Ritika Passi| Samir Saran

The central feature of United States’ external engagement — financial institutions, military posture, diplomatic overtures — for much of post-WWII twentieth century and beyond has been the security of its energy interests. Likewise, recent conversations with Chinese scholars, party members and officials indicate that the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative of Xi Jinxing’s government is likely to become the lynchpin of Chinese engagement with the world in the decades ahead. If to understand American foreign policy of the days past, many have ‘followed the oil,’ to decipher Chinese interests going forward, we may just have to ride the Belt and the Road.

At the third edition of the India-China Think-Tank Dialogue in Beijing, hosted in early January, a cross-section of Chinese scholars (from Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Yunnan) and personnel from the official machinery discussed India-China relations and prospects for regional cooperation. Unlike at previous meets, this time around the conversation cursorily engaged with old tensions, contests and irritants in the bilateral relationship; instead, the centerpiece of all discussion was the OBOR initiative. Be it matters of security, climate change and sustainability, or trade and economics, each Chinese intervention located OBOR as its locus, projecting it as the response to a multitude of challenges and opportunities. To some Chinese scholars, OBOR represented but the second act of their country’s opening up and reform process, no doubt intended to be the crowning feature of Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream.

A Mandarin Tale

Every project must have a compelling narrative. Towards this end, the Chinese have begun to weave new formulations that are giving shape to Beijing’s vision for OBOR and Asia. Some facets could be discerned at this recent interaction.

The first was the novel idea of ‘entity diplomacy’. This construction argues for engaging within and across regions to secure the best interests of an entity that is necessarily larger and with interests broader than those of any sovereign. This follows from the argument of a revival of ‘continentalism’ as the Eurasian landmass deepens linkages and ‘Asia’ emerges, OBOR segues perfectly into this framework. It becomes, for the Chinese, an Asian undertaking that needs to be evaluated on the gains it accrues to the entity, i.e., Asia, as opposed to China alone. It therefore follows, from Beijing’s perspective, that Indian and other Asian nations must support and work for the OBOR initiative.

Entity diplomacy also translates into the establishment of “one economic continent,” the second theme undergirding the conversation. OBOR, then, becomes a vehicle that promotes convergence and alignment of infrastructure, trade and economic strategies. Indeed, for some Chinese speakers, India is already part of the initiative, as its own projects like Project Mausam and economic initiatives such as Make in India and Digital India complement and complete OBOR. Indian participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and joint ownership of the New Development Bank only reaffirm India’s partnership in this Asian project for many in Beijing.

To counter popular allegations of OBOR being a “Chinese scheme” à la US Marshall Plan, the Chinese were quick to clarify that the original project is named the Belt and Road Initiative; the ‘One’ has been an English effect that has popularised a mien of exclusivity around OBOR, to the primary advantage of China, instead of an inclusive Asian economic project in which all participating nations would partake benefit.

The third formulation was that of a mutually beneficial ‘swap’ — India understanding and protecting Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean, and China securing India’s essential undertakings in their part of the waters, read the South and East China Seas. This was in the vein of prompting a “new thinking” of “inclusive collaboration” instead of “exclusive alliances.” However, there was unambiguous clarity that if India cannot assume more responsibility in the Indian Ocean, China will step in. (Coincidentally, this is telling of a Chinese Navy that is comfortable in securing its own extended waters.)

Core Conflicts

 There are some structural challenges that confront the Chinese formulations and the OBOR proposal.

First, the perception, process and implementation till date do not inspire trust in OBOR as a participatory and collaborative venture. The unilateral ideation and declaration — and the simultaneous lack of transparency — further weaken any sincerity towards an Asian entity and economic unity. When questioned, the Chinese recognised this lacuna and remained convinced that the regime in Beijing is committed to pursuing wide-ranging consultations with 60+ nations OBOR implicates. An ‘OBOR Think Tank’ is also being established to engage scholars from these countries.

The second poser for the Chinese is on the appetite in Beijing to commit its political capital to this project and to ensure the security of its economic interests. While for obvious reasons the Chinese would not want to be seen as projecting their military and political presence along OBOR, it was clear that China is willing to underwrite security through a collaborative framework, minimising the anxieties that are already palpable. The success of the OBOR initiative will depend on their ability to fashion such a new security arrangement.

