Category Archives: Global South

Global South, Great Power Dynamics, India, international affairs, US and canada, Writing

The US needs a new paradigm for India: ‘Great Power Partnership’

Samir Saran | Kaush Arha

The US-India partnership is unprecedented in its scope. It holds the promise to substantially augment both nations’ security interests and to shape the world to their mutual advantage. The coordination and collaboration between the world’s longest standing democracy and its largest democracy will have far-reaching regional and global implications. This strategic alignment requires sustained forethought and concerted action—as well as a new realist paradigm and lexicon. Prioritizing pragmatic and principled interests and values will lead to the formulation of a novel US-India strategic framework and vocabulary unshackled by past preconceptions.    

The era of great power competition calls for Great Power Partnerships. Size matters. As the United States engages in competitive or adversarial relationships with Asian and Eurasian powers China and Russia, it is prudent for it to seek a Great Power Partnership. Conversely, India is engaged in localized hostilities with its neighbors China and Pakistan, and finds its one-time friend Russia reduced to being a dependent of China. Realpolitik calls for the largest American and Asian nations, as democracies, to forge a Great Power Partnership to their mutual advantage. 

But the US-India partnership represents a strategic convergence between emerging allies driven by shared interests and values. Both countries realize that they are stronger together in deterring Beijing’s hegemonic designs, which are inimical to both US and Indian interests. India shares the longest disputed land border with China and confronts the hostile China-Pakistan axis along virtually its entire western, northern, and eastern land borders. Meanwhile, China’s major foreign policy goal is to displace the United States as the paramount power in the Indo-Pacific and upend the US-led rules-based international order.

The US-India convergence extends beyond deterring the Chinese Communist Party. It smooths India’s path to achieving its “rightful place” among the world’s leading nations. In turn, the United States has, in India, a partner of size to shape world affairs to their collective advantage. Traditional security assurances and treaty provisions underlie the United States’ closest alliances, including those with NATO nations, Israel, and Japan. India has strenuously shunned alliances over the last seven decades. But realism will compel the two nations to increasingly act in concordance, whether they choose to institutionalize their converging interests into a formal treaty or alliance with reciprocal commitments or not.

The two countries have rightly termed this “the most consequential relationship of the twenty-first century.” US and Indian leaders have also referred to it as a “comprehensive strategic partnership”—the same label the United States uses for Vietnam and Indonesia. India deserves a category of its own: Great Power Partnership.

Areas of collaboration

Both countries are in the midst of a consequential election year, with India’s six-week national vote beginning on April 19 and the United States voting this fall. But these essential ties run deeper than any one administration on either side, even though the continuity of Indian administrations has been critical.

Still, to make this new Great Power Partnership paradigm stick will require more than rhetoric. The two countries need to make rapid advances along four fronts.    

  1. Defense co-production. It is in both countries’ interest to help India become the premier naval force and logistics hub across the Indian Ocean, as well as the munitions factory and backstop for a free and open Indo-Pacific. US-India collaboration on co-producing jet engines and armored vehicles should expand to include autonomous weapons with the goal of making the United States and India the bulwarks of the democratic defense industrial value chain. 
  2. Space collaboration, development, and exploration. In India, the United States has an ambitious, capable, and complementary partner with technical competence coupled with a cost-effective model for space endeavors. India’s space program will gain greatly in ability and ambition from close collaboration with US public and private actors. India offers scale and affordability to amplify US space investments and share the benefits with the Global South.
  3. Development and governance of the digital economy driven by artificial intelligence (AI). The United States and India, as the world’s preeminent digital start-up nations, share an innovator’s perspective for digital governance. In contrast, a regulator’s perspective is more prevalent in Europe. It is in both countries’ interests to coordinate on shaping international AI digital governance that fosters responsible innovation and application.
  4. Winning the hearts and minds of the Global South. India and China offer diametrically opposing visions for the Global South. China wants to enlist emerging nations into a countervailing bloc against the existing rules-based international order. India wants to enhance Global South representation within the existing international order to better reflect demographic and economic realities. The US-India partnership advances both India’s stature among the Global South and US outreach to the region. It is essential for both US and Indian interests that the Global South embraces and strengthens the rules-based international order. India is well-positioned to lead this effort.     

