Author Archives: Dr. Samir Saran

climate change, COP28, Energy, Writing

The Only Way to Make Climate Progress

Green technology and capital is concentrated in rich countries. Here’s how to address the north-south divide.

The recent United Nations climate summit, known as COP28, offered a glimmer of hope for international climate action. Negotiators struck a deal to transition the world away from fossil fuels and formally approved a loss and damage fund to support the countries that are most vulnerable to climate impacts. Yet COP28 fell short in one major area: It did not outline a clear pathway for funding and implementing climate action in the global south.

The implications of this will be felt around the world. Despite landmark U.N. climate agreements, global emissions have continued to rise. New research suggests that the world will breach the critical threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming above preindustrial levels by the end of the decade.

As emissions peak in the developed world, future emissions growth will be concentrated in the global south. Yet the resources needed to limit these emissions—namely, green technology and capital—are concentrated in the global north.

The global energy transition will only be successful if the international community fixes the north-south divide. Critical capital must no longer be withheld from the parts of the world that require it the most. There is an urgent need for leaders to reimagine climate cooperation. They can do this by ensuring that the global south has access to the financing, technology, and forums it needs to scale up energy access, support communities most affected by climate change, and make progress on climate targets.

The global energy transition will only be successful if the international community fixes the north-south divide. Critical capital must no longer be withheld from the parts of the world that require it the most.

Countries in the global south have felt cheated by international climate conferences that often overlook their voices and needs. These nations are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of a warming planet; in 2023, climate-induced natural hazards were among the foremost threats to lives and livelihoods in places including Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, and East Africa.

Yet countries in the global north have not only refused to make binding commitments to reduce emissions, but have also failed to deliver on the meager promises they have made, such as a 2009 commitment to provide $100 billion annually to the global south by 2020.

The resulting tussles between both sides distract from the real scale of the problem. It is not enough to think in terms of billions. The final text at the 2022 U.N. climate summit noted that the world would need to invest between $4 and $6 trillion annually in renewables and decarbonization solutions to transition to a low-carbon economy. Even less ambitious targets call for between $2 and $3 trillion in annual investments. Yet instead of identifying solutions to raise this kind of money, negotiators have fought over small, insignificant change.

Most of these investments will need to go to the global south. Currently, only around 25 percent of global climate finance, both private and public, flows to the global south. Yet in the next three decades, most global energy demand growth will come from these countries as they seek to address severe energy poverty. The International Energy Agency has estimated that one-quarter of this growth between 2019 and 2040 could come from India alone.

Since much of the global south’s energy infrastructure has not been built, there is an opportunity for development that does not follow the carbon-intensive pathways of the global north.

Most of these investments will need to go to the global south. Currently, only around 25 percent of global climate finance, both private and public, flows to the global south.

The good news is that green technologies have become increasingly cost-effective; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has estimated that the average cost of solar and wind energy and batteries has dropped by up to 85 percent since 2010. But the private sector only tends to see a clear business case for green investment in the global north, where more than 80 percent of total global climate finance is concentrated. In the global south, by contrast, only 14 percent of green investment comes from the private sector.

That’s because climate investment often requires considerable upfront capital and can take years to yield substantial returns. That initial investment has proved a hurdle for the global south to securing private funding. The International Energy Agency has estimated that the nominal financing costs for green energy can be seven times higher in developing and emerging economies compared with the United States and Europe.

This imbalance in capital costs is partly due to sovereign risk, or the political risks of investing in developing countries. Yet, while sovereign risk is real, it is often exaggerated and should not outweigh climate risk, which poses the greatest threat to the stability of the international financial system.

The technology needed to scale up green energy solutions also remains concentrated in the developed world and China. The global south often has to pay a heavy premium to use these technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, and battery storage technologies.

Global leaders will need to resolve these disparities to meet their climate targets. Fortunately, climate action already aligns with much of the global south’s national development strategies. As the rotating president of the G-20 last year, India highlighted the need to place green development at the heart of climate action. But the global south can’t do it alone.

