Category Archives: China
Begging will not de-risk Brussels from Beijing
Samir Saran | Gautam Chikermane
Not narratives, not rhetoric: what the EU needs is to wake up from its strategic slumber and act on its China addiction
A new report by the European Union (EU) Chamber of Commerce in China and the China Macro Group, yawning its way between decoupling and de-risking, will be splashed in the media, discussed ad nauseam in think tank convenings, laughed at in Beijing, and laid to rest in the garbage bins of empty rhetoric. Titled “Riskful Thinking: Navigating the Politics of Economic Security”, the report is undergirded by the naive assumption that its 11 recommendations for China will be implemented.
The report effectively resorts to begging for China to adhere to the rules-based order. It recommends that Beijing steer clear of excessive self-reliance but allows considerable latitude for discussing the scope of the word ‘excessive’. It implores the world’s second-largest economy to increase transparency on laws that limit market access, blissfully forgetful of the opaque regime that helped incubate such laws in the first place. Then it urges China to define a common language on de-risking, ignorantly assuming that Chinese polity serves the interests of the EU.
Europe is being suffocated by the rules-based order of its own making—Beijing has weaponised the EU’s rules against itself, thereby asphyxiating its companies, consumers, and citizens.
Trade protectionism, Beijing’s erratic policy shifts, and the quest for localisation find themselves among the other appeals. In a cringeworthy moment, China is even requested to “Refrain from punishing companies for the actions of their home governments.”
Nothing in what is sought is inappropriate. Rather, what is bothersome is that it is being voiced in a 34,000-word, 56-page report that sees a US$19.35-trillion large grouping of 27 democratic nations bend before a US$18.56-trillion authoritarian regime. Besides an amused smile from the Chairman of Everything, Xi Jinping, for exposing the EU’s toxic dependence, this report will achieve little else.
On the other hand, the seven recommendations for the EU, may—and it is a big ‘may’—wake the grouping, and perhaps even the continent, from its strategic slumber. The most important among these is the one around rethinking supply chains of critical inputs and export control frameworks. Yet, here too, the report is unable to imagine a world without China. “Continue to proactively engage with China and reject calls for disengagement,” it recommends. Further, it seeks to remind the actors in this game—chambers of commerce, China-focused think tanks, and businesses—about de-risking but fails to define why this should be paid heed to this time around.
Finally, the report offers nine recommendations for European businesses. Being an industry chamber, some of them are better phrased and informed. For instance, it seeks to pre-empt legislative changes and political risk. It calls for conducting detailed supply chain reviews and risk assessments, as well as intensifying due diligence to determine exposure to potential shocks. It urges companies to monitor areas of risk such as public backlash or sudden changes in market conditions. But when it urges corporations to be prepared for emerging global regulations, it neglects that all ‘global’ regulatory actions are enfeebled by a Beijing that regularly refuses to abide by them.
The recent report sees a US$19.35-trillion large grouping of 27 democratic nations bend before a US$18.56-trillion authoritarian regime. Besides an amused smile from the Chairman of Everything, Xi Jinping, for exposing the EU’s toxic dependence, this report will achieve little else.
Overall, the report, like several before it, illustrates the risks that European businesses face in China and assumes that a benevolent Beijing knows the problems and will do something to fix them. Worse, it details for the benefit of China exactly how dependent the EU is on its markets, its investments, and its manufacturing.
Given that collective economic security shaped by national issues is a subset of collective national security designed for a common cause, carving out an agenda of mutualism will be impossible for the EU. It is not the same as the EU coming together and taking a collective defence/security stand against Russia at the time of conflict (and not prior to it), for instance.
China is appraised as a commercial venture, and it is unlikely that commercial entities will bear the cost of national security until it is too late and too high for them and others. And then they will; just ask the German Industry about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But most businesses work on hindsight and not foresight when it comes to security issues as they have a false belief in their ability to shape outcomes.
When the Stuttgart-based Mercedes-Benz, for instance, decides to deepen investments in China, despite the EU scrambling for an exit strategy, it shows how strongly the corporate tail of a company is wagging the national security dog of an entire continent. That 19.67 percent of the Mercedes stock is held by two Chinese companies (9.98 percent by BAIC Group, and 9.69 percent by Li Shufu) is not only influencing decisions in one of EU’s most high-profile companies but also weakening the EU hand on strategic affairs between Beijing and Brussels. Worse, instead of finding ways to get out of China, the report states that European companies find that decoupling, i.e. “detaching completely from the Chinese market” from China is a risk.
