are at odds with each other, especially during conflict, it is the national brand and interest that is compromised most. Strategic communications is an evolving arena and many in India would do well to go back to school to appreciate its new intricacies.

Finally, in wartime, silence is not an option – but neither is bluster. It was disappointing, for example, to see multiple actors embedding their own messages and meanings in India’s predictably mundane official press briefing(s). Ambiguous messages will naturally lend themselves to speculation and manipulation. Clarity and uniformity must be the defining feature of conflict communications. Blank spaces must be taboo as eyes in the sky and cell-phone cameras will reveal all.

Amidst all the commissions and reports that will dissect the strategic implications of Balakot, it is crucial that sufficient attention also be paid to the question of narratives and information flows. In ‘Power: A Radical View’, Steven Lukes argues that the most “insidious use of power” is to “prevent people … from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things.” One wonders if the cumulative effect of ineffective political and government communications, thunderous media anchors and shrill social media influencers is not just this. Are we, as a society, capable of being clear-headed about the risks and opportunities that lie with our western neighbour? Or are we constrained by the narratives of our own making without even knowing it?

There are, therefore, some important questions that require resolution. How should the government preserve its reliability and authenticity in the information age? How should social media platforms react to rapidly evolving geopolitical events? What ethics and responsibilities must the media abide by in times of conflict? And, perhaps most importantly, what is the role of the new media: the individual who now wields such influence and power? The answers will be crucial to our maturing as a democracy.

E-Commerce, FDI, India, MSME, tech and media

In rising e-Commerce storm, India protects its ship

MNC, investor, institutions, Swadeshi, disconnect, ownership, regulators, geostrategic, data, economy, platform, data, technology, companies, Silicon Valley, algorithms, Economic rights, civil liberties, autonomous, privacy, safeguards, MSME, FDI

The debate on the global governance, ownership and management of data is today confronted by three new realities. The first is that the custodians of data – technology companies in Silicon Valley that famously promised to bring the world together and solve most of its problems through innovative algorithms — have been found wanting in the protection of economic rights and civil liberties that accrue to their users in developing countries. Not only have digital platforms serially misused the data that their consumers hand over in trust, they have also done little to generate local value that can create jobs, contextual content and/or spur secondary and tertiary innovation.

Second, it is increasingly clear that local jurisdictions, however flawed or premature their regulatory ambience may appear today, are the most effective forums to guarantee even a semblance of protection to users of digital platforms. No longer can emerging markets seek refuge under foreign laws that promise enhanced privacy safeguards on paper, but in practice ignore the mischievous harvesting of such data by intelligence or law enforcement agencies of states in which technology giants are incorporated. Put simply, the hypocrisy of “autonomous” and responsible self-regulation stands exposed.

And third, digital markets don’t accurately drive valuations of technology. While IPOs may determine the growth expectations of a tech company, their worth must also be driven by the ability (or not) of their peers to provide the service at competitive rates. The debates on data localisation, done to death, appear to have altogether ignored this reality. The fact is that that India’s entry into the “data storage” market will exponentially bring down price points. The Y2K, BPO and Euro conversion episodes have proven that India is capable of providing digital services at a fraction of the cost sought by others. If India is a financially sustainable destination for data, should hackneyed arguments on localisation be revisited in the light of new economic realities?

All three realities are implicated in the debate on India’s e-commerce policy, which will define how the country trades, transacts and consumes in the coming years. E-commerce is where big-ticket investments are likely to happen; generating jobs, supporting MSMEs and incubating e-product creators along the way.

E-commerce is where big-ticket investments are likely to happen; generating jobs, supporting MSMEs and incubating e-product creators along the way.

Look at the facts as they appear. India has the world’s largest population in the 18 to 35 age group at over 440 million. An estimated half of this population is already in the workforce. As income levels rise, so will purchasing power, which in turn will implicate their choices ranging from clothes to shoes to books to gadgets to news to entertainment to food and beverages.

Affordable access to internet and smartphones (no more in the realm of possibility but already a reality) will facilitate both access to information (for instance, comparing prices and features) as well as greater agency (buying what meets your need at the best price). This is the ‘millennial opportunity’ that India is betting on and e-retail does not want to miss. It is unsurprising then that this sector has proven so controversial—and has become a flashpoint for debate about digital rules, policies and globalization around the world. India is not immune to these either and is witnessing a heated debate on some of its recent policy maneuvers.

Just over two years ago, it seemed like India was willing to fully integrate its emerging e-commerce market with the rapidly expanding global digital commerce, allowing 100% FDI via the automatic route. Big ticket investments by e-commerce giants like Walmart and Amazon were then seen as an endorsement of India’s continuing push towards globalisation and rejection of protectionist nationalism propounded by organisations like the Swadeshi Jagran Manch and practiced by previous governments through their decisions.

Global investors and institutions saw this as a natural consequence of India’s rise. After all, the assumption was that a $3 trillion economy aspiring to become a $5 trillion economy by its next elections cycle of 2024 must acquiesce to the financial and commercial logic of globalization. India, as all other capitalist democracies, would welcome the innovations and efficiencies of global MNCs, even though it ran the risk of their displacing or buying-out local peers.