The global south often has to pay a heavy premium to use these technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, and battery storage technologies.

There are four critical steps that the international community can take to rebuild trust in the climate action process and advance global cooperation.

First, the international financial system needs urgent reform to encourage more private funding in the global south. This will be essential to renewable energy projects and other mitigation measures. But it will also support adaptation efforts, including regenerative agriculture, drought-resistant practices, and low-cost community infrastructure such as bunds to protect against sea level rise and salination.

Multilateral and bilateral development institutions should expand financial guarantees and blended finance mechanisms to reduce the perceived risks associated with investments in the global south. For example, G-20 countries could create a pool of capital—administered by an agency such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which is housed in the World Bank—with the sole aim of reducing the cost of capital for climate-related projects.

Multilateral development banks must also be reformed to tackle the climate crisis. These banks can be instrumental in taking on some of the risks that hinder private capital flows to the global south. An independent committee under India’s G-20 presidency put forward a road map to reform such banks so that they prioritize eliminating extreme poverty; tripling sustainable lending levels; and creating a new, flexible funding mechanism. The G-20, as well as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, should build on this road map by establishing hard timelines for implementing the reforms and ensuring support for green projects.

Second, the international community must ensure that the global south has access to technology it needs for the energy transition. In the health sector, there is a global understanding that while intellectual property protection is vital for innovation, governments may have to override protections in emergencies; in those rare instances, governments can turn to compulsory licenses to use a patent without the consent of the patent holder. Despite this precedent, the COVID-19 pandemic showed the world that even lifesaving technology may not flow quickly enough to the global south in a health emergency.

Before climate emergencies worsen, regulators and global institutions need to identify clearer mechanisms to share intellectual property rights for critical technologies and disseminate climate tech. This will be essential to ensuring that the green transition is not afflicted by severe delays and global disputes similar to those witnessed during the pandemic.

Emerging economies are also starting to see homegrown clean tech ecosystems driven by start-ups looking to disrupt traditional energy systems. Yet this sector suffers from a lack of public funds, reduced access to cutting-edge tech, and a shortage of early-stage risk capital to reach commercial scale. New mechanisms to connect risk capital in the global north to the clean tech sector in the global south will be essential to bridging the technology gap—for instance, a $100 billion fund that would disburse money to around 120 companies in the global south, including start-ups that plan to scale up climate tech.

Emerging economies are also starting to see homegrown clean tech ecosystems driven by start-ups looking to disrupt traditional energy systems.

Third, multilateral forums, such as the UNFCCC and the G-20, should better acknowledge the role of women in climate action, especially in the global south, and create women-led initiatives to mobilize support for political action on climate. Women are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change—in many countries, they bear the responsibility of securing resources such as food and water that are made scarcer by global warming. Investing in female leadership will help shift the climate conversation from an elite discussion to one grounded in the real concerns of households.

Women are also the most likely to face health impacts from climate-related hazards, and public health systems worldwide will have to adapt to new climate-related risks. Putting health and gender equality at the center of the global climate conversation will create new reasons for climate action.

Finally, the world needs to build new pathways for climate cooperation. Despite geopolitical divides, nearly every country has a national action plan for climate mitigation and adaptation. Climate action has driven greater regional dialogue, including through the African Union’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan and Central Asia’s Bishkek High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change and Resilience.

Climate action has also led to inadvertent cooperation among great powers, such as the United States and China. This kind of cooperation, which is often driven by the private sector, has been a key enabler of supply chains essential for green energy growth.

Countries with similar capabilities and concerns should collaborate in smaller groupings for faster and more ambitious action.

Climate cooperation can—and should—become a way to restore global stability and trust in multilateralism. Leaders should energize inadvertent cooperation through new partnerships, institutions, and dialogues. Countries with similar capabilities and concerns should collaborate in smaller groupings for faster and more ambitious action. The “climate club” that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz launched at COP28 to support decarbonization among some 36 member states is a good start. But the world needs an alliance with equal representation from partners in both the global north and south that can implement a binding finance package to channel transformative climate finance to the global south.