The third challenge deals with the success of the ‘whole’ scheme. OBOR is a five-layered lattice that promotes regional integration — the Chinese vision document lays out five components of connectivity: policy, physical, economic, financial and human. While no developing country will turn away infrastructure development opportunities financed by the Chinese, they may not necessarily welcome a rules regime built on a Chinese ethos. Could the physical layer translate into a buy-in to a Chinese-led global economic and financial order or trade architecture?

Finally, how can this initiative navigate the irreconcilable geometries of South Asia that prevent India from providing full backing to OBOR? A formal nod to the project from India will serve as a de-facto legitimisation to Pakistan’s rights on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is “closely related” to OBOR.

Options for India

 The blueprint for OBOR remains fairly ambiguous as of now, and New Delhi does have options it can explore in the meantime. Fundamentally, it needs to resolve for itself whether OBOR represents a threat or an opportunity. The answer undoubtedly ticks both boxes. Chinese political expansion and economic ambitions, packaged as OBOR, are two sides of the same coin. To be firm while responding to one facet, while making use of the opportunities that become available from the other, will largely depend on the institutional agency and strategic imagination India is able to bring to the table.

First and foremost, India needs to match ambition with commensurate augmentation of its capacities that allows it to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region. This will require New Delhi to not only overcome its chronic inability to take speedy decisions with respect to defence partnerships and procurement deals, but will also necessitate a sustained period of predictable economic growth. OBOR can assist in the latter; in doing so, it becomes its own antidote that allows India’s political capacity to secure its strategic waters and territory.

Therefore, just as US trade and economic architecture underwrote the rise of China, Chinese railroads, highways, ports and other capacities can serve as catalysts and platforms for sustained Indian double-digit growth in the coming decades. Simultaneously, India can focus on developing last-mile connectivity in its own backyard linking to the OBOR — the slip roads to the highways, the sidetracks to the Iron Silk Roads. South Asia is among the fastest growing regions in the world. Such ‘niche’ infrastructure thus doubly makes sense, as India neither has the wherewithal to advance an alternate economic proposition nor the luxury to entirely shun OBOR.

Arguably, OBOR offers India another political opportunity. There seems to be a degree of Chinese eagerness to solicit Indian partnership, or at least a positive disposition; at the same time, the Chinese do realise that New Delhi is unlikely to endorse OBOR as long as CPEC remains part of the project. Can India, therefore, on its end, seek reworking of CPEC by Beijing in return for its active participation? It could, for instance, encourage progress in other regional connectivity offshoots of greater mutual interest — such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor — or incentivise Chinese participation in newer tangents, such as in the maritime sphere or transport corridor projects across India. Effectively, OBOR could allow India a new track to its own attempt to integrate South Asia.

Furthermore, for the stability of the South Asian arm of OBOR, can Beijing be motivated to become a meaningful interlocutor prompting rational behavior from Islamabad? A new China-Pakistan-India equation has the potential to ensure that development concerns are not sacrificed at the altar of security considerations.

This is a longer version of an article that appeared in The Hindu.

Samir Saran| Shubh Soni

What was at stake at COP21?

The meeting of world leaders at Paris for the Conference of Parties (COP) 21 was being seen by the international community as a landmark opportunity to seize the momentum for decisive climate action. Nations, institutions, corporations and individuals alike were looking to this meet in Paris to deliver a legally binding and workable agreement, which would ensure temperatures did not rise above two degree Celsius by the end of this century and indeed strive for limiting the temperature rise to the 1.5 degree Celsius mark. The developing world in particular was seeking a commitment on financial and technological flows, which would enable them to mitigate and adapt to the ongoing and impending impacts of climate change. The stakes had never been higher –to get 192 countries to sign off on such an agreement would require both shrewd diplomacy, and the moral and political will of world leaders, to act on the biggest threat facing our planet.