Yet, last year-end’s revised rules — which the government claims have only elaborated and reasserted the terms set in 2017 — have proved that rising industrial powers with sense of sovereignty and alive to their size, rarely make such simple trade-offs.

First came a new FDI Press Note, which limited online retailers from selling the products of vendors that they had invested in and offering heavy discounting on selected products. Next came a new draft e-commerce policy, which tightened rules in relation to online retail practices (including intermediary liability) along with imposing a raft of new data sharing mandates.

With the e-commerce market set to grow from $35 billion to $100 billion by 2022, it is unsurprising that the stakes are high and that the Indian government has received flak from some quarters for what they perceive as an attempt to ‘protect’ local industries. All of a sudden, India is seen as abandoning its commitments to free trade and investment.

What explains this disconnect between the expectations that some in the global financial community have of India and the realities of its political economy and India’s choices?

The answer lies in the underlying shifts in the structure of the global economy and India’s own rising aspirations. Simply put, the global economy is undergoing a new industrial transformation, with digital technologies spearheading this change. A small group of technology platforms, largely based in the US and China, is increasingly mediating billions of dollars of global trade and trillions of bytes in information and communication flows.

Access to personal information and ownership over data infrastructures have allowed these firms to entrench their dominance in markets around the world. In the process they have restructured existing economic and even social relations in a manner that better suits their commercial interests. Unsurprisingly then, there is great uncertainty about how data flows, technology platforms and digital ecosystems will implicate market and state power in the international system.

India is emerging as a global power amidst these realities. It certainly does not aspire to re-orient the moorings of the liberal international order; having benefited from an extended period of peace for its own development. Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus in India that even as the United States and China pry open markets abroad, they are neither interested in creating value for those markets nor nurturing sustainable economic development in these destinations. Around the world, nation states are reassessing frameworks of law, regulation and industry practices that have governed the digital economy.

India’s objective with regards to its digital economy is three-fold:

First, to create regulatory stability (a precondition for investment that scores over other determinants) and a level playing field for all market actors. Agnostic or ambivalent regulations that merely preserve of the value generated by foreign technology companies will not help Indian consumers in any way. If India’s regulatory policy for digital technologies appears in flux, it is because the exact determinants of value creation are uncertain. Regulators around the world are currently attempting to quantify the digital economy and map out the disaggregated set of economic activities that comprise it. However, any sensible policy is likely to have a bias that offsets the current uneven playing field developed and controlled by a handful of transnational corporations.

Second, to create opportunities for local enterprise and value chains. For an economy that is aspiring towards a $5 trillion GDP, this is a natural compulsion—both for electoral reasons and for geostrategic ones. This does not necessarily imply relying on China’s techno-nationalist playbook. India does not seek to expel foreign firms from its markets in order to create domestic champions. Rather, it is attempting to create local value through digital supply chains that have high scale and increasing presence. India must respond to the demands of jobs, social mobility and domestic enterprise. It has a once in a century opportunity to use the “data economy” to transform from a mere collective of billion consumers to a large economy.

Finally, it has to create a globally competitive digital market. This is probably a central challenge of our times. Proprietary data sets have allowed a handful of technology companies to dominate existing and new markets through sheer information asymmetry. Even domestic competitors in the US and EU are questioning the relevance of competition jurisprudence and theory. It is only to be expected that India should develop its own policy propositions for the same.

The great industrial powers of the previous centuries have protected cutting edge industries in one form or another. In the late-19th and early-20th century, the United States ranked amongst the most enthusiastic levelers of tariffs on British goods. Japan’s then infamous Ministry of International Trade and Industry protected domestic industries through the 1950s and 60s until it became a cause of concern in the US. The rise of China’s internet giants was enabled entirely by keeping American technology firms out of the domestic economy. India will not follow that same playbook — it does not have the luxury of creating exceptions for its rise while trying to impose a different set of rules for its peers in the international system.

Instead, India will focus on creation of value for the Indian consumer, who is the primary producer and consumer of data. Foreign technology companies wanting to do business in India should sidestep shrill debates on data localisation .Their primary objective ought to be the elevation of the Indian digital economy from a high-volume, low-intensity engagement to high-volume, high-intensity engagement. The interaction of Indians with data in all its forms — audio, visual, text-based — will catalyse the creation of a new cadre of data scientists capable of tailoring platform engagement in multiple languages and cultural contexts. The value so generated, by jobs, experience and improved digital services, will not only benefit Indians but also the bottom lines of these companies and their ability to do business in any other part of the world. Fair and sophisticated rules on the management and ownership of data will follow subsequently.

Today’s reality is that globalization is increasingly being driven by voluminous flows of data. These flows are generating enormous value for those individuals, industries and geographies that can analyse and monetise them. It is also these very actors who well set the terms of this new globalization—the new rules of trade, commerce, investment and security.

India’s policy shifts must not be an attempt to choose between globalization and protectionism—the choice is obviously the former, even though electoral compulsions certainly do push political parties towards the latter. Instead, home to the world’s largest surplus of data and the largest cohort of consumers, India must attempt to ensure that it emerges as a beneficiary and rule-maker of the digital economy once this period of churn settles. The road to this would be paved with regulatory stability, policies that bias growth to cater to its size and specific needs and having the political courage to remain outside of popular herds and hashtags as it undertakes the above.