The international community must reimagine the global climate governance framework to address the scope of today’s climate challenge. As the clock ticks down to prevent catastrophic warming, only innovative approaches can mitigate damage to our planet. Key to this will be ensuring that the most vulnerable countries are no longer shut out of the capital and technology that they need to transition to green, resilient economies.

This commentary originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

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Artificial Intelligence, Cyber and Technology, Geopolitics, International Diplomacy, Writing

Technology: Taming – and unleashing – technology together

Innovative approaches will require regulatory processes to include all stakeholders.

Technology has long shaped the contours of geopolitical relations – parties competed to outinnovate their opponents in order to build more competitive economies, societies and militaries. Today is different. With breakthroughs in frontier technologies manifesting at rapid rates, the question is not who will capture their benefits first but how parties can work together to promote their beneficial use and limit their risks.

The challenge: benefits of frontier technologies may be compromised by inequities and risks

The prolific pace of advancement of frontier technologies – artificial intelligence (AI), quantum science, blockchain, 3D printing, gene editing and nanotechnology, to name a few – and its pursuit by a multitude of state and non-state actors, with varied motivations, has opened a new chapter in contemporary geopolitics. For state actors, these technologies offer a chance to gain strategic and competitive advantage, while for malicious nonstate actors, these technologies present another avenue to persist with their destabilizing activities.

Therefore, emerging technologies have added another layer to a fragmented and contested global political landscape. Besides shaping geopolitical dynamics, they are also transforming commonly held notions of power – by going beyond the traditional parameters of military and economic heft to focus on states’ ability to control data and information or attain a tech breakthrough as the primary determinant of a state’s geopolitical influence.

These technologies also have significant socioeconomic implications. By some estimates, generative AI could add the equivalent of $2.6 trillion to $4.4 trillion to the global economy and boost labour productivity by 0.6% annually through 2040.14 Yet, simultaneously, the rapid deployment of these technologies has sparked concerns about job displacement and social disruption. These dynamics are triggering new geopolitical alignments as states seek to cooperate or compete in developing and using new technologies.

As frontier technologies take centre stage in global politics, they present a new challenge for international diplomacy.

As frontier technologies take centre stage in global politics, they present a new challenge for international diplomacy. What can states do to stem the proliferation of frontier dual-use technologies in the hands of malicious actors who intend to cause harm? Can states look beyond their rivalries to conceive out-of-the-box solutions, or will they always be playing a catch-up game with tech advancements? What role behoves the United Nations-led multilateral frameworks regarding the global governance of these technologies, or will plurilateralism and club-lateralism trump it?

A new approach for governing frontier technologies

The historical evolution of global tech regimes offers important lessons for the challenges posed by frontier technologies today. During the Cold War, industrialized nations established export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, that sought to exclude certain countries by denying them several dual-use technologies. Those control regimes proved successful in curbing tech proliferation. However, with changing geopolitical realities, the same regimes began extending membership to previously excluded countries. This approach offers a vital lesson: shedding the initial exclusivist approach in favour of extending membership helped to retain the regimes’ legitimacy.

Secondly, while the multilateral export control regimes succeeded, the nuclear non-proliferation regimes performed sub-optimally as they amplified the gap between nuclear haves and have-nots. This triggered resentment from the nuclear have-nots, who sought to chip away at the legitimacy of the regimes.

The key lesson for today is that the success of any tech-related proliferation control efforts is contingent on not accentuating existing technology divisions between the Global North and South.

The UN-led multilateral framework has focused on enhancing global tech cooperation through initiatives like the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. However, while there has been little substantive progress at the global, multilateral level, bilateral and minilateral tech cooperation has thrived. Groupings such as the Quad, AUKUS and I2U2 that focus on niche tech cooperation present a possible model pathway forward.15 They have demonstrated the value of like-minded partners coming together to realise a common vision and ambition. These arrangements also suggest that even as the UN-led multilateral frameworks attempt to grapple with frontier technologies, minilaterals may provide the starting point for collaboration to address frontier technologies’ advancement.