The impassioned quest for benevolence from the Emperor seems to be the European approach towards China. Transborder calls for ‘alms’ must not pass off as strategy—they are not.
So, while China has weaponised everything, from trade and investments to technology and culture, the EU remains trapped in the pincer of its strategic-commercial constraints on the one side and the rise of ‘wokism’ with a Confucius colour on the other. It is being suffocated by the rules-based order of its own making—Beijing has weaponised the EU’s rules against itself, thereby asphyxiating its companies, consumers, and citizens. Against these democratic constraints and strategic confusions, the Beijing model is unambiguous in its direction and its action.
Take a step back and what you see from the Beijing-Brussels midpoint—New Delhi—is a feeble EU approach to China. Blissful in its strategic slumber, lying on the bed of post-World War II prosperity, with eyes wide shut, Brussels remains addicted to Chinese goods, Chinese markets, and Chinese manufacturing. It appears nothing will change, even as Beijing runs circles around the EU, watching it squirm, and awaiting the next round of periodic rhetoric, even as it plans a deeper dive into the strategic vitals of the EU. The impassioned quest for benevolence from the Emperor seems to be the European approach towards China. Transborder calls for ‘alms’ must not pass off as strategy—they are not.
From the vantage of New Delhi, it is not only the possibility of Russia joining the dragon’s choir that is imminent and worrisome; it is rather the European opera halls hosting this choir that present a clear and present danger. The most important learning from this document for those reading it from outside is scary. If the lesson of its energy dependence on Russia, and the consequent decapitating impact on its security in recent years, has not taught the EU ‘Strategy 101’, nothing ever will. Isn’t it time to reconcile to this simple fact: that the EU is a non-strategic actor and, without radical rethinking—always will be?
The original article appeared in ORF Website, March 30, 2024
The United Nations Security Council is constituted to further the colonisation project
We can all agree today that this has been a very long decade; and it’s only just begun. The fabric of internationalism has been ripped in the last three years, and the ability to forge consensus on many vital questions that can enrich peace and strengthen security is at its lowest in nearly a century. There is a clear need to reform and reshape key institutions of global governance. Certainly, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in particular, needs an urgent overhaul.
Yet, we are all aware that the United Nations (UN) process as well the UNSC reform process are going nowhere. It is a fact that only once in the nearly eight decades of the UN’s existence has there been some semblance of reform—when the non-permanent seats of the UNSC were increased from six to 10. Since then, all efforts have largely been exercised in hollow statement-making. Tragically, these statements come with no timelines and are, of course, devoid of any content. Perhaps, this is the right time for this debate. Hence, the idea of bringing in new voices and opening this issue up for debate and discussion to the larger public—to the research community and to academia—must be lauded. We hope that the curious mix of practitioners and thinkers from the Global South can produce some breakthrough solutions that can take this debate forward.
The fabric of internationalism has been ripped in the last three years, and the ability to forge consensus on many vital questions that can enrich peace and strengthen security is at its lowest in nearly a century.
Decades of inaction have also resulted in the prevention of reforms becoming an ideal and an objective in itself. We have seen obstructive tactics, the emergence of a number of clubs and groups on this topic, and a myriad ways of stalling, delaying, and preventing progress. This, now, has become an end goal, and, perhaps, even a key responsibility area for diplomats posted to the hallowed institution that is the UN. That must change. We need to talk about progress in real terms. What should be the new format for engagement? There can be many answers to this question. What diplomats like Ambassador Ruchira Kamboj and academics like Matais Spektor say may not be the only solution. The solution may, in fact, lie in very different viewpoints and voices, and it is imperative that we hear them. Most importantly, we must all agree that status quo is not an answer.
The UN is facing a crisis of credibility as a global institution; and the lack of progress in the reform of the UNSC is going to create complete disenchantment. The future of the UN and its role is intimately linked to the progress made on this subject. Therefore, we must recalibrate our efforts as a global community and make sure that discussions on the reforms are infused with fresh voices and perspectives from geographies that are likely to contribute significantly to a stable and prosperous future. These are also the same nations that are likely to be most affected by a dysfunctional international institution.
