Let me extend a warm welcome to all of you on behalf of the organisers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda, the Rwanda Convention Bureau, ORF America—a new institution in Washington DC that we built during the pandemic—and, of course, ORF India. We are delighted to be here with all of you.
Personally, I am thrilled to be back in Rwanda. I can actually share with you that the number one item on my to-do list, once the pandemic allowed us to travel, was coming back to Kigali. It is immensely satisfying to reconnect with everybody again. I hope over the next few days, we will exchange notes, renew friendships, and shape new partnerships.
By way of introduction to what we plan to do over the next two and a half days, I thought I could take a few notes out of my pandemic diary. On how I was observing the world and assessing it even as we were isolated, quarantined, separated, and sometimes hopeless and helpless, I found that there were three questions that I grappled with.
First and foremost, we must question global governance as it exists today—its institutions and its leadership. When the pandemic hit, if we are really honest, all of us in this room were left to our own devices. There was no cavalry coming to save us, we had to do it ourselves. At the peak of the pandemic, it was every human for themselves. Countries were isolated, societies were quarantined, and global governance was missing in action. We must promise ourselves that next time we will do better and efforts towards that must start today.
What is the point of investing in global institutions, if not for their reassuring presence during these times? I am not suggesting that we need to do away with these institutions. In fact, I urge all of us to rethink, re-invest, and reshape how they work, who they serve, and for what purpose they are designed. And that must be something high on our agenda, as thinkers, as practitioners of policy, and as global citizens. So the quality of global governance has to be the first question we respond to.
We all know that the pandemic was a great leveler. There were no big powers, there were no superpowers, there were no great powers. There were selfish powers who dominated the world. New York, London, Paris, Cape Town, Delhi, name the city, everyone was devastated by the pandemic. Higher spending on health care, greater medical systems, better facilities, all amounted to nothing. We must, therefore, re-think our health architecture—programmes that are meant to preserve lives and protect ourselves must be re-examined. Countries that had spent billions of dollars on building medical capabilities were struggling to respond, as were much poorer nations. Perhaps, instead of spending money on prestige medical projects, a more equitable distribution could have prevented the spread of the virus in geographies that were underprepared and had low infrastructure capabilities.
The second clear reality, or rather virtual reality, was the digitalisation of our societies. No policy by any political leader, no matter how charismatic, could have created the rate of digitalisation that the pandemic was able to do. It was outstanding and astounding at the same time. Outstanding, because we were able to connect; we were able to earn a livelihood; we were able to remain engaged. We were able to, in some sense, continue as a community, as a society. Astounding, simply because the institutions to protect these digital spaces, which are now so precious, do not exist.
We saw the digitalisation of everything. Individuals exist online, yet they live offline. They connect to their near and dear ones offline, but communities are built online. Countries are now digital nations yet, we see wars crop up to defend lines on a map time and again.
We must ask: Have our politics and policies realigned themselves to the emergence of this digital society? Are we recognising the digital arena as an independent domain, akin to a new geography, that requires its own set of rules, principles, ethics, and governance? Or are we still seeing this as an instrument attached to our real world? Depending on how we assess our digital reality, we will come up with responses that may be sub-optimal or ambitious…or perhaps the ones that are most appropriate. This is a debate we must have about the digital societies that the pandemic has, in many ways, incubated.
Next, we are witnessing a reversal to parochialism, tribalism, and selfish behaviour. We have seen nations cannibalise and weaponise production capabilities for their own selfish requirements, hijack medical shipments and more. There were again no big powers or super powers—just selfish ones. There were no saints, only shades of sinners, and all of us were implicated by these actions. This self-serving behaviour was, in turn, endorsed by national media and demanded by electorates on the streets; which begs the question: How do we rectify this?
We have also witnessed a recession of globalism. We are more interconnected, but we trust less, we care less. We are less empathetic. We can’t wish away the rise of these emotions, sub-nationalist and nationalist. But we also can’t ignore the benefits and the protection that an interconnected world provides us. Who are the next generation of leaders who will rebuild globalisation in a different format?
We don’t need to invest in perverse dependencies. What we need is smart, interconnected resilience. The globalisation of tomorrow must be very different to the texture of yesterday. I must reiterate the point I began with: Community is cavalry.