To ensure that efforts at tech regulation succeed, countries will be required to undertake innovation in policy-making, where governments take on board all the stakeholders – tech corporations, civil society, academia and the research community. The challenge posed in recent months by generative AI through tools like deep fakes and natural language processing models like ChatGPT has shown that unless these stakeholders are
integrated into policy design, regulations will always be afterthoughts.

How to strengthen tech cooperation

The following are four proposals for strengthening global cooperation on frontier technologies:

– Develop the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework for emerging technologies: Similar to the R2P framework developed by the UN for protecting civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community must create a regulatory R2P obligation for states to protect civilians from the harms of emerging technologies. This obligation would entail three pillars: 1) the responsibility of each state to protect its populations from the emerging technologies’ misuse, 2) the responsibility of the international community to assist states in protecting their populations from the emerging technologies’ misuse, and 3) the responsibility of the international community to take collective action to protect populations when a state is manifestly failing to protect its own people from the emerging technologies’ misuse. The specific measures that are needed will vary depending on the specific technologies involved and the risks that they pose.

– Design a three-tier “innovation to market” roadmap: States must ensure responsible commercial application and dispersion of new technologies. One critical step towards this is for states to design a three-tiered tech absorption framework comprising a regulatory sandbox (pilot tested in a controlled regulatory environment for assessing collateral impact), city-scale testing and commercial application.

– Convene a standing Conference of the Parties for future tech: The Global South must convene a standing Conference of the Parties (COP) for future technologies along the lines of COP for climate change negotiations. This body would meet on an annual basis where the multistakeholder community – national governments, international organizations and tech community – will deliberate on new tech developments, present new innovations and reflect on related aspects of the dynamic tech ecosystem and its engagement with the society and communities.

– Link domestic innovation ecosystems: Inter-connected national innovation ecosystems will ensure that like-minded countries can pool their finite financial, scientific and technological human resources to develop technologies. For instance, in the field of quantum science, the European Commission’s research initiative, the Quantum Flagship, has partnered with the United States, Canada and Japan through the InCoQFlag project. Likewise, the Quad has the Quad Center of Excellence in Quantum Information Sciences. This underlines the importance of prioritizing one of the frontier technologies and networking domestic innovation ecosystems to focus on its development, as no country alone can harness the deep potential of frontier technologies and mitigate the associated risks. 

Technology as a tool of trust

Throughout history, technology has been the currency of geopolitics. New innovations have bolstered economies and armies, strengthening power and influence. Yet, technology has also served as an opportunity to bind parties closer together. Today, at a time of heightened geopolitical risks, it is incumbent on leaders to pursue frameworks and ecosystems that foster trust and cooperation rather than division.

This essay is a part of the report Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World.

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Geopolitics, India, international affairs, Writing

4 pathways to cooperation amid geopolitical fragmentation

The world is experiencing geopolitical turbulence. Wars are raging across the Middle East, Europe and Africa; 2023 marked the largest ever single-year increase in forcibly displaced people.

In addition to these security challenges, the world faces a warming planet and fragile global economy that can only be addressed through joint action.

Despite this daunting picture, there are ways the international community can still work together. Experts from the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Geopolitics tell us how, in a new report entitled Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World.

The report offers innovative pathways towards greater global cooperation in four areas: global security, climate action, emerging technology and international trade.

Below are the key highlights, as outlined by our experts.

1. Global Security – advancing global security in an age of distrust

By Bruce Jones, Ravi Agrawal, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Karin von Hippel, Lynn Kuok and Susana Malcorra

The starting point must be to recognize that distrust is, in the short and medium term at least, a baked-in feature of geopolitical reality.

