big tech, Cyber and Internet Governance, Cyber and Technology, Cyber Space, India, media and internet, Tech Regulations, U.S., USA and Canada

Accountable Tech: Will the US take a leaf out of the Indian Playbook?

2024 is a decisive year for democracy and the liberal order. 1.8 billion citizens in India and the United States, who together constitute nearly 1/4th of the world’s population, are going to elect their governments in the very same year. This will be the first such instance in a world increasingly mediated and intermediated by platforms, who will be crucial actors shaping individual choices, voter preferences, and indeed, outcomes at these hustings. It is therefore, important to recognise these platforms as actors and not just benign intermediaries.

Prime Minister Modi’s government, especially in its second term, has approached digital regulation with the objective of establishing openness, trust and safety, and accountability. In June this year, Union Minister of State for Electronics & Technology, Rajeev Chandrasekhar, invited public inputs on the draft amendments to the IT Rules 2021 with an ‘open, safe and trusted, accountable internet’ as the central area of focus.

Runaway platforms and cowboy capitalism are the big dangers to the sanctity of our elections and to the citizens’ acceptance of political outcomes.

This Indian aspiration for Accountable Tech must be an imperative for all liberal and open societies if we are to enrich the public sphere, promote innovation and inclusive participation, and indeed, defend democracy itself. If we fail to act now and act in unison, we could end up perverting the outcomes in 2024. Runaway platforms and cowboy capitalism are the big dangers to the sanctity of our elections and to the citizens’ acceptance of political outcomes. India has clearly seen the need for it and is striving to make large tech companies accountable to the geographies they serve. The latest comer who seems to have understood the importance of this is the United States of America.

On 8 September 2022, the White House convened a Listening Session on Tech Platform Accountability ‘with experts and practitioners on the harms that tech platforms cause and the need for greater accountability’. The session ‘identified concerns in six key areas: competition; privacy; youth mental health; misinformation and disinformation; illegal and abusive conduct, including sexual exploitation; and algorithmic discrimination and lack of transparency.’ Hopefully, this session will lead to a more contemporary regulatory and accountability framework that aligns with what is underway in India.

From private censorship and unaccountable conversations hosted by intermediaries to propagation of polarised views, all of them constitute a clear and present danger to democracies, and certainly to India and the US, who are among the most plural, open, and loud digital societies. Digital India is indeed going to be ground zero of how heterogenous, diverse, and open societies co-exist online and in the real world. The efforts of the Indian government to put together sensible regulation may actually benefit many more geographies and communities. If India can create a model that works in the complex human terrain of India, variants of it would be applicable across the world.

The efforts of the Indian government to put together sensible regulation may actually benefit many more geographies and communities.

It must also be understood that there is no single approach to manage platforms, even though there could be a wider and shared urge to promote openness, trust and safety, and accountability. The regulations that flow from this ambition are necessarily going to be contextual and country specific.

Hence, it is important that India, the US, and other large digital hubs coordinate and collaborate with each other to defend these universal principles even as they institute their own and region-specific regulations. For instance, policy architecture in the US will focus on managing platforms and technology companies operating under American law and consistent with their constitutional ethos. India, on the other hand, has the onerous task of ensuring that these same corporations adhere to Indian law and India’s own constitutional ethic.

India and the US lead the free world in terms of global social media users. As of January 2022, India had 329.65 million Facebook23.6 million Twitter, and 487.5 million WhatsApp (June 2021) users, while the US had 179.65 million Facebook, 76.9 million Twitter, and 79.6 million WhatsApp (June 2021) users. The online world is no longer a negligible part of society. Most people online see the medium as an agency additive and are keen to use it to further their views and influence others’ thinking. Of these, many are also influencers in their own localities. What transpires online now has a population scale impact. The mainstream media reads from it, social media trends define the next day’s headline and the debates on primetime television.

Policy architecture in the US will focus on managing platforms and technology companies operating under American law and consistent with their constitutional ethos.

Thus, the idea that one can be casual in managing content on these platforms is no longer feasible and will have deleterious consequences as recent developments have shown. Intermediary liability, that sought to insulate platforms from societal expectations, needs to be transformed to a notion of intermediary responsibility. It must now become a positive and a proactive accountability agenda where the platforms become a part of responsible governance and responsible citizenship.

Predictable regulation is also good for business and policy arbitrage harms corporate planning; so, platforms too have a stake in making their board rooms and leadership accountable. They must make their codes and designs contextual and stop hiding behind algorithmic decision-making that threatens to harm everyone, including their own future growth prospects. And this must be the ambition as we head into 2024–the year when technology could decide the fate of the free world.

Standard
Research, Writing

Big Power, Superpower, Selfish Power: No Saints, Only Sinners

Let me extend a warm welcome to all of you on behalf of the organisers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda, the Rwanda Convention Bureau, ORF America—a new institution in Washington DC that we built during the pandemic—and, of course, ORF India. We are delighted to be here with all of you.