Deepening the partnership

As democracies, the United States and India have a common interest in bolstering and modernizing the rules-based institutions that govern world affairs. Indeed, in the twenty-first century, the United States and India may shape a new international order as the United States and Europe did in the twentieth century. The largest American and Asian countries bear the responsibility to ensure that the twenty-first century international order equitably represents the Med-Atlantic, the Indo-Pacific, and the Global South—reinforcing their shared values of liberty and dignity for all.

The partnership between the United States and Europe is buttressed by cultural affinity and institutional solidarity through shared membership in NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other groupings. The US-India partnership does not yet boast either cultural affinity or institutional solidarity at comparable levels, despite the rising force of the Indian diaspora in US society. In time, it can and should develop both.

India is projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of the decade. The United States should lead the effort of inviting India to become a member of the G7 and the OECD. For their economic security, the United States and India should prioritize binding the Indo-Pacific nations to their collective economies more than that of China.

The United States and India have made great strides in coordination through multilateral institutional arrangements. These include the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (better known as the Quad). The frequency and scope of joint military exercises and intelligence sharing are also on the rise. US-India strategic dialogues on defense and economic coordination need to expand in depth and breadth to regularly engage functionaries in each respective administrative structure to facilitate greater interoperability and knowledge sharing.

The United States and India should also devote singular attention to advancing stronger institutional solidarity and people-to-people connections. Enhanced engagement between middle America and middle India holds the key. The United States is reinvigorating its domestic manufacturing across digital and industrial sectors while confronting a shortage of skilled technicians. India boasts a surfeit of graduates with technical skills looking for better employment. A US-India science and technology mobility agreement with prescreened skilled individuals from both nations would facilitate greater knowledge sharing and co-development between the two digital economies.

The US-India Great Power Partnership enjoys strong tailwinds, but its success is not inevitable. The relationship requires a considered understanding of the cultural, demographic, and political drivers at work in the two complex democracies. All too often, US-India discourse in bureaucratic circles and media outlets is prone to reflexive skepticism and mistrust. Both sides need a more reflective discernment of each other’s society and political system. In this area, the US and Indian business communities are leading the way with a strong sense of cooperation and comprehension.  Overcoming what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has described as “hesitations of history,” a constructive Great Power Partnership could advance core US-India interests and values going forward. 

This article originally appeared in Atlantic Council.

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Brazil, G20 India, Global South, India, Writing

Interview – “[Brazil and India] have a stake and voice, by rights, not indulgence”

Over the past decades, India has witnessed unprecedented growth not only in economic terms but also in terms of its international prominence. Has India effectively utilized its participation in the G20 to showcase global leadership potential emerging from developing nations?

Samir Saran: By all counts, the Indian Presidency of the G20 can be assessed as having been an outstanding success. The Indian leadership was able to ensure that the dynamic federal architecture was able to jointly deliver on the objectives that had been spelled out at the outset. Every state of India was involved, in some cases infrastructure was invested into certain parts of the country, and in all instances visible support of people and polity was in evidence. The G20 became a people’s project and India hosted about 220 meetings in 60 cities.

From a global perspective, India determinedly and delicately ensured that the Global South became a participant, and it could contribute to the agenda for the grouping this year.

From a global perspective, India determinedly and delicately ensured that the Global South became a participant, and it could contribute to the agenda for the grouping this year. India walked an extra mile to understand their concerns and expectations, and also ensured that some were also invited to the proceedings. It conducted two Voices of the Global South conferences under the chairship of the Indian Prime Minister indicating the seriousness with which it took this task. This has lent legitimacy to its international standing within this very large group.

Finally, at a time of polarized politics and breakdown of trust among countries, India fashioned an ambitious declaration in Delhi that responded to issues that are important to all. It achieved consensus amongst countries on matters that had been left unresolved in other multilateral forums. Its ability to deliver this outcome demonstrated its leadership and that of the emerging and developing countries to contribute significantly and effectively to matters pertaining to global governance. Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa, in the consecutive years of Presidency have an opportunity to showcase the importance and prominence of emerging country leadership in world affairs. 

India and Brazil find themselves in a unique position, jointly leading a troika of developing countries. Drawing on India’s experience, can it wield the potential to reshape G20 outcomes? Could you provide concrete examples of results aligning with the Global South perspective?