Managing this and forging responses to global challenges despite it requires recognizing that collaboration is possible even under conditions of intense distrust: the US and the Soviet Union repeatedly proved this during the Cold War.

Third parties are key to managing the distrust through quiet diplomacy (often at or through the UN), brokering offramps, de-escalation and crisis avoidance. So-called “middle powers” have in the past played a key role in great power conflict prevention and de-escalation and are an important part of this moving forwards.

Although this term has, until recently, been confined to Western countries, shifts in the global balance of power mean that it extends beyond the West to “rising” powers elsewhere.

A standing mechanism that links the western major and middle powers with the non-Western ones (Brazil, India, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates and so on) would create a diplomatic mechanism that could straddle the increasingly bifurcated worlds of the G7, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the expanded BRICs.

2. Climate Change – rethinking climate governance

By Samir Saran and Danny Quah

There is now a need to rethink global climate governance. The fundamental imbalance is this that while the developed world has been the key contributor to historical emissions, future emissions will be concentrated in the developing world. It is necessary to not just increase the amount of private capital deployed in the Global South, but also to ensure the scope of such investment is widened to include adaptation.

Similarly, the technology needed to scale up green energy solutions also remains concentrated in the developed world and China. The mandate and lending patterns of multilateral development banks should be changed and the start-up sector in the emerging world should be repositioned towards climate goals.

At the same time, multilateral forums such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the G20 must better acknowledge and differentiate impacts of climate change on health outcomes across genders and craft women-led initiatives to mobilize societal support for political action.

3. Emerging Technology – taming technology together

By Samir Saran, Flavia Alves and Vera Songwe

The prolific pace of advancement of frontier technologies and its pursuit by a multitude of state and non-state actors, with varied motivations, has opened a new chapter in contemporary geopolitics.

To ensure that efforts at tech regulation and stemming their proliferation succeed, countries will be required to undertake innovation in policy-making, where governments take on board all the stakeholders – tech corporations, civil society, academia and the research community.

Similar to the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle developed by the UN for protecting civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community must create a regulatory R2P obligation for states to protect civilians from the harms of emerging technologies.

And the Global South must convene a standing conference of the parties (COP) for future technologies, along the lines of COP for climate change negotiations.

4. International Trade – expanding and rebalancing trade

By Nicolai Ruge and Danny Quah

Strengthening and rebalancing the trade system requires expanding the trade agenda, not limiting it. The broader the benefits delivered by trade, the more firmly it will be aligned with national and global priorities.

Trade that is designed to deliver on globally shared priorities as defined by the UN Sustainable Development Goals will gain the trust of governments and citizens and be “fenced off” from geopolitical rivalry rather than disrupted for near-term political wins.

To rebuild global trust in the benefits of the multilateral trade system, it is of paramount importance that the Global South – and particularly least-developed countries – are not cut out of the growth and development pathways that participation in international trade provides.

Mechanisms must be in place to ensure they are able to take advantage of new opportunities created by shifts in global value chains.

How can these pathways be successful?

Throughout the report , one common factor emerged as key to enhancing cooperation across these four domains: inclusivity.

To address challenges in global security, climate change, emerging technology and trade, the international community must prioritize diverse voices and involve actors that have previously been on the margins of multilateral fora.

With this approach as a North Star, building cooperation is possible.

This publication originally appeared in World Economic Forum.

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2024 Elections, international affairs, world order, Writing

2024: The year that changed democracy?

The Indian general election will go beyond reaffirming the power of democracy; it could make 2024 the year that took democracy home to the people of the world.

Over 50 nations will hold elections in 2024, causing an unprecedented churn in political mandates, governing institutions, and international affairs. No continent will be exempt.

Globally, national progress is being assessed feverishly and people’s voices are coalescing into verdicts. Indeed, 2024 will be consequential for democracy and the world order.