Personally, I am thrilled to be back in Rwanda. I can actually share with you that the number one item on my to-do list, once the pandemic allowed us to travel, was coming back to Kigali. It is immensely satisfying to reconnect with everybody again. I hope over the next few days, we will exchange notes, renew friendships, and shape new partnerships.

By way of introduction to what we plan to do over the next two and a half days, I thought I could take a few notes out of my pandemic diary. On how I was observing the world and assessing it even as we were isolated, quarantined, separated, and sometimes hopeless and helpless, I found that there were three questions that I grappled with.

First and foremost, we must question global governance as it exists today—its institutions and its leadership. When the pandemic hit, if we are really honest, all of us in this room were left to our own devices. There was no cavalry coming to save us, we had to do it ourselves. At the peak of the pandemic, it was every human for themselves. Countries were isolated, societies were quarantined, and global governance was missing in action. We must promise ourselves that next time we will do better and efforts towards that must start today.

What is the point of investing in global institutions, if not for their reassuring presence during these times? I am not suggesting that we need to do away with these institutions. In fact, I urge all of us to rethink, re-invest, and reshape how they work, who they serve, and for what purpose they are designed. And that must be something high on our agenda, as thinkers, as practitioners of policy, and as global citizens. So the quality of global governance has to be the first question we respond to.

We all know that the pandemic was a great leveler. There were no big powers, there were no superpowers, there were no great powers. There were selfish powers who dominated the world. New York, London, Paris, Cape Town, Delhi, name the city, everyone was devastated by the pandemic. Higher spending on health care, greater medical systems, better facilities, all amounted to nothing. We must, therefore, re-think our health architecture—programmes that are meant to preserve lives and protect ourselves must be re-examined. Countries that had spent billions of dollars on building medical capabilities were struggling to respond, as were much poorer nations. Perhaps, instead of spending money on prestige medical projects, a more equitable distribution could have prevented the spread of the virus in geographies that were underprepared and had low infrastructure capabilities.

The second clear reality, or rather virtual reality, was the digitalisation of our societies. No policy by any political leader, no matter how charismatic, could have created the rate of digitalisation that the pandemic was able to do. It was outstanding and astounding at the same time. Outstanding, because we were able to connect; we were able to earn a livelihood; we were able to remain engaged. We were able to, in some sense, continue as a community, as a society. Astounding, simply because the institutions to protect these digital spaces, which are now so precious, do not exist.

We saw the digitalisation of everything. Individuals exist online, yet they live offline. They connect to their near and dear ones offline, but communities are built online. Countries are now digital nations yet, we see wars crop up to defend lines on a map time and again.

We must ask: Have our politics and policies realigned themselves to the emergence of this digital society? Are we recognising the digital arena as an independent domain, akin to a new geography, that requires its own set of rules, principles, ethics, and governance? Or are we still seeing this as an instrument attached to our real world? Depending on how we assess our digital reality, we will come up with responses that may be sub-optimal or ambitious…or perhaps the ones that are most appropriate. This is a debate we must have about the digital societies that the pandemic has, in many ways, incubated.

Next, we are witnessing a reversal to parochialism, tribalism, and selfish behaviour. We have seen nations cannibalise and weaponise production capabilities for their own selfish requirements, hijack medical shipments and more. There were again no big powers or super powers—just selfish ones. There were no saints, only shades of sinners, and all of us were implicated by these actions. This self-serving behaviour was, in turn, endorsed by national media and demanded by electorates on the streets; which begs the question: How do we rectify this?

We have also witnessed a recession of globalism. We are more interconnected, but we trust less, we care less. We are less empathetic. We can’t wish away the rise of these emotions, sub-nationalist and nationalist. But we also can’t ignore the benefits and the protection that an interconnected world provides us. Who are the next generation of leaders who will rebuild globalisation in a different format?

We don’t need to invest in perverse dependencies. What we need is smart, interconnected resilience. The globalisation of tomorrow must be very different to the texture of yesterday. I must reiterate the point I began with: Community is cavalry.

When it comes to our development needs—education, health, skills, and other social sectors, the pandemic has pushed us into a do-it-yourself mode. While we must seek partnerships, we must build networks, and we must create relationships, we must first build ourselves and our capacities. Sharing individual journeys, group experiences, and learnings of countries is one way to strengthen this process of investing in ourselves and our community.

The Kigali Global Dialogue is an attempt to build that community. We are not going to give you the silver bullet to solve all problems. Nor will the dialogue offer a prescription for a better tomorrow. But we are here to be your fellow humans on a journey that we will undertake together.

May you all enjoy the ride over the next two and a half days, and may we discover important lessons on the way. Thank you for joining us at this Dialogue.

Standard
Research

Australia-India need unprecedented collaboration to fight Chinese influence: ORF President Samir Saran

Interview originally published here.

The President of Observer Research Foundation (ORF), one of India’s premier think tanks, Samir Saran, was recently in Australia.