SS: Brazil has an even bigger opportunity than India did. India’s troika with Indonesia and Brazil straddles two continents–Asia and Latin America. Brazil has the advantage of having a troika which includes South Africa and, therefore, the African continent. It is an opportunity which must be capitalized to articulate our common challenges as leaders in the developing world. Brazil has declared poverty reduction as a key theme of its G20 Presidency and this is very relevant. It is an indication of both our challenges and our aspirations. Equality and Equity, even as we grow and develop, are another Brazilian objective and resonate with developing societies.

Brazil has an even bigger opportunity than India did. India’s troika with Indonesia and Brazil straddles two continents–Asia and Latin America. Brazil has the advantage of having a troika which includes South Africa and, therefore, the African continent.

India had strived hard with its partners to have a result-oriented G20. India had 87 outcome documents and 118 action items coming out of its Presidency. The African Union’s addition to the G20 is of course a key achievement. The adoption of a framework on Digital Public Infrastructure is also a significant milestone. Both of these are at the core of the Global South expectations.

The Indian Presidency has also gone further on the social protection agenda. It has come out with G20 Policy Priorities on Adequate and Sustainable Social Protection and Decent Work for Gig and Platform Workers & G20 Policy Options for Sustainable Financing of Social Protection. This is an important part of the Brazilian agenda as well and corresponds with what is needed in developing countries. 

Despite the undeniable significance of the G20, the group faces criticism for inherent characteristics like the absence of a permanent Secretariat, insufficient means for implementation monitoring, and perceived lack of representation due to its “elite” membership. Drawing from your first-hand experience, do these criticisms hold merit? What are the primary challenges and gains associated with a grouping like the G20?

SS: We should look at each of these criticisms discretely. First, on the lack of a permanent Secretariat, one may ask if this is in fact a criticism. The G20 has functioned without overzealous bureaucracies. It may well be one of the secrets to its continued functioning. What we may need is a central repository of G20 knowledge rather than a Secretariat. 

The knowledge repository brings us to the second criticism of implementation and monitoring. Leveraging the knowledge repository may allow us to hold the G20 members accountable for their commitments.

The lack of representation is a weakness of any plurilateral grouping. The ideas which brought the group together are the criterion for its exclusivity. It so happens that the G20 members are economically elite because they currently contribute the most to global GDP. The membership should adapt and change with the times. We have started this process with the addition of the African Union to the group. And the efforts of India to partner with the Global South in many ways smashed the glass ceiling and made the G20 relevant and respond to the leadership of the Global South. 

At the think tank / academic level, we at ORF (Secretariat of the Think 20) were able to solicit policy briefs from over a 1,000 authors from over 75 countries and ensured that the process is inclusive and open to all.  Some of our important convenings outside of India were in Kigali, Rwanda, and Cape Town, South Africa. These established the inclusive design of the Indian Presidency.

As a leader within one of the G20 engagement groups, the Think20, you have had the opportunity to observe how the integration of civil society on official negotiation tracks functions. Does civil society play a substantial role in agenda-setting or decision-making within the official G20 agenda? If so, how can these opportunities be expanded?

SS: We cannot speak on past Presidencies but can say with confidence this year that civil society has contributed to the official G20 agenda. The energy with which the G20 India team followed and engaged with conversations in all the engagement groups is a reflection of these. We have also seen some of our ideas find space in the Leader’s Declaration. 

The addition of the African Union, the commitment to expand climate finance, and the push for digital public infrastructure were all at various points recommended by Think20 India. 

The concept of Task Force notes introduced by T20 Indonesia was elevated to Task Force statements by T20 India. It was something that ensured more engagement with the specific Sherpa tracks. For instance, the Trade and Investment Working Group may not want to wait for the full Think20 Communique which may have specific recommendations. It may have more interest in the full statement of the Task Force on Macroeconomics and Trade.

Innovations such as this help academia and think tanks make more valuable and timely contributions to the G20 process.

India and Brazil have a history of coordinating positions in various multilateral forums such as the United Nations, BRICS, IBSA  Dialogue Forum, and the World Trade Organization G20. Can the G20 be considered a noteworthy example of the potential for Indian-Brazilian cooperation?