This is the first time in the digital age that major democracies will go to polls in the same year. The key electoral attributes of individual participation, mass mobilisation, political messaging and outreach will soon assume centre stage. But so will the inescapable elements that pervert democratic processes—online misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda. If the United States (US) election of 2016, with its deluge of fake news, was a watershed event, it may pale in comparison to what 2024 portends.

Globally, national progress is being assessed feverishly and people’s voices are coalescing into verdicts.

Among the most significant and keenly watched elections will be India’s. The world’s largest democracy—and arguably the world’s longest-running pluralistic society, given that the ancient doctrine of “dharma” was, in a sense, India’s original unwritten Constitution—will deliver a fresh mandate in the era of ChatGPT, deepfakes, and vlogs.

What is unique about the Indian general election is, quite simply, that it involves India. The country is one of the fastest-growing economies. It has completed a remarkably successful tenure as president of the G20. It is the single most development-obsessed geography, with its vision of inclusive development encompassing all of the Global South. One of India’s first interventions as G20 president, for instance, was to host the ‘Voice of the Global South Summit’, where it engaged with 125 other developing nations to understand their concerns and to shape its priorities at the G20 accordingly.

India is also one of the world’s most advanced digital societies. It has consolidated its position as a global tech-enabled services hub; its world-class model of digital public infrastructure (DPI) is being adopted and adapted by advanced and developing countries alike; and it is the highest-ranked country internationally in terms of AI skill penetration and talent concentration.

The key electoral attributes of individual participation, mass mobilisation, political messaging and outreach will soon assume centre stage.

The upcoming election will witness the interplay of India’s democratic urges, developmental aspirations, and technological sophistication.

During its G20 presidency, India rightly laid claim to being the “mother of democracy”, and re-emphasised democratic principles as an Eastern virtue. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi pointed out at the G20 Parliamentary Speakers’ Summit, millennia-old Indian scriptures mention the prevalence of assemblies, open debates, and democratic deliberations, “where collective decisions were made for the betterment of society”. This democratic concern for the greater good underpins the civilisational attribute of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (One Earth, One Family, One Future) that has guided India’s internal and external engagements.

India’s economic prowess, digital achievements, and diplomatic capabilities, coupled with its democratic credentials, make it the North Star of the Global South. Developing nations engaged in political and socio-cultural soul-searching need no longer choose between an unrelatable West and an authoritarian China. An Indian approach and example, more attuned to the needs of developing and emerging economies, is at hand.

It is the single most development-obsessed geography, with its vision of inclusive development encompassing all of the Global South.

The great Indian election: Delivery versus narratives

Today, India is on the verge of becoming a US$ 5-trillion economy. The International Monetary Fund says India could cross this milestone in 2026-27. Since the mid-2010s, the country’s GDP per capita has risen swiftly—from around US$ 1,600 per capita in 2014 to over US$ 2,612 today. Yet, the Indian leadership has advocated for a shift from a “GDP-centric worldview to a human-centric one”, and a liberal, people-focused economic vision that ensures personal growth and well-being.

This vision is in evidence across India. Over 99.9 percent of Indian adults have an Aadhaar digital identity today, transforming their ability to access public services. The country operates the world’s largest financial inclusion programme, serving over 500 million individuals, with 55.5 percent of these bank accounts belonging to women. And 30 million Indians make online financial transactions every day using the homegrown Unified Payments Interface and galvanising the global digital economy.

As the election of 2024 nears, other changes are palpable as well. Between 2006 and 2021, India lifted 415 million people out of poverty. A long-standing Indian focus on women-led development has reaped dividends: women now occupy 36 percent of senior and leadership positions at mid-sized businesses in India, surpassing the global average by 4 percent. Since 2013, the infant mortality rate has dropped from 39.082 to 26.619, and maternal mortality from 167 (per 100,000 live births) to 103. The country’s food grain production touched a record 315.7 million tonnes in 2021-22, bolstering food security.

The country operates the world’s largest financial inclusion programme, serving over 500 million individuals, with 55.5 percent of these bank accounts belonging to women.