To fully appreciate what was at stake in Paris at COP21, it is important to look back at four previous climate summits –COP3 at Kyoto, COP15 at Copenhagen, COP19 at Warsaw and COP20 at Lima. During COP3, the world agreed to the ‘Kyoto Protocol,’which acknowledged historical responsibility of the developed world to combat climate change. The agreement institutionalised the concept of Common But Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) by drawing up a list of developed countries, known as Annex 1, which committed themselves to targets for cutting or slowing down their emissions of greenhouse gases that adversely impact the climate.^[1]

However, a lot of what was agreed at COP3 was undone at Copenhagen. The developing world was left disappointed at COP15 as the international target of cutting emissions by 80% by 2050 was dropped, along with the target of ensuring global temperature does not rise above 1.5 degree Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. Moreover, the remark made by the United States’ president that developing countries should be “getting out of the habit”of looking at previous agreements, which made a distinction between developed and developing countries, was considered a serious setback, and was seen as a tactic by the developed world to wriggle its way out of its responsibility to address climate change.^[2]

COP15 at Copenhagen was a failed culmination of the process started at COP13 at Bali, most of which was ultimately completed at Cancun during COP16. The Paris process began with the The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) at COP17 at Durban and the concept of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) was formulated at Warsaw during COP19 –where it was agreed that countries were to submit their respective INDCs prior to the commencement of COP21. The INDCs were further institutionalised at COP20 as Lima’s ‘Call for Climate Action’dedicated eleven of its 103 clauses to the INDCs, and it was agreed that these individual country commitments were going to be the central feature of global climate action post 2020.

Once all countries had declared their INDCs, the stage was set for Paris to bring all countries to the table and flesh out a global agreement.

Key Actors–US, EU, China, India, Africa

Even though 192 countries were present at Paris and a successful agreement would require all of them to sign on, the narrative of the summit was to be dominated by five actors –S, the European Union, China, India and Africa.

The US went into the climate negotiations looking to assure the world that joint cooperation on climate change was the only way forward. The US could not be seen as the flag-bearer of the developed world trying to force an agreement that would severely constrain the economic development of developing countries. A repeat of the upheaval at Copenhagen needed to be avoided at all costs. And to achieve these goals, the US made significant efforts to showcase its leadership on climate action. The Climate Action Plan, which aims to reduce emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, was designed in such a way that it would not be held hostage by the divisive political narrative in the country (however, certain elements of this plan are being legally challenged by state governments). The American delegation also assured the developing world of its efforts to mobilise $100 billion. However, America’s weak INDC declaration –many felt the leader ought to lead by example and not hide behind domestic pressure –left enough room for scepticism heading into the summit.^[3]

The failure of the Copenhagen summit was felt the hardest by the EU, as the continent had invested the most domestic and diplomatic stock at COP15. At Paris, then, the objective of the EU was to re-establish its agency as a leading global actor on not just climate change, but also on international diplomacy. And it was not just COP15 that had weakened its agency –the financial crises of 2010, and the recent political disruptions in Ukraine, have meant the legitimacy of the ‘Union’is now under intense scrutiny. Moreover, external factors, such as the refugee crises in West Asia and the backlash against those seeking shelter in the old continent, meant Europe desperately needed a positive outcome at COP21. France, in this instance, was not playing host as a western European power, but was representing the entire continent. On specific details of the negotiations, Europe had nuanced differences with both the US and the developing world. With America, the conflict was on the legal nature of the outcome as the US, due to its domestic political dynamics, was incapable of signing a strong legal document which Europe desired. With India and China, the disagreement was on mitigation efforts, since these two countries and the rest of the developing world argued for protecting their carbon space for economic growth while seeking greater commitment from the developed world.

As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, all eyes were on what the Chinese INDCs entailed. Following the successful bilateral meeting between President Obama and President Xi Jingping, China reiterated its ambitions to lower carbon emissions intensity by 60-65 percent from 2005 levels, increase non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20 percent, and increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic metres on the 2005 level. Coming into the summit, Warwick J. McKibben of the Brookings Institute found that the targets announced by China would mean the country faced the second highest economic cost to GDP of all countries modelled –a significant commitment by the Chinese.^[4]

Coming into Paris, India was carrying the unfair tag of a spoiler in climate debates –a country unrelenting in its position to give up its dependence on carbon and fossil fuels. In this context, the Indian INDCs and the Indian delegation at Paris looked to achieve two objectives –to highlight to the world one, India’s leadership on renewable energy, and two, India’s structural dependence on coal for the foreseeable future (unlike China which is now at a stage in its economic growth where it can transition towards green energy). India also made clear that global technology and financial regimes needed to evolve and create “a  regime  where  facilitative  technology  transfer  replaces  an  exploitative  market  driven  mechanism  [which] could  pave  the  way  for  a  common  understanding  of  universal  progress.”^[5]