When it comes to our development needs—education, health, skills, and other social sectors, the pandemic has pushed us into a do-it-yourself mode. While we must seek partnerships, we must build networks, and we must create relationships, we must first build ourselves and our capacities. Sharing individual journeys, group experiences, and learnings of countries is one way to strengthen this process of investing in ourselves and our community.
The Kigali Global Dialogue is an attempt to build that community. We are not going to give you the silver bullet to solve all problems. Nor will the dialogue offer a prescription for a better tomorrow. But we are here to be your fellow humans on a journey that we will undertake together.
May you all enjoy the ride over the next two and a half days, and may we discover important lessons on the way. Thank you for joining us at this Dialogue.
Interview originally published here.
In an exclusive interview with The Australia Today, Mr Saran outlined the importance of the Australia-India bilateral relationship and how crucial this relationship is going to be from a strategic and economic point of view.
Q1) How important is the India-Australia relationship going to be globally and for the Indo-Pacific region from a security point of view?
Mr Saran: India views Australia as one of its most important partners in the world. The relationship has transformed in less than a decade. Today, the two countries are exploring opportunities to work shoulder-to-shoulder on new opportunities to tackle challenges that confront Asia and the world. The partnership has been catalysed by shared concerns about China and a shared responsibility to ensure a peaceful and inclusive Indo-Pacific by partnering closely with like-minded countries in the region.
Q2) How do you see bilateral trade between the two countries going forward, is it likely to substantially increase after the trade agreement?
Mr Saran: The signing of the interim agreement has come at a time when the trade momentum between both the countries is on a high. The latest data by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, released in April 2022, show 104.8% year-on-year growth in Indian exports to Australia and 99.5% year-on-year growth in Australian imports to India. The completion of the FTA would definitely boost volumes of trade between the two countries—both expect trade in goods to double in five years to the US $50 billion. Australia’s aim is to make India the third-largest destination in Asia for Australian investment and also one of its top three export markets by 2035.
Q3) How important is it for Australia to diversify its international trade and reduce its exposure to China?
Mr Saran: It is extremely important. As one of the developed world’s most China-dependent economies, Australia will always be vulnerable in case of deterioration in bilateral ties. By pushing for answers on the origin of the pandemic, Australia has already angered Beijing. After being at the receiving end of Beijing’s trade weaponisation, it is extremely significant for Australia to reduce its perverse dependence on China by diversifying its export markets. Australia and others also need to invest more in trade diversification, and supply chain resilience and are conscious of the geopolitical risks.
Q4) How important is it for Australia to increase its economic engagement with India specifically given the implications not just for geoeconomics but also geopolitics?
Mr Saran: The broader trade and technology agenda is closely linked to and implicated by politics. This geopolitical convergence in the Indo-Pacific is also driving the current upward trajectory in the economic relations between India and Australia. Australia realises that even as it seeks to respond to the increase in Chinese influence within Pacific Island countries, India is staving off the overbearing presence of the dragon in South Asia. Instead of relying solely on the United States, it is time for India and Australia to increase their economic engagement and build their own capabilities to push back against Chinese expansiveness. They have obvious overlapping interests in the region and a clear motivation to make this happen.
Q5) How important is Australia going to be for India from a trade and security point of view?
Mr Saran: As the first bilateral trade agreement of India with a developed country in the last decade, this FTA with Australia is extremely important. as India is not part of any significant regional or free-trade bloc. Apart from eliminating or lowering tariffs on both sides, this FTA positively influences other ongoing bilateral trade negotiations that India has with Canada, the EU and the UK.
As mentioned earlier, due to an overlap in the Indo-Pacific regional visions of the two countries and the escalating competition between US-China, India sees it important for Australia to bolster its security capacities through enhanced defence acquisitions and spending, as well as by strengthening existing defence cooperation. India and Australia, by investing in their own security and economy, are offering the other greater ability to manage and negotiate the changing political and economic landscape in Asia.
Q6) Are there any specific areas where you see the potential for increased engagement that require more attention?
Mr Saran: There are four areas where there’s potential for increased engagement. First is political – both India’s and Australia’s neighbouring island countries are facing excessive inducements by the CCP to follow the Chinese way of life. We need to realise that dialogue with these island countries is not enough, we need to put money where our mouth is. India and Australia can create an islands initiative, wherein we invest in their technology futures and climate resilience, and offer them better, safer money than what is on offer from the Chinese.
The second is climate – as India transitions to a green economy, Australia can vigorously partner with us. As a country with sophisticated financial institutions, Australia can offer significant inputs in the technology, R&D and innovation space. Australia’s financial institutions can also service the significant Indian appetite for green finance and infrastructure projects.