Perspectives from the G20 and BRICS
Two recent debates we in India have been engaged in are of relevance to the conversation on institutional reform. One, of course, is courtesy the G20 presidency and its engagement groups that are working on various aspects of multilateral cooperation. Multilateral reforms is one of the most important debates happening in these groups. We are all apprised of the fact that the UNSC, the UN itself, the multilateral development banks, and the financial institutions need a complete overhaul. These institutions are no longer serving us in this particular century. The second is the aspirations of the BRICS. Under South Africa’s Presidency, there is an eagerness for and anticipation of institutions accommodating the aspirations of the African continent—a continent that is rising dramatically and rapidly.
The war is history, and so are the influence and capabilities of some of the members of this erstwhile group of victors.
We can see that different groupings are also beginning to understand and agitate this very important issue. Why is this important? Why mention the G20 and BRICS? The answer is: because we live in a deeply heterogeneous world. Some people also call it a multipolar world. It is untenable that a group of victors of a war from another century should be in charge of managing the world of today. The war is history, and so are the influence and capabilities of some of the members of this erstwhile group of victors. It is time to strengthen the A-Team and bring in voices who can serve all of us better. But beyond this particular aspect, there are three reasons for why we should be thinking about reform.
Why UNSC reform in particular
First, the current structure of the UNSC is perverse and immoral. For many in the Global South, it is a perpetuation of the colonisation project. The burden of the two World Wars was borne by the colonies, while the privileges of peace benefited the colonisers and their allies. Today, that is something that is being questioned by many; and it is increasingly going to become an important aspect of future debates as the world gets impatient with lack of progress in institutional reform.
Second, the reform is important because, currently, the UNSC is inefficient and does not serve the purpose it was installed for. In the past decades, we have seen how the will of the comity of nations has been negated by one or more of the permanent members. More recently, the crisis in Ukraine presents a classic example of the Security Council’s failure to deliver, and it is a stark reminder of why status quo is untenable. The voting patterns and the abstentions on the Ukraine conflict clearly point to the need to bring in others who can contribute to the global efforts around peace and stability.
We are struggling to reform the UNSC due to the nature of the inter-governmental negotiation (IGN) process itself.
Finally, the UNSC is undemocratic and non-representative. How can we accept a structure that shuts out Africa, Latin America, and democratic Asia, including the world’s largest democracy? The Permanent Five (P5) was configured to disproportionately include three European nations. Even having three nations in the P5 could not keep peace in the Old Continent. Clearly, here, three is a crowd. We need to reconfigure how we have structured the P5.
But this may not be the only viewpoint that is valid. There are others as well, and we must respond to and engage with them. For example, Uniting for Consensus argues that there cannot be any permanent membership of the UNSC for new members. This is a viewpoint against permanency and it must be put on the table. But, we must ask, if there is no permanency, why is it not applicable to the P5 as well? Why is it that all UN member states who want to be sitting as credible actors in the UNSC should not gain favour of 129 votes and assume a permanent role? These debates must not be cast aside or shut off. In fact, different groups and different viewpoints must be brought into the same room. And we hope that through this academic track, we can actually bring these varied perspectives together and come up with a mosaic of ideas and, thereafter, a symphony of solution.
To conclude, two points must be highlighted. First, we are struggling to reform the UNSC due to the nature of the inter-governmental negotiation (IGN) process itself. The fact that the IGN process, unlike any other in the UN, needs consensus for both process and outcomes makes it a nonstarter. In no UN negotiation is consensus a precondition for commencement. This is a fatal flaw in the way the process has been stitched together and no progress is possible unless we revisit this core element. Second, what is imperative is a concrete timeline as well. The 2024 Summit of the Future is being touted as a platform where productive discussions about UNSC reforms may finally take place. But the 2024 Summit cannot be regarded as a cure all and a one-stop-shop for everything. We must agree to a two-year timeframe, or a timeframe that others may suggest to be more viable, and we must rigorously adhere to it.
By the time the UN turns 80 in 2025, UNSC reforms must be well underway. Let us make this target a common agenda for all of us, with all our different viewpoints. Let us unite our energies to transform the UN into a multilateral institution that truly recognises the sovereign equality of all member states, and undertakes an operating systems upgrade that will bring it—with the rest of us—into the third decade of 21st century.
This article formed part of the Framing Remarks given by Samir Saran, President, ORF at the Roundtable on, “Shifting the Balance: Perspectives on the United Nations and UN Security Council Reforms from Global South Think Tanks”.
The roundtable also saw the participation of Ruchira Kamboj, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations; Matias Spektor, Professor of International Relations, FGV, Brazil and Visiting Scholar, Princeton University; and Gustavo de Carvalho, Senior Researcher, South Africa Institute of International Affairs, South Africa.