The African continent contributes least to climate change, both in absolute and per capita terms. An entire continent, with 54 countries, accounts for only 3.8 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. And yet, despite having minimal emission levels, the continent is the most vulnerable to global warming. Its high dependence on low-yielding agriculture for food and income means even if global warming is restricted to two degrees Celsius, much of southern and central Africa would be at risk of severe drought, while east Africa will face the brunt of large-scale floods. The negative impacts on human development indicators, from health to child educational performance, will have serious and adverse impact on any progress made by individual countries.^[6] For Africa therefore, the Paris summit was important not just from a mitigation perspective, but also from a climate change adaptation point of view. In contrast to the developed world, and much of the developing world, the African continent and small island states needed a positive signal on adaptation finance (thus far most of the funds for climate action have primarily focused on mitigation) and the inclusion of ‘loss and damage’in the agreement. The latter in particular was of critical importance to these two regions, as economic cost related to loss and damage can be very high.

In addition to these nations and groupings of nations, there were other significant actors who had a decisive impact on the outcome. For instance, least developing nations, the Like Minded Group of Developing Countries and Brazil-South Africa-India-China groupings wanted differentiation in climate action and significant space for their domestic economies to grow. The Alliance of Small Island States demanded greater global ambition on ensuring global temperature rise be restricted to 1.5 degree Celsius.

The Paris Agreement

In the context of what happened at Copenhagen, and the following COPs at Warsaw and Lima, Paris made significant gains in getting the climate agenda back on track. Many positives can be taken away from the agreement, particularly from a developing country perspective, and more specifically from an Indian point of view. The biggest takeaway was that this agreement was an all-round diplomatic success – with all countries but Nicaragua on board and no public display of acrimony between the global ‘North’and the global ‘South.’

From an Indian perspective, while the inclusion of the phrase ‘climate justice’only in the preamble weakens its larger mandate, it is still a step in the right direction for the developing world, sufficiently that the UN has for the first time acknowledged it in the final agreement. Moreover, several of the provisions of the agreement incorporate the foundations of the concept of climate justice, i.e., historical responsibility of the developed world to correct the ‘original sin’committed by them, of leading by example by adopting more sustainable lifestyles, and the acknowledgment of the fact that those who have contributed least to global warming are the most vulnerable to its impact.

Additionally, the Paris agreement, while not specifically mentioning CBDR, incorporates within it both this principle and the notion of equity, albeit in a slightly nuanced manner. Several provisions of the agreement are predicated on these concepts, none more so than the one on the long-term global goal. The agreement makes it clear that there will be no peak emission targets for developing countries for the time being, giving these nations adequate carbon space and the corresponding development space. From an Indian perspective, it gives the country enough room to manoeuvre by recognising its exceptional status as a country with the fastest growing economy and the best chance the world has to eradicate large-scale poverty.

On highly contested topics such as mitigation and finance, characteristics of climate justice can be found in the agreement. On finance, making the $100 billion agreed in Copenhagen the floor (minimum)amount to be mobilised by the developed world to assist climate action of developing nations achieved the twin objectives of increasing the base amount and incorporating differentiation. Moreover, finance will be provided for both mitigation and adaptation initiatives. On mitigation, keeping the should/shall ‘typography error’aside, differentiation is focused both on ‘scale’and ‘nature’–developed countries will take the lead and have the responsibility of achieving absolute reduction in emissions, while developing nations will continue efforts under nationally determined circumstances (thus taking into account the challenges of lack of energy access, unsustained economic growth, and the simultaneous objective of poverty alleviation facing these latter).

The allusion to the word ‘sustainable’in Article 2, which focuses on purpose, and Article 4 on mitigation, links the Paris Agreement with the Sustainable Development Goals agenda agreed to in 2015. This is of particular importance for the developing world as the SDGs, with their 17 goals and 169 targets, give prime importance to poverty eradication, and endorse within them infrastructure development and manufacturing-led industrialisation. By situating climate change within the overall context of sustainable development, the agreement further allows significant development space to developing nations.