Third is technology – instead of becoming the B-teams of Silicon Valley, the India-Australia technology partnership could create tech for development, fit for our neighbourhood. This would not only help the ASEAN and island countries, but also the emerging world. India and Australia have the potential to be the A-team of the tech for a development paradigm that serves the next 6 billion that silicon valley does not innovate for.
And finally, diaspora – we need to scale up Australia’s educational and knowledge partnership with India. We need to take Australian institutions to India and offshore the education industry, wherein the former is able to increase its presence and build to-scale education and skilling institutions in India.
7) Do you see Quad as having substance or is it more a symbolic grouping at this stage?
Mr Saran: Quad, as of today, is a limited-purpose partnership that was born out of common concern about Chinese activities. At this stage, the Quad is beginning to become more ambitious and is seeking to shape the development and technology pathways the region treads on.
A quad must consider building more substance through institutionalisation and by delivering on specific projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
Co-authored with Jhanvi Tripathi and originally published in the Hindustan Times.
India’s presidency must leave the grouping with the agility and energy to respond to new realities, and it must create a future-ready multilateralism through a novel and robust institutional architecture
India takes over the presidency of the group in December. To live up to the potential of this opportunity, it must choose a policy direction to focus on continuity, incorporate green and digital transitions, and recognise the realities of a post-pandemic world
India’s presidency of the G20 grouping next year — arguably the sole remaining effective forum for global governance — presents an enormous opportunity to accelerate sustainable growth within India, in the emerging world, and beyond.
For India’s presidency to live up to this potential, it must recognise the constraints of the grouping and the crises — from the pandemic to the Ukraine war — that it must confront. But there should also be a clear understanding of the levers that a G20 president has to affect global policy action.
Next year, the troika of the preceding, current, and succeeding presidents will be three developing countries: Indonesia, India, and Brazil. This fortuitous alignment must inform India’s strategy as it designs its G20 agenda.
Three broad principles should underline India’s planning. First, it must recognise the value of the emerging-world troika and choose policy directions that emphasise continuity. Second, it must incorporate the concerns of its dual development transitions — green and digital — into the G20’s agenda. And third, it must recognise the realities of the post-pandemic world and prioritise action on those sectors that have, since 2020, been revealed to be under-capitalised.
India’s agenda must resonate beyond the one year it holds the presidency. This requires it to set its priorities alongside those of the two other members of the troika. The G20 under Indonesia has articulated three priority issues — global health architecture, digital transformation, and sustainable energy transition. Reinterpreting these will be key to building continuity, and, thus, sustained action. It is also important to keep in mind that having too many priorities is the same as having none at all. Indeed, India must prevent the G20 from suffering — as other multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization do — from an over-expansion of its mandate.
Two major transformations will define our economies and societies going forward: Digital transition and green transition. Both are key to addressing the development challenge as well. These transitions are the meeting point of geopolitical and youth aspirations that will dictate our political, economic and social well-being.
On the digital front, India, to a large extent, has been a first mover. India’s youth aspirations are digital-first; the government has responded, and the digital economy is at the centre of its aim for a $5-trillion economy by the second half of the 2020s. The Observer Research Foundation’s youth survey on tech policy found that 83% of respondents want India to adopt a policy that prioritises its domestic technology industry. At the same time, 80% welcome greater cooperation with international partners on technology.
Clearly, a fine balance is needed where technological multilateralism does not come at the cost of developing countries’ needs. The Think Tank 20 (T20) engagement process has identified the internet as a basic right and technology access as vital to reducing inequalities. Cooperation at the G20 would be a good testing ground for pioneering tech regulation that balances the interests of the private sector with sovereignty and the security needs of States, and the growth demands of the economy.
India’s G20 must also recognise the unprecedented, carbon-constrained nature of future growth. Arguments for a green transition can no longer be limited to the moral high ground of saving the planet. A commitment on sustainable consumption must be placed front and centre. International financial regulation and the mandates of multilateral development banks must also ensure that adequate finance incentivises a business case for rapid change with adequate global flows subpoenaed for the developing world. Can the Indian presidency help to architect this new global arrangement?