The new world – shaped by self-interest
A series of far-reaching events are shaping the 21st century. The current conflict in Ukraine, while grabbing headlines and engrossing the G7 summit in Hiroshima, may not seem as pivotal if one is situated in a different part of the world. To most, this is still a festering neighbourhood conflict that Europe must manage. It does not animate lives everywhere; neither does it shape anxieties or future partnerships.
India, Africa and Latin America are not indifferent to the crisis in Europe. They simply have more pressing matters to attend to — the imperatives of nation building being the most urgent. That they now also must navigate the collateral impact of the war makes them all but an interested party.
The first lesson from global reactions to the war is geography still matters. East-West and North-South binaries may be captivating, but proximity and the neighbourhood are considerably more important. We may be hyper-globalised, but we are also more local than ever before. Social media, trends in technology and politics, and a host of other factors have bracketed us into narrow spheres of interest. Thus, while India respects Europe’s difficulties, for it the 2020s began not with Ukraine but with Chinese aggression, the virus from Wuhan and the surrender of Kabul.
Social media, trends in technology and politics, and a host of other factors have bracketed us into narrow spheres of interest.
The second lesson pertains to the UN vote condemning the Ukraine war. Of the 140 countries that voted and condemned Russia, only a fraction sanctioned Russia. Studying the list of countries that were the earliest to receive vaccines in the pandemic could prove to be productive. It might explain which countries have sanctioned Russia. It will also offer valuable lessons about globalisation, its hierarchy and therefore, its discontents. Those sanctioning Russia today are not merely the victors of World War II, but also of globalisation and development. Others are well within their rights to challenge the status quo.
It is often stated, unthinkingly, that India is on the fence. India is not on the fence — it is only standing its ground. It will choose its priorities just as every other country has done. The recent spate of visits by European leaders to China shows that value-based frameworks are untenable. Nations are driven by self-interest and in this case, the need to maintain lucrative economic relations. India is no different. Even as it confronts the Chinese on the Himalayan heights, trade continues where the economy needs it. Distance matters; interest matters even more.
The third lesson derives cumulatively from four recent events: The pandemic; the fallout of the Doha Agreement and the abandoning of Afghanistan; the Chinese aggression on India’s borders; and new sanction regimes and their impact on the loosely termed “Global South”. The Covid-19 outbreak saw the overt hijack of medical equipment and access to vaccines, and growing gaps in treatment capabilities.
Nations are driven by self-interest and in this case, the need to maintain lucrative economic relations.
Indeed, when the pandemic struck, there was no superpower, there was no great power, and there was no big power. There were only selfish powers. Similarly, the Afghan people were betrayed and abandoned because it was expedient for higher powers to flee the country at a particular moment. And Chinese territorial incursions have provoked a range of self-serving responses from different actors otherwise keen to defend democracy.
Put bluntly, there is no moral high ground. All that remains is the ruthless pursuit of national self-interest. Two actors epitomised this approach in the 1960s and 1970s, one actor in the 1980s and 1990s, and several new voices have joined the fray in this century.
If meaningful international dialogue is to be conducted, nations must right-size some of their perceptions about each other and themselves. In this context, the tendency to frame the Global South as a possible bridge actor between competing positions has its merits. But the “Global South” is itself a deeply reductive term, which elides the group’s innate heterogeneity. Very few countries would like to be categorised as “southern” as they continue to rise and shape global systems. Five years from now, Brazil and India might bristle at such a label themselves.
The neatly packaged idea of the Global South fails to recognise that there will soon be far more decisive swings within the group than outside it. How the countries of the South organise themselves over the next decade will have a far more profound impact than the West on the global balance of power, and on the contours of the new world order. As this century progresses, an East and West will emerge within the Global North and South.
LLPs will come to constitute the geometry of politics, and countries will work together on specific issues, for specific purposes, and for specific outcomes.
Concomitantly, international engagements of the future will organise themselves around the standard operating principle of law firms — as limited liability partnerships (LLPs). LLPs will come to constitute the geometry of politics, and countries will work together on specific issues, for specific purposes, and for specific outcomes. With the transition to the new LLP ethos of geopolitics, we will not be burdened by the need to focus on anything other than the narrowly defined collaborative interest at hand, and can build relationships that are more strategic, if also more transactional. This is a gritty, realist world. We may not like it, but it’s here — and here to stay.
Samir Saran 