SS: Brazil-India have been reliable partners to each other. At the G20, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization, the partnership takes on a unique global character. At BRICS, IBSA, and other smaller groups, the partnership is characterized by a conversation amongst similarly situated and aligned countries barring a few exceptions. 

Brazil and India have a vital role in keeping the focus on development in these international plurilateral groups. We have a stake and voice, by rights, not indulgence. The two countries are both aware of this and leverage their voice accordingly. The role of the troika in the success of a G20 Presidency is an open secret.

Brazil and India have a vital role in keeping the focus on development in these international plurilateral groups. We have a stake and voice, by rights, not indulgence. The two countries are both aware of this and leverage their voice accordingly. The role of the troika in the success of a G20 Presidency is an open secret. Our collaboration at the international level on behalf of the Global South is something we should maintain momentum on and continue to permanently center development as the most important mission of the G20. This would certainly be a triumph of the Indian-Brazilian partnership in world affairs.

In India, the Banker’s G20 became the People’s G20. Brazil, with its rich constituency of civil society and research organizations, will take this forward and shape the process indelibly. 

This interview was given to CEBRI-Journal in November 2023.

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Global South, India, Writing

How India can become the bank for the Global South

Today, India is poised at the moment and GDP that China was in in 2007. Does it have the same gumption?

In 2007, China’s GDP was about $3.6 trillion. Today, India’s GDP is $3.7 trillion — perhaps more. This parallel is crucial to understanding the big moment that Indian diplomacy, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is recognising. A moment, if supported by India’s people, its companies and the state apparatus, will reshape the global order. An appreciation of this moment and putting its lessons into concrete actions is the big legacy of 2023 as India concludes a transformational diplomatic year — the year of its G20 stewardship.

Look back at history. In 2007, China was not yet the geoeconomic behemoth it is now. But with a GDP lower than India’s today, it became the go-to nation during the global financial crisis a year later. Every nation sought to deepen relations with Beijing, and to create a special place in their diplomacy for the People’s Republic. Its leaders were the toast of Davos and at business salons. China provided institutional and geoeconomic responses — a development bank, a cross-continental lending programme that galvanised infrastructure accretion without the legacy constraints of Western agencies, and a series of economic projects that eventually coalesced into the Belt and Road Initiative.

It is true that some of these have run into trouble. Nevertheless, the fact is China used its economic promise in 2008 to gain oversized economic and political influence that continues to stand it in good stead. It did this by offering itself as a vital additionality to the global order. At a time when the US was struggling to recover from the financial crisis and the Eurozone was tearing itself apart, it was China that promised stability and economic dynamism. The world wanted and needed an additional engine of growth and an additional source of investment. And so it also welcomed an additional centre of geopolitical power.

India is poised at a similar moment and with a similar GDP. Does it have the same gumption? As we enter 2024, this is the framework within which Indians must understand their place in the world today. The recent past teaches us that an India-sized economy of about $4 trillion can exert a huge influence. With vision and skilful diplomacy, it can carve a space for itself alongside economies that are four or five times large, like the United States, the European Union and China.

This is a real Indian opportunity in 2024, as Europe stagnates, the US turns inward and China deals with internal problems and its share of the global economy that is shrinking in nominal terms. The agenda for India’s next government must simply be this: Demonstrate India’s potential, and the additionality that it can provide for global growth, institutions, and security.

Additionality does not require extraordinariness. After all, China’s growth in recent years has not been extraordinary. But it had momentum, and that is what India has today. It has its own trajectory and the motive force, one better suited to a green and digital future. If China had mass manufacturing, the growth engine of the 2010s, India has its platform economy, the dynamo of the 2020s.

But additionality must have attributes. What Beijing offered 15 years ago was not an inchoate promise. There was a system, a schema, to the China proposition. This roadmap excited China’s partners. An entire future-focused architecture served as the loudest possible announcement that a $4-trillion economy would punch with the weight of a $15-trillion one.

Also, a new cooperation architecture needs to be put in place because India, in a very short while, will be spending serious money globally. The private sector is mobilising to support connectivity, supply chains, and resource resilience projects across the world. But public development finance will also grow alongside, and indeed, faster than India’s economy.