These are inspiring stories. These are the reports of progress Indian citizens would like to wake up to every morning. Yet global media narratives mislead and distort and deliberately draw attention to cleavages and fault lines that any multicultural society, anywhere in the world, has to manage. A cursory look at leading Western media outlets—print, television, and digital—shows that they have chosen to position themselves as the ‘Opposition’ to Prime Minister Modi in these coming elections.

In 2019, Time magazine branded Prime Minister Modi as “India’s divider-in-chief” and wondered—misguidedly, as it turned out—if “the world’s largest democracy [could] ensure another five years of a Modi government”. The New York Times proclaims shrilly that “Since Mr. Modi took power in 2014, India’s once-proud claim to being a free democratic society has collapsed on many fronts”. The Washington Post believes that India appears to be “sliding into authoritarianism”. And the BBC—citing an Oxfam report—laments that the “richest 1% own 40.5% of India’s wealth”, failing to note that even as India creates wealth at the top it spurs mobility at the bottom, and is thus intrinsically different from the nature of European oligarchy.

PM Modi has been identified as one of the world’s most tech-savvy leaders. His government is using technology to deliver benefits to citizens and to communicate its goals at a population scale. There are thus two competing forces at work—on the one hand, the use of digital platforms by the global media to position itself as the anti-Modi coalition; and on the other hand, the use of technology by the Indian leadership to deliver transformational growth and attract people to their proposition.

There are thus two competing forces at work—on the one hand, the use of digital platforms by the global media to position itself as the anti-Modi coalition.

The Indian election will help us decisively evaluate the influence of the global media on domestic affairs, and answer two central questions. Can media narratives trump delivery, or will good governance and last-mile success trump narratives? And would we have been guilty of overhyping the role of the media if, in the end, lived experience and on-ground delivery win?

South rising: Why Indian democracy matters 

Democracy is not a Western endowment and need not have a Western texture and tonality. Indeed, democracy for India is—as it is for much of the Global South—about promoting inclusive growth, infrastructure investments, climate action, women-led development, the mass adoption of environment-friendly lifestyles, and the establishment of DPI that universalises public service delivery, among other interventions. These are the building blocks of equity, without which there is no meaningful democracy. India has delivered in each of these areas. Its advocacy of women-led development at the G20 was accompanied by the passage of a landmark bill that reserves one-third of the seats in the lower house of the Indian parliament and state legislative assemblies for women. It is working on multiple fronts to meet its pledge of achieving net zero by 2070; its pathbreaking LiFE (lifestyle for environment) movement is gaining traction worldwide; and a broad spectrum of nations are partnering with India to build their DPI.

The country has co-opted big tech platforms as part of its growth story and upheld Indian laws while rebuffing sometimes anarchist Southern Californian ideas about freedom of expression.

India also recognises that for the deeply heterogeneous societies of the developing world, online safety is far more important than evangelical and absolutist free speech. Even as American platforms strive to homogenise the global understanding of free speech, India has wisely defended its Constitutional scheme of “reasonable restrictions”. The country has co-opted big tech platforms as part of its growth story and upheld Indian laws while rebuffing sometimes anarchist Southern Californian ideas about freedom of expression.

Collectively, these characteristics make democratic India a lighthouse for countries of the rising South. Since the pioneering ‘Voice of the Global South Summit’ at the outset of its G20 presidency in January 2023, all the way to the New Delhi Leaders’ Summit in September 2023, India has been hailed as the legitimate spokesperson of the Global South. At such a juncture, the Indian general election—the biggest democratic exercise on the planet—will go beyond reaffirming the power of democracy; it could make 2024 the year that took democracy home to the people of the world.

Source : ORF Website

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Global South, India, Writing

How India can become the bank for the Global South

Today, India is poised at the moment and GDP that China was in in 2007. Does it have the same gumption?