In an exclusive interview with The Australia Today, Mr Saran outlined the importance of the Australia-India bilateral relationship and how crucial this relationship is going to be from a strategic and economic point of view.

Q1) How important is the India-Australia relationship going to be globally and for the Indo-Pacific region from a security point of view?

Mr Saran: India views Australia as one of its most important partners in the world. The relationship has transformed in less than a decade. Today, the two countries are exploring opportunities to work shoulder-to-shoulder on new opportunities to tackle challenges that confront Asia and the world. The partnership has been catalysed by shared concerns about China and a shared responsibility to ensure a peaceful and inclusive Indo-Pacific by partnering closely with like-minded countries in the region.

Q2) How do you see bilateral trade between the two countries going forward, is it likely to substantially increase after the trade agreement?

Mr Saran: The signing of the interim agreement has come at a time when the trade momentum between both the countries is on a high. The latest data by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, released in April 2022, show 104.8% year-on-year growth in Indian exports to Australia and 99.5% year-on-year growth in Australian imports to India. The completion of the FTA would definitely boost volumes of trade between the two countries—both expect trade in goods to double in five years to the US $50 billion. Australia’s aim is to make India the third-largest destination in Asia for Australian investment and also one of its top three export markets by 2035.

Q3) How important is it for Australia to diversify its international trade and reduce its exposure to China? 

Mr Saran: It is extremely important. As one of the developed world’s most China-dependent economies, Australia will always be vulnerable in case of deterioration in bilateral ties. By pushing for answers on the origin of the pandemic, Australia has already angered Beijing. After being at the receiving end of Beijing’s trade weaponisation, it is extremely significant for Australia to reduce its perverse dependence on China by diversifying its export markets. Australia and others also need to invest more in trade diversification, and supply chain resilience and are conscious of the geopolitical risks.

Q4) How important is it for Australia to increase its economic engagement with India specifically given the implications not just for geoeconomics but also geopolitics?

Mr Saran: The broader trade and technology agenda is closely linked to and implicated by politics. This geopolitical convergence in the Indo-Pacific is also driving the current upward trajectory in the economic relations between India and Australia. Australia realises that even as it seeks to respond to the increase in Chinese influence within Pacific Island countries, India is staving off the overbearing presence of the dragon in South Asia. Instead of relying solely on the United States, it is time for India and Australia to increase their economic engagement and build their own capabilities to push back against Chinese expansiveness. They have obvious overlapping interests in the region and a clear motivation to make this happen.

Q5) How important is Australia going to be for India from a trade and security point of view?

Mr Saran: As the first bilateral trade agreement of India with a developed country in the last decade, this FTA with Australia is extremely important. as India is not part of any significant regional or free-trade bloc. Apart from eliminating or lowering tariffs on both sides, this FTA positively influences other ongoing bilateral trade negotiations that India has with Canada, the EU and the UK.

As mentioned earlier, due to an overlap in the Indo-Pacific regional visions of the two countries and the escalating competition between US-China, India sees it important for Australia to bolster its security capacities through enhanced defence acquisitions and spending, as well as by strengthening existing defence cooperation. India and Australia, by investing in their own security and economy, are offering the other greater ability to manage and negotiate the changing political and economic landscape in Asia.

Q6) Are there any specific areas where you see the potential for increased engagement that require more attention?

Mr Saran: There are four areas where there’s potential for increased engagement. First is political – both India’s and Australia’s neighbouring island countries are facing excessive inducements by the CCP to follow the Chinese way of life. We need to realise that dialogue with these island countries is not enough, we need to put money where our mouth is. India and Australia can create an islands initiative, wherein we invest in their technology futures and climate resilience, and offer them better, safer money than what is on offer from the Chinese.

The second is climate – as India transitions to a green economy, Australia can vigorously partner with us. As a country with sophisticated financial institutions, Australia can offer significant inputs in the technology, R&D and innovation space. Australia’s financial institutions can also service the significant Indian appetite for green finance and infrastructure projects.

Third is technology – instead of becoming the B-teams of Silicon Valley, the India-Australia technology partnership could create tech for development, fit for our neighbourhood. This would not only help the ASEAN and island countries, but also the emerging world. India and Australia have the potential to be the A-team of the tech for a development paradigm that serves the next 6 billion that silicon valley does not innovate for.

And finally, diaspora – we need to scale up Australia’s educational and knowledge partnership with India. We need to take Australian institutions to India and offshore the education industry, wherein the former is able to increase its presence and build to-scale education and skilling institutions in India.

7) Do you see Quad as having substance or is it more a symbolic grouping at this stage?

Mr Saran: Quad, as of today, is a limited-purpose partnership that was born out of common concern about Chinese activities. At this stage, the Quad is beginning to become more ambitious and is seeking to shape the development and technology pathways the region treads on.

A quad must consider building more substance through institutionalisation and by delivering on specific projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

Standard