A third focus must necessarily be the post-pandemic world order. Covid-19 has proved that health, nutrition, and livelihoods all remain fragile despite commitments made under Agenda 2030. The United Nations has warned that the Covid crisis could result in a lost decade for development. It has sharpened inequalities and widened development gaps. The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund has also cautioned that the pandemic could lead to a “lost generation” of children in terms of education, nutrition, and overall well-being. These conversations have become more complex due to the crisis in Ukraine. The weaponisation of trade and the international banking system during this war has exacerbated uncertainties. The surge in prices of energy and essential staple foods has added a disturbing dimension to an already stressed economic recovery. By putting nutrition, food security, and health at the heart of its G20 agenda, India can ensure the success of the Decade of Action on Sustainable Development. The clincher will be to facilitate greater funding towards these efforts.
India’s presidency is an opportunity to reinvigorate, reinvent and re-centre the multilateral order. The G20 cannot be distracted or undermined by the bilateral relations of specific members, even as we acknowledge the gravity of the humanitarian crisis that is unfolding in Europe. India must leave the G20 with the agility and energy to respond to new realities, and it must create a future-ready multilateralism through a novel and robust institutional architecture.
Remarks by Dr Samir Saran at the Opening Plenary session of the BRICS Academic Forum 2022
It is a pleasure to be back again and be a part of the academic forum that has continued to raise important issues for intra BRICS cooperation and indeed, for the challenges that confront our world.
We are meeting today at an important moment—a moment that will be recorded and studied by future generations. It is important that all of us rise to the challenges that confront us and be creative in discovering solutions. Three major trends are seeking our attention and indeed, resolution.
First, global politics has been upended by the political actions in Asia and Europe. Conflicts, contests, and careless power projection have jeopardised stability, peace, and prosperity for all. Can we discover a new geostrategic balance and what role can BRICS play?
As we emerge from the pandemic—or at least begin to learn to live with it—what are the lessons that we have learnt? Will new development and growth models emerge, and will BRICS and other actors invest in what is most important for humankind?
And finally, we are experiencing the digitalisation of everything. Technology is having an impact on our economy, our politics, our societies, and indeed our individual behaviours, choices, and assessments of the world we live in.
New Politics, Green and Inclusive Growth, and our Common Digital Future beckons us. At the Indian presidency of the BRICS last year, we coined three words—Continuity, Consolidation, and Consensus. These remain relevant even as China steers the group and must continue to define the BRICS agenda.
We have to work together to overcome the contested politics of today. We must be contributors to stability in world affairs. We should reject actions as a group and as individual nations that can create further instability or exacerbate current tensions.
BRICS was always meant to be a grouping that would offer an alternative path to one prescribed by the Atlantic Order. We must continue to strive to do this. Unipolarity must give way to multipolarity. Bipolarity is not an option.
Three key elements will shape the path that BRICS and others must pave.
First, as the political assumptions of the 20th century may no longer be sufficient or valid for a more complex world, we must work together to script a multilateralism that is fit for purpose. It must reflect current realities, the aspirations of different geographies, and a governance structure that is plural, transparent, and accessible. The old hegemony of the Atlantic Order must not be replaced by a new hegemony from another region.
BRICS must continue—individually and collectively—to remain inclusive in shaping the multilateral system. This system must deliver on economic and trade growth. It must find new ways of catalysing financial flows for infrastructure and aspirational needs of multiple geographies. Multilateralism for this century will require new anchors and champions. BRICS can play that role, provided all members are committed to it.
Second, future growth and our economic needs will have to cater to our planetary responsibility. Green transitions must not simply be a buzzword, but the policy design for all. BRICS must work—both within and with others—to put together a template to invest toward a green planet. We have to rethink mobility, urban spaces, consumption, and our lifestyles. We must also work to protect those who are already being burdened by the deleterious consequences of global warming, rising sea levels, and harsh weather conditions.
Thirdly, we have to embrace technology and not allow it to become the new arena for zero-sum politics. The world must see technology as a digital public good and it must serve all of humanity equitably. The rules for this digital future are yet to be written. These rules must not be written only by the western hemisphere. In the absence of such agreed rules, sovereign arrangements must prevail over those written by the boardrooms. BRICS can share experiences and learnings from our individual journeys and offer to the world examples and methods of managing our common digital future. We must ensure that countries, within and outside, do not weaponise technology or game the digital public square.
It is impossible for BRICS to attain its full potential and contribute to global affairs unless each member is committed to the BRICS project and the thinking that led to its creation—peaceful co-existence, within the group and with others, being the primary ethos.