In 2007, China’s GDP was about $3.6 trillion. Today, India’s GDP is $3.7 trillion — perhaps more. This parallel is crucial to understanding the big moment that Indian diplomacy, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is recognising. A moment, if supported by India’s people, its companies and the state apparatus, will reshape the global order. An appreciation of this moment and putting its lessons into concrete actions is the big legacy of 2023 as India concludes a transformational diplomatic year — the year of its G20 stewardship.

Look back at history. In 2007, China was not yet the geoeconomic behemoth it is now. But with a GDP lower than India’s today, it became the go-to nation during the global financial crisis a year later. Every nation sought to deepen relations with Beijing, and to create a special place in their diplomacy for the People’s Republic. Its leaders were the toast of Davos and at business salons. China provided institutional and geoeconomic responses — a development bank, a cross-continental lending programme that galvanised infrastructure accretion without the legacy constraints of Western agencies, and a series of economic projects that eventually coalesced into the Belt and Road Initiative.

It is true that some of these have run into trouble. Nevertheless, the fact is China used its economic promise in 2008 to gain oversized economic and political influence that continues to stand it in good stead. It did this by offering itself as a vital additionality to the global order. At a time when the US was struggling to recover from the financial crisis and the Eurozone was tearing itself apart, it was China that promised stability and economic dynamism. The world wanted and needed an additional engine of growth and an additional source of investment. And so it also welcomed an additional centre of geopolitical power.

India is poised at a similar moment and with a similar GDP. Does it have the same gumption? As we enter 2024, this is the framework within which Indians must understand their place in the world today. The recent past teaches us that an India-sized economy of about $4 trillion can exert a huge influence. With vision and skilful diplomacy, it can carve a space for itself alongside economies that are four or five times large, like the United States, the European Union and China.

This is a real Indian opportunity in 2024, as Europe stagnates, the US turns inward and China deals with internal problems and its share of the global economy that is shrinking in nominal terms. The agenda for India’s next government must simply be this: Demonstrate India’s potential, and the additionality that it can provide for global growth, institutions, and security.

Additionality does not require extraordinariness. After all, China’s growth in recent years has not been extraordinary. But it had momentum, and that is what India has today. It has its own trajectory and the motive force, one better suited to a green and digital future. If China had mass manufacturing, the growth engine of the 2010s, India has its platform economy, the dynamo of the 2020s.

But additionality must have attributes. What Beijing offered 15 years ago was not an inchoate promise. There was a system, a schema, to the China proposition. This roadmap excited China’s partners. An entire future-focused architecture served as the loudest possible announcement that a $4-trillion economy would punch with the weight of a $15-trillion one.

Also, a new cooperation architecture needs to be put in place because India, in a very short while, will be spending serious money globally. The private sector is mobilising to support connectivity, supply chains, and resource resilience projects across the world. But public development finance will also grow alongside, and indeed, faster than India’s economy.

This is the substance behind India’s additionality. Even if we assume India grows at only 10 per cent a year in current dollars, below its recent benchmark, it will be a major new source of development finance. If India slowly but steadily raises its development cooperation budget to less than 0.5 per cent of its GDP by 2030, it will still have put around $70 billion into the global system. India is already the voice of the Global South; it will become the bank of the Global South.

This finance needs to be undergirded by India’s unique proposition, its own roadmap, and its own offering to the world. It urgently needs an outward-focused development finance corporation that can catalyse projects globally. It needs a bank, its own version of the China Development Bank, that will focus on global corporate needs beyond just trade finance. And it needs an imagery that is understood by others.

India’s government has shown this ambition at home. The prime minister’s Gati Shakti initiative links disparate infrastructure projects with a common vision. Similarly, we need an external engagement approach. Together with like-minded partners, India needs maps plotting priority infrastructure, connectivity routes, business and trading hubs and developmental projects. It needs to do this boldly and determinedly, identifying vital regions and sectors where it will resolutely plant the Tricolour. 2024 is the year for inking a world map described by India’s vision for its role in the world.

Source : Indian Express, December 13, 2023

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