While a differentiated transparency framework could not be established, the framework agreed to cover not only action of individual nations, but also the necessary support developed nations are required to extend for climate action. Moreover, the agreement also allows enough flexibility to developing nations even as they declare their efforts –the concept of CBDR is maintained, as emission cuts can be declared according to national circumstances and the respective capacity of nations to act. In a particular win for the Indian delegation, its demand to linking capacity building with transparency was met.

Finally, while the relationship between the Agreement and the Convention remains precarious, particularly with the US insisting dropping the words “under the Convention,” Article 2.1 of the agreement and Paragraph 1 of the COP decision do establish a subsidiary relationship of the agreement to the Convention. However, developing countries, particularly India, need to keep re-emphasising this demand and ensure a deeper relationship between the two as the agreement is fleshed out and implemented in the months ahead.

However, the agreement may disappoint developing countries on certain counts. For instance, on finance, Article 2.1 (c) states that “[m]aking financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate resilient development.” Including this statement, despite strong opposition, could be interpreted as encouraging an era of ‘green conditionalities’for development and infrastructure finance. Following the decision of the US export-import bank to shift funding away from coal plants, such language does add to developing world scepticism.

Furthermore, the transparency framework will be built upon the existing international assessment and review and international consultations and analysis arrangements, and much can change from now till when the modalities are finalised. From a developing country perspective, the details of the framework must incorporate a common matrix on climate finance –an aspect on which there is currently no consensus.

Road ahead for India

India highlighted in its NDCs that over the next decade and a half its electricity demand is set to increase from 776 TWh in 2012 to 2,499 TWh in 2030.^[7] This increase in demand is borne out of the country’s efforts to industrialise, urbanise, eradicate poverty and provide its population with a higher standard of living. This industrialisation will require bolstering the manufacturing sector, building reliable infrastructure and ensuring rapid urbanisation. Thus, despite efforts to strengthen its renewable energy sector, the majority of India’s energy needs will be met through coal and fossil fuels. In light of what was achieved at Paris, it is clear that the agreement allows India enough room to manoeuvre and undertake an industrialisation process largely predicated on these two sources of energy.

On the renewable energy front, as these authors have argued in a recent publication,^[8] India already punches well above its weight when compared to the US, China and Japan, and is only marginally behind Germany. The INDC document submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change also highlights that between 2002 and 2015, the share of renewable grid capacity has increased over six times, from 2% (3.9 GW) to around 13% (36 GW). In its nationally determined contribution, the government has made clear its intention to significantly scale up these efforts to achieve the target of 175 GW renewable energy capacity in the next few years.^[9] Prime Minister Modi’s Solar Alliance with 120 countries is one such effort aimed at capitalising India’s leadership and the global momentum on green energy.

The success of these efforts, however, requires technological and financial flows from the developed world to make renewable sources easily accessible and affordable for India’s 300 million poor people. Unfortunately, as per the existing property regimes, the cost of green energy installations in countries that have the potential to ramp up such installations the fastest and widest, such as India, is 24% to 32% more costly.^[10] It is therefore in India’s and the world’s interest to develop an Indian model of industrialisation that relies significantly on green sources of energy catering to the aspirations and needs of the people at the bottom of the pyramid. Such a successful model can then be replicated in others parts of Asia and Africa.

In this context, Paris is the beginning of a process, which could take up to two years during which ‘t’s will have to be crossed and ‘i’s dotted. Paris has given sufficient negotiation space to all stakeholders without meeting the wish list of any single actor completely. The interpretation, implementation and fleshing out of what was achieved at Paris is still ahead of us, and each party will have to brace itself for fresh rounds of determined negotiations to secure their own specific national objectives based on their circumstances. For India the objectives are threefold. First is to mobilise global support and domestic resources to develop a robust climate adaptation framework. Second is to ensure that adequate funds and finances are available for it to secure its lifeline energy at affordable prices and complete its industrialisation project and offer better life to its people. And, finally, it must seize the opportunity to develop a ‘clean energy’growth model, foster product and process innovation and develop an “India Model”that could be replicable and a benchmark for others further below on the development ladder. It will need to ensure that the global climate agenda allows and supports these rational ambitions.

Malancha Chakrabarty|Samir Saran

India and Africa have a long history of partnership. Technology co-operation has been an essential ingredient in India’s development co-operation with Africa since mid 1960s when the Indian Technical and Economic Co-operation (ITEC) Programme was launched. ITEC was formulated with the intention of providing technical assistance to partner countries by focussing on manpower development. African countries have been the largest recipients under the ITEC Programme.