This is the substance behind India’s additionality. Even if we assume India grows at only 10 per cent a year in current dollars, below its recent benchmark, it will be a major new source of development finance. If India slowly but steadily raises its development cooperation budget to less than 0.5 per cent of its GDP by 2030, it will still have put around $70 billion into the global system. India is already the voice of the Global South; it will become the bank of the Global South.

This finance needs to be undergirded by India’s unique proposition, its own roadmap, and its own offering to the world. It urgently needs an outward-focused development finance corporation that can catalyse projects globally. It needs a bank, its own version of the China Development Bank, that will focus on global corporate needs beyond just trade finance. And it needs an imagery that is understood by others.

India’s government has shown this ambition at home. The prime minister’s Gati Shakti initiative links disparate infrastructure projects with a common vision. Similarly, we need an external engagement approach. Together with like-minded partners, India needs maps plotting priority infrastructure, connectivity routes, business and trading hubs and developmental projects. It needs to do this boldly and determinedly, identifying vital regions and sectors where it will resolutely plant the Tricolour. 2024 is the year for inking a world map described by India’s vision for its role in the world.

Source : Indian Express, December 13, 2023

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climate change, COP28, Global South, international affairs, Writing

Controversies aside, COP28 is a real chance to put Global South at centre

As the world reels from the impact of the hottest year on record in 2023, the attention of the global community turns to COP28 for solutions to the climate challenge. While the previous decades of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations have failed to deliver effective and equitable climate action, this year’s COP in the UAE is a unique opportunity to move from empty promises to real action.

Real action on climate requires pragmatism. It would centre the specific needs of energy-poor countries in the Global South. It would recognise that the energy transition for much of the world is just that: a transition, in which legacy fuels are both rendered more efficient and used to finance the scale-up of renewables. Sermonising western COP presidencies have rarely understood the basic needs of the developing world.

While COP28 might have attracted concern for naming a president-designate who also runs a large fossil fuel company, the fact is that this is cause for optimism. Dr Sultan Al  Jaber does indeed run Abu Dhabi’s national oil company — but he also founded the renewable energy giant Masdar, which pioneered efforts to spread green capital across multiple countries and geographies. A pragmatic climate solution for the Global South would similarly prioritise the spread of enterprise, of solutions, and of technology.

Dr Al Jaber and COP28 have a hard task ahead of them. Estimates indicate that nearly all developed nations, with only two exceptions, are significantly off-course in meeting their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This stark deviation stands as the primary obstacle preventing the realisation of the Paris Climate Goals. Those most culpable for the climate crisis persist in evading their responsibilities. Responsibility for climate finance is even more important. Developing economies will require around $2 trillion annually to meet emission targets and cope with the impact of climate change. In stark contrast, the world has fixated on bickering over a meagre $100 billion annual target for financing from the developed world. We are currently fighting over bicycles when what is required is a Mercedes.

The UAE COP is well placed to establish a new pathway that places the Global South at the centre. It also comes at a time when there is already momentum around Global South led multilateral cooperation. In particular, the Indian G20 Presidency has already demonstrated the ability to build consensus around such a climate agenda. Notably, the inclusion of the Green Development Pact in the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration creates a cohesive narrative around climate action as a catalyst for sustainable and inclusive growth. India has highlighted a few priority action areas which must now be taken forward in the coming year, and COP28 is an ideal starting point.

First, reducing cost of green capital in the developing world is crucial, as these can be nearly seven times higher than in OECD countries. The IMF estimates that emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) have accounted for 80% of global growth since 2008. However, only 25% of climate finance has flowed to these geographies. By design, the current international financial architecture prevents growth from being green. It is imperative to create a global inventory of green projects with a guarantee that each project can access capital at a similar cost. This guarantee can be facilitated by a transnational institution similar to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Response to a planetary crisis must not be compromised by perceived political risks.


Second, COP28 must look to institutionalise climate action as an explicit mandate for Multilateral Development Banks, aligning with the MDB reform agenda put forward during the Indian G20 Presidency. The recently expanded BRICS grouping can also be utilised to further the reform agenda. The newer capital-rich members of the grouping should be galvanised to create a line of funds for Green Transitions within the New Development Bank. This can serve as a boutique model which can increase pressure on West-controlled institutions to accelerate their efforts.