The need for technology co-operation between the countries of the South was felt early on because direct application of technologies developed in the West may not be appropriate for developing countries as they face complex challenges. On the other hand, the technology gap between the Southern countries is smaller. In this regard, Indian technology may be more suited to the needs of African countries, particularly in the field of agriculture and renewable energy technology.

However, given the fact that India itself was a large aid recipient till early 1990s, the scope of India co-operation with African countries was limited. With the rapid growth of the Indian economy in the last two decades, an increase in the role of information technology in India’s growth story and given that Africa is now the fastest growing region in the world and rapidly innovating in its own right, the scope of technology co-operation between India and Africa has now widened.

During the India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008, India committed substantial support towards science and technology development in Africa.

The Department of Science and Technology is implementing a number of programmes and activities under the India-Africa Science and Technology Initiative. The CV Raman Fellowship for African researchers was started in 2010 with the objective of providing opportunities to African researchers to engage in collaborative research in science and technology in Indian universities and institutions under eminent Indian scientists. So far about 164 candidates from African countries have been awarded fellowships under this programme.

The Department of Science and Technology is also providing technical assistance to African institutions engaged in research and development by training African researchers, sharing technological know-how and developing academic linkages with African institutions.

In addition, India has also signed technology co-operation agreements with four African countries namely South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, and Mauritius. India’s co-operation with South Africa in the field of technology started in 1995. This agreement was recently renewed in 2015. So far 74 joint research projects have been undertaken in areas such as biotechnology, information science, astronomy, food science technologies for rural applications, indigenous knowledge systems, nanotechnology, and renewable energy and more than 220 South African researchers have received funding from the government of India .

According to the author’s estimates from the data available in the Department of Science and Technology’s website, so far India has sanctioned research projects worth Rs122,7 million to South Africa. The total value of projects sanctioned to Tunisia is estimated to be Rs21,5 million .

India-Africa science and technology co-operation offers a unique opportunity for agricultural growth in Africa. The case for greater agricultural co-operation between India and Africa is stronger because of the similar agro-climatic conditions in India and Africa. African agriculture suffers from low productivity and limited use of technology. On the other hand, India has built considerable capacity in agricultural research. Two Indian institutions, namely International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) lead India-Africa co-operation in agriculture.

ICRISAT has established agri-business incubators and value-chain incubators in five African countries viz. Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali and Uganda by partnering with local bodies. ILRI focuses on reducing poverty and improving food security in African countries through more sustainable use of livestock. It has ongoing India-Africa programmes in Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Given that less that 10% of the African farmers use high yielding varieties of crops, production of good quality seeds is a major challenge for most African countries.

The National Seed Association of India is partnering with the Syngenta Foundation India in the “India-Africa Seeds Bridge” project. This project aims to develop the seed system in Africa by providing better seeds to African farmers and creating a market for Indian seed companies. In addition to these initiatives, India has also committed to providing 25 PhD and 50 Masters Scholarships a year to African students.

India is also playing a significant role in the deployment of renewable energy technologies in Africa. It has extended credit lines to facilitate the construction of power transmission lines in Kenya and Mali, hydro power plants in Burundi, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and solar power plants in Niger.

Indian institutions such as The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) are promoting the use of solar lanterns and clean cooking options in many African countries. Promotion of decentralised solar energy options and improved cook stoves not only provides energy access to the energy poor rural households in Africa but also improves their quality of life.

India is also helping African countries bridge the digital divide. The Pan-Africa e-Network was launched in 2009 with the aim of narrowing the digital divide in Africa and harnessing socio-economic benefits of ICT. Under this project, India has set up a fibre-optic network to provide satellite connectivity, tele-medicine and tele-education to African countries .

The total value of the project is Rs 452 crores . 48 African countries are part of the project and 169 centres have been commissioned and integrated with the network . Moreover, 80 candidates from various Africa countries have participated in training programmes in IT sector in CDAC Noida and CDAC Pune . India’s lines of credit was used to construct the Technology Development and Innovation Centre in Science and Technology Park in Mozambique, Technology Park in Cape Verde and the Mahatma Gandhi IT and Biotechnology Park in Cote d’Ivoire.

This article originally appeared in The Herald.