Third, progress must be made on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) with a focus on identifying concrete instruments to meet the distinct adaptation finance needs of different regions, particularly for the most vulnerable communities. Furthermore, the GGA should serve as a platform to underscore the repercussions of climate change on health and gender, identifying integrated strategies to tackle these interconnected crises. The Loss and Damage Fund must also be operationalised with concrete financing commitment from the developed world.

Fourth, innovation in climate technologies in the Global South must be encouraged. In particular, green startups should be supported by creating effective knowledge sharing mechanism within the UNFCCC and establishing a social impact fund to support promising green projects.

Finally, it is crucial to diversify and make green technology value chains accessible to all. Presently, China holds disproportionate control over the raw materials and technologies vital for green energy. It is critical to break free from this monopoly and ensure that Beijing does not wield a veto over our green future. 

Source : Times of India, December 3, 2023

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Global South, Writing

How to Reset Relations Between Europe and the Global South

It’s a fact that countries of the Global South, while not supportive of Russia’s war against Ukraine, also blame NATO and the West for its global impact. Europe needs to change its approach.

Samir Saran and Shairee Malhotra

The Russia-Ukraine war is a turning point for the European Union, as this conflict has challenged the EU’s fundamental premise on security. Yet, while the Western alliance’s—comprising the United States, Europe, and its allies—support for Ukraine has strengthened, many countries of the Global South, representing 85 percent of the world’s population and 39 percent of its GDP, have not aligned with the Western understanding and narratives about the war or with the assessments of its origins and implications.

In several United Nations resolutions that sought to reprimand Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, countries of significance across Africa, Asia, and Latin America abstained; a few countries of the Global South even voted against them. Hardly any of these countries joined the Western sanctions against Russia, laying bare a wide global divide.

The battles being fought on the ground are as critical to the EU’s future as the battle of narratives. In a sense, the larger battleground is the Global South, and the prize is the hearts and minds of its countries. It appears this gulf in perspectives is only widening. For a variety of reasons, the Kremlin’s propositions are not being dismissed by many in the Global South, and, in some cases, they have found resonance. This is despite European leaders such as the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaching out to the Global South.

The perception that the positions taken by nations of the Global South are simply a case of neutrality is rather limited. Many countries—including India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates—are neither anti-West nor pro-Russia, but they lack broader sympathy for Europe for a variety of reasons, despite their strong and all-encompassing ties with the continent. Attitudes are being shaped more by assessments of the past relationship with Europe than by the war.

It would be helpful to confront some of these hard truths.

Misperceptions

Berlin, Paris, and Brussels should be mindful of what defines the priorities of these countries, including their geographies, histories, interests, dependencies, conflicts, security concerns, and economic imperatives. Countries do not view the current situation from the European standpoint, but from their own circumstances and lived experiences. Even as all these factors vary for different countries in different continents, a shared reality creates underlying patterns—and colonialism is one such all-engulfing shadow.

For Europeans, contemporary history may have begun on February 24, 2022. For other parts of the world, the hostilities in Ukraine are part of a continuum of violence that has spanned decades. For example, there is India’s long-standing and occasionally violent management of the aggressive and nuclear-armed China-Pakistan axis on its borders, for which Europe seems to have no empathy. Indeed, apathy is on full display when Brussels, Berlin, and other European capitals humor Pakistan-based and backed religious radicals and insurrectionists, and privilege their trade and economic ties with China even as a belligerent Beijing seeks to redraw the political map in the Himalayas.

Memories of the Western retreat during the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst hoarding vaccines at the expense of less privileged citizens in the developing world, are still fresh. The warm reception accorded to Ukrainian refugees compared with xenophobic attitudes toward Afghan and Syrian refugees further contributed to the decline in moral standing. To make matters worse, populist white supremacist movements are now mainstreamed across the continent, even as voices from Europe sermonize to others about their democracies and societies.

The West’s long history of reckless interventions and exits in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya has also resulted in widespread resentment. The current war is being contextualized within the West’s own previous actions, resulting in allegations of hypocrisy and double standards. Russian President Vladimir Putin is exploiting this disillusionment. For many smaller countries that suffered centuries of collective humiliation through European colonial rule, “neutrality” is also an act of defiance and an assertion of sovereignty. This is exacerbated by the fact that former European colonial powers are yet to acknowledge and address many historical wrongs. In sum, there is a huge mismatch between Europe’s self-perception as a bastion of values and what the Global South believes.

Broadly speaking, countries in the Global South are against the war, particularly since they are the ones suffering from its disruptive impact the most. However, even if Russian actions may be more to blame, many believe European sanctions are responsible for the crisis of the three Fs—food, fuel, and fertilizers—with their take on the war being shaped by the hardships they are subjected to. With a preference for peace, many in the Global South view the West’s continued arming of Ukraine and the aggressive rhetoric of its leaders and commentariat as counterproductive. For the rest of the world, while Ukraine has been invaded by Russia, the resulting global suffering is blamed equally on Russia and NATO. That’s the hard truth.

European capitals should recognize that the Global South’s neutrality has not translated into substantial political or material support for Russia. Instead, countries such as India have provided significant humanitarian support to Ukraine and are likely to assist in reconstruction. They have publicly and privately called out Moscow, despite needing to engage with the Kremlin for their defense sector and energy needs. India is not the only one having to do this. However, European policymakers appear insensitive to these concerns that predate the current war. Europe is as much a realpolitik actor as anyone else, even if it prefers to cloak its actions in normative vocabulary. Just as the EU’s security and economic compulsions dictate its choices, the same goes for countries of the Global South.

The hierarchy of concerns goes together with the hierarchy of decision-making. For decades, countries of the Global South have called for equitable representation in multilateral institutions like the UN, which continue to be defined by the legacies of colonialism and hegemony. The failure to reform these institutions has enabled perceptions that a Western-dominated order—that perpetuates imbalances—is under attack, not global order per se.

Doing Things Differently

The reality of the Global South’s positions on the Russia-Ukraine war is complex and warrants deeper reflection. Europe should reflect deeply as to why it is confronted with such reticence while being among the most generous donors of development assistance. Despite the West’s potential to offer better alternatives and opportunities than Moscow and Beijing, it is struggling for influence in the Global South.

European capitals could be attentive to conflicts transpiring elsewhere and adopt a proactive, principled, and fair approach to them as well. Setting a good example always helps. It is also time for Europe to interact with the Global South on equal terms and abdicate its patronizing and condescending approach. All countries are independent sovereign states with agency, and “lecturing” rather than having a dialogue is unhelpful. This needs to change when it comes to matters of war and peace as much as it needs to change for trade and climate change.

There is also a sense of disappointment that plurilateral forums—such as the G20—that can work to respond to the concerns of developing countries, have been hijacked by the posturing over the war at the cost of other critical challenges. It would strengthen the partnership between the North and South if the sanctity and purpose of forums discussing the climate challenge, development concerns, and economic issues could be preserved.

Recently, in the case of Europe’s ties with India, a greater mutual understanding of strategic choices and robust dialogue has ensured continuous cooperation despite differing positions. This is a good model for others as well.

Becoming Part of the Everyday Conversation

It would be useful for Europe to enhance outreach and adopt better messaging so that the Global South does not view the war as a European issue, but rather one with global implications. A world that does not respect the UN Charter would be anarchic and would intensify security concerns everywhere. This could be particularly existential for smaller and less powerful countries, as these kinds of wars could set precedents that the great powers can get away with anything in their apparent spheres of influence.

European capitals should also throw their weight behind reforming global multilateral institutions to create a more level playing field. Countries of the Global South are emerging rapidly and demanding their rightful seats at the international table. If Brussels and Berlin want non-Western nations to play a stronger role in stabilizing the rules-based global order, they must create stakeholders that believe in such an order. In 2022, Chancellor Scholz emphasized that Berlin could not expect countries in the Global South to not aspire for affluence, but it could instead work on sharing technologies to enable countries to achieve growth in a climate-friendly manner. This laudable approach is one that must be encouraged.

Finally, if European capitals wish to push the needle of opinion in the Global South in their favor, they should engage intently with strategic communities and think tanks that play a role in shaping narratives and policy in this vast and heterogenous region. Europe needs to be part of the everyday conversation, not the demanding guest that turns up when it wants something.

Source : Internationale Politik Quarterly, June 30, 2023

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